Klaus Werenbeck v. Australia, Communication No. 579/1994,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/579/1994 (27 March 1997).
Klaus Werenbeck v. Australia, Communication No.
579/1994, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/579/1994 (27 March 1997).
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CCPR/C/59/D/579/1994
27 March 1997
Original: ENGLISH
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HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE
Fifty-ninth session
24 March - 11 April 1997
DECISIONS
Communication No.
579/1994
Submitted by: Klaus Werenbeck
Victim: The author
State party: Australia
Date of communication: 31 May 1993 (initial
submission)
Date of present
decision:
27 March 1997
[ANNEX]
__________
IDEC579.59e cb
GE.97-
ANNEX **/
Decision of the Human Rights Committee under
the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights
- Fifty-ninth
session -
concerning
Communication No. 579/1994
Submitted by: Klaus
Werenbeck
Victim: The
author
State party:
Australia
Date of communication: 31 May 1993 (initial submission)
The Human Rights Committee, established under article 28 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Meeting on 27 March
1997,
Adopts the
following:
Decision on admissibility
1. The author of the communication is Klaus
Werenbeck, a German citizen who, at the time of submission of the
complaint, was detained in Australia. He claims to be the victim of a
violation by Australia of articles 9, paragraph 3; 10, paragraph 1;
14; 16; and 26 of the Covenant. The Covenant entered into force for
Australia on 13 November 1980, and the Optional Protocol on 25
December 1991.
The facts as submitted by the author
2.1 On 5 June 1989, the author was stopped at
Brisbane Airport on suspicion of illegally having imported narcotics
into Australia. He was formally arrested and charged on 7 June 1989
and brought before the Brisbane Magistrate Court. On 8 March 1990,
after a four day trial, he was convicted of the charge and, on 23
March 1990, sentenced to 13 years and four months' imprisonment
with a recommendation to serve a minimum of six and a half years.
Although the author's lawyers advised him that an appeal would be
ineffective, the author filed an appeal with the Court of Criminal
Appeal on 23 April 1990. On 12 June 1990, the author was
given an extension of time and upon recommendation of the presiding
Judge legal aid was granted to him. On 29 October 1990, the
author's appeal against his conviction was dismissed and his
application for leave to appeal against sentence was refused.
2.2 The case for the prosecution was that the
author, on 5 June 1989, had entered Australia by international
airline from Thailand. When his luggage was checked by Customs
Officers, it was discovered that one of the author's bags had a false
bottom, under which heroin was hidden. The heroin was found to weigh
5.3469 kilograms and amounted to 3.635 kg pure heroin. Upon
questioning, the author stated that he had been told the bag was
valuable and that he was going to be paid $ 32,000 upon delivery of
the bag. He denied, however, that he knew that it was heroin he
transported. Upon discovery of the heroin, the author assisted the
police by keeping the arrangements for the handing over of the bag,
as a result of which other suspects could be arrested.
2.3 The author submits that he did not know at all
that anything of value was hidden in the bag; he states that he was
under the impression that the $ 32,000 he was to be paid was for
building- and business-plans, which were in the bag. The author
further submits that, after his arrest, he acted upon instructions
from the police in his dealings with his Thai contacts, that the
police arranged compromising situations for him and that from those
events no evidence of his guilt can be deduced.
2.4 The author appealed his conviction
inter alia on
the grounds that he had not had enough time to consult with his
solicitor, that he was sick during the trial, that he had often been
unable to follow the translation from English to German during the
trial, that because of the faulty translation he made mistakes
detrimental to his defence, and that no defence witnesses were
called. In the judgment of the Court of Appeal, it is indicated that,
although investigations had been made in relation to the issue of the
translation, counsel for the author was not able to advance this
point any further.
The complaint
3.1 The author claims that his pre-trial detention
of nine months was excessive and in violation of articles 9,
paragraph 3, and 14, paragraph 3(c).
3.2 The author also claims that he is a victim of
a violation of article 10, since he did not receive proper
medical treatment during his detention, as a result of which he was
not feeling well during the trial.
