EN
BANC
[G.R.
No. 152154. July 15, 2003]
REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (SPECIAL FIRST
DIVISION), FERDINAND E. MARCOS (REPRESENTED BY HIS ESTATE/HEIRS: IMELDA R.
MARCOS, MARIA IMELDA [IMEE] MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. AND IRENE
MARCOS-ARANETA) AND IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, respondents.
D
E C I S I O N
CORONA, J.:
This
is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to (1)
set aside the Resolution dated January 31, 2002 issued by the Special First
Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0141 entitled Republic of
the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et. al., and (2) reinstate its
earlier decision dated September 19, 2000 which forfeited in favor of
petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) the amount held in escrow in
the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60
as of January 31, 2002.
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
On
December 17, 1991, petitioner Republic, through the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan, docketed as
Civil Case No. 0141 entitled Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E.
Marcos, represented by his Estate/Heirs and Imelda R. Marcos, pursuant to
RA 1379[1][1]
in relation to Executive Order Nos. 1,[2][2]
2,[3][3]
14[4][4]
and 14-A.[5][5]
In
said case, petitioner sought the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356
million (now estimated to be more than US$658 million inclusive of interest)
deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. The funds were previously
held by the following five account groups, using various foreign foundations in
certain Swiss banks:
(1) Azio-Verso-Vibur
Foundation accounts;
(2) Xandy-Wintrop:
Charis-Scolari-Valamo-Spinus- Avertina Foundation accounts;
(3) Trinidad-Rayby-Palmy
Foundation accounts;
(4) Rosalys-Aguamina
Foundation accounts and
(5) Maler Foundation
accounts.
In
addition, the petition sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million
in treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos couple’s salaries, other lawful
income as well as income from legitimately acquired property. The treasury
notes are frozen at the Central Bank of the Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas, by virtue of the freeze order issued by the PCGG.
On
October 18, 1993, respondents Imelda R. Marcos, Maria Imelda M. Manotoc, Irene
M. Araneta and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. filed their answer.
Before
the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental
Agreements[6][6]
dated December 28, 1993 were executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG
Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets of the
Marcos family. Subsequently, respondent Marcos children filed a motion dated
December 7, 1995 for the approval of said agreements and for the enforcement
thereof.
The
General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements sought to identify, collate, cause
the inventory of and distribute all assets presumed to be owned by the Marcos
family under the conditions contained therein. The aforementioned General
Agreement specified in one of its premises or “whereas clauses” the fact that
petitioner “obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on December 21,
1990, that the Three Hundred Fifty-six Million U.S. dollars (US$356 million)
belongs in principle to the Republic of the Philippines provided certain
conditionalities are met x x x.” The said decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme
Court affirmed the decision of Zurich District Attorney Peter Consandey,
granting petitioner’s request for legal assistance.[7][7]
Consandey declared the various deposits in the name of the enumerated
foundations to be of illegal provenance and ordered that they be frozen to
await the final verdict in favor of the parties entitled to restitution.
Hearings
were conducted by the Sandiganbayan on the motion to approve the
General/Supplemental Agreements. Respondent Ferdinand, Jr. was presented as
witness for the purpose of establishing the partial implementation of said
agreements.
On October 18, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for summary
judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings. Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed her
opposition thereto which was later adopted by respondents Mrs. Manotoc, Mrs.
Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr.
In
its resolution dated November 20, 1997, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s
motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings on the ground that
the motion to approve the compromise agreement “(took) precedence over the
motion for summary judgment.”
Respondent
Mrs. Marcos filed a manifestation on May 26, 1998 claiming she was not a party
to the motion for approval of the Compromise Agreement and that she owned 90%
of the funds with the remaining 10% belonging to the Marcos estate.
Meanwhile,
on August 10, 1995, petitioner filed with the District Attorney in Zurich,
Switzerland, an additional request for the immediate transfer of the deposits
to an escrow account in the PNB. The request was granted. On appeal by the
Marcoses, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, in a decision dated December 10,
1997, upheld the ruling of the District Attorney of Zurich granting the request
for the transfer of the funds. In 1998, the funds were remitted to the
Philippines in escrow. Subsequently, respondent Marcos children moved that the
funds be placed in custodia legis because the deposit in escrow in the
PNB was allegedly in danger of dissipation by petitioner. The Sandiganbayan, in
its resolution dated September 8, 1998, granted the motion.
After
the pre-trial and the issuance of the pre-trial order and supplemental
pre-trial order dated October 28, 1999 and January 21, 2000, respectively, the
case was set for trial. After several resettings, petitioner, on March 10,
2000, filed another motion for summary judgment pertaining to the forfeiture of
the US$356 million, based on the following grounds:
I
THE
ESSENTIAL FACTS WHICH WARRANT THE FORFEITURE OF THE FUNDS SUBJECT OF THE PETITION
UNDER R.A. NO. 1379 ARE ADMITTED BY RESPONDENTS IN THEIR PLEADINGS AND OTHER
SUBMISSIONS MADE IN THE COURSE OF THE PROCEEDING.
II
RESPONDENTS’
ADMISSION MADE DURING THE PRE-TRIAL THAT THEY DO NOT HAVE ANY INTEREST OR
OWNERSHIP OVER THE FUNDS SUBJECT OF THE ACTION FOR FORFEITURE TENDERS NO
GENUINE ISSUE OR CONTROVERSY AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT IN THE PRESENT ACTION,
THUS WARRANTING THE RENDITION OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT.[8][8]
Petitioner
contended that, after the pre-trial conference, certain facts were established,
warranting a summary judgment on the funds sought to be forfeited.
Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition to the
petitioner’s motion for summary judgment, which opposition was later adopted by
her co-respondents Mrs. Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr.
On
March 24, 2000, a hearing on the motion for summary judgment was conducted.
In
a decision[9][9]
dated September 19, 2000, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioner’s motion for
summary judgment:
CONCLUSION
There is no
issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence.
The Motion
for Summary Judgment is hereby granted.
The Swiss
deposits which were transmitted to and now held in escrow at the PNB are deemed
unlawfully acquired as ill-gotten wealth.
DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the Republic of the Philippines and
against the respondents, declaring the Swiss deposits which were transferred to
and now deposited in escrow at the Philippine National Bank in the total
aggregate value equivalent to US$627,608,544.95 as of August 31, 2000 together
with the increments thereof forfeited in favor of the State.[10][10]
Respondent
Mrs. Marcos filed a motion for reconsideration dated September 26, 2000.
Likewise, Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr. filed their own motion for reconsideration
dated October 5, 2000. Mrs. Araneta filed a manifestation dated October 4, 2000
adopting the motion for reconsideration of Mrs. Marcos, Mrs. Manotoc and
Ferdinand, Jr.
Subsequently,
petitioner filed its opposition thereto.
In
a resolution[11][11]
dated January 31, 2002, the Sandiganbayan reversed its September 19, 2000
decision, thus denying petitioner’s motion for summary judgment:
CONCLUSION
In sum, the
evidence offered for summary judgment of the case did not prove that the money
in the Swiss Banks belonged to the Marcos spouses because no legal proof exists
in the record as to the ownership by the Marcoses of the funds in escrow from
the Swiss Banks.
The basis
for the forfeiture in favor of the government cannot be deemed to have been established
and our judgment thereon, perforce, must also have been without basis.
