United Nations A/59/2005
General Assembly
Distr.: General
21 March 2005
Original: English
05-27078 (E) 210305
*0527078*
Fifty-ninth session
Agenda items 45 and 55
Integrated and coordinated implementation of and follow-up to the outcomes of
the major United Nations conferences and
summits in the economic, social and related fields Follow-up to the outcome
of the Millennium Summit In larger freedom: towards development, security and
human rights for all
Report of the Secretary-General
Contents
Paragraphs Page
I. Introduction: a historic opportunity in 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1–24 3
A. The challenges of a changing world . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6–11 4
B. Larger freedom: development, security and human rights. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .12–17 5
C. The imperative of collective action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18–22 6
D. Time to decide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23–24 7
II. Freedom from want . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25–73 7
A. A shared vision of development. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28–32 8
B. National strategies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33–46 12
C. Making goal 8 work: trade and financing for development . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .47–56 16
D. Ensuring environmental sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .57–61 19
E. Other priorities for global action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62–71 20
F. The implementation challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .72–73 22
III. Freedom from fear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74–126 24
A. A vision of collective security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..76–86 24
B. Preventing catastrophic terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .87–96 26
C. Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97–105 28
D. Reducing the risk and prevalence of war . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106–121 29
E. Use of force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .122–126 33
IV. Freedom to live in dignity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .127–152 34
A. Rule of law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..133–139 35
B. Human rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..140–147 37
C. Democracy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .148–152 38
V. Strengthening the United Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 153–219 39
A. General Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .158–164 40
B. The Councils . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165–183 41
C. The Secretariat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..184–192 46
D. System coherence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 193–212 47
E. Regional organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .213–215 52
F. Updating the Charter of the United Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .216–219 52
VI. Conclusion: our opportunity and our challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220–222 53
Annex
For decision by Heads of State and Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
I. Introduction: a historic opportunity in 2005
1. Five years into the new millennium, we have it in our power to pass on to
our children a brighter inheritance than that bequeathed to any previous generation.
We can halve global poverty and halt the spread of major known diseases in the
next 10 years. We can reduce the prevalence of violent conflict and terrorism.
We can increase respect for human dignity in every land. And we can forge a
set of updated international institutions to help humanity achieve these noble
goals. If we act boldly — and if we act together — we can make people
everywhere more secure, more prosperous and better able to enjoy their fundamental
human rights.
2. All the conditions are in place for us to do so. In an era of global interdependence,
the glue of common interest, if properly perceived, should bind all States together
in this cause, as should the impulses of our common humanity. In an era of global
abundance, our world has the resources to reduce dramatically the massive divides
that persist between rich and poor, if only those resources can be unleashed
in the service of all peoples. After a period of difficulty in international
affairs, in the face of both new threats and old ones in new guises, there is
a yearning in many quarters for a new consensus on which to base collective
action. And a desire exists to make the most farreaching reforms in the history
of the United Nations so as to equip and resource it to help advance this twenty-first
century agenda.
3. The year 2005 presents an opportunity to move decisively in this direction.
In September, world leaders will come together in New York to review progress
made since the United Nations Millennium Declaration,1 adopted
by all Member States in 2000. In preparation for that summit, Member States
have asked me to report comprehensively on the implementation of the Millennium
Declaration. I respectfully submit that report today. I annex to it a proposed
agenda to be taken up, and acted upon, at the summit.
4. In preparing the present report, I have drawn on my eight years’ experience
as Secretary-General, on my own conscience and convictions, and on my understanding
of the Charter of the United Nations whose principles and purposes it is my
duty to promote. I have also drawn inspiration from two wide-ranging reviews
of our global challenges — one from the 16-member High-level Panel on
Threats, Challenges and Change, whom I asked to make proposals to strengthen
our collective security system (see A/59/565); the other from the 250 experts
who undertook the Millennium Project, which required them to produce a plan
of action to achieve the Millennium Development Goals by 2015.
5. In the present report, I have resisted the temptation to include all areas
in which progress is important or desirable. I have limited myself to items
on which I believe action is both vital and achievable in the coming months.
These are reforms that are within reach — reforms that are actionable
if we can garner the necessary political will. With very few exceptions, this
is an agenda of highest priorities for September. Many other issues will need
to be advanced in other forums and on other occasions. And, of course, none
of the proposals advanced here obviate the need for urgent action this year
to make progress in resolving protracted conflicts that threaten regional and
global stability.
A. The challenges of a changing world
6. In the Millennium Declaration, world leaders were confident that humanity
could, in the years ahead, make measurable progress towards peace, security,
disarmament, human rights, democracy and good governance. They called for a
global partnership for development to achieve agreed goals by 2015. They vowed
to protect the vulnerable and meet the special needs of Africa. And they agreed
that the United Nations needed to become more, not less, actively engaged in
shaping our common future.
7. Five years later, a point-by-point report on the implementation of the Millennium
Declaration would, I feel, miss the larger point, namely, that new circumstances
demand that we revitalize consensus on key challenges and priorities and convert
that consensus into collective action.
8. Much has happened since the adoption of the Millennium Declaration to compel
such an approach. Small networks of non-State actors — terrorists —
have, since the horrendous attacks of 11 September 2001, made even the most
powerful States feel vulnerable. At the same time, many States have begun to
feel that the sheer imbalance of power in the world is a source of instability.
Divisions between major powers on key issues have revealed a lack of consensus
about goals and methods. Meanwhile, over 40 countries have been scarred by violent
conflict. Today, the number of internally displaced people stands at roughly
25 million, nearly one third of whom are beyond the reach of United Nations
assistance, in addition to the global refugee population of 11 to 12 million,
and some of them have been the victims of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
9. Many countries have been torn apart and hollowed out by violence of a different
sort. HIV/AIDS, the plague of the modern world, has killed over 20 million men,
women and children and the number of people infected has surged to over 40 million.
The promise of the Millennium Development Goals still remains distant for many.
More than one billion people still live below the extreme poverty line of one
dollar per day, and 20,000 die from poverty each day. Overall global wealth
has grown but is less and less evenly distributed within countries, within regions
and in the world as a whole. While there has been real progress towards some
of the Goals in some countries, too few Governments — from both the developed
and developing world — have taken sufficient action to reach the targets
by 2015. And while important work has been done on issues as diverse as migration
and climate change, the scale of such long-term challenges is far greater than
our collective action to date to meet them.
10. Events in recent years have also led to declining public confidence in
the United Nations itself, even if for opposite reasons. For instance, both
sides of the debate on the Iraq war feel let down by the Organization —
for failing, as one side saw it, to enforce its own resolutions, or as the other
side saw it, for not being able to prevent a premature or unnecessary war. Yet
most people who criticize the United Nations do so precisely because they think
the Organization is vitally important to our world. Declining confidence in
the institution is matched by a growing belief in the importance of effective
multilateralism.
11. I do not suggest that there has been no good news in the last five years.
On the contrary, there is plenty we can point to which demonstrates that collective
action can produce real results, from the impressive unity of the world after
11 September 2001 to the resolution of a number of civil conflicts, and from
the appreciable increase of resources for development to the steady progress
achieved in building peace and democracy in some war-torn lands. We should never
despair. Our problems are not beyond our power to meet them. But we cannot be
content with incomplete successes and we cannot make do with incremental responses
to the shortcomings that have been revealed. Instead, we must come together
to bring about far-reaching change.
B. Larger freedom: development, security and human rights
12. Our guiding light must be the needs and hopes of peoples everywhere. In
my Millennium Report, “We the peoples” (A/54/2000), I drew on the
opening words of the Charter of the United Nations to point out that the United
Nations, while it is an organization of sovereign States, exists for and must
ultimately serve those needs. To do so, we must aim, as I said when first elected
eight years ago, “to perfect the triangle of development, freedom and
peace”.
13. The framers of the Charter saw this very clearly. In setting out to save
succeeding generations from the scourge of war, they understood that this enterprise
could not succeed if it was narrowly based. They therefore decided to create
an organization to ensure respect for fundamental human rights, establish conditions
under which justice and the rule of law could be maintained, and “promote
social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom”.
14. I have named the present report “In larger freedom” to stress
the enduring relevance of the Charter of the United Nations and to emphasize
that its purposes must be advanced in the lives of individual men and women.
The notion of larger freedom also encapsulates the idea that development, security
and human rights go hand in hand.
15. Even if he can vote to choose his rulers, a young man with AIDS who cannot
read or write and lives on the brink of starvation is not truly free. Equally,
even if she earns enough to live, a woman who lives in the shadow of daily violence
and has no say in how her country is run is not truly free. Larger freedom implies
that men and women everywhere have the right to be governed by their own consent,
under law, in a society where all individuals can, without discrimination or
retribution, speak, worship and associate freely. They must also be free from
want — so that the death sentences of extreme poverty and infectious disease
are lifted from their lives — and free from fear — so that their
lives and livelihoods are not ripped apart by violence and war. Indeed, all
people have the right to security and to development.
16. Not only are development, security and human rights all imperative; they
also reinforce each other. This relationship has only been strengthened in our
era of rapid technological advances, increasing economic interdependence, globalization
and dramatic geopolitical change. While poverty and denial of human rights may
not be said to “cause” civil war, terrorism or organized crime,
they all greatly increase the risk of instability and violence. Similarly, war
and atrocities are far from the only reasons that countries are trapped in poverty,
but they undoubtedly set back development. Again, catastrophic terrorism on
one side of the globe, for example an attack against a major financial centre
in a rich country, could affect the development prospects of millions on the
other by causing a major economic downturn and plunging millions into poverty.
And countries which are well governed and respect the human rights of their
citizens are better placed to avoid the horrors of conflict and to overcome
obstacles to development.
17. Accordingly, we will not enjoy development without security, we will not
enjoy security without development, and we will not enjoy either without respect
for human rights. Unless all these causes are advanced, none will succeed. In
this new millennium, the work of the United Nations must move our world closer
to the day when all people have the freedom to choose the kind of lives they
would like to live, the access to the resources that would make those choices
meaningful and the security to ensure that they can be enjoyed in peace.
C. The imperative of collective action
18. In a world of interconnected threats and challenges, it is in each country’s
selfinterest that all of them are addressed effectively. Hence, the cause of
larger freedom can only be advanced by broad, deep and sustained global cooperation
among States. Such cooperation is possible if every country’s policies
take into account not only the needs of its own citizens but also the needs
of others. This kind of cooperation not only advances everyone’s interests
but also recognizes our
common humanity.