3.3 The author states that at first he was
represented by a private lawyer, but as a result of financial
difficulties this lawyer stopped acting for him, only ten days before
the committal, which took place on 22 September 1989. On 19 September
1989, he was granted legal aid. During the committal hearings he was
represented by a certain lawyer and he wanted this lawyer to defend
him at the trial. However, 11 days before the beginning of the trial
on 5 March 1990 a new lawyer came to see him in prison in
order to prepare the defence and eventually represented him before
the Court. The author claims that these events constitute a violation
of his right under article 14, paragraph 3(b) and (d), to have
adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and
to communicate with counsel of his own choosing. He likewise claims
that the preparation of his defence before the Appeal Court was
insufficient, since the legal aid lawyer came to visit him for the
first time only seven days before the appeal hearing.
3.4 The author further claims that article 14,
paragraph 3(a) and (f), were violated in his case, because he was not
informed in detail and in a language he
understood of the charges against him. He
states that he has only little knowledge of English and therefore
depended on translations and interpretation. He claims that, because
of the bad quality of the interpretation during the trial, he could
only understand half of what was being said, and that as a
consequence mistakes to his disadvantage were made. In particular, he
mistakenly replied in the negative when asked whether he had any
evidence to lead in his defence. Although his counsel was informed of
the author's dissatisfaction, he did not take any steps to improve
the interpretation. He further claims that the translations of his
German statements into English contain mistakes.
3.5 The author also claims that no witnesses were
called on his behalf, despite his repeated requests to counsel. He
submits that he had wanted to call German witnesses to give evidence
about his character and to testify that he went to Australia with the
intention to do business, not to smuggle heroin. He claims that the
failure to call witnesses on his behalf constitutes a violation of
article 14, paragraph 3(e).
3.6 The author further claims that his sentence of
13 years and four months' imprisonment is too harsh and in
violation of article 26. In this connection, he explains that, in
1991, a Lebanese citizen, who was arrested at the airport with two
kilograms of heroin concealed in a bag, was acquitted by the Court.
The author contends that the circumstances in the case were similar,
in particular that both the Lebanese and he were unaware of the fact
that heroin had been concealed in their bags, and claims that his
conviction violates his right to equal protection by the law. In this
context he also alleges a violation of article 16 of the
Covenant.
3.7 The author submits that under Australian law
an appeal to the Court of Appeal can only be argued on points of law.
He claims that this is in violation of article 14, paragraph 5, to
have his conviction reviewed, since a retrial will only be ordered if
the Court of Appeal finds that an error of law has been committed. He
further argues that article 14, paragraph 3(d), was violated during
the appeal, since he was not present during the hearing, although he
had indicated that he desired to be.
3.8 The author submits that his lawyer told him,
after the dismissal of the appeal, that the matter could not be taken
any further and failed to inform him about the possibility of an
appeal to the High Court. Since a case has to be presented to the
High Court within 21 days from the date of the decision of the
lower court, and the author could not do so himself but needed legal
representation to do it, the author claims that he was denied a
review by a higher tribunal, in violation of article 14, paragraph 5.
3.9 Finally, the author complains that during a
transfer from one prison to another sometime in 1991 tapes with
German translations of the English original tapes of the trial, were
lost. Since they could not be located, he was compensated $ 995.
According to the author this amount is too low and he claims
compensation of $ 5,911.
State party's comments on
admissibility
4.1 At the end of January 1996, the State party
submitted its comments on the admissibility of the
communication.
4.2 As regards the author's claim concerning
article 9 of the Covenant, the State party notes that the author was
kept in pre-trial detention from 5 June 1989 until 4 March
1990, prior to the entry into force of the Optional Protocol on 25
December 1991. The State party argues therefore that the claim is
inadmissible ratione
temporis. In this connection, the State
party refers to the Committee's jurisprudence according to which the
test of admissibility ratione
temporis is whether the alleged violations
of human rights continue after the date of entry into force of the
Optional Protocol for the State party concerned or have effects which
in themselves constitute a violation of the Covenant after that date.
The State party further refers to the Committee's decision in
communication No. 520/1992 (E. and
A. K. v. Hungary, declared
inadmissible on 7 April 1994) where the Committee noted that a
continuing violation is to be interpreted as an "affirmation, after
entry into force of the Optional Protocol, by act or by clear
implication of the previous violations". The State party submits that
the author's claim under article 9 of the Covenant is severable from
the other alleged violations and that in imposing sentence on the
author the trial judge made allowance for the period the author had
spent in remand. According to the State party this indicates that
there are no continuing violations or effects of the alleged
violation, rendering the claim inadmissible ratione temporis.