WHEREFORE,
the decision of this Court dated September 19, 2000 is reconsidered and set
aside, and this case is now being set for further proceedings.[12][12]
Hence,
the instant petition. In filing the same, petitioner argues that the
Sandiganbayan, in reversing its September 19, 2000 decision, committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction considering
that --
I
PETITIONER
WAS ABLE TO PROVE ITS CASE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUISITES OF SECTIONS 2 AND
3 OF R.A. NO. 1379:
A. PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS CATEGORICALLY ADMITTED NOT ONLY THE PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF
FERDINAND E. MARCOS AND IMELDA R. MARCOS AS PUBLIC OFFICIALS BUT ALSO THE
EXTENT OF THEIR SALARIES AS SUCH PUBLIC OFFICIALS, WHO UNDER THE CONSTITUTION,
WERE PROHIBITED FROM ENGAGING IN THE MANAGEMENT OF FOUNDATIONS.
B. PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS ALSO ADMITTED THE EXISTENCE OF THE SWISS DEPOSITS AND THEIR
OWNERSHIP THEREOF:
1. ADMISSIONS
IN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ ANSWER;
2. ADMISSION
IN THE GENERAL / SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENTS THEY SIGNED AND SOUGHT TO IMPLEMENT;
3. ADMISSION
IN A MANIFESTATION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT IMELDA R. MARCOS AND IN THE MOTION TO
PLACE THE RES IN CUSTODIA LEGIS; AND
4. ADMISSION
IN THE UNDERTAKING TO PAY THE HUMAN RIGHTS VICTIMS.
C. PETITIONER HAS
PROVED THE EXTENT OF THE LEGITIMATE INCOME OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS AND IMELDA R.
MARCOS AS PUBLIC OFFICIALS.
D. PETITIONER HAS
ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE PRESUMPTION OF UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED WEALTH.
II
SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IS PROPER SINCE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT RAISED ANY GENUINE ISSUE
OF FACT CONSIDERING THAT:
A. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’
DEFENSE THAT SWISS DEPOSITS WERE LAWFULLY ACQUIRED DOES NOT ONLY FAIL TO TENDER
AN ISSUE BUT IS CLEARLY A SHAM; AND
B. IN SUBSEQUENTLY DISCLAIMING
OWNERSHIP OF THE SWISS DEPOSITS, PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ABANDONED THEIR SHAM
DEFENSE OF LEGITIMATE ACQUISITION, AND THIS FURTHER JUSTIFIED THE RENDITION OF
A SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
III
THE FOREIGN
FOUNDATIONS NEED NOT BE IMPLEADED.
IV
THE
HONORABLE PRESIDING JUSTICE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING
HIMSELF ON THE GROUND THAT ORIGINAL COPIES OF THE AUTHENTICATED SWISS DECISIONS
AND THEIR “AUTHENTICATED TRANSLATIONS” HAVE NOT BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE COURT,
WHEN EARLIER THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS QUOTED EXTENSIVELY A PORTION OF THE
TRANSLATION OF ONE OF THESE SWISS DECISIONS IN HIS “PONENCIA” DATED JULY 29,
1999 WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION TO RELEASE ONE HUNDRED FIFTY MILLION US DOLLARS
($150,000,000.00) TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS VICTIMS.
V
PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS ARE DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED THEIR OBJECTION TO THE AUTHENTICITY OF
THE SWISS FEDERAL SUPREME COURT DECISIONS.[13][13]
Petitioner,
in the main, asserts that nowhere in the respondents’ motions for
reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration were the
authenticity, accuracy and admissibility of the Swiss decisions ever
challenged. Otherwise stated, it was incorrect for the Sandiganbayan to use the
issue of lack of authenticated translations of the decisions of the Swiss
Federal Supreme Court as the basis for reversing itself because respondents
themselves never raised this issue in their motions for reconsideration and
supplemental motion for reconsideration. Furthermore, this particular issue
relating to the translation of the Swiss court decisions could not be
resurrected anymore because said decisions had been previously utilized by the
Sandiganbayan itself in resolving a “decisive issue” before it.
Petitioner
faults the Sandiganbayan for questioning the non-production of the
authenticated translations of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court decisions as this
was a marginal and technical matter that did not diminish by any measure the
conclusiveness and strength of what had been proven and admitted before the
Sandiganbayan, that is, that the funds deposited by the Marcoses constituted
ill-gotten wealth and thus belonged to the Filipino people.
In
compliance with the order of this Court, Mrs. Marcos filed her comment to the
petition on May 22, 2002. After several motions for extension which were all
granted, the comment of Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr. and the separate
comment of Mrs. Araneta were filed on May 27, 2002.
Mrs.
Marcos asserts that the petition should be denied on the following grounds:
A.
PETITIONER
HAS A PLAIN, SPEEDY, AND ADEQUATE REMEDY AT THE SANDIGANBAYAN.
B.
THE
SANDIGANBAYAN DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN SETTING THE CASE FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS.[14][14]
Mrs.
Marcos contends that petitioner has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law in view of the resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated
January 31, 2000 directing petitioner to submit the authenticated translations
of the Swiss decisions. Instead of availing of said remedy, petitioner now
elevates the matter to this Court. According to Mrs. Marcos, a petition for
certiorari which does not comply with the requirements of the rules may be
dismissed. Since petitioner has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, that is,
to proceed to trial and submit authenticated translations of the Swiss
decisions, its petition before this Court must be dismissed. Corollarily, the
Sandiganbayan’s ruling to set the case for further proceedings cannot and
should not be considered a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment.
Likewise,
Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr., in their comment, prayed for the dismissal of
the petition on the grounds that:
(A)
BY THE TIME PETITIONER FILED ITS
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 10 MARCH 2000, IT WAS ALREADY BARRED FROM DOING
SO.
(1) The Motion for Summary
Judgment was based on private respondents’ Answer and other documents that had
long been in the records of the case. Thus, by the time the Motion was filed on
10 March 2000, estoppel by laches had already set in against petitioner.
(2) By its positive acts
and express admissions prior to filing the Motion for Summary Judgment on 10
March 1990, petitioner had legally bound itself to go to trial on the basis of
existing issues. Thus, it clearly waived whatever right it had to move for
summary judgment.
(B)
EVEN ASSUMING THAT PETITIONER WAS
NOT LEGALLY BARRED FROM FILING THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THE
SANDIGANBAYAN IS CORRECT IN RULING THAT PETITIONER HAS NOT YET ESTABLISHED A PRIMA
FACIE CASE FOR THE FORFEITURE OF THE SWISS FUNDS.
(1) Republic Act No. 1379,
the applicable law, is a penal statute. As such, its provisions, particularly
the essential elements stated in section 3 thereof, are mandatory in nature.
These should be strictly construed against petitioner and liberally in favor of
private respondents.
(2) Petitioner has failed
to establish the third and fourth essential elements in Section 3 of R.A. 1379
with respect to the identification, ownership, and approximate amount of the
property which the Marcos couple allegedly “acquired during their incumbency”.
(a) Petitioner
has failed to prove that the Marcos couple “acquired” or own the Swiss funds.
(b) Even
assuming, for the sake of argument, that the fact of acquisition has been
proven, petitioner has categorically admitted that it has no evidence showing
how much of the Swiss funds was acquired “during the incumbency” of the Marcos
couple from 31 December 1965 to 25 February 1986.