19. The proposals contained in the present report are designed to strengthen
States and enable them to serve their peoples better by working together on
the basis of shared principles and priorities — which is, after all, the
very reason the United Nations exists. Sovereign States are the basic and indispensable
building blocks of the international system. It is their job to guarantee the
rights of their citizens, to protect them from crime, violence and aggression,
and to provide the framework of freedom under law in which individuals can prosper
and society develop. If States are fragile, the peoples of the world will not
enjoy the security, development and justice that are their right. Therefore,
one of the great challenges of the new millennium is to ensure that all States
are strong enough to meet the many challenges they face.
20. States, however, cannot do the job alone. We need an active civil society
and a dynamic private sector. Both occupy an increasingly large and important
share of the space formerly reserved for States alone, and it is plain that
the goals outlined here will not be achieved without their full engagement.
21. We also need agile and effective regional and global intergovernmental
institutions to mobilize and coordinate collective action. As the world’s
only universal body with a mandate to address security, development and human
rights issues, the United Nations bears a special burden. As globalization shrinks
distances around the globe and these issues become increasingly interconnected,
the comparative advantages of the United Nations become ever more evident. So
too, however, do some of its real weaknesses. From overhauling basic management
practices and building a more transparent, efficient and effective United Nations
system to revamping our major intergovernmental institutions so that they reflect
today’s world and advance the priorities set forth in the present report,
we must reshape the Organization in ways not previously imagined and with a
boldness and speed not previously shown.
22. In our efforts to strengthen the contributions of States, civil society,
the private sector and international institutions to advancing a vision of larger
freedom, we must ensure that all involved assume their responsibilities to turn
good words into good deeds. We therefore need new mechanisms to ensure accountability
— the accountability of States to their citizens, of States to each other,
of international institutions to their members and of the present generation
to future generations. Where there is accountability we will progress; where
there is none we will underperform. The business of the summit to be held in
September 2005 must be to ensure that, from now on, promises made are promises
kept.
D. Time to decide
23. At this defining moment in history, we must be ambitious. Our action must
be as urgent as the need, and on the same scale. We must face immediate threats
immediately. We must take advantage of an unprecedented consensus on how to
promote global economic and social development, and we must forge a new consensus
on how to confront new threats. Only by acting decisively now can we both confront
the pressing security challenges and win a decisive victory in the global battle
against poverty by 2015.
24. In today’s world, no State, however powerful, can protect itself on
its own. Likewise, no country, weak or strong, can realize prosperity in a vacuum.
We can and must act together. We owe it to each other to do so, and we owe each
other an account of how we do so. If we live up to those mutual commitments,
we can make the new millennium worthy of its name.
II. Freedom from want
25. The past 25 years have seen the most dramatic reduction in extreme poverty
that the world has ever experienced. Spearheaded by progress in China and India,
literally hundreds of millions of men, women and children all over the world
have been able to escape the burdens of extreme impoverishment and begin to
enjoy improved access to food, health care, education and housing.
26. Yet at the same time, dozens of countries have become poorer, devastating
economic crises have thrown millions of families into poverty, and increasing
inequality in large parts of the world means that the benefits of economic growth
have not been evenly shared. Today, more than a billion people — one in
every six human beings — still live on less than a dollar a day, lacking
the means to stay alive in the face of chronic hunger, disease and environmental
hazards. In other words, this is a poverty that kills. A single bite from a
malaria-bearing mosquito is enough to end a child’s life for want of a
bed net or $1 treatment. A drought or pest that destroys a harvest turns subsistence
into starvation. A world in which every year 11 million children die before
their fifth birthday and three million people die of AIDS is not a world of
larger freedom.
27. For centuries, this kind of poverty has been regarded as a sad but inescapable
aspect of the human condition. Today, that view is intellectually and morally
indefensible. The scale and scope of progress made by countries in every region
of the world has shown that, over a very short time, poverty and maternal and
infant mortality can be dramatically reduced, while education, gender equality
and other aspects of development can be dramatically advanced. The unprecedented
combination of resources and technology at our disposal today means that we
are truly the first generation with the tools, the knowledge and the resources
to meet the commitment, given by all States in the Millennium Declaration, “to
making the right to development a reality for everyone and to freeing the entire
human race from want”.
A. A shared vision of development
28. The multifaceted challenge of development cuts across a vast array of interlinked
issues — ranging from gender equality through health and education to
the environment. The historic United Nations conferences and summits held in
the 1990s helped build a comprehensive normative framework around these linkages
for the first time by mapping out a broad vision of shared development priorities.
These laid the groundwork for the Millennium Summit to set out a series of time-bound
targets across all these areas — ranging from halving extreme poverty
to putting all children into primary school, all with a deadline of 2015 —
that were later crystallized into the Millennium Development Goals (see box
1).
Box 1
The Millennium Development Goals
Goal 1
Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
Target 1
Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less
than one dollar a day
Target 2
Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger
Goal 2
Achieve universal primary education
Target 3
Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able
to complete a full course of primary schooling
Goal 3
Promote gender equality and empower women
Target 4
Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by
2005, and to all levels of education no later than 2015
Goal 4
Reduce child mortality
Target 5
Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate
Goal 5
Improve maternal health
Target 6
Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio
Goal 6
Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
Target 7
Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS
Target 8
Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other
major diseases
Goal 7
Ensure environmental sustainability
Target 9
Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and
programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources
Target 10
Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe
drinking water and basic sanitation
Target 11
By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least
100 million slum-dwellers
Goal 8
Develop a global partnership for development
Target 12
Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading
and financial system (includes a commitment to good governance, development
and poverty reduction — both nationally and internationally)
Target 13
Address the special needs of the least developed countries (includes tariff-
and quota-free access for least developed countries exports; enhanced programme
of debt relief for heavily indebted poor countries and cancellation of official
bilateral debt; and more generous ODA for countries committed to poverty reduction)
Target 14
Address the special needs of landlocked countries and small island developing
States (through the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small
Island Developing States and the outcome of the twenty-second special session
of the General Assembly)
Target 15
Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through
national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the
long term
Target 16
In cooperation with developing countries, develop and implement strategies for
decent and productive work for youth
Target 17
In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable,
essential drugs in developing countries
Target 18
In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies,
especially information and communications
29. The Millennium Development Goals have galvanized unprecedented efforts to
meet the needs of the world’s poorest, becoming globally accepted benchmarks
of broader progress embraced by donors, developing countries, civil society
and major development institutions alike. As such, they reflect an urgent and
globally shared and endorsed set of priorities that we need to address at the
September 2005 summit. Thanks to the work done by the Millennium Project, whose
report, Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium
Development Goals,2 was delivered to me in January 2005, there
is now an action plan to achieve them. There are also encouraging signs that
the critical ingredient — political will — is emerging. The real
test will be whether broad-based actions by developed and developing countries
to address this agenda are supported by global development assistance being
more than doubled over the next few years, for this is what will be necessary
to help achieve the Goals.
30. At the same time, we need to see the Millennium Development Goals as part
of an even larger development agenda. While the Goals have been the subject
of an enormous amount of follow-up both inside and outside the United Nations,
they clearly do not in themselves represent a complete development agenda. They
do not directly encompass some of the broader issues covered by the conferences
of the 1990s, nor do they address the particular needs of middle-income developing
countries or the questions of growing inequality and the wider dimensions of
human development and good governance, which all require the effective implementation
of conference outcomes.
31. Nevertheless, the urgency of achieving the Millennium Development Goals
cannot be overstated. Despite progress in many areas, overall the world is falling
short of what is needed, especially in the poorest countries (see box 2). As
the Millennium Project’s report makes clear, our agenda is still achievable
globally and in most or even all countries — but only if we break with
business as usual and dramatically accelerate and scale up action until 2015,
beginning over the next 12 months. Success will require sustained action across
the entire decade between now and the deadline. That is because development
successes cannot take place overnight and many countries suffer significant
capacity constraints. It takes time to train the teachers, nurses and engineers,
to build the roads, schools and hospitals, and to grow the small and large businesses
able to create the jobs and income needed.
Box 2
Progress on the Millennium Development Goals
Progress in achieving the Millennium Development Goals has been far from uniform
across the world. The greatest improvements have been in East Asia and South
Asia, where more than 200 million people have been lifted out of poverty since
1990 alone. Nonetheless, nearly 700 million people in Asia still live on less
than $1 a day — nearly two thirds of the world’s poorest people
— while even some of the fastest-growing countries are falling short on
non-income Goals, such as protecting the environment and reducing maternal mortality.
Sub-Saharan Africa is at the epicentre of the crisis, falling seriously short
on most Goals, with continuing food insecurity, disturbingly high child and
maternal mortality, growing numbers of people living in slums and an overall
rise of extreme poverty despite some important progress in individual countries.
Latin America, the transition economies, and the Middle East and North Africa,
often hampered by growing inequality, have more mixed records, with significant
variations in progress but general trends falling short of what is needed to
meet the 2015 deadline. Progress in the achievement of the different Goals has
also varied. Although sub-Saharan Africa and Oceania are lagging in almost all
areas, elsewhere major advances are being made in reducing hunger, improving
access to drinking water and expanding the number of children in primary school.
Child mortality rates have also generally declined, but progress has slowed
in many regions and has even been reversed in parts of Central Asia. Meanwhile,
despite dramatic progress in some countries overall access to sanitation is
off track, particularly in Africa and Asia, where the number of slum-dwellers
is also increasing rapidly. Maternal mortality remains unacceptably high throughout
the developing world, as do the incidence and prevalence of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis
and malaria. Gender equality remains unfulfilled, the 2005 education parity
target was missed in many countries. Environmental degradation is an extreme
concern in all developing regions.
32. In 2005, the development of a global partnership between rich and poor countries
— which is itself the eighth Goal, reaffirmed and elaborated three years
ago at the International Conference on Financing for Development, held in Monterrey,
Mexico, and the World Summit on Sustainable Development, held in Johannesburg,
South Africa — needs to become a reality. It is worth recalling the terms
of that historic compact. Each developing country has primary responsibility
for its own development — strengthening governance, combating corruption
and putting in place the policies and investments to drive privatesector- led
growth and maximize domestic resources available to fund national development
strategies. Developed countries, on their side, undertake that developing countries
which adopt transparent, credible and properly costed development strategies
will receive the full support they need, in the form of increased development
assistance, a more development-oriented trade system and wider and deeper debt
relief. All of this has been promised but not delivered. That failure is measured
in the rolls of the dead — and on it are written millions of new names
each year.
B. National strategies
33. Extreme poverty has many causes, ranging from adverse geography through
poor or corrupt governance (including neglect of marginalized communities) to
the ravages of conflict and its aftermath. Most pernicious are poverty traps
that leave many of the poorest countries languishing in a vicious circle of
destitution even when they have the benefit of honest, committed Governments.