4.3 As regards the author's claim under article 10
of the Covenant, that he did not receive proper medical treatment
during his detention, the State party notes that this allegedly
occurred before 8 March 1990, and that the claim is therefore
inadmissible ratione
temporis.
4.4 Moreover, the State party submits that the
author has not sufficiently substantiated his claim, as required by
rule 90(b) of the Committee's rules of procedure. The State party
notes that the author has not given details concerning his alleged
illness, nor has he submitted details concerning the alleged lack of
medical treatment. The State party notes that the author's claim was
before the Court of Criminal Appeal, which rejected it. The State
party also refers to the author's prison records for the relevant
period of time, which indicate that he was medically examined upon
entering the prison on 3 July 1989, and on three subsequent
occasions, and that no medical conditions were found. The author was
provided with an interpreter during these examinations and the
records do not show any complaints about the medical treatment. The
records do show that the author constantly complained of coldness and
that he was given extra blankets. The State party argues therefore
that the claim is inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional
Protocol.
4.5 As regards the author's claims under article
14 of the Covenant, the State party, noting that the trial against
the author was held from 5 to 8 March 1990, and that his appeal
was dismissed by the Court of Criminal Appeal on 23 April 1990,
argues that his claims are inadmissible ratione temporis. Moreover, the
State party argues that the claim is inadmissible ratione materiae.
4.6 As regards the author's legal representation,
the State party notes that, under the Covenant, no right exists to
legal counsel of one's own choosing when legal assistance is assigned
free of charge, nor to continuous representation by the same legal
counsel. The State party points out that the author benefitted
throughout from public legal counsel provided by the Queensland Legal
Aid Commission. The State party further submits that the author has
failed to substantiate his claim that he had no time to prepare his
defence. The State party notes that public counsel who represented
the author at trial, was experienced and competent in the defence of
criminal matters and that he, at the commencement of the trial, was
satisfied that the matter had been properly prepared. In this
context, the State party points out that the question of preparation
of the defence of an accused in a criminal trial is one of
professional judgment.
4.7 As regards the representation at appeal, the
State party points out that the author was assigned legal aid for the
conduct of his appeal on 7 June 1990. Counsel was
experienced in appeals and had the assistance of an appeal clerk. In
this context, the State party argues that because of the nature of an
appeal, no detailed, if any, instructions are necessary from a client
and that a meeting seven days prior to the appeal is therefore to be
considered sufficient. Had counsel felt unprepared, he would have
asked for an adjournment. The State party submits therefore that the
author's claim is unsubstantiated.
4.8 As regards the author's claim under article
14, paragraph 3(a), the State party submits that the author has
failed to substantiate his claim. The State party refers to sworn
evidence given by a German and English speaking police constable at
trial that the author was informed in detail of the charge against
him in the German language in the evening of 7 June 1989.
4.9 The State party argues that the author has
failed to substantiate his claim under article 14, paragraph 3(f).
The State party submits that the author was provided with free
interpreter and translator services by the Government Translating and
Interpreting Services. At trial an interpreter, a native German
speaker and graduate from Queensland university, with full
qualifications, was appointed. The interpreter's performance record,
for her working period of 1989 to 1994, was outstanding and there is
no record of client dissatisfaction or complaint against her. The
State party further refers to the trial transcript which shows that
the judge provided clear directions for the interpretation of all
that was being said in Court. The State party also notes that the
author has not provided information about the extent or nature of the
alleged mistakes in translation.
4.10 As regards the author's specific claim that,
because of the bad quality of the interpretation, he replied in the
negative when asked whether he had any evidence to lead in his
defence, the State party refers to the trial transcript and notes
that the author was not called as a witness during the trial. When
the author was directly addressed, immediately after the verdict of
guilty had been pronounced against him, he appeared confused, and the
trial was adjourned so as to clarify any possible confusion. The
State party therefore submits that this part of the communication is
also inadmissible for lack of substantiation. The State party further
refers to the judgment of the appeal court in the author's case,
where it is stated that counsel for the author, after having made
investigations into the issue of translation and after having spoken
with the interpreter, was unable to advance the point. The State
party submits that the correctness of translations is a question of
fact, which has been determined by the Court of Appeal, and that the
Committee is not competent to review the determination by the appeal
court.
4.11 As regards the author's claim that no
witnesses were called on his behalf, the State party submits that the
author was given the same powers as the prosecution to compel
attendance of witnesses and to examine or cross-examine witnesses.
