Michael Steadman v. Jamaica, Communication No. 528/1993,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/528/1993 (2 April 1997).
Michael Steadman v. Jamaica, Communication No.
528/1993, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/528/1993 (2 April 1997).
Distr. RESTRICTED [*] */
CCPR/C/59/D/528/1993
2 April 1997
Original: ENGLISH
------------------------------------------------------------------------
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE
Fifty-ninth session
24 March - 11 April 1997
VIEWS
Communication No. 528/1993
Submitted by:
Michael Steadman
[represented by Mr. T. Hart]
Victim: The
author
State party:
Jamaica
Date of communication: 10 November 1992 (initial submission)
Date of adoption of Views: 2 April 1997
On 2 April 1997, the Human Rights Committee
adopted its Views under article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional
Protocol in respect of communication No. 528/1993. The text of the
Views is appended to the present document.
[ANNEX]
VWS528.59e cb
GE.97-
ANNEX*
Views of the Human Rights Committee under
article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
- Fifty-ninth
session -
concerning
Communication No. 528/1993
Submitted by:
Michael Steadman
[represented by Mr. T. Hart]
Victim: The
author
State party:
Jamaica
Date of communication: 10 November 1992 (initial submission)
Date of decision on
admissibility: 15 March 1995
The Human Rights Committee, established under article 28 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Meeting on 2 April
1997,
Having concluded its
consideration of communication No. 528/1993 submitted to the Human
Rights Committee on behalf of Mr. Michael Steadman under the Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights,
Having taken into account all written information made available to it by the author
of the communication, his counsel and the State party,
Adopts the
following:
Views under article 5, paragraph 4, of the
Optional Protocol
1. The author of the communication is Michael
Steadman, a Jamaican citizen, at the time of submission awaiting
execution at St. Catherine District Prison, Spanish Town. The author
claims to be the victim of a violation by Jamaica of articles 6, 9,
10 and 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. He is represented by Mr. T. Hart.
The facts as submitted by the author
2.1 On 12 December 1985, the author was convicted
of the murder, on 26 June 1983, of one Sylvester Morgan and
sentenced to death by the Home Circuit Court of Kingston. His appeal
was refused on 19 February 1988 by the Jamaican Court of
Appeal. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council refused special
leave to appeal on 21 March 1990. The author's death sentence was
commuted in February 1993.
2.2 The prosecution's case against the author was
that he, together with his co-accused Carlton Collins and two others,
on 26 June 1983, entered a yard belonging to one Charlie Chaplin,
where Collins shot Sylvester Morgan in the head, as a result of which
the latter died. It was alleged that the killing arose out of a joint
enterprise between the author and his co-accused. When the men were
entering the yard, they allegedly said: "watch it, watch it, mek me
shoot the boy". During the trial the author was identified by two
witnesses, 13 and 14 years old, as one of the men participating in
the killing. They testified, however, that they had not seen the
author firing a shot himself, although he had been carrying a gun.
One of the witnesses stated that, after the shot was fired, the
author asked his co-accused: "You sure you shot the boy?". Four other
witnesses testified having seen the author and three others running
away after the incident while carrying guns.
2.3 The author gave a sworn statement to the
effect that he had been at work at the time of the killing. No
witnesses were called to support his alibi, however, and during
cross-examination the author admitted that he had arrived home at
7.20 p.m. that day, while the murder allegedly had been committed
around 7 p.m. The author further alleged that, after his arrest,
the police officer had threatened him and fired shots over his
head.
The complaint
3.1 The author states that he was arrested on 22
July 1983 and charged with murder on 30 July 1983, after having been
detained for eight days without recourse to either a legal adviser, a
member of his family or a friend. Preliminary examinations took place
in August 1983 and September 1984. The author was kept in pre-trial
detention until the start of the trial in December 1985, some 28
months later. According to the author the delay in bringing him to
trial was caused by inadequacies in the Jamaican legal system,
amounting to a violation of articles 9, paragraph 3, and 14,
paragraph 3(c), of the Covenant.