Lacking basic infrastructure, human capital and public administration, and burdened
by disease, environmental degradation and limited natural resources, these countries
cannot afford the basic investments needed to move onto a new path of prosperity
unless they receive sustained, targeted external support.
34. As a first step towards addressing these problems, countries need to adopt
bold, goal-oriented policy frameworks for the next 10 years, aimed at scaling
up investments to achieve at least the quantitative Millennium Development Goals
targets. To that end, each developing country with extreme poverty should by
2006 adopt and begin to implement a national development strategy bold enough
to meet the Millennium Development Goals targets for 2015. This strategy should
be anchored in the practical scaling up of public investments, capacity-building,
domestic resource mobilization and, where needed, official development assistance.
This recommendation may not sound revolutionary, but by linking actions directly
to the needs derived from ambitious and monitorable targets, its implementation
would mark a fundamental breakthrough towards greater boldness and accountability
in the fight against poverty.
35. It is important to stress that this does not require the creation of any
new instruments. All that is required is a different approach to their design
and implementation. Countries that already have poverty reduction strategy papers
— nationally owned and developed three-year spending frameworks agreed
with the World Bank and other international development partners — should
align them with a 10-year framework of policies and investments consistent with
achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. In middle-income countries
and others where the Goals are already within reach, Governments should adopt
a “Millennium Development Goals-plus” strategy, with more ambitious
targets.
A framework for action
36. However well crafted on paper, investment strategies to achieve the Millennium
Development Goals will not work in practice unless supported by States with
transparent, accountable systems of governance, grounded in the rule of law,
encompassing civil and political as well as economic and social rights, and
underpinned by accountable and efficient public administration. Many of the
poorest countries will need major capacity-building investments to put in place
and maintain the necessary infrastructure and to train and employ qualified
personnel. But without good governance, strong institutions and a clear commitment
to rooting out corruption and mismanagement wherever it is found, broader progress
will prove elusive.
37. Similarly, without dynamic, growth-oriented economic policies supporting
a healthy private sector capable of generating jobs, income and tax revenues
over time, sustainable economic growth will not be achieved. This requires significantly
increased investments in human capital and development-oriented infrastructure,
such as energy, transport and communications. In addition, small and medium-sized
firms require a favourable legal and regulatory environment, including effective
commercial laws that define and protect contracts and property rights, a rational
public administration that limits and combats corruption, and expanded access
to financial capital, including microfinance. As two important Commissions —
the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization3
and the Commission on the Private Sector and Development4 —
reported to me last year, this is crucial for providing decent jobs that both
provide income and empower the poor, especially women and younger people.
38. Civil society organizations have a critical role to play in driving this
implementation process forward to “make poverty history”. Not only
is civil society an indispensable partner in delivering services to the poor
at the scope required by the Millennium Development Goals but it can also catalyse
action within countries on pressing development concerns, mobilizing broad-based
movements and creating grass-roots pressure to hold leaders accountable for
their commitments. Internationally, some civil society organizations can help
create or galvanize global partnerships on specific issues or draw attention
to the plight of indigenous peoples and other marginalized groups, while others
can work to share best practices across countries through community exchanges
and providing technical support and advice to Governments.
National investment and policy priorities
39. Each national strategy needs to take into account seven broad “clusters”
of public investments and policies which directly address the Millennium Development
Goals and set the foundation for private sector-led growth. As elaborated in
the Millennium Project, all are essential for meeting the Goals, as well as
wider development needs.
Gender equality: overcoming pervasive gender bias
40. Empowered women can be some of the most effective drivers of development.
Direct interventions to advance gender equality include increasing primary school
completion and secondary school access for girls, ensuring secure tenure of
property to women, ensuring access to sexual and reproductive health services,
promoting equal access to labour markets, providing the opportunity for greater
representation in government decision-making bodies and protecting women from
violence.
The environment: investing in better resource management
41. Countries should adopt time-bound environmental targets, particularly for
such priorities as forest replanting, integrated water resources management,
ecosystem preservation and curbing pollution. To achieve targets, increased
investments in environmental management need to be accompanied by broad policy
reforms. Progress also depends on sector strategies, including strategies for
agriculture, infrastructure, forestry, fisheries, energy and transport, which
all require environmental safeguards. Further, improving access to modern energy
services is critical for both reducing poverty and protecting the environment.
There is also a need to ensure that enhancing access to safe drinking water
and sanitation forms a part of development strategies.
Rural development: increasing food output and incomes
42. Smallholder farmers and others living in impoverished rural areas require
soil nutrients, better plant varieties, improved water management and training
in modern and environmentally sustainable farming practices, along with access
to transport, water, sanitation and modern energy services. In sub-Saharan Africa,
these elements must be brought together to launch a twenty-first century African
green revolution commencing in 2005.
Urban development: promoting jobs, upgrading slums and developing alternatives
to new slum formation
43. For the large and growing number of urban poor, core infrastructure services,
such as energy, transport, pollution control and waste disposal, are needed
alongside improved security of tenure and community-led efforts to build decent
housing and support urban planning. To this end, local authorities need to be
strengthened and work closely with organizations of the urban poor. Health systems:
ensuring universal access to essential services
44. Strong health systems are required to ensure universal access to basic health
services, including services to promote child and maternal health, to support
reproductive health and to control killer diseases, such as AIDS, tuberculosis
and malaria (see box 3). This requires sufficient investments, large numbers
of motivated and adequately paid health workers, scaled-up infrastructure and
supplies, strong management systems and the elimination of user fees.
Education: ensuring universal primary, expanded secondary and higher education
45. To advance education at all levels, parents and communities should be able
to hold their schools accountable while Governments improve curricula, educational
quality and mode of delivery; build human resource and infrastructure capacity,
where needed; and institute incentives for bringing vulnerable children to school,
including the elimination of user fees.
Science, technology, and innovation: building national capacities
46. To increase countries’ indigenous capacity for science and technology,
including information and communications technology, Governments should establish
scientific advisory bodies, promote infrastructure as an opportunity for technological
learning, expand science and engineering faculties, and stress development and
business applications in science and technology curricula.
Box 3
The Tragedy of HIV/AIDS
The HIV/AIDS pandemic now kills more than 3 million people each year and poses
an unprecedented threat to human development and security. The disease is wrecking
millions of families and leaving tens of millions of orphans. More than just
a public health crisis, AIDS undermines economic and social stability, ravaging
health, education, agriculture and social welfare systems. While placing an
enormous drag on economic growth, it also weakens governance and security structures,
posing a further threat. The epidemic demands an exceptional response. In the
absence of a cure, only the mass mobilization of every section of society —
unheard of to date in the history of public health — can begin to reverse
AIDS. This requires comprehensive prevention, education, treatment and impact
mitigation programmes, which in turn will not succeed without the personal commitment
of Heads of State and Government to support and lead genuinely multisectoral
AIDS responses.
Since 2000, the world has begun to achieve some successes in the fight against
AIDS. More Governments have made it a strategic priority and set up integrated
administrative structures to lead and coordinate the struggle. The Global Fund
to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, which I called for in 2001, now plays
a leading role in the global effort, while also focusing attention on and fighting
other killer pandemics. Altogether, as of December 2004, 700,000 people in the
developing world were receiving antiretroviral treatment — a nearly 60
per cent increase in just five months. This reflects the priority that the international
community has now placed on rapidly expanding treatment, and shows that a real
difference can be made in a very short time. However, much remains to be done
if we are to have any realistic hope of reducing the incidence of HIV and providing
proper antiretroviral treatment to all who need it within the coming decade.
Many Governments have yet to tackle the disease and its stigma publicly, or
are not sufficiently committed to the kind of frank discussion and action on
gender equality that is needed. In particular, resources for AIDS remain far
short of what is needed to mount a full inclusive response. National Governments,
as well as multilateral and bilateral donors, must now take steps to meet these
costs. Four years ago, I called on the international community to provide $7
billion to $10 billion annually to address the projected needs to fight HIV/AIDS
in the developing world. This amount has not been fully funded. In the meantime,
the disease has spread. As a result, we have an ever increasing gap between
what is needed and what is provided. This cannot continue. We need a more ambitious
and balanced strategy of both prevention and treatment. Therefore, I call on
the international community to provide urgently the resources needed for an
expanded and comprehensive response to HIV/AIDS, as identified by the Joint
United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and its partners, and to provide
full funding for the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.
C. Making goal 8 work: trade and financing for development
47. For many middle-income countries and some poorer ones, most of the resources
needed to fund these strategies can and should be mobilized domestically from
reallocated government revenues, household contributions and private-sector
investment, supplemented by borrowing. But in most low-income countries and
in nearly all the least developed countries, the maximum that can be raised
by such efforts will fall far short of what is needed to reach the Millennium
Development Goals. According to the Millennium Project, the investment costs
for the Goals alone in a typical low-income country will be roughly $75 per
capita in 2006, rising to approximately $140 in 2015 (in constant dollar terms).
These small sums, equivalent to one third to one half of their annual per capita
incomes, are far beyond the resources of most low-income countries. To create
the conditions for greater private investment and an “exit strategy”
from aid in the longer term for these countries, a big push in development assistance
is needed.
Aid
48. One of the most encouraging shifts in recent years has been the increase
in official development assistance (ODA), after a decade of steady decline in
the 1990s. Expressed as a percentage of developed countries’ gross national
income, global ODA currently stands at 0.25 per cent — still well short
of the 0.33 per cent reached in the late 1980s, let alone the long-standing
target of 0.7 per cent that was reaffirmed in the Monterrey Consensus in 2002.5
On the basis of recent commitments to future increases by several donors, annual
ODA flows should increase to about $100 billion by 2010 — nearly double
their levels at the time of the Monterrey Conference. But a significant portion
of this amount reflects debt write-offs and dollar depreciation rather than
net long-term finance, and in any case the total would still be about $50 billion
short of the ODA levels that the Millennium Project calculates will be needed
just to meet the Millennium Development Goals, let alone broader development
priorities.
49. Happily, there are signs of further progress. A new group of donors has
emerged, including new members of the European Union (EU) and some of the wealthier
developing countries, such as Brazil, China and India, all of which are increasingly
offering their expertise to other developing countries through technical cooperation.
Five donor countries have already reached the 0.7 per cent target and six more
have recently set timetables to achieve it. Developed countries that have not
already done so should establish timetables to achieve the 0.7 per cent target
of gross national income for official development assistance by no later
than 2015, starting with significant increases no later than 2006 and reaching
0.5 per cent by 2009.
