BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR

Both the Constitution and law provide for freedom of worship; however, the Government continued to restrict organized activities of religious groups that it declared to be at variance with state laws and policies. The Government generally allowed persons to practice individual worship in the religion of their choice, but the country's legal framework governing religion requires that the Government officially sanction the organization and activities of all religious denominations.

Respect for religious freedom improved during the period covered by this report; however, a number of positive legal reforms remained in the initial stages of implementation. During the period covered by this report, the Government released a number of religious prisoners, facilitated a long-delayed national convention by one of the country's Protestant organizations, allowed the opening of a new training class for Protestant pastors, and introduced several new, less restrictive legal documents governing religion. In November 2004, the Ordinance on Religion and Belief went into effect and now serves as the primary document governing religious practice. In February 2005, the Prime Minister issued an "Instruction on Protestantism" that directed officials to assist unrecognized religious denominations in registering their activities so that they can practice openly. In March 2005, the implementation decree (number 22) for the new Ordinance on Religion established guidelines for religious denominations to register their activities and seek official recognition. 

Participation in religious activities throughout the country continued to grow, and believers in the Central and Northwest Highlands reported improvements in their situation. However, restrictions on the hierarchies and clergy of religious groups remained in place, and the Government maintained a role supervising recognized religions. Religious figures encountered the greatest restrictions when they engaged in activities that the Government perceived as political activism or a challenge to its rule. Official oversight of recognized religions and harassment or repression of followers of nonrecognized religions varied from locality to locality, often as a result of ignorance of national policy or varying local interpretations of it. Many of the hundreds of Protestant house churches in the Central Highlands that had been ordered to shut down in 2001 were able quietly to resume operations, although most had not yet sought or received official registration. Local officials in Dak Lak continued to block the opening and operation of house churches in that province. There were reports that officials pressured ethnic minority Protestants to recant their faith, but the frequency of such reports was less than in previous years. According to credible reports, the police arbitrarily detained and sometimes beat religious believers, particularly in the mountainous ethnic minority areas. The Government denied these allegations. The estimated number of prisoners and detainees held for religious reasons was at least 6, with a minimum of 15 more suffering various levels of restrictions on their activities including effective house arrest in some cases. 

The relationship among religions in society generally was amicable. In various parts of the country, there were modest levels of interfaith cooperation and dialogue. Religious figures from most major recognized religions participated in official bodies such as the Vietnam Fatherland Front and the National Assembly. 

The U.S. Embassy in Hanoi and the U.S. Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City maintained an active and regular dialogue with senior and working-level government officials to advocate greater religious freedom. The U.S. Ambassador and other U.S. officials, including the Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom, raised concerns about the registration and recognition difficulties faced by religious organizations, the detention and arrest of religious figures, the repression of Protestants in the Central and Northwest Highlands, and other restrictions on religious freedom with the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, government cabinet ministers, Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) leaders, provincial officials, and others. 

In September 2004, the Secretary of State designated Vietnam as a "Country of Particular Concern" under the International Religious Freedom Act for particularly severe violations of religious freedom. In May 2005, the United States and Vietnam concluded an agreement in which the Government set forth a number of commitments to advance and protect religious freedom. 

Section I. Religious Demography 

The country has an area of approximately 127,000 square miles, and its population is approximately 83 million. The Government officially recognizes one Buddhist organization (Buddhists make up approximately 50 percent of the population), the Roman Catholic Church (8 to 10 percent of the population), several Cao Dai organizations (1.5 to 3 percent of the population), one Hoa Hao organization (1.5 to 4 percent of the population), two Protestant organizations (.5 to 2 percent of the population), and one Muslim organization (0.1 percent of the population). Many believers belong to organizations that are not officially recognized by the Government. Most other Vietnamese citizens consider themselves nonreligious, although many practice traditional beliefs such as veneration of ancestors and national heroes. 

Among the country's religious communities, Buddhism is the dominant religious belief. Many Buddhists practice an amalgam of Mahayana Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucian traditions that sometimes is called the country's "triple religion." Some estimates suggest that more than half of the population is at least nominally Buddhist. The Office of Religious Affairs uses a much lower estimate of 12 percent (10 million) practicing Buddhists. Buddhists typically visit pagodas on festival days and have a worldview that is shaped in part by Buddhism, but in reality these beliefs often rely on a very expansive definition of the faith. Many individuals, especially among the ethnic majority Kinh who may not consider themselves Buddhist, nonetheless follow traditional Confucian and Taoist practices and often visit Buddhist temples. One prominent Buddhist official has estimated that approximately 30 percent of Buddhists are devout and practice their faith regularly. Mahayana Buddhists, most of whom are part of the ethnic Kinh majority, are found throughout the country, especially in the populous areas of the northern and southern delta regions. There are proportionately fewer Buddhists in certain highland areas, although migration of Kinh to these areas is changing the distribution somewhat. A Khmer ethnic minority in the south practices Theravada Buddhism. Numbering just over 1 million persons, they live almost exclusively in the Mekong Delta. 

There are an estimated 6 to 8 million Roman Catholics in the country, although official government statistics put the number at 5,570,000. French missionaries introduced Catholicism in the 17th century. In the 1940s, priests in the large Catholic dioceses of Phat Diem and Bui Chu, to the southeast of Hanoi, organized a political association with a militia that fought against the Communist guerrillas until defeated in 1954. Hundreds of thousands of Catholics from the northern part of the country fled to Saigon and the surrounding areas ahead of the 1954 partition of North and South. Catholics live throughout the country, but the largest concentrations remain in the southern provinces around Ho Chi Minh City, in parts of the Central Highlands and in the provinces southeast of Hanoi. Catholicism has revived in many areas, with newly rebuilt or renovated churches in recent years and growing numbers of persons who want to be religious workers. The proportion of Catholics in the population of some provinces appears to be increasing modestly. 

Estimates of the number of Protestants in the country range from the official government figure of 500,000 to claims by churches of 1,600,000 or more. Protestantism in the country dates from 1911, when a Canadian evangelist from the Christian and Missionary Alliance arrived in Danang. The two official recognized Protestant churches are the Southern Evangelical Church of Vietnam (SECV), recognized in 2001, and the much smaller Evangelical Church of Vietnam: North (ECVN), recognized since 1963. The SECV has affiliated churches in all of the southern provinces of the country. The ECVN has 15 approved churches in the northern part of the country. The ECVN also has issued papers of affiliation to over 800 ethnic-minority house churches in the northern and northwestern mountainous regions, although it has not formally applied for official registration of any of these. There are estimates that the growth of Protestant believers has been as much as 600 percent over the past decade, despite government restrictions on proselytizing activities. Many of these persons belong to unregistered evangelical house churches. Based on believers' estimates, two-thirds of Protestants are members of ethnic minorities, including Hmong, Thai, and other minority groups in the Northwest Highlands, and members of ethnic minority groups of the Central Highlands (Ede, Jarai, Bahnar, and Koho, among others). The house church movement in the Northwest was sparked in part by Hmong language radiobroadcasts from the Philippines beginning in the late 1980s. In more recent years, missionaries, mostly ethnic Hmong, have increased evangelism in the area. 

The Cao Dai religion was founded in 1926 in the southern part of the country. Official government statistics put the number of Cao Dai at 2.4 million, although Cao Dai officials routinely claim as many as 4 million adherents. Cao Dai groups are most active in Tay Ninh Province, where the Cao Dai "Holy See" is located, and in Ho Chi Minh City and the Mekong Delta. There are 13 separate groups within the Cao Dai religion; the largest is the Tay Ninh sect, which represents more than half of all Cao Dai believers. The Cao Dai religion is syncretistic, combining elements of many faiths. Its basic belief system is influenced strongly by Mahayana Buddhism, although it recognizes a diverse array of persons who have conveyed divine revelation, including Siddhartha, Jesus, Lao-Tse, Confucius, and Moses. During the 1940s and 1950s, the Cao Dai participated in political and military activities. Their opposition to the communist forces until 1975 was a factor in their repression after 1975. A small Cao Dai organization, the Thien Tien branch, was formally recognized in 1995. The Tay Ninh Cao Dai branch was granted legal recognition in 1997. 

The Hoa Hao branch of Buddhism was founded in the southern part of the country in 1939. Hoa Hao is largely a quietist faith, emphasizing private acts of worship and devotion; it does not have a priesthood and rejects many of the ceremonial aspects of mainstream Buddhism. According to the Government, there are 1.6 million Hoa Hao followers; affiliated expatriate groups estimate that there may be up to 3 million followers. Hoa Hao followers are concentrated in the Mekong Delta, particularly in provinces such as An Giang, where the Hoa Hao were dominant as a political and military as well as a religious force before 1975. Elements of the Hoa Hao were among the last to surrender to communist forces in the Mekong Delta in the summer of 1975. The government-recognized Hoa Hao Administrative Committee was organized in 1999. Many Hoa Hao follow other sects that do not have official recognition. 

Mosques serving the country's small Muslim population, estimated at 65,000 persons, operate in western An Giang Province, Ho Chi Minh City, Hanoi, and provinces in the southern coastal part of the country. The Muslim community is composed mainly of ethnic Cham, although in Ho Chi Minh City and An Giang Province it includes some ethnic Vietnamese and migrants originally from Malaysia, Indonesia, and India. Approximately half of the Muslims in the country practice Sunni Islam. Sunni Muslims are concentrated in five locations around the country. An estimated 15,000 live in Tan Chau district of western An Giang Province, which borders Cambodia. Nearly 3,000 live in western Tay Ninh Province, which also borders Cambodia. More than 5,000 Muslims reside in Ho Chi Minh City, with 2,000 residing in neighboring Dong Nai Province. Another 5,000 live in the south central coastal provinces of Ninh Thuan and Binh Thuan. Approximately 50 percent of Muslims practice Bani Islam, a type of Islam unique to the ethnic Cham who live on the central coast of the country. Bani clerics fast during Ramadan; ordinary Bani followers do not. The Bani Qur'an is an abridged version of approximately 20 pages, written in the Cham language. The Bani also continue to participate in certain traditional Cham festivals, which include prayers to Hindu gods and traditional Cham "mother goddesses." Both groups of Muslims appear to be on cordial terms with the Government and are able to practice their faith freely. They have limited contact with Muslims in foreign countries, such as Malaysia. 

There are several smaller religious communities not recognized by the Government, the largest of which is the Hindu community. Approximately 50,000 ethnic Cham in the south-central coastal area practice a devotional form of Hinduism. Another 4,000 Hindus live in Ho Chi Minh City; some are ethnic Cham but most are Indian or of mixed Indian-Vietnamese descent. 

There are an estimated 6,000 members of the Baha'i Faith, largely concentrated in the south. Prior to 1975, there were an estimated 200,000 believers, according to Baha'i officials. Open Baha'i practice was banned from 1975 to 1992, and the number of believers dropped sharply during this time. Since 1992, the Baha'i have met in unofficial meeting halls. Community leaders say they have good relations with authorities. Some Baha'i members in Ho Chi Minh City were allowed to hold a quiet ceremony to mark the 50th anniversary of the Baha'i Faith in the country in May 2004. 

There are several hundred members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) who are spread throughout the country but live primarily in Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi. Some are pre-1975 converts, while others became Mormons while living abroad. 

At least 10 active but unofficially unrecognized congregations of Jehovah's Witnesses, with several hundred members, are present in the country. Most of the congregations are in the south, with five in Ho Chi Minh City. 

Of the country's approximately 83 million citizens, 14 million or more reportedly do not practice any organized religion. Some sources strictly define those considered to be practicing Buddhists, excluding those whose activities are limited to visiting pagodas on ceremonial holidays. Using this definition, the number of nonreligious persons would be much higher, perhaps as high as 50 million. No statistics are available on the level of participation in formal religious services, but it generally is acknowledged that this number has continued to increase from the early 1990s. 

Ethnic minorities constitute approximately 14 percent of the overall population. The minorities historically have practiced sets of traditional beliefs different from those of the ethnic majority Kinh. Many ethnic minorities have converted to Catholicism or Protestantism. 

Foreign missionaries legally are not permitted to proselytize or perform religious activities. Undeclared missionaries from several countries are active in the country. 

Section II. Status of Religious Freedom 

Legal/Policy Framework 

The Constitution, law, and a 2003 Communist Party Central Committee resolution on religion provide for freedom of belief and worship as well as of nonbelief; however, the Government required the registration of all activities by religious groups and used this requirement to restrict activities in certain cases and some areas. Further, the Government continued to restrict significantly the organized activities of independent religious groups and those individuals who it regarded to be a threat to Party authority. The Government generally allowed persons to practice individual worship freely and to participate in public worship under the leadership of any of the major recognized religions. 

The Government's legal framework governing religion changed significantly during the period covered by this report. The new Ordinance on Religion and Belief came into effect on November 15, 2004. The Ordinance serves as the primary document governing religious practice in Vietnam. It reiterates citizens' rights to freedom of belief, religion, and freedom not to follow a religion, and it states that violations of these freedoms are prohibited. However, it advises that "abuse" of freedom of belief or religion "to undermine the country's peace, independence, and unity" is illegal and warns that religious activities must be suspended if they negatively affect the cultural traditions of the nation. The ordinance continues the practice of government control and oversight of religious organizations. Among its provisions are that religious denominations must be officially recognized by the national-level Government, that individual religious congregations must be recognized by appropriate lower-level authorities, and that the establishment of seminaries and enrollment of classes must be approved by appropriate authorities. The naming of priests or other religious officials requires the approval of authorities only when a "foreign element," such as the Vatican, is involved. The ordinance liberalizes government oversight of religion to some extent. For example, religious organizations are only required to inform appropriate authorities of their annual activities or the promotion and transfer of clerics, while in the past this required explicit official approval. Further, the ordinance encourages religious groups to carry out charitable activities in healthcare and education, which was limited in the past. 

On March 1, the Government issued an implementing decree that provided further guidance on the Ordinance on Religion and Belief. As in the ordinance, the decree explicitly bans forced renunciations of faith. It also delineates specific procedures by which an unrecognized religious organization can register its places of worship, its clerics, and its activities, and thus operate openly. It further provides procedures for these groups to apply for official recognition from the Government to gain additional rights. The decree specifies that a religious organization must have 20 years of "stable religious operation" in the country in order to be recognized by the Government. It states that past operation in the country, even prior to registration, can be counted toward the 20-year requirement. It further sets out specific time periods for the Government to consider requests from religious organizations and requires officials to give organizations an explanation in writing for any application that is rejected. 

On February 4, the Prime Minister issued the "Instruction on Some Tasks Regarding Protestantism." The instruction calls upon authorities to facilitate the requests of recognized Protestant denominations to construct churches and train and appoint pastors. Further, the instruction directs authorities to help unrecognized denominations register their congregations with authorities so that they can practice openly and move towards fulfilling the criteria required for full recognition. Addressing the Central and Northwest Highlands, the instruction guides authorities to help groups of Protestant believers register their religious activities and practice in homes or "suitable locations," even if they do not meet the criteria to establish an official congregation. The instruction allows unregistered "house churches" to operate so long as they are "committed to follow regulations" and are not affiliated with separatist political movements. 

In the spring of 2005, the national-level Committee for Religious Affairs held two conferences for provincial-level religious affairs committees to explain the new legal framework for religion in Vietnam, as defined in these documents. The provincial-level committees were then charged with disseminating information about the new legal framework to district-, commune-, and village-level authorities. Knowledge of the new legal framework at lower levels of the Government was mixed, however. The national-level Committee for Religious Affairs also held three conferences for leaders of officially recognized religious denominations to explain the new legal framework to practitioners. Authorities in some areas actively engaged religious leaders in efforts to implement the changes, while authorities in other areas remained ignorant of the changes. 

The constitutional right of freedom of belief and religion is interpreted and enforced unevenly. In some areas, local officials allow relatively wide latitude to believers; in other provinces, members of nonrecognized religious groups sometimes undergo significant harassment or repression and are subject to the whims and prejudices of local officials. This was true particularly for Protestants in the Central and Northwest Highlands. Subsequent to the issuance of the new legal framework governing religion during this reporting period, 16 new churches were opened in the Central Highlands. At the end of the reporting period, local and, in some areas, provincial authorities were engaged in discussions with religious leaders about registering house churches or recognizing new official congregations. 

National security and national solidarity provisions in the Constitution override many laws providing for religious freedom, and these provisions reportedly have been used to impede religious gatherings and the spread of religion to certain ethnic groups. The Penal Code, as amended in 1997, established penalties for offenses that are defined only vaguely, including "attempting to undermine national unity" by promoting "division between religious believers and nonbelievers." In some cases, particularly involving Hmong Protestants in the Northwest, ethnic minority Protestants in the Central Highlands (sometimes referred to as Montagnard Protestants), and Hoa Hao adherents, when authorities charged persons with practicing religion illegally, they used Article 258 of the Penal Code that allowed for jail terms of up to 3 years for "abus[ing] the rights to freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of belief, religion, assembly, association and other democratic freedoms to infringe upon the interests of the State." 

A 1997 directive on administrative probation gives national and local security officials broad powers to detain and monitor citizens and control where they live and work for up to 2 years if they are believed to be threatening "national security." The authorities in some instances have used administrative probation to impose significant restrictions on the freedom of movement as a means of controlling persons whom they believe hold independent and potentially subversive opinions. Two-year administrative probation terms were placed on four UBCV leaders in October 2003 and remained in effect. 

The Government does not favor a particular religion, and virtually all senior government and CPV officials as well as the vast majority of National Assembly delegates are formally "without religion," although many openly practice traditional ancestor worship and Buddhism. The prominent traditional position of Buddhism does not affect religious freedom for others adversely, including those who wish not to practice a religion. 

The Government requires religious and other groups to register and uses this process to monitor and sometimes attempt to control religious organizations, as it does with all social organizations. 

The Government officially recognizes Buddhist, Roman Catholic, Protestant, Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, and Muslim religious organizations. Individual congregations within each of these religious groups must be registered as well. Some leaders of alternative Buddhist, Protestant, Hoa Hao, and Cao Dai organizations and many believers of these religions do not participate in the government-approved associations. The Implementing Decree of the Ordinance on Religion and Belief, which was issued March 1, clarifies the procedures through which religious organizations and individual religious congregations can seek official recognition. The decree further specified that the appropriate authorities provide a written response to such request within 60 or 90 days, depending on the scope of the request. In the case of a refusal, a specific reason must be included in the written response. However, there is no specific mechanism for appeal given in the Ordinance, nor are the reasons for denying a request delimited in any way. 

Some unrecognized Protestant denominations have indicated that they will seek registration and recognition under the new legal system governing religion. According to the Implementing Decree of the Ordinance on Religion and Belief, however, a 1-year period is required after November 15, 2004 (the effective date of the ordinance) before any new denomination that otherwise fulfills the appropriate criteria can be recognized. To obtain official recognition, a denomination must receive government approval of its leadership, its structure, and the overall scope of its activities. Recognized religious denominations, in principle, are allowed to open, operate, and refurbish places of worship, train religious leaders, and obtain permission for the publication of materials. In addition to denominations requiring recognition as a whole, each individual congregation within a denomination is also required by the ordinance to register. Registration is a somewhat more lenient process that requires the congregation to file with relevant authorities information about its structure, leadership, and activities. Authorities then have 45 days to raise questions or concerns. If no objections are raised, the congregation is legally authorized to operate at the end of this period. New congregations belonging to the SECV have begun to register under this new framework in the Central Highlands province of Gia Lai. 

Except in certain parts of the Central and Northwest Highlands, officially recognized religious organizations are able to operate openly, and followers of these religions are able to worship without harassment. Officially recognized organizations must register their annual activities and the transfer and promotion of clerics with authorities. Holding religious conferences or congresses, opening seminaries, enrolling classes in seminaries, collecting donations from believers, constructing or renovating religious facilities, and participating in religious training courses abroad still require the explicit approval of authorities. The naming of new clerics and the promotion of religious dignitaries, such as bishops, require registration with authorities. However when a "foreign element," such as the Vatican, is involved, official approval is required in advance. 

Because of the lack of meaningful due process in the legal system and inadequate higher-level oversight, the actions of religious adherents are subject to the discretion of local officials in their respective jurisdictions. There are no significant punishments for government officials who do not follow laws protecting religious practice, although a resolution on the victims of miscarriages of justice, issued by the National Assembly in 2003, provides channels for citizens to seek official compensation for some abuses. 

There are no religious national holidays. 

Restrictions on Religious Freedom 

Government practices placed restrictions on religious freedom, although in many areas Buddhists, Catholics, Protestants, Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, and the Government itself reported an increase in religious activity and observance. Officially recognized religious groups faced limitations in obtaining teaching materials, expanding training facilities, publishing religious materials, and expanding the number of clergy in religious training in response to increased demand from congregations. However, there were significant examples of these limitations being eased in comparison to previous years. 

The Government continued to ban and actively discourage participation in certain unrecognized religious groups, including the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV) and some Protestant, Hoa Hao and Cao Dai groups. Organizational activities by many of these groups are illegal, though enforcement of this ban varied widely. 

Some evangelical house churches do not attempt to register because they want to avoid any semblance of government control. Some recognized religious groups carried out underground religious activities that they did not report to the Government and faced little or no harassment. Some nonrecognized Protestant groups also conducted religious services and training with the cognizance of authorities and without noticeable restriction from the Government. 