(3) In contravention of the
essential element stated in Section 3 (e) of R.A. 1379, petitioner has failed
to establish the other proper earnings and income from legitimately acquired
property of the Marcos couple over and above their government salaries.
(4) Since petitioner failed
to prove the three essential elements provided in paragraphs (c)[15][15] (d),[16][16] and (e)[17][17] of Section
3, R.A. 1379, the inescapable conclusion is that the prima facie presumption of
unlawful acquisition of the Swiss funds has not yet attached. There can,
therefore, be no premature forfeiture of the funds.
(C)
IT WAS ONLY BY ARBITRARILY ISOLATING
AND THEN TAKING CERTAIN STATEMENTS MADE BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS OUT OF CONTEXT
THAT PETITIONER WAS ABLE TO TREAT THESE AS “JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS” SUFFICIENT TO
ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE AND THEREAFTER A CONCLUSIVE CASE TO JUSTIFY THE
FORFEITURE OF THE SWISS FUNDS.
(1) Under Section 27, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court, the General and Supplemental Agreements, as well as
the other written and testimonial statements submitted in relation thereto, are
expressly barred from being admissible in evidence against private respondents.
(2) Had petitioner bothered
to weigh the alleged admissions together with the other statements on record,
there would be a demonstrable showing that no such “judicial admissions” were
made by private respondents.
(D)
SINCE PETITIONER HAS NOT (YET)
PROVEN ALL THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR
FORFEITURE, AND PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT MADE ANY JUDICIAL ADMISSION THAT
WOULD HAVE FREED IT FROM ITS BURDEN OF PROOF, THE SANDIGANBAYAN DID NOT COMMIT
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
CERTIORARI, THEREFORE, DOES NOT LIE, ESPECIALLY AS THIS COURT IS NOT A TRIER OF
FACTS.[18][18]
For
her part, Mrs. Araneta, in her comment to the petition, claims that obviously
petitioner is unable to comply with a very plain requirement of respondent
Sandiganbayan. The instant petition is allegedly an attempt to elevate to this
Court matters, issues and incidents which should be properly threshed out at
the Sandiganbayan. To respondent Mrs. Araneta, all other matters, save that
pertaining to the authentication of the translated Swiss Court decisions, are
irrelevant and impertinent as far as this Court is concerned. Respondent Mrs.
Araneta manifests that she is as eager as respondent Sandiganbayan or any
interested person to have the Swiss Court decisions officially translated in
our known language. She says the authenticated official English version of the
Swiss Court decisions should be presented. This should stop all speculations on
what indeed is contained therein. Thus, respondent Mrs. Araneta prays that the
petition be denied for lack of merit and for raising matters which, in
elaborated fashion, are impertinent and improper before this Court.
PROPRIETY OF
PETITIONER’S
ACTION FOR
CERTIORARI
But
before this Court discusses the more relevant issues, the question regarding
the propriety of petitioner Republic's action for certiorari under Rule 65[19][19]
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Sandiganbayan Resolution
dated January 21, 2002 should be threshed out.
At
the outset, we would like to stress that we are treating this case as an
exception to the general rule governing petitions for certiorari. Normally,
decisions of the Sandiganbayan are brought before this Court under Rule 45, not
Rule 65.[20][20]
But where the case is undeniably ingrained with immense public interest, public
policy and deep historical repercussions, certiorari is allowed notwithstanding
the existence and availability of the remedy of appeal.[21][21]
One
of the foremost concerns of the Aquino Government in February 1986 was the
recovery of the unexplained or ill-gotten wealth reputedly amassed by former
President and Mrs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, their relatives, friends and business
associates. Thus, the very first Executive Order (EO) issued by then President
Corazon Aquino upon her assumption to office after the ouster of the Marcoses
was EO No. 1, issued on February 28, 1986. It created the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and charged it with the task of assisting
the President in the "recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or
abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and
entities owned or controlled by them during his administration, directly or
through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using
their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship." The urgency
of this undertaking was tersely described by this Court in Republic vs.
Lobregat[22][22]:
surely x x x an enterprise "of
great pith and moment"; it was attended by "great expectations";
it was initiated not only out of considerations of simple justice but also out
of sheer necessity - the national coffers were empty, or nearly so.
In
all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG, this Court has seen
fit to set aside technicalities and formalities that merely serve to delay or
impede judicious resolution. This Court prefers to have such cases resolved on
the merits at the Sandiganbayan. But substantial justice to the Filipino people
and to all parties concerned, not mere legalisms or perfection of form, should
now be relentlessly and firmly pursued. Almost two decades have passed since
the government initiated its search for and reversion of such ill-gotten
wealth. The definitive resolution of such cases on the merits is thus long
overdue. If there is proof of illegal acquisition, accumulation, misappropriation,
fraud or illicit conduct, let it be brought out now. Let the ownership of these
funds and other assets be finally determined and resolved with dispatch, free
from all the delaying technicalities and annoying procedural sidetracks.[23][23]
We
thus take cognizance of this case and settle with finality all the issues
therein.
ISSUES BEFORE THIS COURT
The
crucial issues which this Court must resolve are: (1) whether or not
respondents raised any genuine issue of fact which would either justify or
negate summary judgment; and (2) whether or not petitioner Republic was able to
prove its case for forfeiture in accordance with Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379.
(1) THE PROPRIETY
OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
We
hold that respondent Marcoses failed to raise any genuine issue of fact in
their pleadings. Thus, on motion of petitioner Republic, summary judgment
should take place as a matter of right.
In
the early case of Auman vs. Estenzo[24][24],
summary judgment was described as a judgment which a court may render before
trial but after both parties have pleaded. It is ordered by the court upon
application by one party, supported by affidavits, depositions or other
documents, with notice upon the adverse party who may in turn file an
opposition supported also by affidavits, depositions or other documents. This
is after the court summarily hears both parties with their respective proofs
and finds that there is no genuine issue between them. Summary judgment is
sanctioned in this jurisdiction by Section 1, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure:
SECTION 1.
Summary judgment for claimant.- A party seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time
after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting
affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon
all or any part thereof.[25][25]
Summary
judgment is proper when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material
fact in the action.[26][26]
The theory of summary judgment is that, although an answer may on its face
appear to tender issues requiring trial, if it is demonstrated by affidavits,
depositions or admissions that those issues are not genuine but sham or
fictitious, the Court is justified in dispensing with the trial and rendering
summary judgment for petitioner Republic.
The
Solicitor General made a very thorough presentation of its case for forfeiture:
x x x
4.
Respondent Ferdinand E. Marcos (now deceased and represented by his
Estate/Heirs) was a public officer for several decades continuously and without
interruption as Congressman, Senator, Senate President and President of the
Republic of the Philippines from December 31, 1965 up to his ouster by direct
action of the people of EDSA on February 22-25, 1986.
5. Respondent
Imelda Romualdez Marcos (Imelda, for short) the former First Lady who ruled
with FM during the 14-year martial law regime, occupied the position of
Minister of Human Settlements from June 1976 up to the peaceful revolution in
February 22-25, 1986. She likewise served once as a member of the Interim
Batasang Pambansa during the early years of martial law from 1978 to 1984 and
as Metro Manila Governor in concurrent capacity as Minister of Human
Settlements. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
11. At the
outset, however, it must be pointed out that based on the Official Report of
the Minister of Budget, the total salaries of former President Marcos as
President form 1966 to 1976 was P60,000 a year and from 1977 to 1985, P100,000
a year; while that of the former First Lady, Imelda R. Marcos, as Minister of
Human Settlements from June 1976 to February 22-25, 1986 was P75,000 a
year xxx.