50. While there are clearly capacity constraints in many developing countries,
we must ensure that those countries that are ready receive an immediate scale
up in assistance. Starting in 2005, developing countries that put forward sound,
transparent and accountable national strategies and require increased development
assistance should receive a sufficient increase in aid, of sufficient quality
and arriving with sufficient speed to enable them to achieve the Millennium
Development Goals.
51. The most direct way to increase ODA volumes is to allocate increasing shares
of donor countries’ national budgets to aid. However, because the achievement
of the Millennium Development Goals requires a sharp upward turn in overall
ODA spending over the next few years, new ways to finance a steep increase in
the short and medium terms are well worth exploring. Several longer-term ideas
for innovative sources of finance to complement ODA have been proposed, and
an important initiative led by Brazil, Chile, France, Germany and Spain is currently
exploring some of them. But what is needed now is a mechanism to ensure the
immediate scale-up of financing. The proposed International Finance Facility
has the potential to do this by “front-loading” future flows of
ODA while still using existing disbursement channels. The international community
should in 2005 launch an International Finance Facility to support an immediate
front-loading of ODA, underpinned by scaled-up commitments to achieving the
0.7 per cent ODA target no later than 2015. In the longer term, other innovative
sources of finance for development should also be considered to supplement the
Facility.
52. These steps can and should be supplemented by immediate action to support
a series of “quick wins” — relatively inexpensive, high-impact
initiatives with the potential to generate major short-term gains and save millions
of lives. These range from the free mass distribution of malaria bed nets and
effective antimalaria medicines to the expansion of home-grown school meal programmes
using locally produced food and the elimination of user fees for primary education
and health services. Such rapid steps would provide a critical support for national
Millennium Development Goals strategies. They would generate rapid momentum
and early success stories that would broaden commitment to the Millennium Development
Goals, although they would not be a substitute for longer-term, sustained investments.
53. At the same time, urgent steps are needed to increase the quality, transparency
and accountability of ODA. Aid should be linked to the local needs identified
in countries’ national strategies and to the achievement of the Millennium
Development Goals, not to the interests of suppliers in donor countries. This
is obviously for the benefit of developing countries, but developed countries
themselves also have an interest in being able to show their taxpayers that
aid is effective. In follow-up to the March 2005 Paris High-level Forum on Aid
Effectiveness, donor countries should set, by September 2005, timetables and
monitorable targets for aligning their aid delivery mechanisms with partner
countries’ Millennium Development Goals-based national strategies. This
includes commitments to Millennium Development Goals-based investment plans,
a 2015 time horizon, predictable multi-year funding, dramatically simplified
procedures and direct budget support for countries with appropriate mechanisms
in place.
Debt
54. Closely related to ODA is the issue of external debt. Under the Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC), $54 billion has so far been committed
for debt relief to 27 countries that have reached decision or completion points.
But even though the evidence is persuasive that this unlocks resources which
are critical for the Millennium Development Goals, it still falls far short
of what is needed. To move forward, we should redefine debt sustainability as
the level of debt that allows a country to achieve the Millennium Development
Goals and reach 2015 without an increase in debt ratios. For most HIPC countries,
this will require exclusively grant-based finance and 100 per cent debt cancellation,
while for many heavily indebted non-HIPC and middle-income countries, it will
require significantly more debt reduction than has yet been on offer. Additional
debt cancellation should be achieved without reducing the resources available
to other developing countries, and without jeopardizing the long-term financial
viability of international financial institutions.
Trade
55. While trade does not obviate the need for large scale ODA-supported development
investments, an open and equitable trading system can be a powerful driver of
economic growth and poverty reduction, especially when combined with adequate
aid. Development therefore rightly lies at the heart of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations. At present, developing
countries are often denied a level playing field to compete in global trade
because rich countries use a variety of tariffs, quotas and subsidies to restrict
access to their own markets and shelter their own producers. The December 2005
WTO ministerial meeting offers a chance, which must not be missed, to map out
agreement on how to correct these anomalies. An urgent priority is to establish
a timetable for developed countries to dismantle market access barriers and
begin phasing out trade-distorting domestic subsidies, especially in agriculture.
To address this priority, the Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations
should fulfil its development promise and be completed no later than 2006. As
a first step, Member States should provide duty-free and quota-free market access
for all exports from the least developed countries.
56. The Monterrey Consensus stressed that for many developing countries, particularly
the poorest, which rely on a few commodity products, there is also a supply-side
problem which manifests itself in a lack of capacity to diversify exports, a
vulnerability to price fluctuations and a steady decline in terms of trade.
To build trade competitiveness, national Millennium Development Goals strategies
need to emphasize investments in agricultural productivity, trade-related infrastructure
and competitive export industries, particularly for the least developed countries,
landlocked developing countries and small island developing States. While a
number of initiatives exist to address these problems, encourage diversification
and reduce vulnerability to commodity price fluctuations, support for them has
fallen far short of what is necessary.
D. Ensuring environmental sustainability
57. We fundamentally depend on natural systems and resources for our existence
and development. Our efforts to defeat poverty and pursue sustainable development
will be in vain if environmental degradation and natural resource depletion
continue unabated. At the country level, national strategies must include investments
in improved environmental management and make the structural changes required
for environmental sustainability. For many environmental priorities, such as
shared waterways, forests, marine fisheries and biodiversity, regional and global
efforts must be strengthened. We already have one encouraging example showing
how global solutions can be found. Thanks to the Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer,6 the risk of harmful radiation
appears to be receding — a clear demonstration of how global environmental
problems can be managed when all countries make determined efforts to implement
internationally agreed frameworks. Today, three major challenges for the international
community require particularly urgent action, as described below.
Desertification
58. The degradation of more than a billion hectares of land has had a devastating
impact on development in many parts of the world. Millions of people have been
forced to abandon their lands as farming and nomadic lifestyles have become
unsustainable. Hundreds of millions more are at risk of becoming environmental
refugees. To combat desertification, the international community must support
and implement the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Those
Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly
in Africa.7
Biodiversity
59. Another serious concern is loss of biodiversity, which is occurring at an
unprecedented rate within and across countries. Worrying in its own right, this
trend also severely undermines health, livelihoods, food production and clean
water, and increases the vulnerability of populations to natural disasters and
climate change. To reverse these trends, all Governments should take steps,
individually and collectively, to implement the Convention on Biological Diversity8
and the Johannesburg commitment to achieve a significant reduction in the rate
of loss of biodiversity by 2010.9
Climate change
60. One of the greatest environmental and development challenges in the twentyfirst
century will be that of controlling and coping with climate change. The overwhelming
majority of scientists now agree that human activity is having a significant
impact on the climate. Since the advent of the industrial era in the mideighteenth
century, atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases have increased significantly,
the earth has warmed considerably and sea levels have risen measurably. The
1990s were the warmest decade on record, forcing glaciers and Arctic ice to
retreat. With the concentration of greenhouse gases projected to rise still
further over the next century, a corresponding increase in the global mean surface
temperature is likely to trigger increased climate variability and greater incidence
and intensity of extreme weather events, such as hurricanes and droughts. The
countries most vulnerable to such changes — small island developing States,
coastal nations with large numbers of people living in low-lying areas, and
countries in the arid and semi-arid tropics and subtropics — are least
able to protect themselves. They also contribute least to the global emissions
of greenhouse gases. Without action, they will pay a bitter price for the actions
of others.
61. The entry into force in February 2005 of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol10
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change11
is an important step towards dealing with global warming, but it only extends
until 2012. The international community must agree on stabilization targets
for greenhouse gas concentrations beyond that date. Scientific advances and
technological innovation have an important role to play in mitigating climate
change and in facilitating adaptation to the new conditions. They must be mobilized
now if we are to develop the tools needed in time. In particular, research and
development funding for renewable energy sources, carbon management and energy
efficiency needs to increase substantially. Policy mechanisms, such as carbon
trading markets, should also be expanded. As agreed at Johannesburg, the primary
responsibility for mitigating climate change and other unsustainable patterns
of production and consumption must lie with the countries that contribute most
to the problems. We must develop a more inclusive international framework beyond
2012, with broader participation by all major emitters and both developed and
developing countries, to ensure a concerted globally defined action, including
through technological innovation, to mitigate climate change, taking into account
the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.
E. Other priorities for global action
62. To address broader development needs, action is also needed in a number
of other areas, as set out below.
Infectious disease surveillance and monitoring
63. The overall international response to evolving pandemics has been shockingly
slow and remains shamefully underresourced. Malaria continues to rage throughout
the tropical world, despite the availability of highly effective measures for
prevention and treatment. Many infectious diseases that ravage developing countries
today, notably HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, pose severe risks for the entire world,
particularly in the light of emerging drug resistance. Both familiar and new
infectious diseases require a concerted international response. The severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak of 2003 drew attention to the fact that
even long-distance flight times are shorter than the incubation periods for
many infectious diseases, so that any one of the 700 million passengers who
take international flights each year can be an unwitting disease carrier.
64. The rapid response to SARS also showed that the spread of infectious disease
can be contained when effective global institutions, such as the World Health
Organization (WHO), work in close partnership with functioning national health
agencies and expert technical institutions. No State could have achieved this
degree of containment on its own. To strengthen existing mechanisms for timely
and effective international cooperation, I call on Member States to agree on
the revision of the International Health Regulations at the World Health Assembly
to be held in May 2005. To contain the risk of future outbreaks, greater resources
should also be given to the WHO Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network so
that it can coordinate the response of a broad international partnership in
support of national health surveillance and response systems.
Natural disasters
65. The devastating impact of the Indian Ocean tsunami has reminded us all of
the vulnerability of human life to natural disasters, and also of the disproportionate
effect they have on poor people. Unless more determined efforts are made to
address the loss of lives, livelihoods and infrastructure, disasters will become
an increasingly serious obstacle to the achievement of the Millennium Development
Goals. The World Conference on Disaster Reduction, held in early 2005, adopted
the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015, which identifies strategic objectives
and priority areas to reduce disaster risk in the next 10 years. We must proceed
with its implementation.
66. The countries of the Indian Ocean region, with the help of the United Nations
and others, are now taking steps to establish a regional tsunami early warning
system. Let us not forget, however, the other hazards that people in all regions
of the world are exposed to, including storms, floods, droughts, landslides,
heat waves and volcanic eruptions. To complement broader disaster preparedness
and mitigation initiatives, I recommend the establishment of a worldwide early
warning system for all natural hazards, building on existing national and regional
capacity. To assist in its establishment, I shall be requesting the International
Strategy for Disaster Reduction secretariat to coordinate a survey of existing
capacities and gaps, in cooperation with all United Nations system entities
concerned, and I look forward to receiving its findings and recommendations.