The Government requires all Buddhist monks to be approved by and work under the officially recognized Buddhist organization, the Vietnam Buddhist Sangha (VBS). The Government influenced the selection of the leadership of the VBS, excluding many leaders and supporters of the pre-1975 UBCV organization. The number of Buddhist seminarians is controlled and limited by the Office of Religious Affairs, although the number of Buddhist academies at the local and provincial levels has increased in recent years in addition to several university-equivalent academies. In November 2004, the VBS broke ground on a new Vietnam Institute of Buddhism in Hanoi. Khmer Theravada Buddhists are allowed a somewhat separate identity within the VBS. 

The Government continued to oppose efforts by the unrecognized UBCV to operate independently. In 2003, senior monks of the UBCV held an organizational meeting without government permission at a monastery in Binh Dinh Province. Subsequent to the meeting, four leading monks of the church were detained and sentenced without trial to 2 years' "administrative detention" in their respective pagodas. Authorities have not provided them with a written decision of their administrative detention, despite the legal requirement to do so. Many other leading UBCV members have been placed under conditions similar to administrative probation and, in some cases, effectively under "house arrest," despite the lack of any charges against them. Patriarch Thich Huyen Quang and deputy leader Thich Quang Do have been placed under similar restrictions, although the Government did not appear to be investigating its allegations of "possession of state secrets" against them. In November 2004, Thich Quang Do attempted to travel to Quy Nhon Province to visit Thich Huyen Quang, who was hospitalized at that time. Thich Quang Do was blocked from doing so and was returned to his pagoda in Ho Chi Minh City under police escort. In June 2005, a group of UBCV monks attempted to visit Thich Huyen Quang in his pagoda but were prevented by police from doing so. Thich Quang Do and Thich Huyen Quang were able to receive visits from foreign diplomats and other UBCV members on occasion during the period covered by this report. 

The Catholic Church hierarchy remained somewhat frustrated by government restrictions, but a number of clergy reported continued easing of government control over church activities in certain dioceses. The Catholic Church continued to face restrictions on the training and ordination of priests and the naming of bishops. The Government effectively maintains veto power over Vatican appointments of bishops; however, in practice it has sought to cooperate with the Church in nominations for appointment. The Vatican and the Government reached agreement on mutually acceptable candidates, and all bishoprics were filled in 2004. The Catholic Church operates 6 seminaries in the country with over 800 students enrolled, as well as a new special training program for "older" students. All students must be approved by local authorities for enrolling in seminary and again prior to their ordination as priests. The Church believes that the number of students being ordained is insufficient to support the growing Catholic population and has indicated it would like to open additional seminaries and enroll new classes more frequently. During this reporting period, the Hanoi seminary received approval to begin enrolling new classes of seminarians annually, as opposed to once every 2 years, as remains the case for all other seminaries. The Church has had an application pending for 5 years to open a new seminary in Dong Nai Province, but this approval continued to be delayed by local authorities. 

The northern Protestant ECVN held its long-delayed national congress in December 2004, the first time it has been able to do so since 1988. The meeting allowed the ECVN to vote on new leadership and set priorities for the development of the Church. The congress had been delayed initially due to government refusal to permit the meeting, and in recent years due to the Church's refusal to accept government interference in the selection of its leaders. ECVN members indicated that the Government gave the Church latitude to elect new leaders at the congress, and the Government showed its approval of the new board by inviting it to meet with the Deputy Prime Minister shortly after the congress adjourned. The southern Protestant SECV held its second national congress March 1 to 4, 2005, at which it elected a new leadership board for the organization. The SECV's first congress was held in 2001. 

The practice of Protestantism remained a contentious issue in Vietnam's Central Highlands provinces. Some ethnic minority "Dega" separatists operating in this region have been linked to the "Dega Church." Credible reports indicated that "Dega Protestantism" mixes religious practice with political activism and ethnic minority separatism. During the period covered by this report, house churches generally reported improved conditions in the Central Highlands provinces of Gia Lai, Kon Tum, and Dak Nong, but close government scrutiny persists. In addition, significant restrictions on all Protestant churches continued to be imposed by authorities in Dak Lak Province. In 2001, the Government ordered almost all unrecognized Protestant house churches and meeting points in the Central Highlands, reportedly numbering in the hundreds, to close. Most of these have been allowed to reopen and operate, although they have not yet sought or received official registration. Local officials in Dak Lak continued to block the opening and operation of house churches in that province. 

In 2003, the Committee on Religious Affairs in Hanoi issued a decree on the "normalization" of Protestantism in the Central Highlands and Binh Phuoc Province, intended to expedite the registration of churches in the region. Eighteen of the 33 southern Protestant SECV congregations in the Central Highlands have been recognized since the issuance of the normalization decree. In April 2005, the SECV opened a Bible school in Gai Lai Province to provide training to the many house church preachers in the region, allowing them to receive formal recognition as pastors. The SECV has sought to open a similar school in Dak Lak Province, as outlined by the 2003 decree, but local officials there remain recalcitrant. Some Protestant preachers in the Central Highlands are suspicious of the SECV due to its official sanction by the Government, and reportedly do not plan to seek affiliation with it. 

The Prime Minister's Instruction on Protestantism instructs officials in the Central Highlands to continue to consider and recognize new chapters of the SECV. Officials are also to register those groups of Protestants who do not yet meet the official requirements as a congregation and "create favorable conditions for them to conduct their normal religious practice at home" or at suitable locations within their village. At the end of the period covered by this report, SECV officials in Gia Lai Province were in discussions with authorities over how to implement the instruction. 

The Government continued its close oversight and, with varying degrees of success, exerted control over religious hierarchies, organized religious activities, and other activities of religious groups through Committees for Religious Affairs at the national and provincial levels. While the committees are tasked with protecting the rights of recognized religious bodies, in practice there are few effective legal remedies for violations of religious freedom committed by government officials, particularly police. However, there have been some anecdotal reports that in some areas local police officials have been rebuked for harassing house churches in contravention of the Prime Minister's Order on Protestantism. 

Many pastors of Protestant denominations such as the Seventh-day Adventists, Mennonites, Baptists, and Assemblies of God do not wish to join the SECV because of doctrinal differences. In many parts of Vietnam, particularly in urban areas, these and other unrecognized Protestant organizations reported that they were able to practice openly and with the knowledge of local officials. While there were notable exceptions, such as with the Ho Chi Minh City Mennonite church led by Le Thi Phu Dzung, as a rule, since early 2005, the level of official harassment of house churches has declined markedly across the country. The Government has held discussions about recognition and registration with leaders of at least four Protestant denominations, including Baptists and Jehovah's Witnesses. 

There is substantial networking among Protestant denominations in Ho Chi Minh City but less in the rest of the country. House churches from pre-1975 denominations generally were reported to have fewer restrictions than those established more recently. 

In the Central Highlands, many religious figures reported that there had been considerable improvements in the situation for house churches in Gai Lai Province. In neighboring Dak Lak Province, however, the Protestant community was restricted to four officially recognized churches. Unrecognized churches had difficulty meeting and Protestant believers were largely able to pray only in their own homes. Nongovernment observers attributed this both to official suspicion by Dak Lak officials and to some links between SECV and house church members and separatist groups. Despite this, the number of Protestants in Dak Lak continued to grow, and several different unrecognized Protestant denominations were active in the province. 

There are no officially recognized Protestant churches in the Northwest Highlands, despite the estimated presence of over 110,000 believers in the region. The Prime Minister's Instruction on Protestantism noted the existence of believers in the Northwest Highlands and instructed officials to guide them in finding "suitable places" to practice their religion. Nonetheless, in April and May 2005, officials from Lai Chau, Ha Giang, and Dien Bien Provinces told foreign diplomats that there were no Christians in their respective provinces. Officials in Lao Cai Province acknowledged the presence of Protestants, and said that, in keeping with Hanoi's instruction, they were seeking to open a dialogue with the Protestants on ways they could appropriately practice their religion. 

The Hoa Hao have faced some restrictions on their religious and political activities since 1975, in part because of their previous armed opposition to the communist forces. After 1975, all administrative offices, places of worship, and social and cultural institutions connected to the Hoa Hao faith were closed. Believers continued to practice their religion at home, but the lack of access to public gathering places contributed to the Hoa Hao community's isolation and fragmentation. In 1999, a new official Hoa Hao body, the Hoa Hao Administrative Council was formed. In the spring of 2005, the Hoa Hao Administrative Council was expanded and renamed the Executive Committee of Hoa Hao Buddhism. Several leaders of the Hoa Hao community, including several pre-1975 leaders, openly criticized the Executive Committee. They claimed that the committee was subservient to the Government and demanded official recognition instead of their own Hoa Hao body, the Hoa Hao Central Buddhist Church (HHCBC). Although still unregistered, on May 4, 2005, the HHCBC held an organizational meeting that was attended by 126 delegates from across the southern part of the country. However, it was not allowed to celebrate the religion's "Foundation Day" on June 24. Two members of the HHCBC, Tran Van Thang and Tran Van Hoang, were arrested on February 25, 2005, and sentenced to 6 and 9 months' imprisonment respectively for unauthorized distribution of audio cassettes and DVDs containing teachings of HHCBC leaders. Another Hoa Hao member, Bui Tan Nha, has been imprisoned since 1997, reportedly for reasons connected to his faith. Several leaders of the HHCBC have complained of police surveillance. The Government continued to restrict the number of clergy that the Hoa Hao can train. 

There are six different officially recognized branches of the Cao Dai Church, in southern Vietnam, as well as several others that remain unrecognized. These sects generally divide along geographic lines. The largest Cao Dai sect is based in Tay Ninh Province, where the religion was founded in 1926 and where the seat of Cao Dai authority is located. The Executive Council of the Tay Ninh Province Cao Dai received official government recognition in 1997. Independent Cao Dai groups allege that government interference has undermined the independence of the Tay Ninh group, and it no longer faithfully upholds Cao Dai principles and traditions. Religious training takes place at individual Cao Dai temples rather than at centralized schools; Cao Dai officials have indicated that they do not wish to open a seminary. 

The Muslim Association of Vietnam was banned in 1975 but reauthorized in 1992. It is the only registered Muslim organization in the country. Association leaders state they are able to practice their faith, including saying daily prayers, fasting during the month of Ramadan, and teaching the Qur'an. Several Muslims undertake the Hajj every year, most of them using assistance provided by foreign sponsors. During the period covered by this report, several Muslim students were studying abroad at the invitation of foreign governments. 

The Government controls and monitors all forms of public assembly, including assembly for religious activities; however, some large religious gatherings have been allowed, such as the Catholic celebrations at La Vang, traditional pilgrimage events such as the Hung Kings' Festival, and the Hoa Hao Founding Day and commemoration of the Founder's death, with attendance estimated at hundreds of thousands each year. House church Protestants have been able to gather in groups of as many as 5,000 for special worship services in Ho Chi Minh City and elsewhere. 

The Government prohibits proselytizing by foreign missionary groups and discourages public proselytizing outside of recognized worship centers, including by Vietnamese citizens. Some missionaries visited the country despite this prohibition and carried on informal proselytizing activities. 

Government policy does not permit persons who belong to unofficial religious groups to speak publicly about their beliefs, but at least some continue to conduct religious training and services without harassment. Members of registered religious organizations in theory are permitted to speak about their beliefs and attempt to persuade others to adopt their religions, at least in recognized places of worship, but are discouraged from doing so elsewhere. 

The Government requires all religious publishing to be done by the Religious Publishing House, which is a part of the Office of Religious Affairs, or by other government-approved publishing houses after the Government first approves the proposed items. A range of Buddhist sacred scriptures, Bibles, and other religious texts and publications are printed by these organizations and are distributed openly. The Religious Publishing House has printed 250,000 copies of parts of the Hoa Hao sacred scriptures, along with 100,000 volumes featuring the Founder's teachings and prophesies; however, Hoa Hao believers reported that the Government continued to restrict the distribution of the full scriptures, specifically the poetry of the Founder. The official Hoa Hao Representative Committee cited a lack of funds, not government restrictions, as the reason why the Hoa Hao scriptures had not yet been published in full. The Muslim Association reportedly was able to print enough copies of the Qur'an in 2000 to distribute one to each Muslim believer in the country. The Bible is printed in Vietnamese, Chinese and English, but not in ethnic minority languages. Some ethnic minority Protestants have had minority-language Bibles that were printed abroad seized by authorities. 

The Government allows travel for religious purposes, but the approval of authorities is required for participation in religious conferences and training courses abroad. Muslims are able to undertake the Hajj, and Buddhist, Catholic, and Protestant officials have generally been able to travel abroad for study and for conferences. Some Protestant house church leaders have alleged that they are unable to obtain passports for international travel, although other unofficial leaders travel internationally on a regular basis. Like other citizens, religious persons who travel abroad sometimes are questioned about their activities upon their return and required to surrender their passports. However, this practice appears to be becoming more infrequent. 

Religious affiliation is indicated on citizens' national identification cards and in "family books," which are household identification documents. In practice, many citizens who consider themselves religious do not indicate this on their identification cards, and government statistics list them as nonreligious. There are no formal prohibitions on changing one's religion. While it is possible to change the entry for religion on national identification cards, many converts may find the procedures overly cumbersome or fear government retribution. Formal conversions appear to be relatively rare, apart from non-Catholics marrying Catholics. The Government does not designate persons' religions on passports. 

The Government allows, and in some cases encourages, links between officially recognized religious bodies and coreligionists in other countries; however, the Government actively discourages contacts between the UBCV and its foreign Buddhist supporters. France-based Buddhist leader Thich Nhat Hanh was permitted to return to the country in January for a 10-week trip, his first after 39 years of exile. Thich Nhat Hanh traveled widely through the country, met with large groups of Buddhist adherents, and spoke to intellectuals and political leaders, including Prime Minister Phan Van Khai. Many of Thich Nhat Hanh's comments were critical of the situation for Buddhist believers, and he called for an end to the practice of Buddhist monks holding public offices and for reconciliation between Buddhist groups. 

Contact between Vatican authorities and Catholics in the country occurs routinely, and the Government maintains a regular, active dialogue with the Vatican on a range of issues, including Church leadership, organizational activities, and the prospect of establishing diplomatic relations. 

Contacts between some unregistered Protestant organizations and their foreign supporters are discouraged but occur regularly, including training and the provision of some financial support and religious materials. The Government is particularly vigilant about contact between separatist "Dega" Protestants in the Central Highlands and their overseas supporters. The Government regards Dega Protestants as a group that uses religion as a rallying point for militant action to establish an independent Dega state. 

Adherence to a religious faith generally does not disadvantage persons in civil, economic, and secular life, although it likely would prevent advancement to higher CPV, government, and military ranks. The military does not have a chaplaincy. Avowed religious practice was formerly a bar to membership in the CPV, but now the CPV claims that tens of thousands of the 2.6 million Communist Party members are religious believers. A 2003 CPV Central Committee resolution on religion called for recruiting and advancing more religious believers into the CPV's ranks. Clergy and believers of various faiths serve in local and provincial government positions and are represented on the National Assembly. In the spring of 2004, the Fatherland Front indicated it was seeking to increase representation by religious believers in People's Councils. CPV and Government officials routinely visited pagodas, temples, and churches, making a special point to visit Protestant churches in the Central Highlands over Christmas. 

The Implementing Decree for the Ordinance on Religion and Belief stipulates that local religious affairs committees must approve the construction of new religious facilities. The renovation of religious facilities requires simple notification of authorities, a relaxation on previous regulations. 

Religious organizations have no legal claim to lands or properties taken over by the State following the end of the 1954 war against French rule and the 1975 Communist victory in the south. Despite this blanket prohibition, authorities, mostly at the provincial level, have returned a limited number of confiscated church properties and remain in discussion on other properties. One of the vice-chairmen of the Government-recognized VBS has stated that approximately 30 percent of Buddhist properties confiscated in Ho Chi Minh City have been returned, and from 5 to 10 percent of all Buddhist properties confiscated in the south have been returned. The Catholic and recognized Protestant organizations have obtained a number of previously confiscated properties but have ongoing disputes with officials over others. Some properties have been returned to the Hoa Hao Administrative Council, but few Cao Dai properties have been returned, according to church leaders. Many of the properties seized in the past were religious schools that are now incorporated into the state school system. 

Although the new Ordinance on Religion and Belief "encourages" religious organizations to conduct charitable activities in education and healthcare, the degree of government oversight of these activities varied greatly among localities. In some areas, especially in the south, Catholic priests and nuns operated kindergartens, orphanages, vocational training centers, and clinics, and engaged in a variety of other humanitarian projects. In Ho Chi Minh City and Hue, the Catholic Church is involved in supporting HIV/AIDS hospices and treatment centers and providing counseling to young persons. In April 2005, Ho Chi Minh City authorities did not allow the Church to open a new clinic for those who tested HIV/AIDS positive. They stated the request would need approval from higher level officials. 

Charitable activities by the Catholic Church are much more restricted in northern Vietnam. The Vietnam Buddhist Sangha engaged in humanitarian activities, including anti-drug programs, in many parts of the country. The officially recognized Hoa Hao organization reported that it engaged in numerous charitable activities and local development projects. Catholic, Protestant, and Buddhist groups are allowed to provide religious education to children. Children also are taught religion and language at Khmer Buddhist pagodas and at mosques outside regular classroom hours. 

The Government does not permit religious instruction in public schools; however, it permits clergy to teach at universities in subjects in which they are qualified. Buddhist monks have lectured at the Ho Chi Minh Political Academy, the main CPV school. Several Catholic nuns and at least one Catholic priest teach at Ho Chi Minh City universities. They are not allowed to wear religious dress when they teach or to identify themselves as clergy. Catholic religious education, on weekends or evenings, is permitted in most areas and has increased in recent years in churches throughout the country. Khmer Theravada Buddhists and Cham Muslims regularly hold religious and language classes outside of normal classroom hours in their respective pagodas and mosques. 

There were no reported anti-Semitic incidents during the period covered by this report. The country's small Jewish population is comprised almost entirely of expatriates. 

Abuses of Religious Freedom 

Reports of abuses of religious freedom diminished during the period covered by this report. However, a significant number of religious believers continued to experience harassment or repression because they operated without legal sanction. Local officials have repressed unregistered Protestant believers in the Central and Northwest Highlands and other areas by forcing church gatherings to cease, closing house churches, and pressuring individuals to renounce their religious beliefs, often unsuccessfully. Restrictions on UBCV leaders remained in place, with much of the group's leadership placed under official or de facto pagoda arrest. Police authorities often questioned persons who held independent religious or political views. There were credible reports that officials arbitrarily detained, physically intimidated, and harassed some persons based, at least in part, on their religious beliefs and practice, particularly in mountainous ethnic minority areas. 

Ho Chi Minh City police regularly targeted for harassment the Mennonite house church led by Le Thi Phu Dzung. Police called Mrs. Dzung in for questioning on several occasions, repeatedly disrupted peaceful church services, and detained groups of followers for short periods. During the period covered by this report, Mrs. Dzung's husband, Mennonite pastor and house church leader Nguyen Hong Quang, was serving a 3-year prison term. Five of his followers were sentenced to between 9 months and 2 years in prison. Quang and his followers were convicted as a result of an incident in March 2004 in which he and several of his followers confronted and scuffled with two individuals they believed to be plainclothed police officers monitoring his residence. Quang and his followers seized a motorcycle belonging to the individuals and then reportedly scuffled again with uniformed officers sent to investigate the incident when the officers attempted to impound the motorcycle. However, some observers connected Quang's arrest to his broader social activism. 

The international nongovernmental organization Human Rights Watch reported that security forces in Kontum Province demolished the chapel of Mennonite Pastor Nguyen Cong Chinh in January and September 2004. Authorities reportedly based their actions on the fact that Chinh had purchased under a false name the land on which the chapel was built. Some observers noted that at least one other unregistered Protestant church operated a short distance away from Chinh's but suffered no harassment. Chinh has reportedly complained that he has been refused issuance of an identity card, which is required for household registration and ownership of property. 

There are credible allegations that Baptist pastor Than Van Truong was involuntarily committed to a mental asylum by authorities in Doing Nai Province in July 2004, as a result of his religious and political activism. He remained there through the end of the period covered by this report. He had previously been kept in pre-trial detention for 8 months for "propagandizing against the government" and under house arrest for 6 months after he was released from pre-trial detention. He was imprisoned in June 2004 for violating the terms of his house arrest but transferred to a mental asylum shortly thereafter. 

In October 2004, Ho Chi Minh City police disrupted an informal religious training session for 17 Hmong pastors in a private house. The Hmong were detained by police overnight and forced to return to their home provinces in the Northwest Highlands the following day. In May 2005, police disrupted a gathering of Protestant students from Hanoi Agricultural University and detained the students for a few hours. Also in May, Protestant House Church preacher Nguyen Van Cam told a reporter that local authorities in Dong Lam Commune of Tien Hai District, Thai Binh Province, had tried on several occasions to convince him to sign documents committing him to stop holding house church services. There are unconfirmed reports that a Methodist church in Xuan Lanh Commune, Dong Xuan District, Phu Yen Province, and a Nazarene Church in Phu Ly Commune, Vinh Cuu District, Dong Nai Province, were harassed by local authorities for holding "illegal gatherings." 

Several leaders of nonrecognized churches in the Central and Northwest Highlands reportedly were harassed or detained and sometimes pressured to renounce their faith, usually without success. 