The State party states that it was a matter of professional judgment
by the author's legal representative whether to call witnesses for
the defence or not. The State party refers to the Committee's
jurisprudence that a State party cannot be held accountable for
alleged errors made by a defence lawyer, unless it was or should have
been manifest to the judge that the lawyer's behaviour was
incompatible with the interests of justice (Perera v. Australia,
communication No. 536/1993, declared inadmissible on
28 March 1995). The State party concludes that the author
has failed to advance a claim under article 2 of the Optional
Protocol.
4.12 As regards the author's claim that his right
under article 14, paragraph 5, was violated, because the law in
Australia allows only an appeal to be argued on points of law, and
therefore does not constitute a real review, the State party submits
that the appeal procedure in Queensland is compatible with article
14(5), and that the Queensland Court of Criminal Appeal did review
the author's conviction and sentence. In this context, the State
party explains that according to the Queensland Criminal Code, an
appeal against conviction on a question of law can be made without
leave, and an appeal against conviction on a question of fact with
leave of the court, and an appeal against sentence also with leave.
The Criminal Code expressly provides that the Court of Appeal must
allow the appeal if the verdict of the jury is unreasonable or cannot
be supported having regard to the evidence, if the judgment was wrong
in law, and if a miscarriage of justice occurred.
4.13 As regards the author's claim that he was not
present at the appeal hearing, although he had indicated that he
desired to be, the State party refers to the Committee's General
Comment 13 (adopted at the Committee's 21st session) where it is
explained that article 14, paragraph 3(d), means that "the accused or
his lawyer must have the right to act diligently and fearlessly in
pursuing all the available defences and the right to challenge the
conduct of the case if they believe it unfair". The State party
argues that article 14, paragraph 3(d), does not contain an
absolute requirement to have an accused present at the appeal, when
he is being represented by counsel. The State party also submits that
the author has failed to show that the interests of justice would
have been better served if he had been personally present at the
appeal. The State party concludes that the claim is inadmissible
under article 2 of the Optional Protocol.
4.14 As regards the author's claim that he was not
informed that a possibility to appeal to the High Court existed,
effectively preventing him from obtaining a review by a higher
tribunal, in violation of article 14, paragraph 5, the State party
contends that this provision guarantees no right beyond a single
appeal to a higher tribunal. The State party states that the author's
representative on appeal was of the judgment that an application for
special leave to appeal to the High Court would have had no prospect
of success. The State party further submits that conversations
between counsel and clients lie outside the scope of responsibility
of the State party. Moreover, the State party points out that it has
been informed by the Queensland Government that it is standard
procedure to advise each client of his appeal rights to the High
Court and that the appeal clerk, allocated to the author's defence on
appeal at the time, recalls that the author was in fact advised of
his right at the time.
4.15 As regards the author's claim under article
26, the State party argues that it is inadmissible ratione temporis. It also
contends that the claim is inadmissible for lack of substantiation.
In this connection, the State party submits that the acquittal of
another person for a criminal offence under the Federal Customs Act
cannot be relevant to the conviction of the author, since each case
before the courts is judged on its own merits.
4.16 As regards the author's claim under article
16 of the Covenant, the State party argues that the facts of the case
do not raise an issue under this article, since the author exercised
the same legal rights as any other individual brought before a court
in Australia.
4.17 As regards the author's complaint that he
lost six tapes (with German translations of English original tapes)
when being transferred from one prison to another, and that he has
not received sufficient compensation, the State party explains that
the compensation paid was based on the cost to the author to have
these tapes translated. The State party argues that the claim is
inadmissible ratione
temporis, because the tapes were lost some
time before 26 June 1991, i.e. before the entry into force of the
Optional Protocol for Australia, and that no continuing effects exist
which in themselves constitute a violation of the Covenant. The State
party moreover submits that this complaint made by the author does
not raise an issue under the Covenant and that he has failed to
exhaust domestic remedies in respect to his allegation.
5.1 By letter of 1 March 1996, the author comments
on the State party's submission. He argues that his communication is
admissible ratione temporis because the events of which he complains have continuing
effects, since he is still in prison.
5.2 As to the length of his pre-trial detention,
he maintains that this constituted a violation of his rights under
article 9, paragraph 3, and 14, paragraph 3(c), and argues that
the shorter sentence imposed by the judge does not remedy the
violations.