When disasters strike, we also need improved rapid response arrangements for
immediate humanitarian relief, which are considered in section V below.
Science and technology for development
67. To help drive economic development and to enable developing countries
to forge solutions to their own problems, a significantly increased global effort
is required to support research and development to address the special needs
of the poor in the areas of health, agriculture, natural resource and environmental
management, energy and climate. Two particular priorities should be to mount
a major global initiative on research in tropical diseases and to provide additional
support to the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR)
for research on tropical agriculture.
68. Information and communication technologies can significantly contribute
to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. To fully utilize the
potential of information and communication technology (ICT), we need to address
the digital divide, including through voluntary financing mechanisms, such as
the recently launched Digital Solidarity Fund.
Regional infrastructure and institutions
69. Regional infrastructure and policy cooperation are essential for supporting
economic development. This is particularly so when developing countries are
landlocked or small islands, both of which need special support. But other countries
that may simply have small populations or are dependent on their neighbours
for transport, food, water or energy, also need assistance. International donors
should support regional cooperation to deal with these problems, and developing
countries should make such cooperation an integral part of their national strategies.
This should cover not only economic cooperation but also mechanisms for regional
political dialogue and consensus-building, such as the African Peer Review Mechanism
and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).
Global institutions
70. The international financial institutions are essential to ensuring development
around the world and successful implementation of the Millennium Development
Goals. I encourage them to ensure that the country programmes they support are
ambitious enough to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. In addition, these
institutions and their shareholders should consider what changes they might
undergo in order to better reflect the changes in the world’s political
economy since 1945. This should be done in the context of the Monterrey Consensus
agreement to broaden and strengthen the participation of developing and transition
countries in international economic decision-making and norm-setting. The Bretton
Woods institutions have already taken some steps to strengthen the voice and
participation of developing countries. But more significant steps are needed
to overcome the widespread perception among developing countries that they are
underrepresented in both bodies, which in turn tends to put their legitimacy
in doubt.
Migration
71. Today, more people live outside their countries of origin than at any time
in history and their numbers are expected to increase in the future. Migration
offers many opportunities — to the migrants themselves, to the countries
that receive younger workforce and also — notably in the form of remittance
payments, which have grown spectacularly in recent years — to their countries
of origin. But it also involves many complex challenges. It can contribute simultaneously
to unemployment in one region or sector and to labour shortages and “brain
drains” in another. If not carefully managed, it can also provoke acute
social and political tensions. The impact of these trends is not yet well understood,
but I believe that the report of the Global Commission on International Migration,
which I shall receive later in 2005, will provide some valuable guidance. The
high-level dialogue on the subject to be held by the General Assembly in 2006
will provide an important opportunity to tackle the hard questions on this issue.
F. The implementation challenge
72. The urgent task in 2005 is to implement in full the commitments already
made and to render genuinely operational the framework already in place. The
principles of mutual responsibility and mutual accountability that underpinned
the Monterrey Consensus are sound and need to be translated into deeds. The
September summit must produce a pact for action, to which all nations subscribe
and on which all can be judged. The Millennium Development Goals must no longer
be floating targets, referred to now and then to measure progress. They must
inform, on a daily basis, national strategies and international assistance alike.
Without a bold breakthrough in 2005 that lays the groundwork for a rapid progress
in coming years, we will miss the targets. Let us be clear about the costs of
missing this opportunity: millions of lives that could have been saved will
be lost; many freedoms that could have been secured will be denied; and we shall
inhabit are more dangerous and unstable world.
73. By the same token, development would be at best hindered and at worst reversed
in a world riven by violent conflict or mesmerized by the fear of terrorism
and weapons of mass destruction, or one in which human rights were trampled,
the rule of law was disregarded and citizens’ views and needs were ignored
by unresponsive and unrepresentative Governments. Progress on the issues covered
in sections III and IV below, therefore, is essential to realizing the objectives
set out above, just as development is itself an indispensable underpinning for
longer-term security, human rights and the rule of law.
Box 4
The special needs of Africa
The problems discussed in the present report are global in nature, and solutions
must be global. Yet almost all of them affect Africa disproportionately. If
we are to achieve truly global solutions, we must recognize Africa’s special
needs, as world leaders did in the Millennium Declaration. From action to achieve
the Millennium Development Goals to better collective capacity to build peace
and strengthen States, the special needs of Africa lie at the heart of every
part of the present report. There have been some positive developments in Africa
in the past five years. Today, more African States have democratically elected
Governments than ever before and the number of military coups on the continent
has declined significantly. Some long-standing conflicts, such as those in Angola
and Sierra Leone, have been resolved. From Uganda to Mozambique, many individual
countries are experiencing rapid and sustained economic and social recovery.
And throughout the continent, ordinary people are organizing themselves and
making their voices heard. And yet much of Africa — especially South of
the Sahara — continues to suffer the tragic effects of persistent violent
conflict, extreme poverty and disease. Some 2.8 million refugees — and
fully half of the world’s 24.6 million internally displaced people —
are victims of conflict and upheaval in Africa. Africa continues to lag behind
the rest of the developing world in achieving the Millennium Development Goals.
About three quarters of the world’s AIDS deaths every year occur in Africa,
with women the most affected. The high prevalence of HIV/AIDS in many African
countries is both a human tragedy and a major obstacle to development. Of the
one million or more people in the world killed by
malaria each year, roughly 90 per cent are killed in sub-Saharan Africa, most
of them children less than five years old. Much of sub-Saharan Africa continues
to face a combination of high transport costs and small markets, low agricultural
productivity, a very high disease burden and slow diffusion of technology from
abroad. All these make it particularly prone to persistent poverty.
Today, African States are addressing these problems with new energy and determination.
They are adopting more robust development strategies to meet the Millennium
Development Goals by 2015. Africa is building a new architecture of institutions,
including the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development,
through which to prevent, manage and resolve violent conflict, promote good
governance and democracy, and create the right conditions for its economies
to grow and thrive in a sustainable way. As the Commission on Africa set up
by the United Kingdom reported in March 2005, Africa’s leaders and people
will need special support from the rest of the world to succeed in these pioneering
efforts. The international community must respond to this need. It must give
tangible and sustained support to African countries and regional and subregional
organizations, in a spirit of partnership and solidarity. This means ensuring
follow-through on existing and needed commitments on debt relief, opening markets
and providing greatly increased official development assistance. It also means
contributing troops for peacekeeping operations and strengthening the capacity
of African States to provide security for their citizens and to meet their needs.
III. Freedom from fear
74. While, in the development sphere, we suffer from weak implementation, on
the security side, despite a heightened sense of threat among many we lack even
a basic consensus and implementation, where it occurs, is all too often contested.
75. Unless we can agree on a shared assessment of these threats and a common
understanding of our obligations in addressing them, the United Nations will
lag in providing security to all of its members and all the world’s people.
Our ability to assist those who seek freedom from fear will then be partial
at best.
A. A vision of collective security
76. In November 2003, alarmed by the lack of agreement among Member States on
the proper role of the United Nations in providing collective security —
or even on the nature of the most compelling threats that we face — I
set up the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. The Panel delivered
its report, “A more secure world: our shared responsibility” (A/59/565),
in December 2004.
77. I fully embrace the broad vision that the report articulates and its case
for a more comprehensive concept of collective security: one that tackles new
threats and old and that addresses the security concerns of all States. I believe
that this concept can bridge the gap between divergent views of security and
give us the guidance we need to face today’s dilemmas.
78. The threats to peace and security in the twenty-first century include not
just international war and conflict but civil violence, organized crime, terrorism
and weapons of mass destruction. They also include poverty, deadly infectious
disease and environmental degradation since these can have equally catastrophic
consequences. All of these threats can cause death or lessen life chances on
a large scale. All of them can undermine States as the basic unit of the international
system.
79. Depending on wealth, geography and power, we perceive different threats
as the most pressing. But the truth is we cannot afford to choose. Collective
security today depends on accepting that the threats which each region of the
world perceives as most urgent are in fact equally so for all.
80. In our globalized world, the threats we face are interconnected. The rich
are vulnerable to the threats that attack the poor and the strong are vulnerable
to the weak, as well as vice versa. A nuclear terrorist attack on the United
States or Europe would have devastating effects on the whole world. But so would
the appearance of a new virulent pandemic disease in a poor country with no
effective health-care system.
81. On this interconnectedness of threats we must found a new security consensus,
the first article of which must be that all are entitled to freedom from fear,
and that whatever threatens one threatens all. Once we understand this, we have
no choice but to tackle the whole range of threats. We must respond to HIV/AIDS
as robustly as we do to terrorism and to poverty as effectively as we do to
proliferation. We must strive just as hard to eliminate the threat of small
arms and light weapons as we do to eliminate the threat of weapons of mass destruction.
Moreover, we must address all these threats preventively, acting at a sufficiently
early stage with the full range of available instruments.
82. We need to ensure that States abide by the security treaties they have signed
so that all can continue to reap the benefit. More consistent monitoring, more
effective implementation and, where necessary, firmer enforcement are essential
if States are to have confidence in multilateral mechanisms and use them to
avoid conflict.
83. These are not theoretical issues but issues of deadly urgency. If we do
not reach a consensus on them this year and start to act on it, we may not have
another chance. This year, if ever, we must transform the United Nations into
the effective instrument for preventing conflict that it was always meant to
be by acting on several key policy and institutional priorities.
84. We must act to ensure that catastrophic terrorism never becomes a reality.
This will require a new global strategy, which begins with Member States agreeing
on a definition of terrorism and including it in a comprehensive convention.
It will also require all States to sign, ratify, implement and comply with comprehensive
conventions against organized crime and corruption. And it will require from
them a commitment to take urgent steps to prevent nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons getting into the hands of terrorist groups.
85. We must revitalize our multilateral frameworks for handling threats from
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The threat posed by these weapons
is not limited to terrorist use. The existence of multilateral instruments to
promote disarmament and prevent proliferation among States has been central
to the maintenance of international peace and security ever since those instruments
were agreed. But they are now in danger of erosion. They must be revitalized
to ensure continued progress on disarmament and to address the growing risk
of a cascade of proliferation, especially in the nuclear field.
86. We must continue to reduce the prevalence and risk of war. This requires
both the emphasis on development outlined in section II above and the strengthening
of tools to deliver the military and civilian support needed to prevent and
end wars as well as to build a sustainable peace. Investment in prevention,
peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding can save millions of lives. If only
two peace agreements had been successfully implemented in the early 1990s —
the Bicesse Accords in Angola and the Arusha Accords in Rwanda — we could
have prevented the deaths of almost three million people.