ANALYSIS
OF RESPONDENTS
LEGITIMATE
INCOME
x x x
12. Based
on available documents, the ITRs of the Marcoses for the years 1965-1975 were
filed under Tax Identification No. 1365-055-1. For the years 1976 until 1984,
the returns were filed under Tax Identification No. M 6221-J 1117-A-9.
13. The
data contained in the ITRs and Balance Sheet filed by the “Marcoses are
summarized and attached to the reports in the following schedules:
Schedule A:
Schedule of
Income (Annex “T” hereof);
Schedule B:
Schedule of
Income Tax Paid (Annex “T-1” hereof);
Schedule C:
Schedule of
Net Disposable Income (Annex “T-2” hereof);
Schedule D:
Schedule of
Networth Analysis (Annex “T-3” hereof).
14. As
summarized in Schedule A (Annex “T” hereof), the Marcoses reported P16,408,442.00
or US$2,414,484.91 in total income over a period of 20 years from 1965 to
1984. The sources of income are as follows:
Official
Salaries - P
2,627,581.00 - 16.01%
Legal
Practice - 11,109,836.00
- 67.71%
Farm
Income - 149,700.00
- .91%
Others - 2,521,325.00
- 15.37%
Total P16,408,442.00
- 100.00%
15. FM’s
official salary pertains to his compensation as Senate President in 1965 in the
amount of P15,935.00 and P1,420,000.00 as President of the
Philippines during the period 1966 until 1984. On the other hand, Imelda
reported salaries and allowances only for the years 1979 to 1984 in the amount
of P1,191,646.00. The records indicate that the reported income came
from her salary from the Ministry of Human Settlements and allowances from Food
Terminal, Inc., National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation, National Food
Authority Council, Light Rail Transit Authority and Home Development Mutual
Fund.
16. Of the P11,109,836.00
in reported income from legal practice, the amount of P10,649,836.00 or
96% represents “receivables from prior years” during the period 1967 up to
1984.
17. In the
guise of reporting income using the cash method under Section 38 of the
National Internal Revenue Code, FM made it appear that he had an extremely
profitable legal practice before he became a President (FM being barred by law
from practicing his law profession during his entire presidency) and that,
incredibly, he was still receiving payments almost 20 years after. The only
problem is that in his Balance Sheet attached to his 1965 ITR immediately
preceeding his ascendancy to the presidency he did not show any Receivables
from client at all, much less the P10,65-M that he decided to later
recognize as income. There are no documents showing any withholding tax
certificates. Likewise, there is nothing on record that will show any known
Marcos client as he has no known law office. As previously stated, his networth
was a mere P120,000.00 in December, 1965. The joint income tax returns
of FM and Imelda cannot, therefore, conceal the skeletons of their kleptocracy.
18. FM
reported a total of P2,521,325.00 as Other Income for the years 1972 up
to 1976 which he referred to in his return as “Miscellaneous Items” and
“Various Corporations.” There is no indication of any payor of the dividends or
earnings.
19. Spouses
Ferdinand and Imelda did not declare any income from any deposits and
placements which are subject to a 5% withholding tax. The Bureau of Internal
Revenue attested that after a diligent search of pertinent records on file with
the Records Division, they did not find any records involving the tax
transactions of spouses Ferdinand and Imelda in Revenue Region No. 1, Baguio
City, Revenue Region No.4A, Manila, Revenue Region No. 4B1, Quezon City and
Revenue No. 8, Tacloban, Leyte. Likewise, the Office of the Revenue Collector of
Batac. Further, BIR attested that no records were found on any filing of
capital gains tax return involving spouses FM and Imelda covering the years
1960 to 1965.
20. In
Schedule B, the taxable reported income over the twenty-year period was P14,463,595.00
which represents 88% of the gross income. The Marcoses paid income taxes
totaling P8,233,296.00 or US$1,220,667.59. The business expenses in the
amount of P861,748.00 represent expenses incurred for subscription,
postage, stationeries and contributions while the other deductions in the
amount of P567,097.00 represents interest charges, medicare fees, taxes and
licenses. The total deductions in the amount of P1,994,845.00 represents
12% of the total gross income.
21. In
Schedule C, the net cumulative disposable income amounts to P6,756,301.00
or US$980,709.77. This is the amount that represents that portion of the
Marcoses income that is free for consumption, savings and investments. The
amount is arrived at by adding back to the net income after tax the personal
and additional exemptions for the years 1965-1984, as well as the tax-exempt
salary of the President for the years 1966 until 1972.
22.
Finally, the networth analysis in Schedule D, represents the total accumulated
networth of spouses, Ferdinand and Imelda. Respondent’s Balance Sheet attached
to their 1965 ITR, covering the year immediately preceding their ascendancy to
the presidency, indicates an ending networth of P120,000.00 which FM
declared as Library and Miscellaneous assets. In computing for the networth,
the income approach was utilized. Under this approach, the beginning capital is
increased or decreased, as the case may be, depending upon the income earned or
loss incurred. Computations establish the total networth of spouses Ferdinand
and Imelda, for the years 1965 until 1984 in the total amount of US$957,487.75,
assuming the income from legal practice is real and valid x x x.
G. THE
SECRET MARCOS DEPOSITS
IN SWISS BANKS
23. The
following presentation very clearly and overwhelmingly show in detail how both
respondents clandestinely stashed away the country’s wealth to Switzerland and
hid the same under layers upon layers of foundations and other corporate
entities to prevent its detection. Through their dummies/nominees, fronts or
agents who formed those foundations or corporate entities, they opened and
maintained numerous bank accounts. But due to the difficulty if not the
impossibility of detecting and documenting all those secret accounts as well as
the enormity of the deposits therein hidden, the following presentation is
confined to five identified accounts groups, with balances amounting to about $356-M
with a reservation for the filing of a supplemental or separate forfeiture
complaint should the need arise.
H. THE
AZIO-VERSO-VIBUR
FOUNDATION
ACCOUNTS
24. On June
11, 1971, Ferdinand Marcos issued a written order to Dr. Theo Bertheau, legal
counsel of Schweizeresche Kreditanstalt or SKA, also known as Swiss Credit Bank,
for him to establish the AZIO Foundation. On the same date, Marcos
executed a power of attorney in favor of Roberto S. Benedicto empowering him to
transact business in behalf of the said foundation. Pursuant to the said Marcos
mandate, AZIO Foundation was formed on June 21, 1971 in Vaduz. Walter Fessler
and Ernst Scheller, also of SKA Legal Service, and Dr. Helmuth Merling from
Schaan were designated as members of the Board of Trustees of the said
foundation. Ferdinand Marcos was named first beneficiary and the Marcos
Foundation, Inc. was second beneficiary. On November 12, 1971, FM again
issued another written order naming Austrahil PTY Ltd. In Sydney, Australia, as
the foundation’s first and sole beneficiary. This was recorded on December 14,
1971.
25. In an
undated instrument, Marcos changed the first and sole beneficiary to CHARIS
FOUNDATION. This change was recorded on December 4, 1972.