5.3 As to his claim under article 10 of the
Covenant, the author refers to newspaper articles describing the
situation in Australia's prisons, and adds that he was never taken
seriously by the prison system. He reiterates that he was forced to
stand trial while sick.
5.4 As regards his claim that he didn't have
enough time and facilities in preparation for his defence, the author
states that no lawyer came to visit him after the committal hearing
on 22 September 1989 until eleven days before the beginning
of the trial in March 1990. He submits that he therefore had only 11
days to prepare for his defence and that this was not adequate. The
author further claims that under article 14, paragraph 3(b) and (d),
he has a right to choose his own counsel provided to him without
payment.
5.5 As to the interpretation during the trial, the
author maintains that he did not understand everything that was going
on during the trial, despite the judge's directions to the
interpreter and despite the interpreter's qualifications. He further
submits that if his appeal counsel would have consulted him better he
would certainly have been able to advance arguments in support of the
ground of appeal.
5.6 As regards to his claims under articles 16 and
26 of the Covenant, the author refers to his original communication
and reiterates his arguments. He further refers to publications
illustrating the level of corruption in Queensland and argues that
deals between the police, judiciary and Lebanese drug syndicates are
being made regularly.
5.7 In respect to the lost tapes, the author
states that no further domestic remedies exist in practice, since it
is beyond anybody's means to seek review in the Supreme Court. He
maintains that the compensation received does not cover the costs of
the tapes.
State party's further submission and author's
comments thereon
6.1 In September 1996, the State party reaffirmed
its view that the communication is inadmissible. It reiterated that
the author's claim concerning the medical treatment at Brisbane
Correctional Centre (BCC) is inadmissible ratione temporis since he was
detained there only from June 1989 to September 1989. The State party
adds that part of the BCC was closed in November 1989, and the whole
in July 1992, following a recommendation to that effect by the
Commission of Review into Corrective Services in Queensland.
6.2 As regards the author's lost tapes, the State
party maintains that available domestic remedies in the form of
judicial review have not been exhausted by the author. It explains
the procedure of review and rejects the author's assertion that a
review to the Queensland Supreme Court would be too costly, since
only a filing fee of $ 154 is required. Moreover, an applicant
can request the Court for an order regarding the costs, if he does
not have the necessary resources. If the author had availed himself
of the remedy, the Court could have remitted the matter for further
consideration and higher compensation awarded if that had been lawful
and appropriate.
7. In his comments, the author explains that an
application for review to the Queensland Supreme Court, concerning
the compensation for the lost tapes, is no longer possible because
the deadline for filing such an application has expired. He states
that he was not informed by the authorities at the time that he could
file such application. He adds a decision by the Supreme Court in a
review application submitted by another prisoner, which according to
the author shows that this avenue is without prospect.
8. Both State party and author inform the
Committee that, following the author's release on parole, he has left
Australia and now resides in Germany. The author adds that he
maintains his communication.
Issues and proceedings before the
Committee
9.1 Before considering any claim contained in a
communication, the Human Rights Committee must, in accordance with
rule 87 of its rules of procedure, decide whether or not it is
admissible under the Optional Protocol to the Covenant.
9.2 As to the duration of the author's pre-trial
detention - nine months -, the Committee notes that this lasted from
5 June 1989 to 4 March 1990 and thus occurred prior to the entry into
force of the Optional Protocol for Australia. This claim is,
accordingly, inadmissible ratione
temporis, in so far as it relates to
articles 9, paragraph 3, and 14, paragraph 3(c).
9.3 As to the author's claim that he did not
receive adequate medical treatment during his pre-trial detention, in
violation of article 10, paragraph 1, the Committee also notes that
this occurred before March 1990, i.e. once again before the entry
into force of the Optional Protocol for Australia. This claim,
therefore, is also inadmissible ratione
temporis.
9.4 As regards the author's claim that he was
denied the right to communicate with counsel of his own choosing, the
Committee notes that the author was represented by counsel from the
beginning, first by a privately retained lawyer and subsequently by
different legal aid lawyers. The Committee recalls that article 14,
paragraph 3(d), does not entitle an accused to choose counsel
provided free of charge. As regards article 14, paragraph 3(b), the
author has not indicated that he was ever denied access to a counsel
with whom he wished to communicate. The Committee considers therefore
that the author has advanced no claim under article 2 of the Optional
Protocol and that this part of the communication is accordingly
inadmissible.