B. Preventing catastrophic terrorism
Transnational terrorism
87. Terrorism is a threat to all that the United Nations stands for: respect
for human rights, the rule of law, the protection of civilians, tolerance among
peoples and nations, and the peaceful resolution of conflict. It is a threat
that has grown more urgent in the last five years. Transnational networks of
terrorist groups have global reach and make common cause to pose a universal
threat. Such groups profess a desire to acquire nuclear, biological and chemical
weapons and to inflict mass casualties. Even one such attack and the chain of
events it might set off could change our world forever.
88. Our strategy against terrorism must be comprehensive and should be based
on five pillars: it must aim at dissuading people from resorting to terrorism
or supporting it; it must deny terrorists access to funds and materials; it
must deter States from sponsoring terrorism; it must develop State capacity
to defeat terrorism; and it must defend human rights. I urge Member States and
civil society organizations everywhere to join in that strategy.
89. Several steps are urgently required, as described below.
90. We must convince all those who may be tempted to support terrorism that
it is neither an acceptable nor an effective way to advance their cause. But
the moral authority of the United Nations and its strength in condemning terrorism
have been hampered by the inability of Member States to agree on a comprehensive
convention that includes a definition.
91. It is time to set aside debates on so-called “State terrorism”.
The use of force by States is already thoroughly regulated under international
law. And the right to resist occupation must be understood in its true meaning.
It cannot include the right to deliberately kill or maim civilians. I endorse
fully the High-level Panel’s call for a definition of terrorism, which
would make it clear that, in addition to actions already proscribed by existing
conventions, any action constitutes terrorism if it is intended to cause death
or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating
a population or compelling a Government or an international organization to
do or abstain from doing any act. I believe this proposal has clear moral force,
and I strongly urge world leaders to unite behind it and to conclude a comprehensive
convention on terrorism before the end of the sixtieth session of the General
Assembly.
92. It is vital that we deny terrorists access to nuclear materials. This means
consolidating, securing and, when possible, eliminating hazardous materials
and implementing effective export controls. While the Group of Eight Major Industrialized
Countries (G8) and the Security Council have taken important steps to do this,
we need to make sure that these measures are fully enforced and that they reinforce
each other. I urge Member States to complete, without delay, an international
convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism.
93. The threat of biological terrorism differs from that of nuclear terrorism.
There will soon be thousands of laboratories around the world capable of producing
designer bugs with awesome lethal potential. Our best defence against this danger
lies in strengthening public health, and the recommendations to this end contained
in section II above have a double merit: they would both help to address the
scourge of naturally occurring infectious disease and contribute to our safety
against manmade outbreaks. As we commit ourselves to strengthen local health
systems — a task that will take us a generation — we must also ensure
that our existing global response is adequate. The World Health Organization
Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network has done an impressive job in monitoring
and responding to outbreaks of deadly infectious disease, whether natural or
suspicious. But it has done so on a shoestring. I urge Member States to give
it the resources it needs to do the job thoroughly, in all our interests.
94. Terrorists are accountable to no one. We, on the other hand, must never
lose sight of our accountability to citizens all around the world. In our struggle
against terrorism, we must never compromise human rights. When we do so we facilitate
achievement of one of the terrorist’s objectives. By ceding the moral
high ground we provoke tension, hatred and mistrust of Governments among precisely
those parts of the population where terrorists find recruits. I urge Member
States to create a special rapporteur who would report to the Commission on
Human Rights on the compatibility of counter-terrorism measures with international
human rights laws.
Organized crime
95. The threat of terrorism is closely linked to that of organized crime, which
is growing and affects the security of all States. Organized crime contributes
to State weakness, impedes economic growth, fuels many civil wars, regularly
undermines United Nations peacebuilding efforts and provides financing mechanisms
to terrorist groups. Organized criminal groups are also heavily involved in
the illegal smuggling of migrants and trafficking in firearms.
96. In recent years, the United Nations has made important progress in building
a framework of international standards and norms for the fight against organized
crime and corruption, with the adoption or entry into force of several major
conventions and protocols. However, many of the States parties to these treaties
have not implemented them adequately, sometimes because they genuinely lack
the capacity to do so. All States should both ratify and implement these conventions,
while helping each other to strengthen their domestic criminal justice and ruleof-
law systems. And Member States should give adequate resources to the
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime for its key role in overseeing implementation
of the conventions.
C. Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons
97. Multilateral efforts to bridle the dangers of nuclear technology while harnessing
its promise are nearly as old as the United Nations itself. The Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,12 35 years old this
month, has proved indispensable: it has not only diminished nuclear peril but
has also demonstrated the value of multilateral agreements in safeguarding international
peace and security. But today, the Treaty has suffered the first withdrawal
of a party to the Treaty and faces a crisis of confidence and compliance born
of a growing strain on verification and enforcement. The Conference on Disarmament,
for its part, faces a crisis of relevance resulting in part from dysfunctional
decision-making procedures and the paralysis that accompanies them.
98. Progress in both disarmament and non-proliferation is essential and neither
should be held hostage to the other. Recent moves towards disarmament by the
nuclear-weapon States should be recognized. Bilateral agreements, including
the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty signed by the United States and
the Russian Federation, have led to the dismantlement of thousands of nuclear
weapons, accompanied by commitments to further sharp reductions in stockpiles.
However, the unique status of nuclear-weapon States also entails a unique responsibility,
and they must do more, including but not limited to further reductions in their
arsenals of non-strategic nuclear weapons and pursuing arms control agreements
that entail not just dismantlement but irreversibility. They should also reaffirm
their commitment to negative security assurances. Swift negotiation of a fissile
material cut-off treaty is essential. The moratorium on nuclear test explosions
must also be upheld until we can achieve the entry into force of the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. I strongly encourage States parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to endorse these measures at the 2005
Review Conference.
99. The spread of nuclear technology has exacerbated a long-standing tension
within the nuclear regime, arising from the simple fact that the technology
required for civilian nuclear fuel can also be used to develop nuclear weapons.
Measures to mitigate this tension must confront the dangers of nuclear proliferation
but must also take into account the important environmental, energy, economic
and research applications of nuclear technology. First, the verification authority
of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) must be strengthened through
universal adoption of the Model Additional Protocol. Second, while the access
of non-nuclear weapon States to the benefits of nuclear technology should not
be curtailed, we should focus on creating incentives for States to voluntarily
forego the development of domestic uranium enrichment and plutonium separation
capacities, while guaranteeing their supply of the fuel necessary to develop
peaceful uses. One option is an arrangement in which IAEA would act as a guarantor
for the supply of fissile material to civilian nuclear users at market rates.
100. While the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remains
the foundation of the non-proliferation regime, we should welcome recent efforts
to supplement it. These include Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), designed
to prevent non-State actors from gaining access to nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons, technology and materials, and their means of delivery; and the voluntary
Proliferation Security Initiative, under which more and more States are cooperating
to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.
101. The availability of ballistic missiles with extended range and greater
accuracy is of growing concern to many States, as is the spread of shoulder-fired
missiles which could be used by terrorists. Member States should adopt effective
national export controls covering missiles and other means of delivery for nuclear,
biological and chemical weapons, rockets and shoulder-fired missiles, as well
as a ban on transferring any of them to non-State actors. The Security Council
should also consider adopting a resolution aimed at making it harder for terrorists
to acquire or use shoulder-fired missiles.
102. Where progress has been made, it should be consolidated. The 1997 Convention
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on Their Destruction13 calls for the complete
elimination and destruction of chemical weapons by all States parties, thus
offering a historic opportunity to complete a task begun more than a century
ago. States parties to the Convention on Chemical Weapons should recommit themselves
to achieving the scheduled destruction of declared chemical weapons stockpiles.
I call upon all States to accede immediately to the Convention.
103. The 1975 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction14
has enjoyed a remarkable degree of support and adherence, and has been strengthened
further through recent annual meetings. States parties should consolidate the
results of these meetings at the 2006 Review Conference and commit themselves
to further measures to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
I also call upon all States to accede immediately to the Convention and to increase
the transparency of bio-defence programmes.
104. Further efforts are needed to bolster the biological security regime. The
capability of the Secretary-General to investigate suspected use of biological
agents, as authorized by the General Assembly in its resolution 42/37, should
be strengthened to incorporate the latest technology and expertise; and the
Security Council should make use of that capability, consistent with Security
Council resolution 620 (1988).
105. Indeed, the Security Council must be better informed on all matters relevant
to nuclear, chemical and biological threats. I encourage the Council to regularly
invite the Director-General of IAEA and the Director-General of the Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to brief the Council on the status of
safeguards and verification processes. And I myself stand ready, in consultation
with the Director-General of the World Health Organization, to use my powers
under Article 99 of the Charter of the United Nations to call to the attention
of the Security Council any overwhelming outbreak of infectious disease that
threatens international peace and security.
D. Reducing the risk and prevalence of war
106. No task is more fundamental to the United Nations than the prevention and
resolution of deadly conflict. Prevention, in particular, must be central to
all our efforts, from combating poverty and promoting sustainable development;
through strengthening national capacities to manage conflict, promoting democracy
and the rule of law, and curbing the flow of small arms and light weapons; to
directing preventive operational activities, such as the use of good offices,
Security Council
missions and preventive deployments.
107. Member States must ensure that the United Nations has the right structure
and sufficient resources to perform these vital tasks.
Mediation
108. Although it is difficult to demonstrate, the United Nations has almost
certainly prevented many wars by using the Secretary-General’s “good
offices” to help resolve conflicts peacefully. And over the past 15 years,
more civil wars have ended through mediation than in the previous two centuries,
in large part because the United Nations provided leadership, opportunities
for negotiation, strategic coordination and the resources to implement peace
agreements. But we could undoubtedly save many more lives if we had the capacity
and personnel to do so. I urge Member States to allocate additional resources
to the Secretary-General for his good offices function.
Sanctions
109. Sanctions are a vital tool at the disposal of the Security Council for
dealing preventively with threats to international peace and security. They
constitute a necessary middle ground between war and words. In some cases, sanctions
can help to produce agreements. In others, they can be combined with military
pressure to weaken and isolate rebel groups or States that are in flagrant violation
of Security Council resolutions.