26. On
August 29, 1978, the AZIO FOUNDATION was renamed to VERSO FOUNDATION. The Board
of Trustees remained the same. On March 11, 1981, Marcos issued a written
directive to liquidated VERSO FOUNDATION and to transfer all its assets to
account of FIDES TRUST COMPANY at Bank Hofman in Zurich under the account
“Reference OSER.” The Board of Trustees decided to dissolve the foundation on
June 25, 1981.
27. In an
apparent maneuver to bury further the secret deposits beneath the thick layers
of corporate entities, FM effected the establishment of VIBUR FOUNDATION on May
13, 1981 in Vaduz. Atty. Ivo Beck and Limag Management, a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Fides Trust, were designated as members of the Board of Trustees.
The account was officially opened with SKA on September 10, 1981. The
beneficial owner was not made known to the bank since Fides Trust Company acted
as fiduciary. However, comparison of the listing of the securities in the safe
deposit register of the VERSO FOUNDATION as of February 27, 1981 with that of
VIBUR FOUNDATION as of December 31, 1981 readily reveals that exactly the same
securities were listed.
28. Under
the foregoing circumstances, it is certain that the VIBUR FOUNDATION is the
beneficial successor of VERSO FOUNDATION.
29. On
March 18, 1986, the Marcos-designated Board of Trustees decided to liquidate
VIBUR FOUNDATION. A notice of such liquidation was sent to the Office of the
Public Register on March 21, 1986. However, the bank accounts and respective
balances of the said VIBUR FOUNDATION remained with SKA. Apparently, the
liquidation was an attempt by the Marcoses to transfer the foundation’s funds
to another account or bank but this was prevented by the timely freeze order
issued by the Swiss authorities. One of the latest documents obtained by
the PCGG from the Swiss authorities is a declaration signed by Dr. Ivo Beck
(the trustee) stating that the beneficial owner of VIBUR FOUNDATION is
Ferdinand E. Marcos. Another document signed by G. Raber of SKA shows that
VIBUR FOUNDATION is owned by the “Marcos Familie”
30. As
of December 31, 1989, the balance of the bank accounts of VIBUR FOUNDATION with
SKA, Zurich, under the General Account No. 469857 totaled $3,597,544.00
I.
XANDY-WINTROP: CHARIS-SCOLARI-
VALAMO-SPINUS-AVERTINA
FOUNDATION
ACCOUNTS
31. This is
the most intricate and complicated account group. As the Flow Chart hereof
shows, two (2) groups under the foundation organized by Marcos dummies/nominees
for FM’s benefit, eventually joined together and became one (1) account group
under the AVERTINA FOUNDATION for the benefit of both FM and Imelda. This is
the biggest group from where the $50-M investment fund of the Marcoses was
drawn when they bought the Central Bank’s dollar-denominated treasury notes
with high-yielding interests.
32. On
March 20, 1968, after his second year in the presidency, Marcos opened bank
accounts with SKA using an alias or pseudonym WILLIAM SAUNDERS,
apparently to hide his true identity. The next day, March 21, 1968, his First
Lady, Mrs. Imelda Marcos also opened her own bank accounts with the same bank
using an American-sounding alias, JANE RYAN. Found among the voluminous
documents in Malacañang shortly after they fled to Hawaii in haste that fateful
night of February 25, 1986, were accomplished forms for “Declaration/Specimen
Signatures” submitted by the Marcos couple. Under the caption “signature(s)”
Ferdinand and Imelda signed their real names as well as their respective
aliases underneath. These accounts were actively operated and maintained by the
Marcoses for about two (2) years until their closure sometime in February, 1970
and the balances transferred to XANDY FOUNDATION.
33. The
XANDY FOUNDATION was established on March 3, 1970 in Vaduz. C.W. Fessler, C.
Souviron and E. Scheller were named as members of the Board of Trustees.
34. FM and
Imelda issued the written mandate to establish the foundation to Markus Geel of
SKA on March 3, 1970. In the handwritten Regulations signed by the Marcos
couple as well as in the type-written Regulations signed by Markus Geel both
dated February 13, 1970, the Marcos spouses were named the first beneficiaries,
the surviving spouse as the second beneficiary and the Marcos children –
Imee, Ferdinand, Jr. (Bongbong) and Irene – as equal third beneficiaries.
35. The
XANDY FOUNDATION was renamed WINTROP FOUNDATION on August 29, 1978. The Board
of Trustees remained the same at the outset. However, on March 27, 1980, Souviron
was replaced by Dr. Peter Ritter. On March 10. 1981, Ferdinand and Imelda
Marcos issued a written order to the Board of Wintrop to liquidate the
foundation and transfer all its assets to Bank Hofmann in Zurich in favor of
FIDES TRUST COMPANY. Later, WINTROP FOUNDATION was dissolved.
36. The
AVERTINA FOUNDATION was established on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz with Atty. Ivo
Beck and Limag Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of FIDES TRUST CO., as
members of the Board of Trustees. Two (2) account categories, namely: CAR and
NES, were opened on September 10, 1981. The beneficial owner of AVERTINA was
not made known to the bank since the FIDES TRUST CO. acted as fiduciary.
However, the securities listed in the safe deposit register of WINTROP
FOUNDATION Category R as of December 31, 1980 were the same as those listed in
the register of AVERTINA FOUNDATION Category CAR as of December 31, 1981.
Likewise, the securities listed in the safe deposit register of WINTROP
FOUNDATION Category S as of December 31, 1980 were the same as those listed in
the register of Avertina Category NES as of December 31, 1981.Under the
circumstances, it is certain that the beneficial successor of WINTROP
FOUNDATION is AVERTINA FOUNDATION. The balance of Category CAR as of December
31, 1989 amounted to US$231,366,894.00 while that of Category NES as of
12-31-83 was US$8,647,190.00. Latest documents received from Swiss authorities
included a declaration signed by IVO Beck stating that the beneficial owners of
AVERTINA FOUNDATION are FM and Imelda. Another document signed by G. Raber of
SKA indicates that Avertina Foundation is owned by the “Marcos Families.”
37. The
other groups of foundations that eventually joined AVERTINA were also
established by FM through his dummies, which started with the CHARIS
FOUNDATION.
38. The
CHARIS FOUNDATION was established in VADUZ on December 27, 1971. Walter Fessler
and Ernst Scheller of SKA and Dr. Peter Ritter were named as directors. Dr.
Theo Bertheau, SKA legal counsel, acted as founding director in behalf of FM by
virtue of the mandate and agreement dated November 12, 1971. FM himself was
named the first beneficiary and Xandy Foundation as second beneficiary in
accordance with the handwritten instructions of FM on November 12, 1971 and the
Regulations. FM gave a power of attorney to Roberto S. Benedicto on February
15, 1972 to act in his behalf with regard to Charis Foundation.
39. On
December 13, 1974, Charis Foundation was renamed Scolari Foundation but the
directors remained the same. On March 11, 1981 FM ordered in writing that the
Valamo Foundation be liquidated and all its assets be transferred to Bank
Hofmann, AG in favor of Fides Trust Company under the account “Reference OMAL”.
The Board of Directors decided on the immediate dissolution of Valamo Foundation
on June 25, 1981.