3.2 The author further claims that he was severely
prejudiced by this delay, since the witnesses no longer had the
incident fresh in their minds and had been exposed to local gossip
and publicity, because of which they had lost their impartiality. He
also claims that, because of the lapse of time, potential defence
witnesses could no longer be traced. In this connection, the author
points out that after the preliminary examination in August 1983, he
did not meet with his counsel until the day of the trial.
3.3 The author further alleges that he is a victim
of a violation of article 14, paragraph 3(b) and (d), since
he was denied adequate time and facilities to prepare his defence. In
this context, the author claims that he was deprived of adequate
legal representation, both at his trial and at his appeal to the
Court of Appeal of Jamaica. He submits that the legal aid counsel,
who was originally assigned to represent him, failed to appear at the
preliminary examination, and that he was then represented by a junior
counsel. The author claims that he had no opportunity to instruct his
counsel and that this counsel was only present at the first
preliminary examination. Following the preliminary examination, the
author had no contact with his legal representative until the day of
the trial. He therefore alleges that he was denied the opportunity to
prepare his defence, whereas the Prosecution had some 28 months to
prepare its case.
3.4 As regards the appeal hearing, the author
submits that he was represented by another counsel, who had not
previously been involved in the case. He alleges that this counsel
never communicated with him before the hearing, and that he therefore
was not able to give him instructions as to the grounds of appeal.
During the hearing, counsel submitted that there were no grounds to
appeal the conviction, according to the author thereby effectively
withdrawing his appeal without his consent. Counsel only addressed
the Court on the matter of sentence, claiming that both the author
and the co-accused had been under 18 years of age at the time of the
killing and should therefore not be sentenced to death. The Appeal
Court, however, found that research by the Registrar General had
proven that the author was born on 31 December 1964 and that he was
over the age of 18 years at the time of the murder. As the
Prosecution failed to prove that the author's co-accused was over the
age of 18 at the time of the offence, his sentence was varied to
imprisonment during Her Majesty's pleasure.
3.5 The author further alleges that he was denied
a fair hearing in violation of article 14, paragraph 1, of
the Covenant, because the judge failed to direct the jury properly as
to identification and manslaughter, which were central issues during
the trial. In this connection, the author points out that the
witnesses gave contradictory evidence with regard to the exact hour
of the incident, some claiming that it happened around 7 p.m.,
others around 8 p.m. It is stated that, while it would still have
been light at 7 p.m., it would have been dark at 8 p.m. The
author claims that the darkness would have affected proper
identification of the perpetrators and that the judge should have
alerted the jury to the issue as to whether it was in fact dark,
which he failed to do. He further alleges that the judge failed to
bring to the attention of the jury certain other inconsistencies in
the evidence and to warn the jury properly with regard to the need
for caution in relying on identification evidence.
3.6 The author also claims that the judge did not
direct the jury properly as regards the issue of joint enterprise in
that he did not advert to the possibility that the author's
co-accused, who was alleged to have fired the only shot, might have
gone beyond what was tacitly agreed as part of the joint enterprise.
In this connection, the author points out that the witnesses'
evidence showed that the four men were looking for a Derrick Morgan,
not for the deceased, and that the jury had to decide whether the
author had indeed the intention to kill or do serious harm to the
deceased. The author claims that it was open to the jury to find him
guilty of manslaughter if he started out on an enterprise which
envisaged some degree of violence and his co-accused went beyond the
scope of the enterprise. However the judge allegedly instructed the
jury that the author was to be convicted of murder or
acquitted.
3.7 The author also alleges that he is a victim of
a violation of article 6, paragraph 2, of the Covenant,
since he has been sentenced to death after a trial during which the
provisions of the Covenant were violated. In this connection, the
author refers to the Committee's Views in communication
No. 250/1987.1
3.8 The author finally alleges that he is a victim
of a violation by Jamaica of article 10 of the Covenant, since
the State party fails to provide him with sufficient food, medical or
dental care, and basic necessities for personal hygiene. To support
his claims, the author encloses copy of a report by Professor
W. E. Hellerstein, based on a study of the conditions in
Jamaican prisons, conducted in January 1990.