House churches are frequently tolerated in some places, although their unofficial status often leaves them at the mercy of local authorities. For example, in February 2005, government border guards in Gap Trung village, Hoang Su Phi District, Ha Giang Province, reportedly intimidated local Protestants and blocked them from gathering to hold services in an unofficial house church. At least four house churches in Muong Nha Commune and Pu Nhi Commune of Dien Bien Province were reportedly unable to meet and hold religious services. In April 2005, local officials in Lu Khau Village in Ta Phin Commune of Sapa District reportedly seized the land of twelve ethnic Hmong Protestant families, telling them that God should provide food for them. The land was later returned. In addition, two Protestant believers from this village, Giang A Tinh and Trang A Cam, were reportedly beaten by local officials and urged to sign documents renouncing their faith. Sapa District authorities stated that the land seizures and physical clashes were, in fact, instigated by Hmong clan elders upset that the individuals had abandoned their traditional beliefs, and that when authorities became aware of the situation, they ensured that the land was returned. 

At the end of the reporting period, the Government had not responded to Embassy inquiries about the reason for Hmong Protestant believer Mua Say So's continued detention. According to sources outside the Government, Mua Say So of Dien Bien District, Dien Bien Province, reportedly was detained in 2003 and sentenced to 42 months' imprisonment after accusing police of involvement in the death of his brother, Protestant believer Mua Bua Senh. Religious activists allege that Mua Bua Senh was beaten to death by authorities in 2002 for refusing to renounce his faith. In 2003, the Government informed diplomats that Mua Bua Senh had died of natural causes. 

The repression of Protestantism in the Central Highlands is complicated by the presence of the small "Dega" separatist group, which advocates an autonomous or independent homeland for the indigenous persons who live in the area, particularly in Gia Lai and Dak Lak Provinces. The Dega have links to political advocacy groups residing in the United States, including the Montagnard Foundation, Inc., which has proclaimed itself a Dega "government-in-exile." While many Dega followers are Protestant, the "Dega Church" mixes religious practice with of political activism and ethnic minority separatism. The relationship between the Degas and Protestant believers belonging to the recognized SECV or apolitical house church groups is tense. The Degas reportedly have criticized certain mainstream Protestant pastors, many of whom accuse the Degas of manipulating religion for political purposes. A small number of Protestant pastors in this area reportedly support the establishment of an autonomous "Dega" state; however, the more orthodox majority of Protestant pastors in the Highlands do not. One local Protestant leader estimated that 20 percent of Protestants in his province were actively affiliated with or sympathetic to the Dega. Other estimates of support for the Dega movement are much lower.

On April 10, 2004, several thousand ethnic minority citizens protested against authorities in several districts in the Central Highlands provinces of Dak Lak, Gia Lai, and Dak Nong. Authorities reportedly violently suppressed the protests, including beating or killing some of the protestors. A number of the protestors reportedly resorted to violence as well. Individuals supporting the Dega movement from abroad claimed that restrictions on religious freedom were a significant motivating factor in the protests. The Government, as well as many official and unofficial religious leaders, depicted the protests as being motivated by disputes over land or other socio-economic grievances. 

Outflows of ethnic minority Central Highlanders seeking refugee status in Cambodia continued during the period covered by this report, and were especially numerous from July to December 2004. Potential asylees interviewed by the Office of the United National High Commissioner for Refugees in Cambodia cited disputes over land and continued poverty more than any other reason as the cause of their flight, although religious persecution was also cited. 

In February 2005, police in An Giang Province detained Hoa Hao believers Tran Van Hoang and Tran Van Thanh for distributing unauthorized audio cassettes and DVDs with religious teachings on them. On April 27, authorities sentenced them to 9 and 6 months' imprisonment, respectively. While the two were convicted of illegal distribution of recordings, the extreme rarity with which this regulation is enforced in Vietnam led observers to believe they were targeted as a result of their adherence to the unrecognized HHCBC 

Imprisoned leaders and members of the HHCBC, such as Ha Hai, Truong van Duc, and Nguyen Van Lia, were amnestied during the period covered by this report. 

In August 2004, authorities arrested Hong Thien Hank, leader of the small To Dinh Tan Chieu Minh Cao Dai sect in Tien Giang Province. The Government claimed that Hank had engaged in illegal religious activities, printed and distributed religious information without permission, and defrauded believers. 

Priests and lay brothers of the Catholic order Congregation of the Mother Co-Redemptrix continued to face government restrictions. Founded by Reverend Tran Dinh Thu in Bui Chu Diocese in 1953, the historically anti-communist order re‑established its headquarters in Thu Duc District of Ho Chi Minh City in 1954. In 1988 police surrounded the 15-acre site and arrested all the priests and lay persons inside the compound. With the release in May 2005 of Co-Redemptrix priest Father Pham Minh Tri, only Nguyen Thien Phung remained imprisoned from that episode. His 20-year sentence is due to expire in March 2007. 

Cao Dai believer Ngo Van Thong was arrested in 1983 and sentenced to death by a Tay Ninh provincial court; his sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment. Thong was released in 2001. The Government first reported his release in September 2004. 

There were an estimated six religious prisoners and detainees held at the end of the period covered by this report, although the actual number may be higher. This was a significant reduction from the number of religious prisoners cited in the previous report. The number decreased both due to the release of a number of prisoners of concern and due to clarifications by the Government that many individuals who had been alleged by private groups to be held for religious reasons were, in fact, free. 

It is difficult to determine the exact number of religious detainees and religious prisoners because there is little transparency in the justice system, and it is very difficult to obtain confirmation of when persons are detained, imprisoned, tried, or released. Some observers estimate the number of religious prisoners to be much higher, generally as a result of including individuals arrested for participation in "Dega" separatist groups or in the clashes between police and ethnic minority protestors in April 2004. At the end of the period covered by this report, the only person thought to be held without formal arrest or charge for reasons connected to his or her religious belief was Baptist Pastor Than Van Truong, who was being held in a mental asylum in Dong Nai Province. 

At least 15 other individuals were held in conditions resembling house arrest for reasons related to the expression of their religious beliefs or attempts to form non-authorized religious organizations, despite the apparent lack of any official charges against them. 

Those persons believed to be imprisoned or detained at least in part for the peaceful expression of their religious faith at the end of the period covered by this report included: Catholic priest Nguyen Thien Phung, Protestant believer Mua Say So, Cao Dai believer Hong Thien Hank, and Hoa Hao believers Tran Van Hoang, Tran Van Thanh, and Bui Tan Nha. Hoa Hao and Protestant groups alleged a number of other persons were kept in prison for religious reasons, but these claims could not be verified. UBCV monks Thich Tue Sy, Thich Nguyen Ly, Thich Thanh Huyen, and Thich Dong Tho were given 2-year sentences of administrative probation in 2003. Other religious leaders, including UBCV monks Thich Huyen Quang and Thich Quang Do and Catholic priest Pham Van Loi, were under de facto house arrest. A number of other UBCV, Cao Dai, Catholic, Hoa Hao, and Protestant dignitaries and believers had their movements restricted or were watched and followed by police. 

Forced Religious Conversion 

The implementing decree of the Ordinance on Religion and Belief, released on March 1 states that, "Acts to force citizens to follow a religion or renounce their faith... are not allowed." The Prime Minister's Instruction on Some Tasks Regarding Protestantism, issued February 4, contained a similarly worded statement. While government officials said that forced conversions or renunciation of faith had always been illegal, these were the first legal documents to state so explicitly. Subsequent to the issuance of the implement decree, religious contacts from the Central and Northwest Highlands reported that attempted forced renunciations were less frequent. Nonetheless, several incidents were reported during the period covered by this report. 

On several occasions, local officials in several northwestern villages reportedly attempted to convince or force Hmong Protestants to recant their faith. Local authorities reportedly also encouraged clan elders to pressure members of their extended families to cease practicing Christianity and to return to traditional practices. For example, four Hmong Protestants from Gap Trung Village, Hoang Su Phi District, Ha Giang Province, were reportedly pressured unsuccessfully by Government border guards to sign documents renouncing their faith in April 2005. Similarly, in May, authorities in Cha Cang Commune, Muong Lay District, Dien Bien Province, reportedly pressured believers from several Protestant house churches to construct traditional altars in their homes, and to sign documents renouncing Protestantism. In July and August 2004, authorities reportedly detained without charge more than 100 Hmong Protestants--choosing 1 member from each Protestant family--in at least 5 different communes in Sapa District, Lao Cai Province. The authorities attempted to force the detainees to renounce Protestantism, releasing them only when they promised to do so. 

In the Central Highlands, there were credible reports that local authorities were encouraging ethnic minorities to abandon any affiliation with the "Dega" church and join other Protestant organizations. 

There were no reports of forced religious conversion of minor U.S. citizens who had been abducted or illegally removed from the United States, or of the refusal to allow such citizens to be returned to the United States. 

Abuses by Terrorist Organizations 

There were no reported abuses targeted at specific religions by terrorist organizations during the period covered by this report. 

Improvements and Positive Developments in Respect 
To Religious Freedom 

The status of respect for religious freedom improved during the period covered by this report. Much of the change came through significant revisions to the legal framework governing religion and a lessening of government pressure on Protestant groups. However, at the end of this reporting period, the legal reforms remained in the early stages of implementation. 

The Ordinance on Religion and Belief, which came into effect on November 15, 2004, upheld the principle of freedom of religion and belief. While maintaining the basic rule of close government oversight of religious organizations, it relaxed control of annual religious activities and the promotion and transfer of clerics in most cases by requiring that organizations only inform authorities, rather than seek their explicit approval. Further, the ordinance allows religious organizations to conduct charitable activities in education and healthcare, activities that had been highly restricted in the past. 

The Implementing Decree for the Ordinance on Religion and Belief, issued March 1, 2005, further defined many facets of government oversight of religion. The decree states that acts to force others to renounce their faith are illegal. By setting forth the specific steps necessary for religious organizations to register as a whole and for congregations to register their activities and meeting places, the decree also gives clarity to processes that previously had been left largely to the discretion of local or provincial officials. Further, the decree stipulates that responses to such applications must come in writing and within a specific timeframe, adding further transparency to the process. 

The Prime Minister's "Instruction on Some Tasks Regarding Protestantism," issued on February 4, 2005, urges officials to cooperate with Protestant believers and calls upon authorities to facilitate the requests of recognized Protestant denominations to construct churches and train and appoint pastors. Further, the instruction directs authorities to help unrecognized denominations register their congregations so that they can practice openly and move towards fulfilling the criteria required for full recognition. This stipulation effectively allows unrecognized "house churches" to operate so long as they are "committed to follow regulations" and are not affiliated with separatist movements. 

Dissemination of these laws was a slow process, and, through the end of the period covered by this report, many leaders of places of worship reported that police and other authorities had not implemented fully these new legal codes. In some cases, officials were not aware of them or had not yet seen them. There were anecdotal reports of police and other government officials approaching house church leaders in some areas to inform them of the new regulations. There were reports from parts of the Northwest Highlands that local officials told believers the new laws did not apply to the Northwest. Subsequent to the release of the March 2005 Implementing Decree, when six different house churches from Ha Giang Province attempted to register with local authorities, their applications were not accepted. Despite this, many recognized and unrecognized religious groups reported that they believed the situation for their practitioners continued to improve. 

In some anecdotal examples, a pastor from Ha Giang Province reported that he oversaw 55 congregations, only 1 of which had difficulties with authorities. While previously his practitioners had been forced to meet in small groups and at unusual hours, they now meet openly and during the daytime, with the full knowledge of authorities. In Hanoi, the Catholic Church noted that its long-standing requests to expand the size of its seminary and frequency of classes both were granted. The SECV reported a number of improvements in the Central Highlands. In Gia Lai Province, the SECV was permitted to open a Bible training school for unrecognized preachers, which will potentially lead to a rapid expansion in the number of new pastors in that province. The SECV also opened nine new churches in Gia Lai Province and seven in Dak Nong Province during the period covered by this report. A number of the congregations in Gia Lai were reportedly provided land by provincial authorities on which to construct new church buildings. 

Attendance at religious services continued to increase during the period covered by this report. The number of Buddhist monks and Catholic priests also continued to increase. 

A number of religious prisoners were amnestied or otherwise released from prison during the period covered by this report. Four Hmong Protestants--Vang Chin Sang, Vang Mi Ly, Ly Chin Seng and Ly Xin Quang--from Hoang Su Phi District, Ha Giang Province, who had been sentenced to prison terms from 26 to 36 months in December 2003 after organizing unauthorized religious services, were amnestied in May 2005. Hmong Protestant leader Mua A Chau, who had been detained in Lai Chau Province in March 2003 and sentenced to 36 months in prison for "resisting a person carrying out official duties" after an altercation with police officers, was also amnestied in May 2005. UBCV monk Thich Thien Minh, who had been imprisoned since March 1979, was amnestied in February 2005. He had been sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment for "activities aimed at overthrowing the people's government," reportedly after protesting the destruction of his temple, and to 10 years' imprisonment after an escape attempt. 

Hoa Hao follower Nguyen Van Lia, who had been sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment in October 2003 after holding a commemoration of the disappearance of the Hoa Hao prophet, was amnestied in September 2004. Nguyen Ha Hai, the third-ranking officer of the HHCBC who had been sentenced to 5 years in prison in 2001 for abusing "democratic rights," was released on May 31, 2004, but died of cancer 15 days later. Ho Van Trong, who had been sentenced to 4 years' imprisonment in May 2001 after a group of 60 to 70 individuals attacked a group of Hoa Hao headed by church leader Le Quang Liem, was  released on June 11, 2004. Truong Van Duc, who had been sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment for involvement in the same event, was released in January 2005. Catholic priest Father Nguyen Van Ly, who had been serving a 5-year prison sentence since May 2001 for "damaging the Government's unity policy," was amnestied in May 2005. Also released in May was Catholic Co-Redemptrix priest Father Pham Minh Tri, who had been in prison since 1987. 

Section III. Societal Attitudes 

In general, there are amicable relations among the various religious communities, and there were no known instances of societal discrimination or violence based on religion during the period covered by this report. In Ho Chi Minh City and Hue, there were some ecumenical dialogues among leaders of disparate religious communities. Buddhists, Hoa Hao, and Cao Dai reportedly sometimes cooperate on some social and charitable projects. Various UBCV Buddhists, Catholic, Cao Dai, Protestant, and Hoa Hao activists appeared to network with each other; many of them reportedly formed bonds while serving prison terms at Xuan Loc. On February 15, more than 6,000 people attended an interfaith religious service organized by the Catholic Archdioceses of Ho Chi Minh City to raise awareness of HIV/AIDS. Buddhist, Muslim, Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Protestant leaders also spoke at the service as did leading HCMC officials. 

Section IV. U.S. Government Policy 

In September 2004, the U.S. Secretary of State designated Vietnam a "Country of Particular Concern" (CPC) for the first time for particularly severe violations of religious freedom. Subsequent to this, the Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom, together with the United States Mission in Vietnam, conducted multiple discussions with the Government to urge improvements in religious freedom. 

On June 21, 2005, the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Vietnam discussed the status of religious freedom in the country. In early May, the Deputy Secretary of State visited the country and discussed human rights and religious freedom with high-level government officials. 

On May 5, 2005, the United States and Vietnam concluded an agreement that addresses a number of important religious freedom concerns. Under the agreement, the Government made a number of commitments including: to fully implement the new laws on religious activities and to render previous contradictory regulations obsolete; to instruct local authorities to strictly and completely adhere to the new legislation and ensure their compliance; to facilitate the process by which religious congregations are able to open houses of worship, and; to give special consideration to prisoners and cases of concern raised by the United States during the granting of prisoner amnesties. Dependent upon the Government's fulfillment of these commitments, the United States committed to consider the removal of Vietnam from the CPC list. 

The Embassy in Hanoi and the Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City actively and regularly raised U.S. concerns about religious freedom with a wide variety of CPV leaders and Government officials, including authorities in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Office of Religious Affairs, the Ministry of Public Security, and other offices in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, and the provinces. 

The Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom and staff traveled to various regions of the country on five occasions between 2003 and 2005 to meet religious leaders and government authorities. During an extended visit to Hanoi in March 2005, the Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom, together with the United States Mission in Vietnam, met with senior government officials from four ministries and conducted discussions about next steps after CPC designation. In these discussions, government officials explained the new, less restrictive legal regime it had put in place to govern religion in the country subsequent to CPC designation. Further, Government officials agreed to detail in writing the measures it was taking to ensure that these laws were being implemented throughout the country. 

The National Security Council Senior Director for Asia and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor also raised religious freedom issues with government officials in the country during the period covered by this report. The U.S. Ambassador, the Consul General in Ho Chi Minh City, and other Embassy and Consulate officers have raised religious freedom issues with senior cabinet ministers, including the Prime Minister, two Deputy Prime Ministers, the Foreign Minister, other senior government officials, the head of the Office of Religious Affairs, Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Public Security, officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' External Relations Office in Ho Chi Minh City, chairpersons of Provincial People's Committees around the country, and other officials, particularly in the Central and Northwest Highlands. Embassy and Consulate General officials maintained regular contact with the key government offices responsible for respect for human rights. Embassy and Consulate General officers repeatedly informed government officials that a lack of progress on religious freedom and human rights was a significant impediment in the bilateral relationship. 

The Ambassador and other Mission officers urged recognition of a broad spectrum of religious groups, including members of the UBCV, the Protestant house churches, and dissenting Hoa Hao and Cao Dai groups. They urged greater freedom for recognized religious groups. The Ambassador and other Mission officers repeatedly advocated ending restrictions on Thich Huyen Quang and Thich Quang Do, among others. The Ambassador also requested that the Government investigate alleged abuses of religious believers and punish any officials found to be responsible. They, along with the Ambassador at Large for Religious Freedom and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, continued to urge an end to forced renunciations and the punishment of officials involved, and to call for the registration and re-opening of house churches that had been closed. 

Representatives of the Embassy and the Consulate General have frequent contact with leaders of major religious communities, including Buddhists, Catholics, Protestants, Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Muslims. In November 2004, the Ambassador met with UBCV Patriarch Thich Huyen Quang while he was under conditions resembling house arrest at his pagoda, and in December, he met with UBCV monk Thich Quang Do. Consulate General officers maintained regular contact with these and other UBCV Buddhist monks. Embassy and Consulate General officers met with the cardinal of Ho Chi Minh City, the Catholic archbishops of Hue and Hanoi, and the bishops of Gia Lai, Kontum, Can Tho, Lang Son, Buon Ma Thuot, and Haiphong as well as other members of the Episcopal Conference. Embassy and Consulate General officers also met repeatedly with leaders of various Protestant house churches and with leaders of the Muslim community. When traveling outside of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, Embassy and Consulate General officers regularly met with provincial Religious Affairs Committees, village elders, local clergy, and believers. 

U.S. Government pressure may have had an immediate impact in some cases of imprisonment for religious reasons. Thirteen individuals raised by the United States as prisoners of concern for reasons connected to their faith were freed by the Government during the period covered by this report. In broader terms, some religious sources have cited diplomatic intervention, primarily from the United States, as a reason why the Government is seeking to legalize more religious groups and is allowing already legalized groups more freedom.

 

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2)Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Vietnam ( U.S. Dept. of State)

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor

2005

March 8, 2006

The Socialist Republic of Vietnam is an authoritarian state, ruled and controlled by the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV). Its population is approximately 83.5 million. The CPV's constitutionally mandated primacy and the continued occupancy of all senior government positions by party members allowed it to set the broad parameters of national policy. However, the CPV continued to reduce its formal involvement in government operations and allowed the government to exercise significant discretion in implementing policy. The most recent elections to choose members of the National Assembly, held in 2002, were neither free nor fair, since all candidates were chosen and vetted by the CPV's Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF), an umbrella group that monitors the country's popular organizations. The National Assembly remained subject to CPV direction; however, the government continued to strengthen the assembly's capacity. The civilian authorities generally maintained effective control of the security forces.

The government's human rights record remained unsatisfactory. Government officials, particularly at the local level, continued to commit serious abuses, despite improvement during the year. Economic developments remained a major influence on the human rights situation as the country carried on with its rapid transition from a centrally planned economy to a "socialist‑oriented market economy." Economic reforms and the rising standard of living continued to reduce CPV and government control over, and intrusion into, daily life. However, many persons in isolated rural areas--including members of ethnic minority groups in the Northwest Highlands, Central Highlands, and the central coastal regions--continued to live in extreme poverty. The government continued to seek greater (primarily economic) links with the outside world, with some parallel change in attitude toward human rights. Thus the more urban areas of the country continued to show improvement in this respect, while the Central and Northwest Highlands remained areas of international concern. The following human rights problems were reported: 

During the year the government took steps to improve respect for human rights, including worker rights. Unlike in previous years, there were no credible reports of killings or disappearances by security forces. The government amnestied more than 26 thousand prisoners, including several high-profile prisoners‑of‑conscience. The government implemented an agreement with Cambodia and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to facilitate the return of nearly 200 ethnic minority citizens to the Central Highlands from Cambodia, and it provided access and facilitated travel to the Central Highlands for UNHCR and foreign mission staffs to monitor the progress and treatment of returnees. The government created a new and relatively more open legal framework for religious freedom, which, for example, resulted in improved conditions for Protestant house churches in the southern and central areas of the country, eased restrictions on the training of Catholic and Buddhist clergy, and accepted applications for some previously unrecognized ethnic minority Protestant congregations in the Northwest Highlands to register for worship, although by year's end none had received permission to do so.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From:

a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life 

The government or its agents did not commit any politically motivated killings; in addition, unlike in previous years, there were no credible reports of extrajudicial killings by security forces. 