110. The use of financial, diplomatic, arms, aviation, travel and commodity
sanctions to target belligerents, in particular the individuals most directly
responsible for reprehensible policies, will continue to be a vital tool in
the United Nations arsenal. All Security Council sanctions should be effectively
implemented and enforced by strengthening State capacity to implement sanctions,
establishing well resourced monitoring mechanisms and mitigating humanitarian
consequences. Given the difficult environments in which sanctions are often
used and the lessons learned in recent years, future sanctions regimes must
also be structured carefully so as to minimize the suffering caused to innocent
third parties — including the civilian populations of targeted States
— and to protect the integrity of the programmes and institutions involved.
Peacekeeping
111. Over the decades, the United Nations has done a great deal to stabilize
zones of conflict, and in the last 15 years or so also to help countries emerge
from conflict, by deploying peacekeeping forces. Since the issuance of the report
of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809, annex),
which led to important reforms in the management of our peacekeeping operations,
the renewed confidence of Member States in United Nations peacekeeping has led
to a surge in demand, with the result that the United Nations now has more missions
on the ground than ever before. The majority of these are in Africa, where —
I regret to say — developed countries are increasingly reluctant to contribute
troops. As a result, our capacity is severely stretched.
112. I appeal to Member States to do more to ensure that the United Nations
has effective capacities for peacekeeping, commensurate with the demands that
they place upon it. In particular, I urge them to improve our deployment options
by creating strategic reserves that can be deployed rapidly, within the framework
of United Nations arrangements. United Nations capacity should not be developed
in competition with the admirable efforts now being made by many regional organizations
but in cooperation with them. Decisions by the European Union to create standby
battle groups, for instance, and by the African Union to create African reserve
capacities, are a very valuable complement to our own efforts. Indeed, I believe
the time is now ripe for a decisive move forward: the establishment of an interlocking
system of peacekeeping capacities that will enable the United Nations to work
with relevant regional organizations in predictable and reliable partnerships.
113. Since the rule of law is an essential element of lasting peace, United
Nations peacekeepers and peacebuilders have a solemn responsibility to respect
the law themselves, and especially to respect the rights of the people whom
it is their mission to help. In the light of recent allegations of misconduct
by United Nations administrators and peacekeepers, the United Nations system
should reaffirm its commitment to respect, adhere to and implement international
law, fundamental human rights and the basic standards of due process. I will
work to strengthen the internal capacity of the United Nations to exercise oversight
of peacekeeping operations, and I remind Member States of their obligation to
prosecute any members of their national contingents who commit crimes or offences
in the States where they are deployed. I am especially troubled by instances
in which United Nations peacekeepers are alleged to have sexually exploited
minors and other vulnerable people, and I have enacted a policy of “zero
tolerance” towards such offences that applies to all personnel engaged
in United Nations operations. I strongly encourage Member States to do the same
with respect to their national contingents.
Peacebuilding
114. Our record of success in mediating and implementing peace agreements is
sadly blemished by some devastating failures. Indeed, several of the most violent
and tragic episodes of the 1990s occurred after the negotiation of peace agreements
— for instance in Angola in 1993 and in Rwanda in 1994. Roughly half of
all countries that emerge from war lapse back into violence within five years.
These two points drive home the message: if we are going to prevent conflict
we must ensure that peace agreements are implemented in a sustained and sustainable
manner. Yet at this very point there is a gaping hole in the United Nations
institutional machinery: no part of the United Nations system effectively addresses
the challenge of helping countries with the transition from war to lasting peace.
I therefore propose to Member States that they create an intergovernmental Peacebuilding
Commission, as well as a Peacebuilding Support Office within the United Nations
Secretariat, to achieve this end.
115. A Peacebuilding Commission could perform the following functions: in the
immediate aftermath of war, improve United Nations planning for sustained recovery,
focusing on early efforts to establish the necessary institutions; help to ensure
predictable financing for early recovery activities, in part by providing an
overview of assessed, voluntary and standing funding mechanisms; improve the
coordination of the many post-conflict activities of the United Nations funds,
programmes and agencies; provide a forum in which the United Nations, major
bilateral donors, troop contributors, relevant regional actors and organizations,
the international financial institutions and the national or transitional Government
of the country concerned can share information about their respective post-conflict
recovery strategies, in the interests of greater coherence; periodically review
progress towards medium-term recovery goals; and extend the period of political
attention to post-conflict recovery. I do not believe that such a body should
have an early warning or monitoring function, but it would be valuable if Member
States could at any stage make use of the Peacebuilding Commission’s advice
and could request assistance from a standing fund for peacebuilding to build
their domestic institutions for reducing conflict, including through strengthening
the rule-of-law institutions.
116. I believe that such a body would best combine efficiency with legitimacy
if it were to report to the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council
in sequence, depending on the phase of the conflict. Simultaneous reporting
lines should be avoided because they will create duplication and confusion.
117. The Peacebuilding Commission would be most effective if its core membership
comprised a sub-set of Security Council members, a similar number of Economic
and Social Council members, leading troop contributors and the major donors
to a standing fund for peacebuilding. In its country-specific operations, the
Peacebuilding Commission should involve the national or transitional authorities,
relevant regional actors and organizations, troop contributors, where applicable,
and the major donors to the specific country.
118. The participation of international financial institutions is vital. I have
started discussions with them to determine how best they can be involved, with
due respect for their mandates and governing arrangements.
119. Once these discussions are completed, in advance of September 2005, I will
present Member States a more fully developed proposal for their consideration.
Small arms, light weapons and landmines
120. The accumulation and proliferation of small arms and light weapons continues
to be a serious threat to peace, stability and sustainable development. Since
the adoption in 2001 of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate
the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects,15
awareness of the problem has grown and there have been various initiatives to
tackle it. We must now begin to make a real difference by ensuring better enforcement
of arms embargoes, strengthening programmes for the disarmament of ex-combatants
and negotiating a legally binding international instrument to regulate the marking
and tracing of small arms and light weapons, as well as one to prevent, combat
and eradicate illicit brokering. I urge Member States to agree on an instrument
to regulate marking and tracing no later than next year’s Review Conference
on the Programme of Action, and to expedite negotiations on an instrument on
illicit brokering.
121. We must also continue our work to remove the scourge of landmines, which
— along with other explosive remnants of war — still kill and maim
innocent people in nearly half the world’s countries and hold back entire
communities from working their way out of poverty. The Convention on the Prohibition
of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and
on Their Destruction,16 supplemented by Amended Protocol II17
to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate effects,18 now has 144 States parties and has
made a real difference on the ground. Transfers of mines have virtually halted,
large tracts of previously mined lands have been cleared and more than 31 million
stockpiled mines have been destroyed. Yet not all States parties to the Convention
have fully implemented it and there are vast stockpiles of mines in the arsenals
of States that remain outside it. I therefore urge States parties to implement
their obligations in full, and call on those States that have not yet done so
to accede to both the Convention and the Protocol at the earliest possible moment.
E. Use of force
122. Finally, an essential part of the consensus we seek must be agreement on
when and how force can be used to defend international peace and security. In
recent years, this issue has deeply divided Member States. They have disagreed
about whether States have the right to use military force pre-emptively, to
defend themselves against imminent threats; whether they have the right to use
it preventively to defend themselves against latent or non-imminent threats;
and whether they have the right — or perhaps the obligation — to
use it protectively to rescue the citizens of other States from genocide or
comparable crimes.
123. Agreement must be reached on these questions if the United Nations is to
be — as it was intended to be — a forum for resolving differences
rather than a mere stage for acting them out. And yet I believe the Charter
of our Organization, as it stands, offers a good basis for the understanding
that we need.
124. Imminent threats are fully covered by Article 51, which safeguards the
inherent right of sovereign States to defend themselves against armed attack.
Lawyers have long recognized that this covers an imminent attack as well as
one that has already happened.
125. Where threats are not imminent but latent, the Charter gives full authority
to the Security Council to use military force, including preventively, to preserve
international peace and security. As to genocide, ethnic cleansing and other
such crimes against humanity, are they not also threats to international peace
and security, against which humanity should be able to look to the Security
Council for protection?
126. The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source
of authority but to make it work better. When considering whether to authorize
or endorse the use of military force, the Council should come to a common view
on how to weigh the seriousness of the threat; the proper purpose of the proposed
military action; whether means short of the use of force might plausibly succeed
in stopping the threat; whether the military option is proportional to the threat
at hand; and whether there is a reasonable chance of success. By undertaking
to make the case for military action in this way, the Council would add transparency
to its deliberations and make its decisions more likely to be respected, by
both Governments and world public opinion. I therefore recommend that the Security
Council adopt a resolution setting out these principles and expressing its intention
to be guided by them when deciding whether to authorize or mandate the use of
force.
IV. Freedom to live in dignity
127. In the Millennium Declaration, Member States stated that they would spare
no effort to promote democracy and strengthen the rule of law, as well as respect
for all internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms. In
so doing, they recognized that while freedom from want and fear are essential
they are not enough. All human beings have the right to be treated with dignity
and respect.
128. The protection and promotion of the universal values of the rule of law,
human rights and democracy are ends in themselves. They are also essential for
a world of justice, opportunity and stability. No security agenda and no drive
for development will be successful unless they are based on the sure foundation
of respect for human dignity.
129. When it comes to laws on the books, no generation has inherited the riches
that we have. We are blessed with what amounts to an international bill of human
rights, among which are impressive norms to protect the weakest among us, including
victims of conflict and persecution. We also enjoy a set of international rules
on everything from trade to the law of the sea, from terrorism to the environment
and from small arms to weapons of mass destruction. Through hard experience,
we have become more conscious of the need to build human rights and rule-of-law
provisions into peace agreements and ensure that they are implemented. And even
harder experience has led us to grapple with the fact that no legal principle
— not even sovereignty — should ever be allowed to shield genocide,
crimes against humanity and mass human suffering.
130. But without implementation, our declarations ring hollow. Without action,
our promises are meaningless. Villagers huddling in fear at the sound of Government
bombing raids or the appearance of murderous militias on the horizon find no
solace in the unimplemented words of the Geneva Conventions, to say nothing
of the international community’s solemn promises of “never again”
when reflecting on the horrors of Rwanda a decade ago. Treaties prohibiting
torture are cold comfort to prisoners abused by their captors, particularly
if the international human rights machinery enables those responsible to hide
behind friends in high places. A warweary population infused with new hope after
the signing of a peace agreement quickly reverts to despair when, instead of
seeing tangible progress towards a Government under the rule of law, it sees
war lords and gang leaders take power and become laws unto themselves. And solemn
commitments to strengthen democracy at home, which all States made in the Millennium
Declaration, remain empty words to those who have never voted for their rulers
and who see no sign that things are changing.