State party's observations
4. By submission of 19 May 1994, the State party
argues that the communication is inadmissible for failure to exhaust
domestic remedies. In this context, the State party argues that it is
open to the author to seek redress for the alleged violations of his
rights by way of a constitutional motion to the Supreme Court.
5. In a letter, dated 6 February 1995, counsel for
the author refers to his initial communication and states that he has
no further comments to make.
The Committee's admissibility
decision
6.1 At its 53rd session, the Committee considered
the admissibility of the communication.
6.2 The Committee ascertained, as required under
article 5, paragraph 2 (a), of the Optional Protocol,
that the same matter was not being examined under another procedure
of international investigation or settlement.
6.3 The Committee took note of the State party's
claim that the communication was inadmissible for failure to exhaust
domestic remedies. The Committee recalled its prior jurisprudence and
considered that, in the absence of legal aid, a constitutional motion
did not, in the circumstances of the case, constitute an available
remedy which needed to be exhausted for purposes of the Optional
Protocol. In this respect, the Committee therefore found that it was
not precluded by article 5, paragraph 2(b), from
considering the communication.
6.4 The Committee noted that part of the author's
allegations related to the evaluation of evidence and to the
instructions given by the judge to the jury. The Committee referred
to its prior jurisprudence and reiterated that it is generally for
the appellate courts of States parties to the Covenant to evaluate
facts and evidence in a particular case. Similarly, it was not for
the Committee to review specific instructions to the jury by the
trial judge, unless it could be ascertained that the instructions to
the jury were clearly arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice.
The material before the Committee did not show that the trial judge's
instructions or the conduct of the trial suffered from such defects.
Accordingly, this part of the communication was inadmissible as
incompatible with the provisions of the Covenant, pursuant to
article 3 of the Optional Protocol.
6.5 The Committee noted that the author, in
support of his claim under article 10 of the Covenant, only
referred to a general report about conditions in Jamaican prisons.
The Committee considered that, in the absence of any information
concerning the specific situation of the author, this claim had not
been substantiated for purposes of admissibility. This part of the
communication was therefore inadmissible under article 2 of the
Optional Protocol.
6.6 The Committee considered that the author and
his counsel had sufficiently substantiated, for purposes of
admissibility, that the delay in bringing the author to trial and his
continued detention throughout this period might raise issues under
articles 9, paragraph 3, and 14, paragraph 3(c), of the
Covenant, which needed to be examined on the merits. The Committee
also considered that the author's claim that he was denied time and
facilities to prepare his defence and that his counsel effectively
abandoned his appeal might raise issues under article 14,
paragraph 3(b) and (d), which needed to be examined on the
merits.
7. Accordingly, the Human Rights Committee decided
that the communication was admissible in so far as it might raise
issues under articles 9, paragraph 3, and 14,
paragraph 3(b), (c) and (d), juncto article 6,
paragraph 2, of the Covenant.
State party's observations on the merits of the
communication
8.1 By submission of 25 September 1996, the State
party argues that the delay of 28 months between the author's arrest
and the beginning of the trial against him does not constitute a
violation of articles 9, paragraph 3, and 14, paragraph 3(c), because
two preliminary hearings were held during that time. The State party
submits that there is no basis for the assertion that this delay was
undue or prejudicial to the author and points out that witnesses
could have refreshed their memory from their own statements given
shortly after the incident occurred.
8.2 The State party further is of the opinion that
it cannot be held accountable for the manner in which counsel
conducts a trial or argues an appeal.
Issues and proceedings before the
Committee
9. The Human Rights Committee has considered the
present communication in the light of all the information made
available to it by the parties, as provided in article 5, paragraph
1, of the Optional Protocol.