In April 2004 ethnic minorities protested in numerous locations in the central highlands provinces of Dak Nong, Dak Lak, and Gia Lai. In a number of cases, police reportedly responded by beating and firing upon demonstrators. The government reported the deaths of three protesters, allegedly all at the hands of other demonstrators. Credible estimates put the number of protesters killed by police at 10 to 12; some international organizations alleged that the figures were much higher (see section 2.b.). Following the protests, the government increased efforts to provide development assistance to ethnic minority areas in the Central Highlands. In some jurisdictions it also eased restrictions on Protestant groups. 

No action was taken against officials involved in the 2003 killings of Protestant devotee Vang Seo Giao or Tran Minh Duc. There also were no developments in the 2002 killings of Nguyen Ngoc Chau, Khong Van Thoi, and Pham Van Dung. 

b. Disappearance 

Unlike in previous years, there were no credible reports of politically motivated disappearances. 

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 

The law prohibits physical abuse; however, police sometimes physically mistreated suspects while arresting them or holding them in custody. In mid‑September local officials in the central highland province of Gia Lai reportedly beat two ethnic Dao Protestants, who were subsequently hospitalized for five days. Provincial government authorities reportedly were investigating the incident, but at year's end no official had been reprimanded. As in previous years, a small number of allegations were made that police, particularly in the Northwest Highlands, beat suspects, mainly ethnic minority Protestants, to the point of unconsciousness while also forcing them to perform acts against their religious beliefs such as consuming alcohol. However, other sources were not able to verify or confirm these allegations. 

In October 2004 Dong Nai provincial police and prosecutors ordered the involuntary commitment of Protestant Than Van Truong to a mental institution. Officials stated that Truong demonstrated delusional behavior in his religious beliefs, although officials acknowledged that Truong did not pose a violent threat. The offense that called the attention of law enforcement authorities was Truong's letters to senior CPV and government officials urging them to abandon Marxism‑Leninism and follow the Christian faith. Truong was released in September, apparently on the condition that he sign a document certifying his mental illness, making him subject to readmission to a mental institution should he "relapse." 

There were no developments in the 2003 incident in which militia soldiers and local officials in the village of Nam Nga, Lai Chau Province, reportedly raped two girls, destroyed several houses, killed livestock, and destroyed fences, allowing animals to enter fields and trample crops, in an attempt to punish individuals in the village for practicing Protestantism. 

Prison and Detention Center Conditions 

Prison conditions reportedly often were harsh but generally did not threaten the lives of prisoners. Overcrowding, insufficient diet, and poor sanitation remained serious problems in many prisons. Most prisoners had access to basic health care. Prisoners generally were required to work but received no wages (see section 6.c.). In 2004 diplomatic observers reported Spartan but generally acceptable conditions in two prisons. Prisoners, including those held for political reasons, reportedly were sometimes moved to solitary confinement, where they were deprived of reading and writing materials, for periods of up to several months. 

Although political and religious prisoners often were confined under harsh conditions, there was no evidence to suggest their conditions were significantly different than those for the regular prison population. In some instances they received better treatment, including better rations and access to care packages from home, than those in the general prison population. 

During the year the government did not permit the International Committee of the Red Cross, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), or diplomatic observers to visit prisons. 

d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention 

The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the government continued to arrest and detain citizens for the peaceful expression of their views. 

Role of the Police and Security Apparatus 

Internal security primarily is the responsibility of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS); however, in some remote areas the military is the primary government agency and provides public safety functions, including maintaining public order in the event of civil unrest. The MPS controls the police, a special national security investigative agency, and other internal security units. It also maintained a system of household registration and block wardens to monitor the population, concentrating on those suspected of engaging, or being likely to engage in, unauthorized political activities; however, this system has become less pervasive in its intrusion into most citizens' daily lives. 

Police organizations exist at the provincial, district, and local levels and are subject to the authority of the people's committees at each level. The police were generally effective at maintaining political stability and public order, but police capacities, especially investigative, were very low. Police training and resources were inadequate. Corruption was a significant problem among the police force at all levels. Internal police oversight structures existed but were subject to political influence. 

Arrest and Detention 

The Supreme People's Procuracy (the public prosecutor) issues arrest warrants, generally at the request of police; however, police may make an arrest without a warrant on the basis of a complaint filed by any person. In such cases the public prosecutor must issue retroactive arrest warrants. 

After police detain a suspect, a judge must issue a decision to initiate a formal criminal investigation within nine days, or police must release the suspect. Under the criminal code, this investigative period may last from 3 months for "less serious" offenses (those that may result in less than 3 years' imprisonment) to 16 months for "exceptionally serious" offenses (those that may result in more than 15 years' imprisonment, life imprisonment, or capital punishment), and an additional 4 months for national security cases. The code further permits the public prosecutor an additional two months at the end of the investigation to consider whether to prosecute the detained person or return the case to the police for additional investigation. There is no legal limit on the time within which a judge's panel (a body consisting of at least one judge and two lay assessors) must rule on a case (see section 1.e.). Time spent in pretrial detention counts toward time served upon conviction and sentencing. Although the criminal code allows for the operation of a bail system, in practice no such system existed. 

The criminal procedure code allows pretrial detainees access to their lawyers from the point of detention; however, bureaucratic delays frequently limited initial contact between detainees and their lawyers, and some detainees, particularly political activists, were not permitted regular access by lawyers until shortly before their trials. The code also provides that during the investigative period, defense lawyers be informed of interrogations and also be able to attend them, be given access to case files, and be permitted to make copies of documents in the files. Legal experts reported that defense attorneys were able to exercise these rights. However, a defendant first must request the presence of a lawyer, and it was not clear whether authorities always advised defendants of their new rights. In national security cases, defense lawyers were granted access to clients only after an investigation had ended. 

Although the constitution provides for legal counsel for all persons accused of criminal offenses, a scarcity of trained lawyers made this provision difficult to implement. Counsel generally was provided only to those charged with crimes that could lead to life imprisonment or the death penalty. Prior to being formally charged, a detainee has a statutory right to notify family members, and police generally informed the family of the detainee's whereabouts. However, family members may visit a detainee only with the permission of the investigator. 

Courts may sentence persons to administrative detention of up to five years after completion of a sentence. In addition police or mass organizations can propose that five "administrative measures" be imposed by people's committee chairpersons at district and provincial levels without a trial. The measures include terms ranging from six months to two years in either juvenile reformatories or adult detention centers and generally were applied to repeat offenders with a record of minor offenses such as committing petty theft or "humiliating other persons." Chairpersons may also impose terms of "administrative probation," which generally has been some form of restriction on movement and travel. 

Following his February release from prison under the amnesty program, Catholic priest Nguyen Van Ly reported that he remained under administrative probation. However, he was able to travel within the country with the prior approval of Thua Thien Hue provincial officials. Senior leaders of the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV) reported that they remained under effective "pagoda arrest," although government officials denied that such orders existed. In 2004 UBCV leaders and at least one Hoa Hao follower remained under formal administrative detention. A number of Buddhist, Catholic, and Protestant clerics, as well as some writers and political activists, were subject to varying degrees of informal detention in their residences (see sections 2.c. and 2.d.). In 2003 the people's committee chairman of Ho Chi Minh City reportedly sentenced four UBCV monks to two years' house arrest. 

Authorities in the Central Highlands continued to prosecute ethnic minority members whom the government alleged were involved in separatist activities or in helping other individuals illegally cross into Cambodia. Government press reports indicated that at least 15 ethnic minority persons were convicted and sentenced to prison terms of 2 to 13 years. There were credible reports that in at least two instances during the year, one in Dak Lak and one in Gia Lai, some of these persons were held for lengthy periods without trial. One of the individuals reportedly was held and tried in secret. 

Citizens seeking to exercise freedom of religion, assembly, and expression were at times detained by security forces for several days. In particular there were numerous reports that government officials in the Central and Northwest Highlands temporarily detained ethnic minority Protestant believers. During July and August 2004 in Sapa District, Lao Cai Province, authorities detained without charge numerous ethnic minority Hmong Protestants in at least eight different communes (see section 2.c.). 

On occasion foreign citizens were detained and interrogated. In May two foreign citizens were detained by local authorities in Gia Lai Province, questioned for two days before being fined for having been in a restricted area, and released. In July 2004 foreign citizen Larry Linh Nguyen was held for seven days and interrogated about his alleged affiliation with Vietnamese‑American political groups opposed to the CPV. Foreign citizen Hoang The Lan was detained by public security officers in August 2004 in Soc Trang and interrogated for four days about his involvement with groups that advocate democracy in Vietnam before being released. 

The government held at least eight political detainees at year's end, according to international NGOs and diplomatic observers. In general the government refused to allow access to political detainees for international humanitarian organizations. 

Amnesty 

During the year the government amnestied 26,688 prisoners, in 3 groups, a significant increase from previous years' holiday amnesties. Several high‑profile prisoners benefited from these amnesties, including political and religious activists such as Dr. Nguyen Dan Que, Father Ly, and the UBCV's Thich Thien Minh (see section 1.e.). 

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial 

The law provides for the independence of judges and lay assessors; however, in practice the CPV controls the courts at all levels by selecting judges at least in part for their political reliability. The CPV also influenced high‑profile cases and others in which a person was charged with challenging or harming the CPV or the state. During the year CPV and government officials likely exerted control over court decisions by influencing lay assessors and judges. 

The system of appointing judges and lay assessors contributed to executive control over the judiciary. The president presents a nomination for the presiding judge of the Supreme People's Court (SPC) to the National Assembly for approval. The president directly appoints the other members of the SPC upon the recommendation of a committee including the presiding judge of the SPC, members of the Ministries of the Interior and Defense, the VFF, and the Vietnam Lawyers Association. At the provincial and district levels the recommending panel is headed by the chairman of the provincial people's council (the provincial legislature) and includes members of the provincial people's court, provincial department of personnel, the VFF, and the provincial lawyers' association. Judges are appointed for five‑year terms. Provincial and district governments disburse judges' salaries at their respective levels. 

The judiciary consists of the SPC; the district and provincial people's courts; military tribunals; administrative, economic, and labor courts; and other tribunals established by law. Each district has a district people's court, which serves as the court of first instance for most domestic, civil, and criminal cases. Each province has a provincial people's court, which serves as the appellate forum for district court cases as well as court of first instance for other cases. The SPC is the highest court of appeal and review. It reports to the National Assembly. Administrative courts deal with complaints by citizens about official abuse and corruption. 

There was a shortage of trained lawyers and judges, and there was no independent bar association. Low judicial salaries hindered efforts to develop a trained judiciary. The few judges who had formal legal training often had studied abroad in countries with communist legal traditions. In 2004 a newspaper affiliated with the Ministry of Justice reported that in some courts as many as 30 to 40 percent of verdicts were incorrect and as many as 50 persons had been wrongly imprisoned in the first quarter of the year. The newspaper also noted that, according to 2001 statistics, 31.2 percent of judgments in criminal cases made by local courts had to be reexamined and 46 percent of the verdicts in civil cases were wrong. 

Government training programs to address the problem of inadequately trained judges and other court officials were underway. Foreign governments and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) provided assistance; however, the lack of openness in the criminal judicial process and the continuing lack of independence of the judiciary hampered progress. 

Courts of first instance at district and provincial levels include judges and lay assessors, but provincial appeals courts and the SPC are composed of judges only. People's councils appoint lay assessors from a pool of candidates suggested by the VFF. Lay assessors are required to have "high moral standards," but legal training is not necessary. Some international observers suggested that the short terms of appointment for judges and lay assessors and the strong representation of provincial officials on their nominating boards frequently made judges and lay assessors subject to political pressures. 

The CPV and the government have established special committees to help resolve local disputes. 

Corruption remained endemic within the judicial system. Phan Trung Ly, vice chairman of the National Assembly's law committee, noted in the MPS‑affiliated An Ninh The Gioi (World Security) newspaper on August 28 that "giving of bribes to judicial workers, including judges, court clerks, procurators, and settlers of court decisions has increased and has become more complex as rings coordinating such acts have formed." On August 13, Phan Dang Dung, a court clerk of the Ho Chi Minh City People's Court, was caught taking a bribe of approximately $7 thousand (VND 110 million). On June 16, Le Bao Quoc, a lawyer from the Ha Tinh Province Bar Association, was caught receiving $126 thousand (VND 2 billion) and $30 thousand (VND 465 million) from Tran Thi Ngoc, the winner of a civil law suit. Quoc reportedly asked for this money to "coordinate" the settlement of a court decision that declared Ngoc to be the legitimate owner of a $392 thousand (VND 6.2 billion) orchard in Phu Giao District of Binh Duong Province (see section 3). 

Trial Procedures 

Trials generally were open to the public; however, judicial authorities closed trials or strictly limited attendance in sensitive cases. Defendants have the right to be present at their trials and to have a lawyer, although not necessarily the lawyer of their choice, and this right was generally upheld in practice. Defendants unable to afford a lawyer were generally provided one only in cases involving life imprisonment or capital punishment. The defendant or the defense lawyer has the right to cross‑examine witnesses; however, there were credible reports that defendants were not allowed to access government evidence in advance of the trial, to cross‑examine witnesses, or to challenge statements. Lawyers reported that they often had little time before trials to examine evidence to be presented against their clients. There also were credible reports that defense lawyers were pressured not to take as clients religious or democracy activists facing trial. Convicted persons have the right to appeal. Courts did not publish their proceedings. 

The public prosecutor brings charges against an accused and serves as prosecutor during trials. Under the July 2004 revisions to the criminal procedures code, courtroom procedures were to change from an "investigative" system, in which the judge leads the questioning, to an "adversarial" system, in which prosecutors and defense lawyers advocate for their respective sides. This was intended to provide more protections for defendants and prevent judges from coercing defendants into confessing guilt; however, the extent to which this change was implemented in practice remained unclear. Although the constitution provides that citizens are innocent until proven guilty, some lawyers complained that judges generally presumed guilt. 

Military tribunals, although funded by the Ministry of National Defense (MND), operate under the same rules as other courts. The MND is represented on the judicial selection panels, and the head of the military tribunal system is the deputy head of the SPC. Military tribunal judges and assessors are military personnel, chosen jointly by the SPC and the MND but supervised by the SPC. The law gives military courts jurisdiction over all criminal cases involving military entities, including military‑owned enterprises. The military has the option of using the administrative, economic, or labor courts for civil cases. 

Political Prisoners 

The government continued to pressure, harass, and imprison persons for the peaceful expression of dissenting religious and political views. In February democracy activist Dr. Nguyen Dan Que was amnestied after being convicted in July 2004 of "abusing democratic freedoms to infringe upon the interests of the state" and sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment. Journalists Nguyen Vu Binh and Dr. Pham Hong Son remained in prison for their 2003 conviction of "espionage" (see section 2.a.). 

In June Hoa Hao activists conducted an anniversary ceremony marking the death of Hoa Haoism's founder that featured protests against government control over the Hoa Hao faith. In August police arrested 10 Hoa Hao activists at several locations on various obstruction of justice and inciting violence charges stemming from the June incident. Two Hoa Hao committed self‑immolation, and one of them died (see section 2.c.). 

The government claimed that it did not hold any political or religious prisoners; such persons were usually convicted of violating national security laws or general criminal laws. As with the general prison population, the government did not allow access by humanitarian organizations to political prisoners. 

There were no reliable estimates of the number of political prisoners, because the government usually did not publicize such arrests and sometimes conducted closed trials and sentencing sessions. There were at least eight prisoners known to be held for political reasons and one prisoner reportedly held for religious reasons; however, some sources had much higher estimates. Among those imprisoned were political activists Pham Hong Son, Nguyen Vu Binh, Nguyen Khac Toan, scientist and writer Tran Van Luong, and religious persons Tran Van Hoang and Ma Van Bay. 

As part of the government's amnesty program, the following prisoners were released during the year: Dr. Nguyen Dan Que; Nguyen Dinh Huy; human rights activist Tran Van Luong; Father Nguyen Van Ly; Brother Nguyen Thien Phung; Hmong Protestants Vang Chin Sang, Vang Mi Ly, Ly Xin Quang, and Ly Chin Seng; and Buddhist monk Thich Thien Minh. Nguyen Thi Minh Hoan was released after completing her eight‑month sentence. Mennonite pastor Nguyen Hong Quang was amnestied in September, although co‑defendant Pham Ngoc Thach remained imprisoned. 

Property Restitution 

By law citizens are to be compensated when they are resettled to make way for infrastructure projects, but there were widespread complaints, including from the National Assembly, that compensation was not fair or was delayed. There were several reports that officials forced ethnic minority Protestants to leave their homes without providing them with adequate compensation, particularly in the Sapa District of the northwest highlands area. Some ethnic minority individuals in the Central Highlands continued to complain that they had not received proper compensation for past seizures of their land, which was given to government‑owned coffee and rubber plantations (see section 1.f.). 

f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence 

The law provides for the right to privacy of home and correspondence; however, the government restricted this right significantly. Household registration and block warden systems existed for the surveillance of all citizens but usually did not intrude on most citizens. Authorities focused on persons whom they regarded as having dissenting views or whom they suspected of involvement in unauthorized political or religious activities. 

Forced entry into homes is not permitted without orders from the public prosecutor; however, in practice security forces seldom followed these procedures but instead asked permission to enter homes, with an implied threat for failure to cooperate. Some individuals refused to cooperate with such "requests." In urban areas police generally left when faced with noncompliance. 

Government authorities opened and censored targeted persons' mail, confiscated packages and letters, and monitored telephone conversations, e-mail, and facsimile transmissions. The government cut the telephone lines and interrupted the cellular telephone service of a number of religious and political activists and their family members. 

The government sought to tighten control of the Internet with a regulation that requires Internet agents, such as cybercafes, to register the personal information of their customers and store records of Internet sites visited by customers. The government also monitored e‑mail, searched for sensitive key words, and regulated Internet content (see section 2.a.). 

The government did not have a policy of forced resettlement. However, the government resettled some citizens to make way for infrastructure projects, and there were widespread reports that compensation was either not fair or was not paid in a timely manner (see section 1.e.). 

Membership in the CPV remained a prerequisite to career advancement for all government and government‑linked organizations and businesses. However, economic diversification made membership in CPV‑controlled mass organizations and the CPV less essential to financial and social advancement. 

The government continued to implement a family planning policy that urged families to have no more than two children; the policy emphasized exhortation rather than coercion. The government can deny promotions and salary increases to government employees with more than two children, but it was unclear if this policy was enforced. Government officials expressed growing concern that family planning efforts were failing. In June Deputy Prime Minister Pham Gia Khiem instructed population authorities to take "more drastic measures" to control the growing population and prevent families from having more than two children. However, this directive apparently was not enforced. 

Local officials harassed some family members of political or religious activists. Authorities in Ho Chi Minh City reportedly cut the telephone lines at the home of Dr. Nguyen Dan Que and other political activists on a number of occasions throughout the year. The home of a lay Protestant preacher in a remote area of Quang Nam Province reportedly was burned down after he refused to renounce his religion in August. On March 30, police in the village of Plei Tao Ro in Chu Se District, Gia Lai Province, reportedly destroyed the home of a woman married to an ethnic minority man who had been resettled to a third country. In the same incident police also allegedly beat the family of a man who had been hiding from authorities since April 2004. 

Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including: 

a. Freedom of Speech and Press 

The law provides for freedom of speech and of the press; however, the government significantly restricted these freedoms in practice, particularly with respect to political and religious speech. Both the constitution and the criminal code include broad national security and antidefamation provisions that the government used to restrict such freedoms. The criminal code defines the crimes of "sabotaging the infrastructure of Socialism," "sowing divisions between religious and nonreligious people," and "conducting propaganda against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam" as serious offenses against national security. The code also expressly forbids "taking advantage of democratic freedoms and rights to violate the interests of the state and social organizations." 

In 2003 the NGO Reporters Without Borders claimed that the government severely restricted freedom of the press. In late 2004 reporter Lan Anh of Tuoi Tre newspaper reported on internal ministry of health deliberations of price fixing of pharmaceuticals. In January she was charged for revealing "state secrets" and placed under house arrest. The threat of Anh's prosecution triggered unprecedented criticism from Tuoi Tre and other leading daily newspapers, including Thanh Nien and Nguoi Lao Dong. The Hanoi public prosecutor eventually announced Lan Anh would not be prosecuted, and in April charges against her were dropped. 

A press law requires journalists to pay monetary damages to individuals or organizations harmed as a result of their reporting, even if the reports are true. Independent observers noted that this law limits investigative reporting. Several media outlets continued to test the limits of government press restrictions by publishing articles that criticized actions by CPV and government officials. During the year there were press reports about topics that generally were considered sensitive, such as the prosecution on corruption charges of high‑ranking CPV and government officials. Nonetheless, the freedom to criticize the CPV and its senior leadership remained restricted. Occasional criticism of officials and official associations appeared in the local press. On August 20, Civilization Magazine expressed disapproval of a meeting of the Vietnam Journalists Congress and called the group a rubber stamp organization. At the meeting more than 300 media delegates were urged to implement state and party policies and not to publish articles that could adversely affect the party. 