40 The
SPINUS FOUNDATION was established on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz with Atty. Ivo Beck
and Limag Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Fides Trust Co., as members
of the Foundation’s Board of Directors. The account was officially opened with
SKA on September 10, 1981. The beneficial owner of the foundation was not made
known to the bank since Fides Trust Co. acted as fiduciary. However, the list
of securities in the safe deposit register of Valamo Foundation as of December
31, 1980 are practically the same with those listed in the safe deposit
register of Spinus Foundation as of December 31, 1981. Under the circumstances,
it is certain that the Spinus Foundation is the beneficial successor of the
Valamo Foundation.
41. On
September 6, 1982, there was a written instruction from Spinus Foundation to
SKA to close its Swiss Franc account and transfer the balance to Avertina
Foundation. In July/August, 1982, several transfers from the foundation’s
German marks and US dollar accounts were made to Avertina Category CAR totaling
DM 29.5-M and $58-M, respectively. Moreover, a comparison of the list of
securities of the Spinus Foundation as of February 3, 1982 with the safe
deposit slips of the Avertina Foundation Category CAR as of August 19, 1982
shows that all the securities of Spinus were transferred to Avertina.
J.
TRINIDAD-RAYBY-PALMY
FOUNDATION
ACCOUNTS
42. The
Trinidad Foundation was organized on August 26, 1970 in Vaduz with C.W. Fessler
and E. Scheller of SKA and Dr. Otto Tondury as the foundation’s directors.
Imelda issued a written mandate to establish the foundation to Markus Geel on
August 26, 1970. The regulations as well as the agreement, both dated August
28, 1970 were likewise signed by Imelda. Imelda was named the first beneficiary
and her children Imelda (Imee), Ferdinand, Jr. (Bongbong) and, Irene were named
as equal second beneficiaries.
43. Rayby
Foundation was established on June 22, 1973 in Vaduz with Fessler, Scheller and
Ritter as members of the board of directors. Imelda issued a written mandate to
Dr. Theo Bertheau to establish the foundation with a note that the foundation’s
capitalization as well as the cost of establishing it be debited against the
account of Trinidad Foundation. Imelda was named the first and only beneficiary
of Rayby foundation. According to written information from SKA dated November
28, 1988, Imelda apparently had the intention in 1973 to transfer part of the
assets of Trinidad Foundation to another foundation, thus the establishment of
Rayby Foundation. However, transfer of assets never took place. On March 10,
1981, Imelda issued a written order to transfer all the assets of Rayby
Foundation to Trinidad Foundation and to subsequently liquidate Rayby. On the
same date, she issued a written order to the board of Trinidad to dissolve the
foundation and transfer all its assets to Bank Hofmann in favor of Fides Trust Co.
Under the account “Reference Dido,” Rayby was dissolved on April 6, 1981 and
Trinidad was liquidated on August 3, 1981.
44. The
PALMY FOUNDATION was established on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz with Dr. Ivo Beck and
Limag Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Fides Trust Co, as members of
the Foundation’s Board of Directors. The account was officially opened with the
SKA on September 10, 1981. The beneficial owner was not made known to the bank
since Fides Trust Co. acted as fiduciary. However, when one compares the
listing of securities in the safe deposit register of Trinidad Foundation as of
December 31,1980 with that of the Palmy Foundation as of December 31, 1980, one
can clearly see that practically the same securities were listed. Under the
circumstances, it is certain that the Palmy Foundation is the beneficial
successor of the Trinidad Foundation.
45. As of
December 31, 1989, the ending balance of the bank accounts of Palmy Foundation
under General Account No. 391528 is $17,214,432.00.
46. Latest
documents received from Swiss Authorities included a declaration signed by Dr.
Ivo Beck stating that the beneficial owner of Palmy Foundation is Imelda.
Another document signed by Raber shows that the said Palmy Foundation is owned
by “Marcos Familie”.
K.
ROSALYS-AGUAMINA
FOUNDATION
ACCOUNTS
47. Rosalys
Foundation was established in 1971 with FM as the beneficiary. Its Articles of
Incorporation was executed on September 24, 1971 and its By-Laws on October 3,
1971. This foundation maintained several accounts with Swiss Bank Corporation
(SBC) under the general account 51960 where most of the bribe monies from
Japanese suppliers were hidden.
48. On
December 19, 1985, Rosalys Foundation was liquidated and all its assets were
transferred to Aguamina Corporation’s (Panama) Account No. 53300 with SBC. The
ownership by Aguamina Corporation of Account No. 53300 is evidenced by an
opening account documents from the bank. J. Christinaz and R.L. Rossier, First
Vice-President and Senior Vice President, respectively, of SBC, Geneva issued a
declaration dated September 3, 1991 stating that the by-laws dated October 3,
1971 governing Rosalys Foundation was the same by-law applied to Aguamina
Corporation Account No. 53300. They further confirmed that no change of
beneficial owner was involved while transferring the assets of Rosalys to
Aguamina. Hence, FM remains the beneficiary of Aguamina Corporation Account No.
53300.
As of
August 30, 1991, the ending balance of Account No. 53300 amounted to
$80,566,483.00.
L. MALER
FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
49. Maler
was first created as an establishment. A statement of its rules and regulations
was found among Malacañang documents. It stated, among others, that 50% of the
Company’s assets will be for sole and full right disposal of FM and Imelda during
their lifetime, which the remaining 50% will be divided in equal parts among
their children. Another Malacañang document dated October 19,1968 and signed by
Ferdinand and Imelda pertains to the appointment of Dr. Andre Barbey and Jean
Louis Sunier as attorneys of the company and as administrator and manager of
all assets held by the company. The Marcos couple, also mentioned in the said
document that they bought the Maler Establishment from SBC, Geneva. On the same
date, FM and Imelda issued a letter addressed to Maler Establishment, stating
that all instructions to be transmitted with regard to Maler will be signed
with the word “JOHN LEWIS”. This word will have the same value as the couple’s
own personal signature. The letter was signed by FM and Imelda in their
signatures and as John Lewis.
50. Maler
Establishment opened and maintained bank accounts with SBC, Geneva. The opening
bank documents were signed by Dr. Barbey and Mr. Sunnier as authorized
signatories.
51. On
November 17, 1981, it became necessary to transform Maler Establishment into a
foundation. Likewise, the attorneys were changed to Michael Amaudruz, et. al.
However, administration of the assets was left to SBC. The articles of
incorporation of Maler Foundation registered on November 17, 1981 appear to be
the same articles applied to Maler Establishment. On February 28, 1984, Maler
Foundation cancelled the power of attorney for the management of its assets in
favor of SBC and transferred such power to Sustrust Investment Co., S.A.
52. As of
June 6, 1991, the ending balance of Maler Foundation’s Account Nos. 254,508 BT
and 98,929 NY amount SF 9,083,567 and SG 16,195,258, respectively, for a total
of SF 25,278,825.00. GM only until December 31, 1980. This account was opened
by Maler when it was still an establishment which was subsequently transformed
into a foundation.
53. All the
five (5) group accounts in the over-all flow chart have a total balance of
about Three Hundred Fifty Six Million Dollars ($356,000,000.00) as shown by
Annex “R-5” hereto attached as integral part hereof.
x
x x x x x.[27][27]
Respondents
Imelda R. Marcos, Maria Imelda M. Manotoc, Irene M. Araneta and Ferdinand
Marcos, Jr., in their answer, stated the following:
xxx xxx xxx
4. Respondents
ADMIT paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Petition.
5. Respondents
specifically deny paragraph 5 of the Petition in so far as it states that
summons and other court processes may be served on Respondent Imelda R. Marcos
at the stated address the truth of the matter being that Respondent Imelda R.