9.5 As regards the author's claim that he did not
have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence,
the Committee notes that nothing in the information submitted by the
author indicates that he ever complained before or during the trial
to counsel or to the court that he had not had enough time and
facilities to prepare his defence, nor did his counsel inform the
court that he was not ready to present the defence. The Committee
considers that the author has failed to substantiate, for purposes of
admissibility, his claim and that this part of the communication is
equally inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol.
9.6 As regards the author's claim under article
14, paragraph 3(a), the Committee notes that, although the author has
invoked this provision, he has not adduced any facts in support of
his contention that he was not promptly informed and in detail in a
language which he understands of the nature and cause of the charge
against him. This part of the communication is inadmissible under
article 2 of the Optional Protocol.
9.7 As regards the author's allegation that the
quality of the interpretation was poor and that this prejudiced him
in his defence, the Committee notes that the trial transcript shows
that the judge regularly intervened in the hearing of witnesses in
order to facilitate the work of the interpreter. The State party
further has shown that the interpreter during the author's trial had
full professional qualifications. Article 14, paragraph 3(f),
obliges States parties to provide the free assistance of a competent
interpreter if an accused cannot understand or speak the language
used in court. In the instant case, such an interpreter was provided
by the State party, and the Committee notes that the record does not
show any problems with the interpretation. In the circumstances, this
part of the communication is inadmissible under article 2 of the
Optional Protocol.
9.8 As regards the author's claim that the failure
to call witnesses on his behalf constitutes a violation of article
14, paragraph 3(e), the Committee notes that the defence was free to
call any witness, but that the author's counsel, exercising his
professional judgment, chose not to do so. The Committee considers
that the State party cannot be held accountable for alleged errors
made by a defence lawyer, unless it was or should have been manifest
to the judge that the lawyer's behaviour was incompatible with the
interest of justice. In the instant case, there is no reason to
believe that counsel was not using his best judgment, and this part
of the communication is therefore inadmissible under article 2 of the
Optional Protocol.
9.9 As regards the author's claims that he is a
victim of a violation of article 26 and 16 of the Covenant, the
Committee notes that each criminal case is to be examined on its own
merits and that the acquittal of one accused and the conviction of
another as such do not raise issues of recognition as a person or of
equality before the law. This part of the communication is therefore
inadmissible under article 3 of the Optional Protocol, as
incompatible with the provisions of the Covenant.
9.10 As regards the author's claim under article
14, paragraph 5, the Committee notes that the author's appeal with
regard to both conviction and sentence was in fact heard and the
evidence reviewed by the Court of Appeal. This part of the
communication is therefore inadmissible under article 2 of the
Optional Protocol.
9.11 As regards the appeal to the High Court, the
Committee observes that, once a further appeal has been provided by
law, the guarantees of article 14 apply and the convicted person thus
has a right to make use of this appeal.
In the instant case, the Committee notes that the
author has not substantiated, for purposes of admissibility, his
claim that he was denied his right to appeal to the High Court. This
part of the communication is therefore inadmissible under article 2
of the Optional Protocol.
9.12 Finally, the Committee considers that the
issue of the tapes with German translations of English original tapes
of the trial, which were lost during a prison transfer, does not
raise any issue under the Covenant. This part of the communication is
therefore inadmissible under article 3 of the Optional Protocol, as
incompatible with the provisions of the Covenant.
10. The Human Rights Committee therefore
decides:
(a) that the communication is
inadmissible;
(b) that this decision shall be communicated to
the State party and to the author.
[Adopted in English, French and Spanish, the
English text being the original version. Subsequently to be issued
also in Arabic, Chinese and Russian as part of the annual report to
the General Assembly.]
*/
Made public by decision of the Human Rights Committee.
**/ The
following members of the Committee participated in the examination of
the communication: Messrs. Nisuke Ando,
Prafullachandra N. Bhagwati and Thomas Buergenthal, Mrs.
Christine Chanet, Lord Colville, Mr. Omran El Shafei, Mrs. Elizabeth
Evatt, Ms. Pilar Gaitan de Pombo, Messrs. Eckart Klein, David
Kretzmer and Rajsoomer Lallah, Mrs. Cecilia Medina Quiroga, Mrs.
Laure Moghaizel, Messrs. Fausto Pocar, Julio Prado Vallejo, Martin
Scheinin and Maxwell Yalden.