The government exercised oversight through the Ministry of Culture and Information, supplemented by pervasive party guidance and national security legislation sufficiently broad to ensure effective self‑censorship by the domestic media. In August, when a religious activist tried to self‑immolate in front of a diplomatic mission because of religious freedom concerns, several foreign media outlets reported on the occurrence, but no domestic press carried the story. 

The law allows citizens to complain openly about inefficient government, administrative procedures, corruption, and economic policy. In general citizens freely exercised this right, but the government considered any overt political criticism stemming from such commentary a crime. Senior government and party leaders traveled to many provinces reportedly to try to resolve citizen complaints. In October 2004 the editor of the online news service VNExpress reportedly was dismissed because he published complaints from readers about the government's purchase of automobiles for an international conference in Hanoi. Corruption related to land use was a particular concern widely publicized in the press. In 2003 the Hanoi People's Court sentenced 4 persons to jail terms ranging from 24 to 44 months after they disseminated letters denouncing local land clearance policies. Also in 2003 a court in Dong Nai Province sentenced 4 persons to prison terms of 30 to 42 months for inciting fellow farmers to voice complaints over provincial land use policies. 

The government continued to prohibit speech that questioned the role of the CPV, criticized individual government leaders, promoted pluralism or multiparty democracy, or questioned policies on sensitive matters such as human rights or the border agreement with China. The line between what constituted private speech and public speech in those areas continued to be arbitrary. In early January the head of the Haiphong Publishing House reportedly was dismissed from his position because of his role in writing the introduction of a book that criticized former Party General Secretary Do Muoi. In December 2004 scientists Tran Van Luong and Nguyen Thi Minh Hoan were sentenced to 21 and 8 months in prison respectively for having written essays critical of government economic policies. On October 19, police reportedly arrested Truong Quoc Huy, Truong Quoc Tuan, Truong Quoc Nghia, and a foreigner for participating in a Web-chat forum called "the voice of people in Vietnam and abroad." In July 2004 democracy activist Dr. Nguyen Dan Que was sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment for posting an essay on the Internet that called for less government censorship. Dr. Que was released in February but remained subject to government surveillance and low‑level harassment. Also in July 2004 activists Tran Khue and Pham Que Duong were each sentenced to 19 months' imprisonment including time served (see section 2.b.).

In 2003 democracy activist and former revolutionary Tran Dung Tien was sentenced to 10 months' imprisonment including time served after signing a letter that criticized the arrest of Duong and Khue. Tran Khue, Pham Que Duong, and Tran Dung Tien completed their prison sentences and were released. Also in 2003 journalist Nguyen Vu Binh was convicted of "espionage" after he had criticized the border agreement with China and sent testimony on human rights issues in the country to a foreign government. Binh was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment and three years' house arrest. The sentence was upheld on appeal. Dr. Pham Hong Son also was convicted of "espionage" in 2003 and sentenced to 13 years' imprisonment and 3 years' house arrest, later reduced on appeal to 5 years' imprisonment, after translating an Internet article titled "What Is Democracy." 

In June 2004 the government reduced by five years the prison sentence imposed on Catholic priest Thaddeus Nguyen Van Ly but kept in force a five‑year administrative detention order to be served after his release in February. Father Ly originally was sentenced in 2001 to 15 years' imprisonment for "damaging national unity," but the sentence stood at 5 years after the June 2004 reduction and a similar reduction in 2003. In 2001 Father Ly had submitted written testimony critical of the government to a foreign agency and frequently spoke out for political pluralism and complete religious freedom. In 2003 the Ho Chi Minh City People's Court sentenced Father Ly's niece, Nguyen Thi Hoa, and two nephews, Nguyen Truc Cuong and Nguyen Vu Viet, to sentences ranging from three to five years' imprisonment for communicating information on his activities to foreign journalists. In 2003 the Ho Chi Minh Court of Appeals reduced the sentences of the three to time served.

Some persons who expressed alternative opinions on religious or political issues were not allowed to travel abroad (see section 2.d.). 

The CPV, the government, and the party‑controlled mass organizations controlled all print, broadcast, and electronic media.

Published reports on high‑level government corruption and mismanagement have become more frequent and prominent in recent years. For example, in 2004 domestic papers reported extensively on the corruption trial of former Ministry of Agriculture official La Thi Kim Oanh and the subsequent dismissal of Minister of Agriculture Le Huy Ngo. Also in 2004 Vice Minister of Trade Mai Van Dau and his son, Mai Thanh Hai, were arrested for allegedly taking tens of thousands of dollars in bribes in exchange for arranging quotas for companies exporting textile products. Prosecutors announced their indictment on charges of accepting bribes. All major newspapers carried detailed reports about their crimes and luxurious lifestyles. 

Foreign journalists must be approved by the Foreign Ministry's press center and must be based in Hanoi. The number of foreign staff allowed was limited, and local staff who worked for foreign media were required to be registered with the Foreign Ministry. It also was difficult for foreign media outlets to hire local photographers and receive approval for their accreditation. The government can withhold or withdraw registration. The press center monitored journalists' activities and decided on a case‑by‑case basis whether to approve interview, photograph, film, or travel requests, all of which must be submitted five days in advance. In September the press center rejected foreign journalists' requests to travel to Cuc Phong National Park to report on avian influenza and also a request by the World Health Organization to visit the park to collect blood samples. In 2004 the press center refused requests by foreign journalists to travel to the Central Highlands in the immediate aftermath of the April 10 protests in the region. By law foreign journalists are required to address all questions to government agencies through the Foreign Ministry, although it appeared that this procedure often was ignored in practice. Foreign journalists generally received visas valid for six months. In 2004 at least two foreign journalists were threatened with nonrenewal of their visas as a result of their reporting. 

The government generally required religious publishing to be done through one government‑owned religious publishing house; however, some religious groups were able to print their own materials or import them, subject to government approval (see section 2.c.). In other cases unauthorized religious materials were confiscated and the owners either fined or arrested. 

Foreign‑language editions of some banned books, such as Duong Thu Huong's Memories of a Pure Spring, were sold openly by street peddlers, and Bao Ninh's previously banned book, Sorrow of War, was available in bookstores in Vietnamese‑language editions. 

Foreign‑language periodicals were widely available in cities; however, the government occasionally censored articles about the country. The government sometimes delayed availability of a foreign periodical because of sensitive articles. The government generally did not limit access to international radio, except to Radio Free Asia (RFA)and the Far East Broadcasting Corporation, which it continued to jam periodically. 

The law limits access to satellite television to top officials, foreigners, luxury hotels, and the press; however, it was not enforced uniformly, and an increasing number of persons in urban and some rural areas had access to uncensored television programs via home satellite equipment or cable. Cable television, including foreign‑origin channels, was available to subscribers living in urban areas, although the government periodically blocked many subscribers from receiving certain news channels, including CNN and the BBC. Satellite dishes picking up pirated satellite signals from Thailand and the Philippines were increasingly common. During the prime minister's June trip to the United States, CNN subscribers were unable to watch some CNN reports on the visit that featured antigovernment protests. In addition authorities blacked out with ink portions of articles reporting on the visit that were published in the International Herald Tribune edition delivered to foreigners. 

The government controlled art exhibits, music, and other cultural activities; however, it generally allowed artists broader latitude than in past years to choose the themes for their works. Many artists received permission to exhibit their works abroad and received passports to attend the exhibits and export permits to send their works out of the country. Additionally, a number of foreign embassies and consulates were able to conduct a wider variety of cultural activities than in the past. 

The government allowed access to the Internet through a limited number of Internet Service Providers (ISPs), all of which were state‑owned joint stock companies. In January 2004 the MPS issued a decision forbidding direct access to the Internet through foreign ISPs, requiring domestic ISPs to store information transmitted on the Internet for at least 15 days, and further requiring ISPs to provide technical assistance and workspace to public security agents to allow them to monitor Internet activities. The decision also requires Internet agents, such as cybercafes, to register the personal information of their customers, store records of Internet sites visited by customers for 30 days, and cooperate with public security officials. It was not clear how fully these provisions were being followed in practice, although many cybercafes did not register the personal details of their clients. 

The government used firewalls to block Web sites that it deemed politically or culturally inappropriate, including sites operated by exile groups abroad. The government restricted access to the RFA and Voice of America Web sites during the year, but local press occasionally wrote stories based on RFA broadcasts. 

The government required all owners of domestic Web sites, including those operated by foreign entities, to register their sites with the government and submit their Web site content to the government for approval. In July a senior foreign diplomat held a live and uncensored Web chat with local citizens on bilateral and domestic issues, including international concerns on human rights and religious freedom. 

The government restricted academic freedom, and foreign field researchers often were questioned and monitored. However, the government permitted a more open flow of information, including in the university system, than in previous years. Local librarians increasingly were being trained in professional skills and international standards that supported wider international library and information exchanges and research. Foreign academic professionals temporarily working at universities in the country were allowed to discuss nonpolitical issues widely and freely in classes; however, government observers regularly attended classes taught by both foreigners and citizens. Security officials occasionally questioned persons who attended programs on diplomatic premises or used diplomatic research facilities. Nevertheless, requests for materials from foreign research facilities increased. Academic publications usually reflected the views of the CPV and the government. 

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association 

Freedom of Assembly 

The right of assembly is restricted in law, and the government restricted and monitored all forms of public protest or gathering. Persons wishing to gather in a group are required to apply for a permit, which local authorities can issue or deny arbitrarily. In general the government did not permit demonstrations that could be seen as having a political purpose. Persons routinely gathered in informal groups without government interference; however, the government restricted the right of some unregistered religious groups to gather in worship. 

As in previous years, there were reports from the Northwest Highlands and Central Highlands that officials prevented meetings of some Protestant believers or dispersed those meetings when they occurred (see section 2.c.). In mid‑September a Protestant group's petition to gather for worship in the Chu Prong District of Gia Lai Province was refused. In June a Protestant congregation in Quang Ninh Province also was denied permission to register their group so that they could legally gather for worship. 

Unlike in 2004, no ethnic minority protests were reported in the Central Highlands. In April 2004 ethnic minorities conducted unannounced demonstrations in numerous locations in the central highlands provinces of Dak Nong, Dak Lak, and Gia Lai to protest against lack of economic opportunity, loss of traditional lands, and restrictions on religion. Some protesters also reportedly called for the establishment of an independent, ethnic minority "Dega" state in the Central Highlands. In a number of cases, police reportedly responded to the demonstrations by beating and firing upon protesters (see sections 1.a. and 1.c.). The government claimed two persons died during the riots, although credible sources say at least one dozen were killed and many more were injured. In August 2004 a court in Buon Ma Thuot, Dak Lak Province, sentenced 9 persons to between 5 and 12 years' imprisonment for having taken part in the protests. In November 2004 a court in Dak Nong Province sentenced 17 ethnic Ede to between 3 and 10 years in prison for having taken part in the protests. Human rights groups counted at least 76 ethnic minority individuals sentenced to prison for participating in protests in 2001 and 2004, and some observers estimated the figure might have been considerably higher. 

During the year peaceful small protests of farmers demanding redress for land rights issues frequently took place in front of government buildings in Hanoi. Police monitored these protests but did not disrupt them. Protesters in Ho Chi Minh City sought to block the demolition of a number of homes over which the state had exercised eminent domain. Additionally, Ho Chi Minh City authorities ordered the demolition of a portion of the home of Mennonite pastor Nguyen Hong Quang that was being used as a house church (see section 2.c.). 

Freedom of Association 

The government restricted freedom of association. Opposition political parties were not permitted. The government prohibited the legal establishment of private, independent organizations, insisting that persons work within established, party‑controlled mass organizations, usually under the aegis of the VFF. However, some entities, particularly unregistered religious groups, were able to operate outside of this framework with little or no government interference (see section 2.c.). 

In May 2004 a court in Ho Chi Minh City sentenced Nguyen The Hanh to two years in prison for having been involved with Vietnamese‑American political activist groups during the two years he spent outside the country. 

Also in May 2004 a group of lawyers and journalists held a public ceremony in Hanoi to mark the establishment of "Lawyers for Justice," an advocacy group to aid victims of the police or legal injustice. The head of the Hanoi Bar Association declared their organization illegal and ordered them to disband or be disbarred. Subsequently, the group formally disbanded, although members maintained contact with each other and met as a group with foreign diplomats and others. 

c. Freedom of Religion 

The constitution and government decrees provide for freedom of worship; however, the government continued to restrict to a significant degree the organized activities of religious groups that it declared to be at variance with state laws and policies.

The government generally allowed persons to practice individual worship in the religion of their choice, but the legal framework governing religion requires that the government officially sanction the organization and activities of all religious denominations. In March an implementation decree for the 2004 ordinance on belief and religion established guidelines for religious denominations to register their activities and seek official recognition. This new legal framework, which supersedes the more restrictive 1999 decree on religion, relaxed controls on the promotion and transfer of clerics, the scheduling of religious activities, and the abilities of religious groups to carry out charitable functions. It also provided a clear mechanism for unregistered house churches to normalize their activities, which reinforced an earlier, special "Instruction on Protestantism" issued in February by the prime minister that directed officials to assist unrecognized religious denominations in registering their activities so that they could practice openly. 

Despite restrictions on organized activity, participation in religious activities continued to grow significantly. Two house church organizations successfully registered in Ho Chi Minh City under the new framework. They and at least one other house church organization had applications pending in other provinces. Some congregations belonging to previously recognized faiths were able to legally register their activities and places of worship. 

Nonetheless, the new framework maintained overall government control of religious organizations and kept in place significant limitations on education, medical, and charitable work by religious groups. The government continued to use the registration and recognition process to control and monitor church organizations. The government officially recognized Buddhist, Roman Catholic, Protestant, Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, and Muslim religious organizations. To obtain official recognition, a group must obtain government approval of its charter, its leadership, and the overall scope of its activities. Official approval is required for the opening of new places of worship, ordination of clerics, establishment of religious teaching institutions, and entry of students into those institutions. 

The government's approval process was slow and nontransparent, although the law mandates that the government act in a time‑bound and transparent fashion. Annual activities by congregations must be registered with authorities, and activities not on this annual calendar require explicit government approval. Officially recognized religious organizations were able to operate with varying degrees of freedom throughout the country, and followers of these religious bodies were usually able to worship without government harassment. 

In addition to officially recognized religious denominations, numerous unrecognized denominations operated in the country, including independent Buddhists, Baptists, Mennonites, Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormons, the Baha'i Faith, independent Cao Dai and Hoa Hao groups, and ethnic Cham Hindus. Some unrecognized Protestant, Buddhist, and Hoa Hao religious bodies have unsuccessfully requested official recognition of their organizations in past years. Two Protestant denominations, one Baptist and the other Seventh-day Adventist, registered their activities in Ho Chi Minh City under the new legal framework. Their applications were pending in other provinces. Other groups such as the Mennonites and Jehovah's Witnesses attempted to register and normalize their activities under the new legal framework governing religion, but at year's end they had not received government approval. 

Official oversight of recognized religions and problems of harassment or repression of followers of unrecognized religions varied from locality to locality, often as a result of ignorance of national policy or varying local interpretations of it. Activities of unregistered religious groups were technically considered illegal by the authorities, and these groups sometimes experienced harassment, although the level of harassment declined, particularly of Protestant house churches, in the central and southern regions. Many unregistered churches and temples, especially those in urban areas or belonging to traditional Hindu and Muslim groups, were allowed to operate without interference. The government actively discouraged contacts between the illegal UBCV and its foreign supporters, and between unofficial Protestant organizations and their foreign supporters, although such contacts continued. Police routinely questioned some persons who held alternative religious or political views, such as UBCV monks and Catholic priests. For example, throughout the year UBCV monks from Hue and Ho Chi Minh City were prevented from visiting their patriarch in Binh Dinh Province. According to credible reports, police also detained persons in the Central Highlands based upon a suspicion that the form of Protestant religion they were practicing encouraged ethnic minority separatism. 

Police and local officials in some areas strove to prevent Protestants who belonged to unregistered or unrecognized groups from assembling to worship. This situation was particularly acute in some areas of the Central Highlands. The international NGO Human Rights Watch reported that security forces in Kon Tum Province demolished the chapel of Mennonite pastor Nguyen Cong Chinh twice during 2004. Authorities reportedly based their actions on the fact that Chinh had purchased under a false name the land on which the chapel was built. At least one other unregistered Protestant church operated a short distance away from Chinh's but suffered no harassment. 

In Ho Chi Minh City, the house church of Mennonite pastor Nguyen Hong Quang was a target of particularly severe harassment. In June 2004, following a scuffle with police officers, Quang was detained and sentenced to three years' imprisonment, while five of his followers were sentenced to between nine months and two years in prison. Some observers connected Quang's arrest to his broader social activism. During Quang's detention his wife continued to operate their unauthorized church but repeatedly was harassed by police. Allegations that police tortured a number of Quang's followers in prison could not be corroborated. Quang was released in September in an amnesty. Since his release, harassment against his church has ebbed. 

In October 2004 police in Ho Chi Minh City disrupted an unregistered private Bible study seminar and detained 2 unofficial Protestant pastors and 17 ethnic Hmong house church leaders from the Northwest Highlands. The 17 Hmong were held overnight and then returned to the Northwest Highlands. There were credible reports that Protestants in the Northwest Highlands were beaten for reasons connected to their faith (see section 1.a.). In March Thao A Long from the village of Ca Ngay in Sapa District, Lao Cai Province, reportedly was arrested and seriously beaten by police because of his membership in the Evangelical Church of Vietnam. In April in the same area, Vang A Lo from Lu Khau village, reportedly a CPV member since 1997, was forced to flee arrest to neighboring Lai Chau Province because he refused to renounce Protestantism. Local authorities subsequently seized his land illegally. Despite these sporadically reported problems, the overall number of reports of harassment of Protestant groups declined during the year (see section 2.b.). In 2003 officials reportedly raped two girls in Nam Nga village, Lai Chau Province, to punish their families for following Protestantism (see section 1.c.). 

Government officials denied allegations that Protestant house churches were destroyed or closed because they were unregistered and therefore illegal. Ho Chi Minh City authorities instead claimed they ordered the demolition of a portion of the home of Mennonite pastor Nguyen Hong Quang apparently because it was built without the required permits. Although local authorities maintained that other constructions in the area had been destroyed because they were illegal, none of the houses in the immediate vicinity of Quang's home appeared to be affected by government action. 

With the exception of Dak Lak Province, many of the Protestant house churches in the Central Highlands affiliated with the government‑recognized Southern Evangelical Church of Vietnam (SECV) that had been ordered to shut down in 2001 were able to resume operations, and a small but growing number were officially registered. A number of unregistered Protestant congregations among ethnic minority groups in the Northwest Highlands, the Hmong in particular, began to approach local authorities to begin registration proceedings. In several northwest highlands provinces, officials denied the existence of any Protestant religious believers, despite recognition by the central government that thousands of unregistered Protestants resided there. By year's end several hundred congregations in the northwest had applied for registration, but only one received any kind of response from local authorities despite a national mandate for prompt replies to such applications. Many congregations also reported that official harassment increased significantly after making their efforts to register legally. 

In March the SECV held its second national convention. According to credible sources, the Church was able to elect a new leadership slate free from government interference. In December 2004 the officially recognized Evangelical Church of Vietnam: North (ECVN) held a national convention for the first time in 20 years. The convention initially had been delayed by government refusal to grant permission and also by the reluctance of ECVN leaders to hold the meeting until they could ensure it would be free from government interference. The convention allowed the ECVN to vote on a new leadership board, appoint new pastors, and begin a renovation and expansion program. 

There were significantly fewer allegations of forced renunciations during the year. In August there were credible reports that local officials attempted to force an SECV lay preacher to renounce his faith and stop his ministry in the ethnic minority Hre village in Quang Ngai Province. His house reportedly was burned down in retaliation. 

Pastors of a house church Ninh Thuan province reported that following the baptism of 7 new ethnic minority villagers in June, local police summoned all 33 members of the group to the village police station. Only five or six members of the group went to the village police station, where they were questioned for half a day and then sent home; the other members did not go but suffered no negative consequences for declining the police summons. Simultaneously police questioned the house church's two evangelists for three days; they were allowed to return home in the evenings. In October the chairman of the commune people's committee summoned the members of the Protestant community to the village chief's house. Five Protestants attended. In a public gathering, local officials threatened the five with the loss of government benefits and government-provided housing if they did not renounce Protestantism. Four renounced and one did not, but none suffered any negative consequences afterwards, nor did any other members of the house church community. 

In July and August 2004 authorities reportedly detained without charge more than 100 Hmong Protestants, choosing a member from each Protestant family in at least 5 different communes in Sapa District, Lao Cai Province. The authorities attempted to force the detainees to renounce Protestantism, releasing them only when they promised to do so. In March 2004 police in Kon Tum Province reportedly harassed Protestant believers at a house church, seized Bibles, and fined the church organizer. Also in March 2004 in Kon Tum, police reportedly detained an unregistered ethnic Gia Rai Protestant pastor three different times, beat him, and attempted to force him to renounce his faith on each occasion. 

In past years, under threat of physical abuse or confiscation of property, some ethnic minority Protestants allegedly were made to sign a formal, written renunciation or to undergo a symbolic ritual. However, only one credible report of such a case was reported during the year. In late November an ethnic minority pastor in Ha Giang Province was forced to sign a written renunciation of his faith after his congregation attempted to register with the local authorities per the national policy on religion. 