Marcos may be served with summons and other processes at No. 10-B Bel Air
Condominium 5022 P. Burgos Street, Makati, Metro Manila, and ADMIT the rest.
xxx xxx xxx
10.
Respondents ADMIT paragraph 11 of the Petition.
11.
Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 12 of the Petition for lack of
knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since
Respondents were not privy to the transactions and that they cannot remember
exactly the truth as to the matters alleged.
12.
Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 13 of the Petition for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of
the alleged ITRs and Balance Sheet.
13.
Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 14 of the Petition for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the
alleged ITRs.
14.
Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 15 of the Petition for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of
the alleged ITRs.
15.
Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 16 of the Petition for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of
the alleged ITRs.
16. Respondents
specifically DENY paragraph 17 of the Petition insofar as it attributes willful
duplicity on the part of the late President Marcos, for being false, the same
being pure conclusions based on pure assumption and not allegations of fact;
and specifically DENY the rest for lack of knowledge or information sufficient
to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot
remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs or the attachments
thereto.
17.
Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 18 of the Petition for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of
the alleged ITRs.
18.
Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 19 of the Petition for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of
the alleged ITRs and that they are not privy to the activities of the BIR.
19.
Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 20 of the Petition for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of
the alleged ITRs.
20.
Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 21 of the Petition for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of
the alleged ITRs.
21. Respondents
specifically DENY paragraph 22 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since
Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs.
22.
Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 23 insofar as it alleges that
Respondents clandestinely stashed the country’s wealth in Switzerland and hid
the same under layers and layers of foundation and corporate entities for being
false, the truth being that Respondents aforesaid properties were lawfully
acquired.
23.
Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30 of the
Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth of the allegation since Respondents were not privy to the
transactions regarding the alleged Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts, except
that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers that the
funds involved were lawfully acquired.
24.
Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36,37, 38, 39, 40,
and 41 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form
a belief as to the truth of the allegations since Respondents are not privy to
the transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to they cannot
remember with exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except that
as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers that the funds
involved were lawfully acquired.
25.
Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 42, 43, 44, 45, and 46, of the
Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth of the allegations since Respondents were not privy to the
transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to they cannot remember
with exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except that as to
Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers that the funds involved
were lawfully acquired.
26.
Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 49, 50, 51 and 52, of the Petition for
lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of
the allegations since Respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to
such transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with exactitude the
same having occurred a long time ago, except that as to Respondent Imelda R.
Marcos she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully
acquired.
Upon
careful perusal of the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent Mrs. Marcos
and the Marcos children indubitably failed to tender genuine issues in their
answer to the petition for forfeiture. A genuine issue is an issue of fact
which calls for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue
which is fictitious and contrived, set up in bad faith or patently lacking in
substance so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. Respondents’
defenses of “lack of knowledge for lack of privity” or “(inability to) recall
because it happened a long time ago” or, on the part of Mrs. Marcos, that “the
funds were lawfully acquired” are fully insufficient to tender genuine issues.
Respondent Marcoses’ defenses were a sham and evidently calibrated to compound
and confuse the issues.
The
following pleadings filed by respondent Marcoses are replete with indications
of a spurious defense:
(a) Respondents' Answer
dated October 18, 1993;
(b) Pre-trial Brief dated
October 4, 1999 of Mrs. Marcos, Supplemental Pre-trial Brief dated October 19,
1999 of Ferdinand, Jr. and Mrs. Imee Marcos-Manotoc adopting the pre-trial
brief of Mrs. Marcos, and Manifestation dated October 19, 1999 of Irene
Marcos-Araneta adopting the pre-trial briefs of her co- respondents;
(c) Opposition to Motion
for Summary Judgment dated March 21, 2000, filed by Mrs. Marcos which the other
respondents (Marcos children) adopted;
(d) Demurrer
to Evidence dated May 2, 2000 filed by Mrs. Marcos and adopted by the Marcos
children;
(e) Motion
for Reconsideration dated September 26, 2000 filed by Mrs. Marcos; Motion for
Reconsideration dated October 5, 2000 jointly filed by Mrs. Manotoc and
Ferdinand, Jr., and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration dated October 9,
2000 likewise jointly filed by Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr.;
(f) Memorandum
dated December 12, 2000 of Mrs. Marcos and Memorandum dated December 17, 2000
of the Marcos children;
(g) Manifestation
dated May 26, 1998; and
(h) General/Supplemental
Agreement dated December 23, 1993.
An
examination of the foregoing pleadings is in order.
Ø Ø Respondents’
Answer dated October 18, 1993.
In their answer, respondents failed to specifically deny
each and every allegation contained in the petition for forfeiture in the
manner required by the rules. All they gave were stock answers like “they have
no sufficient knowledge” or “they could not recall because it happened a long
time ago,” and, as to Mrs. Marcos, “the funds were lawfully acquired,” without
stating the basis of such assertions.
Section
10, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
A defendant
must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not
admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters
upon which he relies to support his denial. Where a defendant desires to deny
only a part of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and
material and shall deny the remainder. Where a defendant is without knowledge
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material
averment made in the complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the effect
of a denial.[28][28]
The
purpose of requiring respondents to make a specific denial is to make them
disclose facts which will disprove the allegations of petitioner at the trial,
together with the matters they rely upon in support of such denial. Our jurisdiction
adheres to this rule to avoid and prevent unnecessary expenses and waste of
time by compelling both parties to lay their cards on the table, thus reducing
the controversy to its true terms. As explained in Alonso vs. Villamor,[29][29]
A
litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled
and skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys
the other. It is rather a contest in which each contending party fully and
fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as
wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of
procedure, asks that justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels,
are not to be won by a rapier’s thrust.
On
the part of Mrs. Marcos, she claimed that the funds were lawfully acquired.
However, she failed to particularly state the ultimate facts surrounding the
lawful manner or mode of acquisition of the subject funds. Simply put, she
merely stated in her answer with the other respondents that the funds were
“lawfully acquired” without detailing how exactly these funds were supposedly
acquired legally by them. Even in this case before us, her assertion that the
funds were lawfully acquired remains bare and unaccompanied by any factual support
which can prove, by the presentation of evidence at a hearing, that indeed the
funds were acquired legitimately by the Marcos family.
Respondents’
denials in their answer at the Sandiganbayan were based on their alleged lack
of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegations of the petition.
It
is true that one of the modes of specific denial under the rules is a denial
through a statement that the defendant is without knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the material averment in the
complaint. The question, however, is whether the kind of denial in respondents’
answer qualifies as the specific denial called for by the rules. We do not
think so. In Morales vs. Court of Appeals,[30][30]
this Court ruled that if an allegation directly and specifically charges a
party with having done, performed or committed a particular act which the
latter did not in fact do, perform or commit, a categorical and express denial
must be made.