10.1 The author has claimed that the delay in
bringing him to trial, a period of more than 27 months (from his
arrest on 22 July 1983 to the beginning of the trial on 9 December
1985) during which he remained in detention, is in violation of
articles 9, paragraph 3, and 14, paragraph 3(c). The Committee notes
that the author has stated that the preliminary enquiry against him
was held in August 1983 and that the State party has not provided any
information as to why it was adjourned or why the trial did not start
until 26 months later. In the absence of any specific grounds from
the State party, as to why the trial only started 26 months after the
adjournment of the preliminary enquiry, the Committee is of the
opinion that the delay in the instant case was contrary to the State
party's obligation to bring an accused to trial without undue
delay.
10.2 As regards the author's claim that he did not
have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence,
the Committee notes that the information before it shows that the
author was represented at trial by the same counsel who had
represented him at the preliminary examination. The Committee further
notes that neither the author nor counsel ever requested the Court
for more time in the preparation of the defence. In the
circumstances, the Committee finds that the facts before it do not
show a violation of article 14, paragraph 3(b), of the Covenant in
respect to the author's trial.
10.3 The author has further complained that
counsel who was assigned to represent him on appeal, did not contact
him before the appeal, and that he did not advance any grounds for
appeal against conviction. It appears from the judgment of the Court
of Appeal that the author's counsel for the appeal (who had not
represented him at the trial) conceded at the hearing that there were
no arguments that he could put forward to affect the conviction. The
Committee recalls that, while article 14, paragraph 3(d), does not
entitle the accused to choose counsel provided to him free of charge,
measures must be taken to ensure that counsel, once assigned,
provides effective representation in the interests of justice. This
includes consulting with, and informing, the accused if he intends to
withdraw an appeal or to argue before the appellate instances that
the appeal has no merit. While it is not for the Committee to
question counsel's professional judgment that there was no merit in
the appeal against conviction, the Committee considers that in a
capital case, when counsel for the accused concedes that there is no
merit in the appeal, the Court should ascertain whether counsel has
consulted with the accused and informed him accordingly. If not, the
Court must ensure that the accused is so informed, so that he can
consider any other remaining options open to him. In the
circumstances, the Committee concludes that the author was not
effectively represented on appeal, in violation of article 14,
paragraph 3(b) and (d).
10.4 The Committee is of the opinion that the
imposition of a sentence of death upon conclusion of a trial in which
the provisions of the Covenant have not been respected constitutes,
if no further appeal against the sentence is possible, a violation of
article 6 of the Covenant. As the Committee noted in its General
Comment 6(16), the provision that a sentence of death may be imposed
only in accordance with the law and not contrary to the provisions of
the Covenant implies that "the procedural guarantees therein
prescribed must be observed, including the right to a fair hearing by
an independent tribunal, the presumption of innocence, the minimum
guarantees for the defence, and the right to review of conviction and
sentence by a higher tribunal".2 In the present case, since
the final sentence of death was passed without effective
representation for the author on appeal, there has consequently also
been a violation of article 6 of the Covenant.
11. The Human Rights Committee, acting under
article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is of the view that the facts
before it disclose a violation of articles 9, paragraph 3, and 14,
paragraph 3(b), (c) and (d), and consequently of article 6,
paragraph 2, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.
12. Under article 2, paragraph 3(a), of the
Covenant, Mr. Steadman is entitled to an effective remedy. The
Committee is of the opinion that in the circumstances of the case,
the author is entitled to an appropriate remedy. The State party is
under an obligation to ensure that similar violations do not occur in
the future.
13. Bearing in mind that, by becoming a State
party to the Optional Protocol, the State party has recognized the
competence of the Committee to determine whether there has been a
violation of the Covenant or not and that, pursuant to article 2 of
the Covenant, the State party has undertaken to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights recognized in the Covenant and to provide an effective and
enforceable remedy in case a violation has been established, the
Committee wishes to receive from the State party, within 90 days,
information about the measures taken to give effect to the
Committee's Views.
[Adopted in English, French and Spanish, the
English text being the original version. Subsequently to be issued
also in Arabic, Chinese and Russian as part of the annual report to
the General Assembly.]
-*-
__________
*/
Made public by decision of the Human Rights Committee.