131. To advance a vision of larger freedom, the United Nations and its Member
States must strengthen the normative framework that has been so impressively
advanced over the last six decades. Even more important, we must take concrete
steps to reduce selective application, arbitrary enforcement and breach without
consequence. Those steps would give new life to the commitments made in the
Millennium Declaration.
132. Accordingly, I believe that decisions should be made in 2005 to help strengthen
the rule of law internationally and nationally, enhance the stature and structure
of the human rights machinery of the United Nations and more directly support
efforts to institute and deepen democracy in nations around the globe. We must
also move towards embracing and acting on the “responsibility to protect”
potential or actual victims of massive atrocities. The time has come for Governments
to be held to account, both to their citizens and to each other, for respect
of the dignity of the individual, to which they too often pay only lip service.
We must move from an era of legislation to an era of implementation. Our declared
principles and our common interests demand no less.
A. Rule of law
133. I strongly believe that every nation that proclaims the rule of law at
home must respect it abroad and that every nation that insists on it abroad
must enforce it at home. Indeed, the Millennium Declaration reaffirmed the commitment
of all nations to the rule of law as the all-important framework for advancing
human security and prosperity. Yet in many places, Governments and individuals
continue to violate the rule of law, often without consequences for them but
with deadly consequences for the weak and the vulnerable. In other instances,
those who make no pretence of being bound by the rule of law, such as armed
groups and terrorists, are able to flout it because our peacemaking institutions
and compliance mechanisms are weak. The rule of law as a mere concept is not
enough. New laws must be put into place, old ones must be put into practice
and our institutions must be better equipped to strengthen the rule of law.
134. Nowhere is the gap between rhetoric and reality — between declarations
and deeds — so stark and so deadly as in the field of international humanitarian
law. It cannot be right, when the international community is faced with genocide
or massive human rights abuses, for the United Nations to stand by and let them
unfold to the end, with disastrous consequences for many thousands of innocent
people. I have drawn Member States’ attention to this issue over many
years. On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, I presented
a five-point action plan to prevent genocide. The plan underscored the need
for action to prevent armed conflict, effective measures to protect civilians,
judicial steps to fight impunity, early warning through a Special Adviser on
the Prevention of Genocide, and swift and decisive action when genocide is happening
or about to happen. Much more, however, needs to be done to prevent atrocities
and to ensure that the international community acts promptly when faced with
massive violations.
135. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty and
more recently the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, with its
16 members from all around the world, endorsed what they described as an “emerging
norm that there is a collective responsibility to protect” (see A/59/565,
para. 203). While I am well aware of the sensitivities involved in this issue,
I strongly agree with this approach. I believe that we must embrace the responsibility
to protect, and, when necessary, we must act on it. This responsibility lies,
first and foremost, with each individual State, whose primary raison d’être
and duty is to protect its population. But if national authorities are unable
or unwilling to protect their citizens, then the responsibility shifts to the
international community to use diplomatic, humanitarian and other methods to
help protect the human rights and well-being of civilian populations. When such
methods appear insufficient, the Security Council may out of necessity decide
to take action under the Charter of the United Nations, including enforcement
action, if so required. In this case, as in
others, it should follow the principles set out in section III above.
136. Support for the rule of law must be strengthened by universal participation
in multilateral conventions. At present, many States remain outside the multilateral
conventional framework, in some cases preventing important conventions from
entering into force. Five years ago, I provided special facilities for States
to sign or ratify treaties of which I am the Depositary. This proved a major
success and treaty events have been held annually ever since. This year’s
event will focus on 31 multilateral treaties to help us respond to global challenges,
with emphasis on human rights, refugees, terrorism, organized crime and the
law of the sea. I urge leaders especially to ratify and implement all treaties
relating to the protection of civilians.
137. Effective national legal and judicial institutions are essential to the
success of all our efforts to help societies emerge from a violent past. Yet
the United Nations, other international organizations and member Governments
remain ill-equipped to provide support for such institutions. As I outlined
in my report on the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict
societies (S/2004/616), we lack appropriate assessment and planning capacities,
both in the field and at Headquarters. As a result, assistance is often piecemeal,
slow and ill-suited to the ultimate goal. To help the United Nations realize
its potential in this area, I intend to create a dedicated Rule of Law Assistance
Unit, drawing heavily on existing staff within the United Nations system, in
the proposed Peacebuilding Support Office (see sect. V below) to assist national
efforts to re-establish the rule of law in conflict and post-conflict societies.
138. Justice is a vital component of the rule of law. Enormous progress has
been made with the establishment of the International Criminal Court, the continuing
work of the two ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the
creation of a mixed tribunal in Sierra Leone and hopefully soon in Cambodia
as well. Other important initiatives include commissions of experts and inquiry,
such as those set up for Darfur, Timor-Leste and Côte d’Ivoire.
Yet impunity continues to overshadow advances made in international humanitarian
law, with tragic consequences in the form of flagrant and widespread human rights
abuses continuing to this day. To increase avenues of redress for the victims
of atrocities and deter further horrors, I encourage Member States to cooperate
fully with the International Criminal Court and other international or mixed
war crimes tribunals, and to surrender accused persons to them upon request.
139. The International Court of Justice lies at the centre of the international
system for adjudicating disputes among States. In recent years, the Court’s
docket has grown significantly and a number of disputes have been settled, but
resources remain scarce. There is a need to consider means to strengthen the
work of the Court. I urge those States that have not yet done so to consider
recognizing the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court — generally if possible
or, failing that, at least in specific situations. I also urge all parties to
bear in mind, and make greater use of, the Court’s advisory powers. Measures
should also be taken, with the cooperation of litigating States, to improve
the Court’s working methods and reduce the length of its proceedings.
B. Human rights
140. Human rights are as fundamental to the poor as to the rich, and their protection
is as important to the security and prosperity of the developed world as it
is to that of the developing world. It would be a mistake to treat human rights
as though there were a trade-off to be made between human rights and such goals
as security or development. We only weaken our hand in fighting the horrors
of extreme poverty or terrorism if, in our efforts to do so, we deny the very
human rights that these scourges take away from citizens. Strategies based on
the protection of human rights are vital for both our moral standing and the
practical effectiveness of our actions.
141. Since its establishment, the United Nations has committed itself to striving
for a world of peace and justice grounded in universal respect for human rights
— a mission reaffirmed five years ago by the Millennium Declaration. But
the system for protecting human rights at the international level is today under
considerable strain. Change is needed if the United Nations is to sustain long-term,
high-level engagement on human rights issues, across the range of the Organization’s
work.
142. Important change is already under way. Since the Millennium Declaration,
the United Nations human rights machinery has expanded its protection work,
technical assistance and support for national human rights institutions, so
that international human rights standards are now better implemented in many
countries. Last year, I launched “Action 2”, a global programme
designed to equip United Nations interagency country teams to work with Member
States, at their request, to bolster their national human rights promotion and
protection systems. This programme urgently needs more resources and staff,
including a stronger capacity to train country teams within the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.
143. But technical assistance and long-term institution-building are of little
or no value where the basic principle of protection is being actively violated.
A greater human rights field presence during times of crisis would provide timely
information to United Nations bodies and, when necessary, draw urgent attention
to situations requiring action.
144. The increasing frequency of the Security Council’s invitations to
the High Commissioner to brief it on specific situations shows that there is
now a greater awareness of the need to take human rights into account in resolutions
on peace and security. The High Commissioner must play a more active role in
the deliberations of the Security Council and of the proposed Peacebuilding
Commission, with emphasis on the implementation of relevant provisions in Security
Council resolutions. Indeed, human rights must be incorporated into decision-making
and discussion throughout the work of the Organization. The concept of “mainstreaming”
human rights has gained greater attention in recent years, but it has still
not been adequately reflected in key policy and resource decisions.
145. These observations all point to the need to strengthen the Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights. While the role of the High Commissioner
has expanded in the areas of crisis response, national human rights capacity-building,
support for the Millennium Development Goals and conflict prevention, her Office
remains woefully ill-equipped to respond to the broad range of human rights
challenges facing the international community. Member States’ proclaimed
commitment to human rights must be matched by resources to strengthen the Office’s
ability to discharge its vital mandate. I have asked the High Commissioner to
submit a plan of action within 60 days.
146. The High Commissioner and her Office need to be involved in the whole spectrum
of United Nations activities. But this can only work if the intergovernmental
foundations of our human rights machinery are strong. In section V below, therefore,
I shall make a proposal to transform the body which should be the central pillar
of the United Nations human rights system — the Commission on Human Rights.
147. But the human rights treaty bodies, too, need to be much more effective
and more responsive to violations of the rights that they are mandated to uphold.
The treaty body system remains little known; is compromised by the failure of
many States to report on time if at all, as well as the duplication of reporting
requirements; and is weakened further by poor implementation of recommendations.
Harmonized guidelines on reporting to all treaty bodies should be finalized
and implemented so that these bodies can function as a unified system.
C. Democracy
148. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,19 adopted
by the General Assembly in 1948, enunciated the essentials of democracy. Ever
since its adoption, it has inspired constitution-making in every corner of the
world, and it has contributed greatly to the eventual global acceptance of democracy
as a universal value. The right to choose how they are ruled, and who rules
them, must be the birthright of all people, and its universal achievement must
be a central objective of an Organization devoted to the cause of larger freedom.
149. In the Millennium Declaration, every Member State pledged to strengthen
its capacity to implement the principles and practices of democracy. That same
year, the General Assembly adopted a resolution on promoting and consolidating
democracy.20 More than 100 countries have now signed the Warsaw
Declaration of the Community of Democracies (see A/55/328, annex I), and in
2002 that Community endorsed the Seoul Plan of Action (see A/57/618, annex I),
which listed the essential elements of representative democracy and set forth
a range of measures to promote it. Regional organizations in many parts of the
world have made democracy promotion a core component of their work, and the
emergence of a strong community of global and regional civil society organizations
that promote democratic governance is also encouraging. All of which reinforces
the principle that democracy does not belong to any country or region but is
a universal right.
150. However, commitments must be matched by performance and protecting democracy
requires vigilance. Threats to democracy have by no means ceased to exist. As
we have seen time and again, the transition to democracy is delicate and difficult
and can suffer severe setbacks. The United Nations assists Member States by
supporting emerging democracies with legal, technical and financial assistance
and advice. For example, the United Nations has given concrete support for elections
in more and more countries, often at decisive moments in their history —
more than 20 in the last year alone, including Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq
and Burundi. Similarly, the Organization’s work to improve governance
throughout the developing world and to rebuild the rule of law and State institutions
in war-torn countries is vital to ensuring tha