Unlike in previous years, there were no reports that officials fabricated evidence. In some past cases, particularly involving Hmong Protestants, when authorities prosecuted persons who had organized unauthorized religious services, they used provisions of the penal code that allow for jail terms of up to three years for "abusing freedom of speech, press or religion," and terms of up to two years for "causing public disorder." The penal code establishes penalties ranging from 2 to 15 years' imprisonment for "attempting to undermine national unity" by promoting "division between religious believers and nonbelievers." 

Buddhists practicing their religion under the Vietnam Buddhist Sangha Executive Council, the officially sanctioned Buddhist governing council, were generally free to practice their religion. While these constituted the majority of Buddhists, the government continued to harass members of the banned UBCV and prevented them from conducting independent religious activities outside their pagodas. In 2003 UBCV leaders met in Binh Dinh in what church members characterized as a de facto reestablishment of the UBCV structure and leadership. Security authorities intercepted several UBCV leaders leaving the meeting and returned them to their respective pagodas. From that point until year's end, senior UBCV leaders, including Patriarch Thich Huyen Quang and Thich Quang Do, remained confined to their pagodas and had restrictions on their ability to travel and meet with followers. In November 2004 Thich Quang Do attempted to travel to Quy Nhon Province to visit Thich Huyen Quang, who was hospitalized at that time. Thich Quang Do was blocked from doing so and was returned to his pagoda in Ho Chi Minh City under police escort. Other UBCV monks also were prevented from visiting Thich Huyen Quang during the year. However, foreign ambassadors were able to meet with Patriarch Thich Huyen Quang in April and November 2004, and visiting foreign officials met with Thich Quang Do and other UBCV leaders on several occasions in 2004 and during the year. The government also declared illegal the UBCV's formation of provincial representative boards in at least nine provinces in central and southern regions of the country in mid-year. 

The government eased restrictions over the Roman Catholic Church, although it maintained veto power over Vatican appointments of Catholic bishops. The Vatican and the government reached agreement on mutually acceptable candidates, and all bishoprics were filled. The government agreed to create a new bishopric by splitting the Xuan Loc diocese into two. The government restricted the number of Catholic seminaries and the size and frequency of entering classes, although in 2004 it allowed an 80 percent increase in the number of new students in at least 1 seminary. The Catholic Church reported the number of priests was insufficient to meet the needs of believers and was seeking to increase further the size and frequency of classes. In November, during the visit of a Vatican cardinal, 57 priests were ordained in Hanoi. According to church officials, the government was considering granting permission to open a new seminary in Dong Nai Province. Under the new framework on religion, the Church is free to appoint candidates to enter seminary and may then ordain them as priests. A number of Catholic clergy reported a continued easing of government control over activities in certain dioceses during the year. In many places local government officials allowed Catholic Church officials to conduct religious education classes (outside regular school hours) and some charitable activities; however, in other areas, particularly in some parts of the Central Highlands, local officials were more restrictive. The government continued discussions to normalize diplomatic relations with the Vatican and in November hosted the visit of the cardinal in charge of the Vatican's missionary works. 

The government amnestied 3 Hoa Hao leaders in 2004; however, at least 10 Hoa Hao church followers remained in prison. Hoa Hao monks and believers following the government‑approved Hoa Hao Administrative Council (HHAC) were allowed freedom to practice their faith. Between 100 and 200 visitors worshipped at the central Hoa Hao Pagoda in An Giang Province on a daily basis. Monks and followers who belonged to dissident groups or declined to recognize the authority of the HHAC suffered restrictions. In June Hoa Hao activists organized a ceremony to commemorate the 2004 death of founder Nguyen Hai Ha. Some activists reportedly clashed with police when they displayed banners protesting government control over the Hoa Hao faith. In August police arrested eight persons involved in the June event. Two other Hoa Hao activists committed self‑immolation during the arrests, one of whom died. At year's end the other person remained in police custody. 

In January Hong Thien Hanh, leader of the small To Dinh Tan Chieu Minh group in Tien Giang Province, was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment for engaging in illegal religious activities and defrauding his followers. 

Muslim Association members were able to practice their faith, including daily prayer and fasting during the month of Ramadan. 

Many persons, although not adherents of a particular faith, practiced a native form of ancestor worship. 

Open adherence to a religious faith generally did not disadvantage persons in civil, economic, or secular life, although it would prevent advancement to the highest government and military ranks. However, there were some reports that ethnic minority boarding schools discriminated against children from religious, especially Protestant, families. Religious practice does not preclude membership in the CPV. Some government and CPV officials admitted that they followed traditional and Buddhist religious practices. 

The government restricted and monitored all forms of public assembly, including assembly for religious activities. Large regularly scheduled religious gatherings were allowed, such as the Catholic celebrations at La Vang Pilgrimage Center in Quang Tri Province and the Cao Dai celebrations in Tay Ninh Province. The Hoa Hao were allowed to hold large public gatherings to commemorate some traditional anniversaries. 

Foreign missionaries may not operate openly as religious workers in the country, although many undertook humanitarian or development activities with government approval. 

A government publishing house oversees the publishing of all religious materials. Many Buddhist sacred scriptures, Christian Bibles, and other religious texts and publications, including some in ethnic minority languages, were printed by government‑approved organizations. 

The government allowed religious travel for some religious persons. Muslims were not prohibited from taking the Hajj, and more Buddhist, Catholic, and Protestant officials were able to travel and study abroad. The government allowed many bishops and priests to travel freely within their dioceses and allowed greater, but still restricted, freedom for travel outside these areas, particularly in ethnic areas. Many Protestant house church leaders traveled overseas and within the country during the year. In the past government officials discouraged officially recognized clergy from entering Son La Province, Lai Chau Province, and some other "sensitive" ethnic‑minority highlands border provinces; however, some Protestant leaders reported that this policy eased significantly during the year. 

Persons who were religious practitioners in an unrecognized group sometimes were not approved for foreign travel. 

Societal Abuses and Discrimination 

In general relations among the various religious communities continued to be amicable, and there were no known instances of societal discrimination or violence based on religion. There was budding cooperation between the Catholic Church and the government-recognized Vietnam Buddhist Sangha on charitable activities such as the fight against HIV/AIDS. There were no reports of anti‑Semitic acts. 

For a more detailed discussion, see the 2005 International Religious Freedom Report. 

d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation 

The constitution provides that citizens "shall enjoy freedom of movement and of residence within the country…(and) freely travel abroad and return home…in accordance with the provisions of the law"; however, the government imposed some limits on freedom of movement. Some local authorities required some members of ethnic minority groups to obtain permission to travel outside certain highland areas, including in some cases travel outside their own villages. 

In September 2004 the Prime Minister's Office released a decision requiring citizens and resident foreigners to obtain a permit to visit border areas, defense facilities, industrial zones involved in national defense, areas of "national strategic storage," and "works of extreme importance for political, economic, cultural and social purposes." 

Local officials reportedly informally discouraged some clergy from traveling domestically, even within their own provinces, especially when travel to ethnic minority areas was involved (see section 2.c.). 

By law citizens had to obtain permission to change their residence. However, in practice many persons continued to move without approval, especially migrant or itinerant laborers moving from rural areas to cities in search of work. Moving without permission hampered persons in obtaining legal residence permits. Foreign passport holders must register to stay in private homes, and local authorities at times refused to allow foreign visitors to stay with friends and family. Citizens are also required to register with local police when they stay overnight in any location outside of their own homes; the government appeared to have enforced these requirements more strictly in some districts of the Central and Northwest Highlands. In May two foreign citizens were detained by local authorities in Gia Lai Province for two days before being fined for being in a restricted area and released. Police in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City used the requirement described above on two occasions in 2004 to detain groups of ethnic Hmong house church leaders participating in private Bible‑study seminars and return them to their home provinces (see section 2.c.). 

Unlike in past years, the government allowed fact‑finding visits by UNHCR and foreign mission staff to the Central Highlands. In general these trips were closely monitored but not hindered by local government authorities. The government granted UNHCR and foreign mission staff access to local citizens of interest. 

Although the government no longer required citizens traveling abroad to obtain exit or reentry visas, the government sometimes refused to issue passports. In the past the government did not allow some persons who publicly or privately expressed critical opinions on religious or political issues to travel abroad; however, during the year dissident Hoang Minh Chinh traveled overseas for medical care, and dissident author Duong Thu Huong also traveled abroad. After Chinh returned to Hanoi in December, he was harassed and his property damaged by groups angry about his antigovernment comments while abroad. Authorities reportedly prevented political activist Tran Khue from traveling to Europe and the United States. 

Citizens' access to passports sometimes was constrained by factors such as bribery and corruption. Refugee and immigrant visa applicants sometimes encountered local officials who arbitrarily delayed or denied passport issuance based on personal animosities, on the officials' perception that an applicant did not meet program criteria, or to extort a bribe. Some family members of ethnic minorities granted refugee status abroad were reissued household registration papers with the missing member removed, a step that allows the remaining family members to obtain passports. In other cases family members of refugees were unable to obtain passports to reunite abroad. Provinces in the Central Highlands other than Dak Lak generally made progress in resolving outstanding family reunification cases involving ethnic minorities. 

The law does not provide for forced internal or external exile; however, cases amounting to de facto exile continued to occur. In 2003 several UBCV leaders were forcibly returned to their home pagodas and placed under official or unofficial administrative detention there (see section 2.c.). Protestant pastor Nguyen Lap Ma has been forced to reside in an isolated village in Can Tho Province since 1982, but authorities have allowed him to travel to Ho Chi Minh City for monthly medical examinations since he suffered a stroke in 1998. Another Protestant pastor, Nguyen Nhat Thong, has been forced to reside in a remote village in Binh Thuan Province since 1979. He has been allowed to travel outside the village since 1986, but he must ask for the permission of local authorities each time. In January 2004 Protestant pastor Tran Dinh Ai, a citizen and frequent critic of the government now living abroad, was refused entry into the country. When he attempted to return in December, he was denied entry and returned to Singapore, his point of embarkation. 

The United States continued to process immigrants and refugee applicants for admission and resettlement, including Amerasians, former reeducation camp detainees, former US government employees, family reunification cases, and returnees from camps of first asylum elsewhere in the region (under the Resettlement Opportunity for Vietnamese Returnees program). Most of these programs were closed to new applicants nearly a decade ago, and the number of cases in some categories is now in the low double digits. (An exception was the Amerasian program, which remained open to new applicants; however, this program remained on hold pending new adjudication guidelines.) 

The government generally permitted citizens who had emigrated abroad to return to visit. By law the government considers anyone born in the country to be a citizen, even if the person has acquired another country's citizenship, unless a formal renunciation of citizenship has been approved by the president. However, in practice the government usually treated overseas Vietnamese as citizens of their adopted country. Emigrants were not permitted to use Vietnamese passports after they acquired other citizenship. The government generally encouraged visitation by such persons but sometimes monitored them carefully. 

Following April 2004 protests in the Central Highlands, a number of ethnic minorities hid in forests and rubber plantations, and some attempted to flee across the border into Cambodia. Vietnamese police attempted to block these potential refugees and reportedly crossed the border into Cambodia. The UNHCR received approximately 775 ethnic minority refugees in its camps in Cambodia. Thirteen potential refugees who received UNHCR protection in Phnom Penh independently returned to Vietnam in October 2004. According to authorities, the 13 persons returned safely to their homes; however, newspaper accounts made it clear that they were interviewed extensively by authorities upon their return. 

On January 25, the government signed a tripartite Memorandum of Understanding on the Settlement of Issues Relating to the Vietnamese Central Highlands Ethnic Minority People in Cambodia with the government of Cambodia and the UNHCR to facilitate the return of all ethnic minority individuals in Cambodia who did not qualify for third‑country resettlement. Subsequent to this agreement, more than 140 ethnic minorities returned to Vietnam. On July 20, 94 individuals who did not have refugee status were deported to Vietnam, which resulted in increased calls from the international community to allow monitoring access in the Central Highlands. The UNHCR and various foreign diplomats were permitted to visit returnees after their arrival in the Central Highlands. In September the UNHCR was permitted to accompany several individuals on their return trip from the border to the Central Highlands and conduct additional follow-up monitoring. Central government and provincial officials were emphatic that they were attempting to reintegrate the returnees peacefully. However, some provinces did not allow some international observers private access to the returnees to examine scattered reports of abuse or discrimination of returnees. An additional 400 ethnic minorities in Cambodia received third‑country resettlement status. 

Protection of Refugees 

The country is not a signatory to the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 protocol. In July 2004 the government allowed more than 450 North Koreans illegally present in the country to travel to South Korea. Unconfirmed reports from international NGOs in August 2004 stated that as many as 100 North Korean refugees had been returned to China. In incidents in December 2004 and July, a handful of North Korean asylum seekers entered foreign diplomatic missions in Hanoi. The government permitted the respective missions to facilitate the North Koreans' travel to a third country. Subsequent to the July incident, however, the government issued a circular to diplomatic missions and international organizations calling on them to hand over to local authorities any third‑country intruders, whom the government considers to be immigration law violators. There were no reports at year's end that the government had invoked this new policy. 

Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government 

The constitution does not provide for the right of citizens to change their government peacefully, and citizens could not freely choose and change the laws and officials that govern them. All authority and political power is vested in the CPV, and the constitution delineates the leadership of the CPV. Political opposition movements and other political parties are illegal. The CPV Politburo, led by a triumvirate consisting of CPV Chairman Nong Duc Manh, President Tran Duc Luong, and Prime Minister Phan Van Khai, is the supreme decision‑making body in the country, although it technically reports to the CPV Central Committee. 

The government continued to restrict public debate and criticism to certain aspects of individual, state, or party performance determined by the CPV itself. No public challenge to the legitimacy of the one‑party state was permitted; however, there were instances of unsanctioned letters critical of the government from private citizens, including some former senior party members, which circulated publicly. 

Elections and Political Participation 

The most recent elections to select members of the National Assembly were held in 2002. These elections were neither free nor fair, since all candidates were chosen and vetted by the CPV's VFF, an umbrella group that monitors all of the country's popular organizations. Consequently, 90 percent of the delegates were CPV members. Those that were not CPV members were only nominally independent. 

Revisions to the Law on Election of Deputies to People's Councils, issued by the National Assembly in 2003, provided for higher numbers of female and minority candidates, more candidates per position, and fewer party members standing for seats in people's council elections at all levels. Nonetheless, for the 2004 people's councils elections, the party‑controlled VFF approved all candidates, as it did for national and provincial assembly elections. Although voting is not compulsory, election officials applied many means to persuade citizens to vote, including using public address systems to ask late‑voting citizens by name to come to the polls. The government claimed a 99.7 percent voter turnout at the district level for the April 2004 people's councils election. Proxy voting in that election, while illegal, appeared widespread. In addition, most voting was finished by 10 a.m., although polls were required to stay open until 7 p.m. 

The National Assembly, although subject to the control of the CPV (all of its senior leaders and 90 percent of its members were party members), increasingly served as a forum for the expression of local and provincial concerns, as a critic of corruption and inefficiency, and as an arena for debating progress in improved transparency for the legal and regulatory systems. In the past it did not initiate legislation and did not pass legislation that the CPV opposed; however, for the first time, the National Assembly reportedly drafted independent legislation during the year. CPV officials occupied most senior government and national assembly positions and continued to have the final decision on key issues. Legislators continued to question and criticize ministers, including for the first time the prime minister, in biannual national assembly sessions that were broadcast live on television. 

The law provides the opportunity for equal participation in politics by women and minority groups. Women held a number of important government positions, including the vice presidency. There were 136 women in the 498‑seat National Assembly. There were three women at the ministerial level but no female members of the Politburo. There were only a few women in provincial‑level leadership positions. 

There were 87 ethnic minority members in the National Assembly and 2 ethnic minority members serving in cabinet‑level positions. The CPV general secretary is a member of the Tay ethnic minority group; however, the number of minorities in the executive branch of government or within the party at a national‑level did not accurately reflect their proportion (15 percent) of the population. 

Government Corruption and Transparency 

Corruption continued to be a major problem. The government showcased its efforts to fight corruption, including publicizing budgets at different levels of government and streamlining government inspection measures. Cases of government officials accused of corruption were publicized widely. For example, in July the media carried extensive accounts of the public prosecutor's decision to conduct a formal investigation against Deputy Trade Minister Mai Van Dau, arrested in November 2004 for allegedly receiving bribes to grant quotas to some garment companies. In October the MPS instructed the public prosecutor to publicly charge Nguyen Quang Thuong and five other former senior staff members of Petro Vietnam and Vietsopro with corruption, "deliberately acting against the state's regulations on economic management, causing serious consequences," and "lacking a spirit of responsibility, causing serious consequences" (see section 1.e.). Thuong, deputy director general of Vietnam Oil and Gas Corporation, was arrested in June 2004 for allegedly receiving a bribe of 400 thousand dollars to endorse a false 17-million-dollar equipment contract for an offshore oil well belonging to Vietsopetro, the country's leading Vietnamese‑Russian joint venture on oil and gas. 

In accordance with the amended Law on Promulgation of Legal Normative Documents, the Official Gazette published most legal documents in its daily publication. Party documents such as politburo decrees were not published in the Gazette. 

Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights 

The government does not permit private, local human rights organizations to form or operate. The government generally did not tolerate attempts by organizations or individuals to comment publicly on government human rights practices, and it used a wide variety of methods to suppress domestic criticism of its human rights policies, including surveillance, limits on freedom of assembly, interference with personal communications, and detention. 

The government generally prohibited private citizens from contacting international human rights organizations, although some activists did so. The government generally did not permit visits by international NGO human rights monitors; however, it allowed representatives from the press, UNHCR, foreign governments, and international development and relief NGOs to visit the Central Highlands in August, September, and November. The government criticized almost all public statements on human rights issues by international NGOs and foreign governments. However, on August 18, for the first time the government responded publicly to international criticism of its human rights record by publishing a white paper that outlined efforts to improve the overall human rights situation. 

The government generally was willing to discuss human rights problems bilaterally with some foreign governments, and during the year several foreign governments continued official talks with the government concerning human rights. 

Section 5 Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons 

The law prohibits discrimination based on gender, ethnicity, religion, or social class; however, enforcement of these prohibitions was uneven. While many persons formerly interned in reeducation camps on the basis of association with the pre‑1975 government were well integrated into society, some continued to report varying levels of discrimination as they and their families sought access to housing, education, and employment. Some military veterans of the pre‑1975 government still faced economic hardship as a result of past employment restrictions and discrimination, but none were known still to be incarcerated for their activities before 1975. These veterans and their families generally were unable to obtain employment with the government. This prohibition was less restrictive than in previous years because of the growth of job opportunities in the private sector. 

Women 

The penal code prescribes punishment ranging from warnings to up to two years' imprisonment for "those who cruelly treat persons dependent on them"; however, the police and legal system were generally not equipped to deal with cases of domestic violence. Officials increasingly acknowledged domestic violence, which also was discussed more openly in the media. Domestic violence against women reportedly was common, although there are no firm statistics measuring the extent of the problem. Hot lines for victims of domestic violence run by domestic NGOs existed in some major cities. There were no reports of police or judicial reluctance to act on domestic abuse cases. The government did not take any special actions to combat rape during the year. Approximately two‑thirds of divorces reportedly were due in part to domestic violence. The divorce rate has risen in the past few years, but many women remained in abusive marriages rather than confront the social and family stigma as well as the economic uncertainty of divorce. 

It is a crime to use violence, threaten violence, take advantage of a person who is unable to act in self‑defense, or resort to trickery to have sexual intercourse with a person against that person's will. This appears to criminalize rape, spousal rape, and, in some instances, sexual harassment; however, there were no known instances of prosecution for spousal rape or sexual harassment. 

Prostitution is officially illegal but enforcement was uneven. Estimates varied widely, but some NGOs estimated that there were 300 thousand prostitutes in the country, including those who engaged in prostitution part‑time or seasonally. As in past years, some women reportedly were coerced to work as prostitutes, often victimized by false promises of lucrative work (see section 5, Trafficking). Many more women felt compelled to work as prostitutes because of poverty and a lack of other employment opportunities. There were reports in 2003 that some persons in Ho Chi Minh City addicted young women to heroin and forced them to work as prostitutes to earn money for drugs (see section 5, Children). There were continued reports that some parents coerced daughters into prostitution or made extreme financial demands that compelled them to engage in prostitution, since parents often expected an eldest daughter to assume responsibility for a significant part of a family's finances. The Vietnam Women's Union as well as international NGOs engaged actively in education and rehabilitation programs to combat these abuses. 

While there is no legal discrimination, women faced societal discrimination. Despite the large body of legislation and regulations devoted to the protection of women's rights in marriage as well as in the workplace and labor code provisions that call for preferential treatment of women, women did not always receive equal treatment. Nevertheless, women played an important role in the economy and were engaged widely in business and in social and educational institutions. Opportunities for young professional women have increased markedly in the past few years, with greater numbers of women entering and staying in the civil service, universities, and the private sector. 

The VFF‑controlled Women's Union has a broad agenda to promote women's rights, including political, economic, and legal equality, and protection from spousal abuse. The Women's Union operated micro‑credit consumer finance programs and other programs to promote the advancement of women. International NGOs and other international organizations regarded the Women's Union as effective, but they and union representatives believed that more time is required to overcome societal attitudes that relegated women to lower status than men. The government also has a committee for the advancement of women, which coordinated interministerial programs that affected women. 

Children 

International organizations and government agencies reported that despite the government's promotion of child protection and welfare, children continued to be at risk of economic exploitation. While education is compulsory through the age of 14, the authorities did not enforce the requirement, especially in rural areas where government and family budgets for education were strained and where children were needed for agricultural labor. Most schools operated two sessions, and children attended either morning or afternoon classes. Some street children in Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi participated in night education courses. The culture's strong emphasis on education led parents who could send children to school to do so rather than allow them to work. The public school system includes 12 grades. More than 90 percent of children attended primary grades; however, the percentage that attended lower and upper secondary school was much lower. While secondary school enrollments have increased sharply, they were still at less than 75 percent of eligible students for lower secondary and less than 50 percent for upper secondary. Enrollments were lower at all educational levels in remote mountainous areas, although the government ran a system of subsidized boarding schools through the high school level for high‑aptitude ethnic minority students. The government also had a program of preferential placement for ethnic minority individuals seeking university entry. Religious groups operated some orphanages, despite the government's prohibition on such activities, and sent the children to public schools during the day. 

The government continued a nationwide immunization campaign, and the government‑controlled press regularly stressed the importance of health and education for all children. While reports from domestic sources indicated that responsible officials generally took these goals seriously, concrete actions were constrained by limited budgets. According to the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), despite growth in incomes over the past decade, severe malnutrition remained a problem; approximately 39 percent of children under 5 years of age were underweight during the 1995‑2000 period. 

There was no information on occurrences of child abuse. 

Widespread poverty contributed to continued child prostitution, particularly of girls but also of some boys, in major cities. Many prostitutes in Ho Chi Minh City were under 18 years of age. Some child prostitutes, such as those from abusive homes, were forced into prostitution for economic reasons. 

Some children were trafficked domestically, and others were trafficked to foreign destinations for the purpose of sexual exploitation (see section 5, Trafficking). 

According to the Ministry of Labor, Invalids, and Social Affairs (MOLISA), there were 21,869 street children in the country as of February 2003. Street children were vulnerable to abuse and sometimes were abused or harassed by police. International NGOs documented numerous cases of Cambodian children trafficked to Ho Chi Minh City for short‑term work in begging rings. 

Trafficking in Persons 

The penal code prohibits trafficking in women and children; however, trafficking in women and children for the purpose of sexual exploitation remained a serious problem. There were no known cases of trafficking in adult persons for labor during the year. While reliable statistics on the number of citizens who were victims of sex-related trafficking were not available, there was evidence that the number has grown in recent years. The Social Evils Department of MOLISA and the Criminal Police Department of the MPS were the main government agencies involved in combating trafficking, in cooperation with the Ministry of Justice, the Women's Union, and the border guards. Police took an increasingly active role in investigating trafficking during the year, including training a dedicated antitrafficking force and building a conviction record. 

Throughout the year the government increased efforts to prosecute traffickers. The law provides for prison sentences of 2 to 20 years for each offense for persons found guilty of trafficking women, and for between 3 years and life in prison for each offense for persons found guilty of trafficking children. Hundreds of traffickers have been convicted and imprisoned. The government worked with international NGOs to supplement law enforcement measures and cooperated with other national governments to prevent trafficking. It also cooperated closely with other countries within the framework of INTERPOL and its Asian counterpart. 

The country was a source for trafficking in persons. Women were trafficked primarily to Cambodia and China for sexual exploitation and arranged marriages. According to one report, between 1990 and 2000 approximately 20 thousand young women and girls were sent to China to become brides, domestic workers, or prostitutes; however, it was not clear how many were victims of trafficking. Chinese police stated they had rescued more than 1,800 trafficking victims on the China‑Vietnam border since 2001. Between 1995 and 2000, approximately five thousand women and children were trafficked to and escaped from Cambodia. Some women also were trafficked to Singapore, Hong Kong, Macau, Thailand, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. There also were reports that some women going to Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau, and China for arranged marriages were victims of trafficking. The government estimated that approximately 10 percent of women in arranged marriages with Chinese men may have become trafficking victims. Some women and children also were trafficked within the country, usually from rural to urban areas. There were no reported incidents of trafficking of adult males during the year. 

Some children were trafficked domestically, and others were trafficked to foreign destinations for the purpose of prostitution. An NGO advocate has estimated that the average age of trafficked girls was between 15 and 17 years of age. Some reports indicated that the ages of girls trafficked to Cambodia typically were even lower. 

Individuals also were convicted in cases in which parents received payments in exchange for giving up their infant children for adoption. In addition, there was anecdotal evidence that small children and infants were sometimes kidnapped and sold to traffickers in China. Children also were trafficked to other countries; in September the press reported that Vietnamese children arriving illegally in the United Kingdom had become the victims of crime and abuse, including being forced to work in brothels, as beggars, in crime rings, or as drug traffickers (see section 5, Children). Mass organizations and NGOs continued to operate limited programs to reintegrate trafficked children into society. During the year programs designed to provide protection and reintegration assistance for trafficking victims through psychosocial support and vocational training, as well as to supplement regional and national prevention efforts by targeting at‑risk populations for similar services, continued operation in the north of the country. 

There were reports that some women from Ho Chi Minh City and the Mekong Delta who married men from Taiwan were forced into prostitution after their arrival in Taiwan. There was reported trafficking in women to the Macau Special Administrative Region of China with the assistance of organizations in China that were ostensibly marriage service bureaus, international labor organizations, and travel agencies. After arrival, women were forced into conditions similar to indentured servitude; some were forced into prostitution. In 2002 the government suspended the licenses of marriage mediation services and transferred their function to the Women's Union. The services had helped to arrange marriages between women and foreigners, primarily Taiwanese men. Government officials noted that it continued to be difficult to obtain information from Taiwanese officials on cases of alleged trafficking in Taiwan. 

Poor women and teenage girls, especially those from rural areas, were most at risk for being trafficked. MPS and UNICEF research indicated that trafficking victims can come from any part of the country but were concentrated in certain northern and southern border provinces as well as the central province of Thanh Hoa. Some were sold by their families as domestic workers or for sexual exploitation. In some cases traffickers paid families several hundred dollars in exchange for allowing their daughter to go to Cambodia for an "employment offer." Many victims faced strong pressure to make significant contributions to the family income. Others were offered lucrative jobs by acquaintances. False advertising, debt bondage, confiscation of documents, and threats of deportation were other methods commonly used by the traffickers, spouses, and employers. 

Individual opportunists and informal networks, as well as some organized groups, lured poor, often rural, women with promises of jobs or marriage and forced them to work as prostitutes (see section 5, Women). The government stated that organized criminal groups were involved in recruitment, transit, and other trafficking‑related activities. 

There were no cases indicating that governmental authorities or security forces facilitated or condoned trafficking in persons. However, the government continued to have a persistent problem with corruption, which is particularly severe among street‑level police and border agents. 

Official institutions, including MOLISA, the Women's Union, the Youth Union, and the Committee for Population, Family, and Children, had active programs aimed at prevention and victims' protection. These programs included warning women and girls of these dangers, repatriation programs, and vocational training for teenage girls in communities considered vulnerable to trafficking. Government agencies worked closely with the International Organization for Migration and other international NGOs to provide temporary shelter, medical services, education, credit, counseling, and rehabilitation to returned trafficking victims. Throughout the year security agencies with border control responsibility received training in investigative techniques to prevent trafficking. 

Persons with Disabilities 

The law requires the state to protect the rights and encourage the employment of persons with disabilities; however, the provision of services to such persons was limited. Government agencies worked with domestic and foreign organizations to provide protection, support, physical access, education, and employment. The government operated a small network of rehabilitation centers to provide long‑term, inpatient physical therapy. 

Educational opportunities for children with disabilities were poor but improving. Slightly more than 10 percent of children with disabilities were enrolled in school. During the year the government worked with donor countries and international NGOs to train additional teachers for students with disabilities. 

The law provides for preferential treatment for firms that recruit persons with disabilities and for fines on firms that do not meet minimum quotas that reserve 2 to 3 percent of their workforce for workers with disabilities; however, the government enforced these provisions unevenly. Firms with 51 percent employees with disabilities can qualify for special government‑subsidized loans. During the year the government provided $750 thousand (12 billion VND) for vocational training for persons with disabilities. In 2002 the Ministry of Construction enacted the "Barrier‑Free Design and Construction Code" and "Standards for Access for People with Disabilities," which requires that the construction or major renovation of new government and large public buildings include access for persons with disabilities. The Ministry of Construction trained architects and engineers in the new requirements. During the year the government established two provincial enforcement units to work on an enforcement and compliant process to support the new codes. 

International groups also assisted the government in implementing programs to increase access by persons with disabilities to education and employment. 

National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities 

Although the government officially was opposed to discrimination against ethnic minorities, longstanding societal discrimination against ethnic minorities remained a widespread problem. The government continued to implement policies to narrow the gap in the standard of living by granting preferential treatment to domestic and foreign companies that invested in highland areas. The government also had infrastructure development programs that targeted poor, largely ethnic minority areas and established agricultural extension programs for remote rural areas. The government ran special schools for ethnic minorities in many provinces, including subsidized boarding schools at the high‑school and middle-school levels, and it offered special admission and preparatory programs as well as scholarships and preferential admissions at the university level. 

The government resettled some ethnic minorities from inaccessible areas to locations where basic services were easier to provide; however, the resettlement sometimes diluted political and social solidarity of these groups. The government acknowledged that one of the goals of resettlement was to persuade the minorities to change from traditional slash‑and‑burn agricultural methods to sedentary agriculture. This also had the effect of making more land available to ethnic majority Kinh migrants and state-owned plantations the mountainous areas. In August 2004 the government announced a suspension of state‑sponsored migration programs to bring settlers to the Central Highlands and vowed to discourage spontaneous migration into the area. Large‑scale migration of ethnic Kinh to the Central Highlands in past years led to numerous land disputes between ethnic minority households and ethnic Kinh migrants. The loss (often through sales) of traditional ethnic minority lands to Kinh migrants was an important factor behind the ethnic unrest in the Central Highlands in 2001 and again in 2004. 

Some members of ethnic minority groups continued to flee to Cambodia, reportedly to seek greater economic opportunity as well as to escape ethnic and religious pressures in the Central Highlands. Government officials continued to monitor some highland minorities closely, particularly several ethnic groups in the Central Highlands, because of concern that the form of Protestant religion they were practicing encouraged ethnic minority separatism. Hmong Protestants in the northwest provinces were also subject to special attention and occasional harassment for practicing their religion without official approval (see section 2.c.). 

The government continued to impose extra security measures in the Central Highlands, especially after the April 2004 demonstrations. There were numerous reports that ethnic minorities seeking to cross into Cambodia were returned to the country by Vietnamese police operating on both sides of the border, sometimes followed by beatings and detentions; however, the government also continued to implement measures to address the causes of ethnic minority discontent and initiate new measures as well. These included special programs to improve education and health facilities and expand road access and electrification of rural communities and villages. The government allocated land to ethnic minorities in the Central Highlands through a special program; however, there were complaints that implementation of these special programs was uneven. 

The government continued a program to begin conducting classes in some local ethnic minority languages up to the fifth grade. The government worked with local officials to develop a local language curriculum. The government appeared to implement this program more comprehensively in the Central Highlands than in the mountainous northern and northwestern provinces. The government broadcast radio and television programming in ethnic minority languages in some areas. The government also instructed ethnic Kinh officials to learn the language of the locality in which they worked; however, implementation was not widespread. Provincial governments continued initiatives designed to increase employment, reduce the income gap between ethnic minorities and ethnic Kinh, and make officials sensitive and receptive to ethnic minority culture and traditions. 

Other Societal Abuses and Discrimination 

There was no evidence of official discrimination against persons with HIV/AIDS, but there was substantial widespread societal discrimination against persons with HIV/AIDS. There were multiple credible reports that persons with HIV/AIDS lost jobs or suffered from discrimination in the workplace or in finding housing. In a few cases children of persons with HIV/AIDS were barred from schools. 

Section 6 Worker Rights 

a. The Right of Association 

Workers are not free to join or form unions of their choosing. Trade unions are controlled by the CPV. All unions must be approved by and affiliated with the party‑controlled Vietnam General Confederation of Labor (VGCL). In June VGCL claimed a total of approximately 5.2 million members, with 71.9 percent working in the public sector, 34.9 percent working for state‑owned enterprises, and 28.1 percent working in the private sector. The VGCL claimed that its membership represented 95 percent of public sector workers and 90 percent of workers in state‑owned enterprises. Approximately 1.5 million union members worked in the private sector, including enterprises with foreign investment (more than 600 thousand persons). The vast majority of the workforce lived in rural areas, engaged in small‑scale farming, and was not unionized. The overall level of unionization of the workforce was 12 percent. 

Union leaders influenced key decisions, such as amending labor legislation, developing social safety nets, and setting health, safety, and minimum wage standards. However, the VGCL asserted that authorities did not prosecute some violations of the labor law. For example, on March 14, United Motor Vietnam Company Ltd. (UMV) in Hanoi fired 80 workers who took part in a strike. MOLISA and the Hanoi people's committee instructed the Hanoi Department of Labor, Invalids, and Social Affairs (DOLISA) to pay an inspection visit to the UMV. The inspector concluded that the company had violated many provisions of the labor law, such as labor contract signing, social insurance, working regulations, labor safety, illegal salary reductions, and firing the 80 workers. In addition UMV had hired 103 foreign workers, approximately 8 percent of total employees, which is 5 percent higher than the legal limit. None of the foreign workers had work permits. Because of these labor violations, the Hanoi DOLISA recommended imposing an administrative fine on UMV and withdrawing its investment license. However, the Hanoi people's committee vice chairman imposed only an administrative penalty of $1,930 (30 million VND), ignoring the illegal recruitment of the foreign workers and the illegal layoffs. 

While the labor law states that all enterprise‑level and professional trade unions are affiliated with the VGCL, in practice hundreds of unaffiliated "labor associations" were organized at many individual enterprises and in occupations such as cooks, market porters, and taxi, motorcycle, and cyclo drivers. The International Labor Organization (ILO) and the UNDP continued to cooperate on a large multiyear technical assistance program to strengthen labor law implementation. This involved projects that encouraged job promotion for young women and improvements in occupational safety and health, among other objectives. The ILO also continued to implement two projects to eliminate child labor and improving industrial relations, including collective bargaining and dispute settlement. In September MOLISA, VGCL, and the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) held their first tripartite industrial relations dialogue. At year's end the VCCI issued its first report on industrial relations in the country. The report was widely shared with its members and the government. Parts of the report were to be used as materials for educating employers in industrial relations and making proposals to policy-making agencies. VCCI announced plans to make the report on an annual basis in the future. 

Individual unions legally are not free to affiliate with, join, or participate in international labor bodies; however, the VGCL had relations with 140 labor organizations in 91 countries and 20 international and regional occupational trade unions. 

The labor law prohibits antiunion discrimination on the part of employers against employees who seek to organize. Enterprises are required to facilitate employee efforts to join a trade union. 

b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively 

By law the provincial or metropolitan branch of the VGCL is responsible for organizing a union within six months of the establishment of any new enterprise, and management is required to cooperate with the union. The labor law provides VGCL‑affiliated unions the right to bargain collectively on behalf of workers. 

The labor law provides for the right to strike if workers follow the stipulated process of conciliation and arbitration. The law requires that management and labor first attempt to resolve labor disputes through the enterprise's own labor conciliation council. However, many enterprises did not have labor conciliation councils. In the absence of such a council or if a council fails to resolve a labor dispute, the dispute is referred to labor arbitration successively at the district and provincial levels. Individual workers may take cases directly to the people's court system, but in most cases they may do so only after conciliation has been attempted and failed. Unions have the right to appeal decisions of provincial labor arbitration councils to provincial people's courts or to strike. Because this process was lengthy and the necessary dispute resolution bodies in many provinces and localities have never been established, nearly every strike was de jure illegal. According to MOLISA, between early 1995 and December, nearly one thousand strikes took place in the country. Most of the strikes were considered illegal by the government under the industrial action law. 

According to the Ministry of Labor, 147 strikes occurred, an increase of 22 compared with 2004. Of these, 100 were against foreign‑invested enterprises, 39 involved domestic private enterprises, and 8 affected state‑owned firms. In May nearly 10 thousand workers staged a 2‑day strike at Keyhing Toys Company to protest 12‑hour days without overtime. They also complained that they had no water to drink, they were given only 45 minutes for lunch, and their pay was reduced if they visited the restroom more than twice a day or spent more than 2 hours in a health clinic. In November 2004 hundreds of workers of King Ken Garment Factory in Ho Chi Minh City went on strike because the foreign employer changed its method of salary payment. According to VGCL's 2004 year‑end report, as many as 95 percent of that year's strikes were due to employers' labor regulation violations. 

Strikes typically did not follow the authorized conciliation and arbitration process and thus were of questionable legality; however, the government tolerated them and took no action against the strikers. Although the VGCL or its affiliate unions did not sanction these strikes officially, the local and provincial levels of the VGCL unofficially supported many of them. The labor law prohibits retribution against strikers, and there were no reports of retribution. In some cases the government disciplined employers for the illegal practices that led to strikes. For example, on May 3 local authorities in Binh Duong Province imposed an administrative punishment on a foreign–owned business of $4,400 (70 million VND) because it owed $63 thousand (1 billion VND) in social insurance contributions for the firms' workers and also was late in paying them. 

The labor law prohibits strikes in 54 occupational sectors and businesses that serve the public or are considered by the government to be important to the national economy and defense. A subsequent decree defined these enterprises to be those involved in electricity production; post and telecommunications; railway, maritime, and air transportation; banking; public works; and the oil and gas industry. The law also grants the prime minister the right to suspend a strike considered detrimental to the national economy or public safety. 

The same labor laws in effect for the rest of the country govern the growing number of export processing zones and industrial zones. There was anecdotal evidence that the government enforced labor laws more actively in the zones than outside them. 

c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor 

The law prohibits forced and compulsory labor, including by children; however, there were reports that thousands of children worked in exploitative situations (see section 6.d.). Some women were coerced into prostitution (see section 5). 

Prisoners routinely were required to work for little or no pay. They produced food and other goods used directly in prisons or sold on local markets reportedly to purchase items for their personal use. 

A government ordinance requires all male citizens between 18 and 45 years of age and women between 18 and 35 years of age to perform 10 days of annual public labor; however, this ordinance was rarely enforced. The ordinance also allows citizens to find a substitute or pay a marginal fee instead of working. 

In December a government taskforce finished a year-long survey of forced labor and was reviewing all legal regulations related to forced labor. 

d. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment 

Child labor was a problem. The labor law prohibits most child labor but allows exceptions for certain types of work. The law sets the minimum age for employment at 18, but enterprises may hire children between the ages of 15 and 18 if the firm obtains permission from parents and MOLISA. The government reported in March that approximately 23 thousand children between the ages of 8 and 14 worked part‑time or full‑time in violation of the labor law. That estimate may be low, since many more children worked in the informal sector, usually on family farms or in family businesses not within the scope of the labor law. According to a 2002‑03 living standard survey, approximately 18 percent of children participated in economic activities, and of these, 63 percent did not go to school. This same study found that 20.4 percent of rural children worked versus 7.3 percent of those living in urban areas. 

By law an employer must ensure that workers under 18 years of age do not undertake hazardous work or work that would harm their physical or mental development. Prohibited occupations are specified in the labor law. The law permits children to register at trade training centers, a form of vocational training, from 13 years of age. Children may work a maximum of 7 hours per day and 42 hours per week and must receive special health care. 

In rural areas children worked primarily on family farms and in other agricultural activities. In some cases they began work as young as 6 years of age and were expected to do the work of adults by the time they were 15. In urban areas children also work in family‑owned small businesses. According to the 2002‑03 living standard survey, the percentage of children working in household businesses and family‑owned small businesses was 88.5, while the rate of children in wage‑earning work was 11.5 percent. Migration from rural to urban settings exacerbated the child labor problem, because unauthorized migrants were unable to register their households in urban areas. This meant that their children could not attend public schools and families had less access to credit. Officials stated that juveniles in education and nourishment centers, which functioned much as reform schools or juvenile detention centers do elsewhere, were commonly assigned work for "educational purposes." 

A 2004 study of child labor in Ho Chi Minh City found cases in which parents in poor families entered into "verbal agreements" with employers, who then put their children to work. An ILO‑ and Ministry of Labor‑sponsored study of four groups of child workers conducted by Hanoi National University of Vietnam's Center for Woman Studies found that the salaries of children in domestic labor were sent directly to the parents. Most children in the study rarely used the wages for themselves, although some of them were able to pay their school fees with part of their salary. The study also noted that the working hours and income of children engaged in coal sorting and fishing were to some degree managed by their families. 

Government officials have the power to fine and, in cases of criminal code violations, prosecute employers who violate child labor laws. While the government committed insufficient resources to enforce effectively laws providing for children's safety, especially for children working in mines and as domestic servants, it detected some cases of child exploitation, removed the children from the exploitative situations, and fined the employers. International donor assistance targeted the problem of child labor. The government also continued programs to eliminate persistent child labor, with a particular focus on needy families and orphans. 

e. Acceptable Conditions of Work 

The labor law requires the government to set a minimum wage, which is adjusted for inflation and other economic changes. Since 1999 the official monthly minimum wage for foreign‑investment joint ventures has been $40 (626 thousand VND) in urban districts of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City; $35.90 (556 thousand VND) in rural districts of Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, and districts of Hai Phong, Bien Hoa City, and Vung Tau City; and $31.40 (487 thousand VND) elsewhere. The government may temporarily exempt certain joint ventures from paying the minimum wage during the first months of an enterprise's operations or if the enterprise is located in a very remote area, but the minimum wage in these cases can be no lower than $29.90 (417 thousand VND). On October 1, the official monthly minimum wage of the state sector was increased to $22.15 (350 thousand VND). This amount remained inadequate to provide a worker and family a decent standard of living. The new salary policy benefited more than 6 million persons, including more than 300 thousand public servants working in administrative organizations, CPV bodies, and unions. However, state‑owned enterprises consistently paid more than the state sector minimum wage. The number of workers who received government‑subsidized housing decreased. Many workers received bonuses and supplemented their incomes by engaging in entrepreneurial activities. Households frequently included more than one wage earner. 

The government set the workweek for government employees and employees of companies in the state sector at 40 hours, and it encouraged the private business sector and foreign and international organizations that employed local workers to reduce the number of hours in the workweek to 40 hours but did not make compliance mandatory. 

The labor law sets normal working hours at 8 hours per day, with a mandatory 24‑hour break each week. Additional hours require overtime pay at one and one‑half times the regular wage, two times the regular wage on weekdays off, and three times the regular wage on holidays and paid leave days. The law limits compulsory overtime to 4 hours per week and 200 hours per year. Amendments to the labor law in 2002 provide for an exception in special cases where this maximum can be up to 300 overtime hours worked annually, subject to stipulation by the government after consulting with the VGCL and employer representatives. The law also prescribes annual leave with full pay for various types of work. It was unclear how well the government enforced these provisions. 

According to the law, a female employee who is engaged, pregnant, on maternity leave, or is raising a child under one year of age cannot be dismissed unless the enterprise closes. Female employees who are at least seven months' pregnant or are raising a child under one year of age cannot work overtime, at night, or in distant locations. 

The labor law requires the government to promulgate rules and regulations that ensure worker safety. MOLISA, in coordination with local people's committees and labor unions, is charged with enforcing the regulations. In practice enforcement was inadequate because of low funding and a shortage of trained enforcement personnel. The VGCL reported that there were 300 labor inspectors in the country but that at least 600 were needed. On‑the‑job injuries due to poor health and safety conditions in the workplace were a problem. The greatest number of occupational injuries was caused by machinery, such as rolling mills and presses. In addition 10 percent of occupational injuries were caused by mining accidents. According to MOLISA statistics, in the first half of the year there were 2,670 injuries and 252 fatalities resulting from 2,596 work‑related accidents. In 2004 there were 6,186 injuries and 575 fatalities resulting from 6,026 work‑related accidents (some involving multiple workers), approximately 55 percent more than in 2003; however, there was evidence that workers, through labor unions, were effective in improving working conditions. Some foreign companies with operations in the country have established independent monitoring of problems at their factories. Companies reported that MOLISA or provincial labor agencies performed labor and occupational safety and health inspections at enterprises when they learned of serious accidents or when there were reports of hazardous conditions. 

The labor law provides that workers may remove themselves from hazardous conditions without risking loss of employment; however, it was unclear how well this stipulation was enforced in practice. MOLISA stated that there have been no worker complaints of employers failing to abide by it.

Official institutions, including MOLISA, the Women's Union, the Youth Union, and the Committee for Population, Family, and Children, had active programs aimed at prevention and victims' protection. These programs included warning women and girls of these dangers, repatriation programs, and vocational training for teenage girls in communities considered vulnerable to trafficking. Government agencies worked closely with the International Organization for Migration and other international NGOs to provide temporary shelter, medical services, education, credit, counseling, and rehabilitation to returned trafficking victims. Throughout the year security agencies with border control responsibility received training in investigative techniques to prevent trafficking. 

Persons with Disabilities 

The law requires the state to protect the rights and encourage the employment of persons with disabilities; however, the provision of services to such persons was limited. Government agencies worked with domestic and foreign organizations to provide protection, support, physical access, education, and employment. The government operated a small network of rehabilitation centers to provide long‑term, inpatient physical therapy. 

Educational opportunities for children with disabilities were poor but improving. Slightly more than 10 percent of children with disabilities were enrolled in school. During the year the government worked with donor countries and international NGOs to train additional teachers for students with disabilities. 

The law provides for preferential treatment for firms that recruit persons with disabilities and for fines on firms that do not meet minimum quotas that reserve 2 to 3 percent of their workforce for workers with disabilities; however, the government enforced these provisions unevenly. Firms with 51 percent employees with disabilities can qualify for special government‑subsidized loans. During the year the government provided $750 thousand (12 billion VND) for vocational training for persons with disabilities. In 2002 the Ministry of Construction enacted the "Barrier‑Free Design and Construction Code" and "Standards for Access for People with Disabilities," which requires that the construction or major renovation of new government and large public buildings include access for persons with disabilities. The Ministry of Construction trained architects and engineers in the new requirements. During the year the government established two provincial enforcement units to work on an enforcement and compliant process to support the new codes. 

International groups also assisted the government in implementing programs to increase access by persons with disabilities to education and employment. 

National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities 

Although the government officially was opposed to discrimination against ethnic minorities, longstanding societal discrimination against ethnic minorities remained a widespread problem. The government continued to implement policies to narrow the gap in the standard of living by granting preferential treatment to domestic and foreign companies that invested in highland areas. The government also had infrastructure development programs that targeted poor, largely ethnic minority areas and established agricultural extension programs for remote rural areas. The government ran special schools for ethnic minorities in many provinces, including subsidized boarding schools at the high‑school and middle-school levels, and it offered special admission and preparatory programs as well as scholarships and preferential admissions at the university level. 

The government resettled some ethnic minorities from inaccessible areas to locations where basic services were easier to provide; however, the resettlement sometimes diluted political and social solidarity of these groups. The government acknowledged that one of the goals of resettlement was to persuade the minorities to change from traditional slash‑and‑burn agricultural methods to sedentary agriculture. This also had the effect of making more land available to ethnic majority Kinh migrants and state-owned plantations the mountainous areas. In August 2004 the government announced a suspension of state‑sponsored migration programs to bring settlers to the Central Highlands and vowed to discourage spontaneous migration into the area. Large‑scale migration of ethnic Kinh to the Central Highlands in past years led to numerous land disputes between ethnic minority households and ethnic Kinh migrants. The loss (often through sales) of traditional ethnic minority lands to Kinh migrants was an important factor behind the ethnic unrest in the Central Highlands in 2001 and again in 2004. 

Some members of ethnic minority groups continued to flee to Cambodia, reportedly to seek greater economic opportunity as well as to escape ethnic and religious pressures in the Central Highlands. Government officials continued to monitor some highland minorities closely, particularly several ethnic groups in the Central Highlands, because of concern that the form of Protestant religion they were practicing encouraged ethnic minority separatism. Hmong Protestants in the northwest provinces were also subject to special attention and occasional harassment for practicing their religion without official approval (see section 2.c.). 

The government continued to impose extra security measures in the Central Highlands, especially after the April 2004 demonstrations. There were numerous reports that ethnic minorities seeking to cross into Cambodia were returned to the country by Vietnamese police operating on both sides of the border, sometimes followed by beatings and detentions; however, the government also continued to implement measures to address the causes of ethnic minority discontent and initiate new measures as well. These included special programs to improve education and health facilities and expand road access and electrification of rural communities and villages. The government allocated land to ethnic minorities in the Central Highlands through a special program; however, there were complaints that implementation of these special programs was uneven. 

The government continued a program to begin conducting classes in some local ethnic minority languages up to the fifth grade. The government worked with local officials to develop a local language curriculum. The government appeared to implement this program more comprehensively in the Central Highlands than in the mountainous northern and northwestern provinces. The government broadcast radio and television programming in ethnic minority languages in some areas. The government also instructed ethnic Kinh officials to learn the language of the locality in which they worked; however, implementation was not widespread. Provincial governments continued initiatives designed to increase employment, reduce the income gap between ethnic minorities and ethnic Kinh, and make officials sensitive and receptive to ethnic minority culture and traditions. 

Other Societal Abuses and Discrimination 

There was no evidence of official discrimination against persons with HIV/AIDS, but there was substantial widespread societal discrimination against persons with HIV/AIDS. There were multiple credible reports that persons with HIV/AIDS lost jobs or suffered from discrimination in the workplace or in finding housing. In a few cases children of persons with HIV/AIDS were barred from schools. 

Section 6 Worker Rights 

a. The Right of Association 

Workers are not free to join or form unions of their choosing. Trade unions are controlled by the CPV. All unions must be approved by and affiliated with the party‑controlled Vietnam General Confederation of Labor (VGCL). In June VGCL claimed a total of approximately 5.2 million members, with 71.9 percent working in the public sector, 34.9 percent working for state‑owned enterprises, and 28.1 percent working in the private sector. The VGCL claimed that its membership represented 95 percent of public sector workers and 90 percent of workers in state‑owned enterprises. Approximately 1.5 million union members worked in the private sector, including enterprises with foreign investment (more than 600 thousand persons). The vast majority of the workforce lived in rural areas, engaged in small‑scale farming, and was not unionized. The overall level of unionization of the workforce was 12 percent. 

Union leaders influenced key decisions, such as amending labor legislation, developing social safety nets, and setting health, safety, and minimum wage standards. However, the VGCL asserted that authorities did not prosecute some violations of the labor law. For example, on March 14, United Motor Vietnam Company Ltd. (UMV) in Hanoi fired 80 workers who took part in a strike. MOLISA and the Hanoi people's committee instructed the Hanoi Department of Labor, Invalids, and Social Affairs (DOLISA) to pay an inspection visit to the UMV. The inspector concluded that the company had violated many provisions of the labor law, such as labor contract signing, social insurance, working regulations, labor safety, illegal salary reductions, and firing the 80 workers. In addition UMV had hired 103 foreign workers, approximately 8 percent of total employees, which is 5 percent higher than the legal limit. None of the foreign workers had work permits. Because of these labor violations, the Hanoi DOLISA recommended imposing an administrative fine on UMV and withdrawing its investment license. However, the Hanoi people's committee vice chairman imposed only an administrative penalty of $1,930 (30 million VND), ignoring the illegal recruitment of the foreign workers and the illegal layoffs. 

While the labor law states that all enterprise‑level and professional trade unions are affiliated with the VGCL, in practice hundreds of unaffiliated "labor associations" were organized at many individual enterprises and in occupations such as cooks, market porters, and taxi, motorcycle, and cyclo drivers. The International Labor Organization (ILO) and the UNDP continued to cooperate on a large multiyear technical assistance program to strengthen labor law implementation. This involved projects that encouraged job promotion for young women and improvements in occupational safety and health, among other objectives. The ILO also continued to implement two projects to eliminate child labor and improving industrial relations, including collective bargaining and dispute settlement. In September MOLISA, VGCL, and the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) held their first tripartite industrial relations dialogue. At year's end the VCCI issued its first report on industrial relations in the country. The report was widely shared with its members and the government. Parts of the report were to be used as materials for educating employers in industrial relations and making proposals to policy-making agencies. VCCI announced plans to make the report on an annual basis in the future. 

Individual unions legally are not free to affiliate with, join, or participate in international labor bodies; however, the VGCL had relations with 140 labor organizations in 91 countries and 20 international and regional occupational trade unions. 

The labor law prohibits antiunion discrimination on the part of employers against employees who seek to organize. Enterprises are required to facilitate employee efforts to join a trade union. 

b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively 

By law the provincial or metropolitan branch of the VGCL is responsible for organizing a union within six months of the establishment of any new enterprise, and management is required to cooperate with the union. The labor law provides VGCL‑affiliated unions the right to bargain collectively on behalf of workers. 

The labor law provides for the right to strike if workers follow the stipulated process of conciliation and arbitration. The law requires that management and labor first attempt to resolve labor disputes through the enterprise's own labor conciliation council. However, many enterprises did not have labor conciliation councils. In the absence of such a council or if a council fails to resolve a labor dispute, the dispute is referred to labor arbitration successively at the district and provincial levels. Individual workers may take cases directly to the people's court system, but in most cases they may do so only after conciliation has been attempted and failed. Unions have the right to appeal decisions of provincial labor arbitration councils to provincial people's courts or to strike. Because this process was lengthy and the necessary dispute resolution bodies in many provinces and localities have never been established, nearly every strike was de jure illegal. According to MOLISA, between early 1995 and December, nearly one thousand strikes took place in the country. Most of the strikes were considered illegal by the government under the industrial action law. 

According to the Ministry of Labor, 147 strikes occurred, an increase of 22 compared with 2004. Of these, 100 were against foreign‑invested enterprises, 39 involved domestic private enterprises, and 8 affected state‑owned firms. In May nearly 10 thousand workers staged a 2‑day strike at Keyhing Toys Company to protest 12‑hour days without overtime. They also complained that they had no water to drink, they were given only 45 minutes for lunch, and their pay was reduced if they visited the restroom more than twice a day or spent more than 2 hours in a health clinic. In November 2004 hundreds of workers of King Ken Garment Factory in Ho Chi Minh City went on strike because the foreign employer changed its method of salary payment. According to VGCL's 2004 year‑end report, as many as 95 percent of that year's strikes were due to employers' labor regulation violations. 

Strikes typically did not follow the authorized conciliation and arbitration process and thus were of questionable legality; however, the government tolerated them and took no action against the strikers. Although the VGCL or its affiliate unions did not sanction these strikes officially, the local and provincial levels of the VGCL unofficially supported many of them. The labor law prohibits retribution against strikers, and there were no reports of retribution. In some cases the government disciplined employers for the illegal practices that led to strikes. For example, on May 3 local authorities in Binh Duong Province imposed an administrative punishment on a foreign–owned business of $4,400 (70 million VND) because it owed $63 thousand (1 billion VND) in social insurance contributions for the firms' workers and also was late in paying them. 

The labor law prohibits strikes in 54 occupational sectors and businesses that serve the public or are considered by the government to be important to the national economy and defense. A subsequent decree defined these enterprises to be those involved in electricity production; post and telecommunications; railway, maritime, and air transportation; banking; public works; and the oil and gas industry. The law also grants the prime minister the right to suspend a strike considered detrimental to the national economy or public safety. 

The same labor laws in effect for the rest of the country govern the growing number of export processing zones and industrial zones. There was anecdotal evidence that the government enforced labor laws more actively in the zones than outside them. 

c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor 

The law prohibits forced and compulsory labor, including by children; however, there were reports that thousands of children worked in exploitative situations (see section 6.d.). Some women were coerced into prostitution (see section 5). 

Prisoners routinely were required to work for little or no pay. They produced food and other goods used directly in prisons or sold on local markets reportedly to purchase items for their personal use. 

A government ordinance requires all male citizens between 18 and 45 years of age and women between 18 and 35 years of age to perform 10 days of annual public labor; however, this ordinance was rarely enforced. The ordinance also allows citizens to find a substitute or pay a marginal fee instead of working. 

In December a government taskforce finished a year-long survey of forced labor and was reviewing all legal regulations related to forced labor. 

d. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment 

Child labor was a problem. The labor law prohibits most child labor but allows exceptions for certain types of work. The law sets the minimum age for employment at 18, but enterprises may hire children between the ages of 15 and 18 if the firm obtains permission from parents and MOLISA. The government reported in March that approximately 23 thousand children between the ages of 8 and 14 worked part‑time or full‑time in violation of the labor law. That estimate may be low, since many more children worked in the informal sector, usually on family farms or in family businesses not within the scope of the labor law. According to a 2002‑03 living standard survey, approximately 18 percent of children participated in economic activities, and of these, 63 percent did not go to school. This same study found that 20.4 percent of rural children worked versus 7.3 percent of those living in urban areas. 

By law an employer must ensure that workers under 18 years of age do not undertake hazardous work or work that would harm their physical or mental development. Prohibited occupations are specified in the labor law. The law permits children to register at trade training centers, a form of vocational training, from 13 years of age. Children may work a maximum of 7 hours per day and 42 hours per week and must receive special health care. 

In rural areas children worked primarily on family farms and in other agricultural activities. In some cases they began work as young as 6 years of age and were expected to do the work of adults by the time they were 15. In urban areas children also work in family‑owned small businesses. According to the 2002‑03 living standard survey, the percentage of children working in household businesses and family‑owned small businesses was 88.5, while the rate of children in wage‑earning work was 11.5 percent. Migration from rural to urban settings exacerbated the child labor problem, because unauthorized migrants were unable to register their households in urban areas. This meant that their children could not attend public schools and families had less access to credit. Officials stated that juveniles in education and nourishment centers, which functioned much as reform schools or juvenile detention centers do elsewhere, were commonly assigned work for "educational purposes." 

A 2004 study of child labor in Ho Chi Minh City found cases in which parents in poor families entered into "verbal agreements" with employers, who then put their children to work. An ILO‑ and Ministry of Labor‑sponsored study of four groups of child workers conducted by Hanoi National University of Vietnam's Center for Woman Studies found that the salaries of children in domestic labor were sent directly to the parents. Most children in the study rarely used the wages for themselves, although some of them were able to pay their school fees with part of their salary. The study also noted that the working hours and income of children engaged in coal sorting and fishing were to some degree managed by their families. 

Government officials have the power to fine and, in cases of criminal code violations, prosecute employers who violate child labor laws. While the government committed insufficient resources to enforce effectively laws providing for children's safety, especially for children working in mines and as domestic servants, it detected some cases of child exploitation, removed the children from the exploitative situations, and fined the employers. International donor assistance targeted the problem of child labor. The government also continued programs to eliminate persistent child labor, with a particular focus on needy families and orphans. 

e. Acceptable Conditions of Work 

The labor law requires the government to set a minimum wage, which is adjusted for inflation and other economic changes. Since 1999 the official monthly minimum wage for foreign‑investment joint ventures has been $40 (626 thousand VND) in urban districts of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City; $35.90 (556 thousand VND) in rural districts of Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, and districts of Hai Phong, Bien Hoa City, and Vung Tau City; and $31.40 (487 thousand VND) elsewhere. The government may temporarily exempt certain joint ventures from paying the minimum wage during the first months of an enterprise's operations or if the enterprise is located in a very remote area, but the minimum wage in these cases can be no lower than $29.90 (417 thousand VND). On October 1, the official monthly minimum wage of the state sector was increased to $22.15 (350 thousand VND). This amount remained inadequate to provide a worker and family a decent standard of living. The new salary policy benefited more than 6 million persons, including more than 300 thousand public servants working in administrative organizations, CPV bodies, and unions. However, state‑owned enterprises consistently paid more than the state sector minimum wage. The number of workers who received government‑subsidized housing decreased. Many workers received bonuses and supplemented their incomes by engaging in entrepreneurial activities. Households frequently included more than one wage earner. 

The government set the workweek for government employees and employees of companies in the state sector at 40 hours, and it encouraged the private business sector and foreign and international organizations that employed local workers to reduce the number of hours in the workweek to 40 hours but did not make compliance mandatory. 

The labor law sets normal working hours at 8 hours per day, with a mandatory 24‑hour break each week. Additional hours require overtime pay at one and one‑half times the regular wage, two times the regular wage on weekdays off, and three times the regular wage on holidays and paid leave days. The law limits compulsory overtime to 4 hours per week and 200 hours per year. Amendments to the labor law in 2002 provide for an exception in special cases where this maximum can be up to 300 overtime hours worked annually, subject to stipulation by the government after consulting with the VGCL and employer representatives. The law also prescribes annual leave with full pay for various types of work. It was unclear how well the government enforced these provisions. 

According to the law, a female employee who is engaged, pregnant, on maternity leave, or is raising a child under one year of age cannot be dismissed unless the enterprise closes. Female employees who are at least seven months' pregnant or are raising a child under one year of age cannot work overtime, at night, or in distant locations. 

The labor law requires the government to promulgate rules and regulations that ensure worker safety. MOLISA, in coordination with local people's committees and labor unions, is charged with enforcing the regulations. In practice enforcement was inadequate because of low funding and a shortage of trained enforcement personnel. The VGCL reported that there were 300 labor inspectors in the country but that at least 600 were needed. On‑the‑job injuries due to poor health and safety conditions in the workplace were a problem. The greatest number of occupational injuries was caused by machinery, such as rolling mills and presses. In addition 10 percent of occupational injuries were caused by mining accidents. According to MOLISA statistics, in the first half of the year there were 2,670 injuries and 252 fatalities resulting from 2,596 work‑related accidents. In 2004 there were 6,186 injuries and 575 fatalities resulting from 6,026 work‑related accidents (some involving multiple workers), approximately 55 percent more than in 2003; however, there was evidence that workers, through labor unions, were effective in improving working conditions. Some foreign companies with operations in the country have established independent monitoring of problems at their factories. Companies reported that MOLISA or provincial labor agencies performed labor and occupational safety and health inspections at enterprises when they learned of serious accidents or when there were reports of hazardous conditions. 

The labor law provides that workers may remove themselves from hazardous conditions without risking loss of employment; however, it was unclear how well this stipulation was enforced in practice. MOLISA stated that there have been no worker complaints of employers failing to abide by it.