Here,
despite the serious and specific allegations against them, the Marcoses
responded by simply saying that they had no knowledge or information sufficient
to form a belief as to the truth of such allegations. Such a general,
self-serving claim of ignorance of the facts alleged in the petition for
forfeiture was insufficient to raise an issue. Respondent Marcoses should have
positively stated how it was that they were supposedly ignorant of the facts
alleged.[31][31]
To
elucidate, the allegation of petitioner Republic in paragraph 23 of the
petition for forfeiture stated:
23. The
following presentation very clearly and overwhelmingly show in detail how both
respondents clandestinely stashed away the country’s wealth to Switzerland and
hid the same under layers upon layers of foundations and other corporate
entities to prevent its detection. Through their dummies/nominees, fronts or
agents who formed those foundations or corporate entities, they opened and
maintained numerous bank accounts. But due to the difficulty if not the
impossibility of detecting and documenting all those secret accounts as well as
the enormity of the deposits therein hidden, the following presentation is
confined to five identified accounts groups, with balances amounting to about $356-M
with a reservation for the filing of a supplemental or separate forfeiture
complaint should the need arise.[32][32]
Respondents’
lame denial of the aforesaid allegation was:
22.
Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 23 insofar as it alleges that
Respondents clandestinely stashed the country’s wealth in Switzerland and hid
the same under layers and layers of foundations and corporate entities for
being false, the truth being that Respondents’ aforesaid properties were
lawfully acquired.[33][33]
Evidently,
this particular denial had the earmark of what is called in the law on
pleadings as a negative pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant with the
admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not
squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed
at.[34][34]
Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which
carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind
favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of
the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with
qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so
qualified or modified are literally denied, has been held that the qualifying
circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.[35][35]
In
the instant case, the material allegations in paragraph 23 of the said petition
were not specifically denied by respondents in paragraph 22 of their answer.
The denial contained in paragraph 22 of the answer was focused on the averment
in paragraph 23 of the petition for forfeiture that “Respondents clandestinely
stashed the country’s wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and
layers of foundations and corporate entities.” Paragraph 22 of the respondents’
answer was thus a denial pregnant with admissions of the following substantial
facts:
(1) the Swiss bank deposits
existed and
(2) that the estimated sum
thereof was US$356 million as of December, 1990.
Therefore,
the allegations in the petition for forfeiture on the existence of the Swiss
bank deposits in the sum of about US$356 million, not having been specifically
denied by respondents in their answer, were deemed admitted by them pursuant to
Section 11, Rule 8 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure:
Material
averment in the complaint, xxx shall be deemed admitted when not specifically
denied. xxx.[36][36]
By
the same token, the following unsupported denials of respondents in their
answer were pregnant with admissions of the substantial facts alleged in the
Republic’s petition for forfeiture:
23.
Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30 of the
Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth of the allegation since respondents were not privy to the
transactions regarding the alleged Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts, except
that, as to respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she specifically remembers that the
funds involved were lawfully acquired.
24.
Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39,
40, 41 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form
a belief as to the truth of the allegations since respondents were not privy to
the transactions and as to such transactions they were privy to, they cannot
remember with exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except as to
respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she specifically remembers that the funds involved
were lawfully acquired.
25.
Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 42, 43, 45, and 46 of the petition for
lack of knowledge or information sufficient to from a belief as to the truth of
the allegations since respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to
such transaction they were privy to, they cannot remember with exactitude, the
same having occurred a long time ago, except that as to respondent Imelda R.
Marcos, she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully
acquired.
26.
Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 49, 50, 51 and 52 of the petition for
lack of knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
of the allegations since respondents were not privy to the transactions and as
to such transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with exactitude the
same having occurred a long time ago, except that as to respondent Imelda R.
Marcos, she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully
acquired.
The
matters referred to in paragraphs 23 to 26 of the respondents’ answer pertained
to the creation of five groups of accounts as well as their respective ending
balances and attached documents alleged in paragraphs 24 to 52 of the
Republic’s petition for forfeiture. Respondent Imelda R. Marcos never
specifically denied the existence of the Swiss funds. Her claim that “the funds
involved were lawfully acquired” was an acknowledgment on her part of the
existence of said deposits. This only reinforced her earlier admission of the
allegation in paragraph 23 of the petition for forfeiture regarding the
existence of the US$356 million Swiss bank deposits.
The
allegations in paragraphs 47[37][37]
and 48[38][38]
of the petition for forfeiture referring to the creation and amount of the
deposits of the Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation as well as the averment in
paragraph 52-a[39][39]
of the said petition with respect to the sum of the Swiss bank deposits
estimated to be US$356 million were again not specifically denied by
respondents in their answer. The respondents did not at all respond to the
issues raised in these paragraphs and the existence, nature and amount of the
Swiss funds were therefore deemed admitted by them. As held in Galofa vs.
Nee Bon Sing,[40][40]
if a defendant’s denial is a negative pregnant, it is equivalent to an
admission.
Moreover,
respondents’ denial of the allegations in the petition for forfeiture “for lack
of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegations since respondents were not privy to the transactions” was just a
pretense. Mrs. Marcos’ privity to the transactions was in fact evident from her
signatures on some of the vital documents[41][41]
attached to the petition for forfeiture which Mrs. Marcos failed to specifically deny as required by the rules.[42][42]
It
is worthy to note that the pertinent documents attached to the petition for
forfeiture were even signed personally by respondent Mrs. Marcos and her late
husband, Ferdinand E. Marcos, indicating that said documents were within their
knowledge. As correctly pointed out by Sandiganbayan Justice Francisco
Villaruz, Jr. in his dissenting opinion:
The pattern
of: 1) creating foundations, 2) use of pseudonyms and dummies, 3) approving
regulations of the Foundations for the distribution of capital and income of
the Foundations to the First and Second beneficiary (who are no other than FM
and his family), 4) opening of bank accounts for the Foundations, 5) changing
the names of the Foundations, 6) transferring funds and assets of the
Foundations to other Foundations or Fides Trust, 7) liquidation of the
Foundations as substantiated by the Annexes U to U-168, Petition [for
forfeiture] strongly indicate that FM and/or Imelda were the real owners of the
assets deposited in the Swiss banks, using the Foundations as dummies.[43][43]
How
could respondents therefore claim lack of sufficient knowledge or information
regarding the existence of the Swiss bank deposits and the creation of five
groups of accounts when Mrs. Marcos and her late husband personally
masterminded and participated in the formation and control of said foundations?
This is a fact respondent Marcoses were never able to explain.
Not
only that. Respondents' answer also technically admitted the genuineness and
due execution of the Income Tax Returns (ITRs) and the balance sheets of the
late Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos attached to the petition for
forfeiture, as well as the veracity of the contents thereof.
The
answer again premised its denials of said ITRs and balance sheets on the ground
of lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
of the contents thereof. Petitioner correctly points out that respondents'
denial was not really grounded on lack of knowledge or information sufficient
to form a belief but was based on lack of recollection. By reviewing their own
records, respondent Marcoses could have easily determined the genuineness and
due execution of the ITRs and the balance sheets. They also had the means and
opportunity of verifying the same from the records of the BIR and the Office of
the President. They did not.
When
matters regarding which respondents claim to have no knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief are plainly and necessarily within their knowledge,
their alleged ignorance or lack of information will not be considered a
specific denial.[44][44]
An unexplained denial of information within the control of the pleader, or is
readily accessible to him, is evasive and is insufficient to constitute an
effective denial.[45][45]
The
form of denial adopted by respondents must be availed of with sincerity and
in good faith, and certainly not for the purpose of confusing the adverse party
as to what allegations of the petition are really being challenged; nor should
it be made for the purpose of delay.[46][46]
In the instant case, the Marcoses did not only present unsubstantiated
assertions but in truth attempted to mislead and deceive this Court by
presenting an obviously contrived defense.
Simply
put, a profession of ignorance about a fact which is patently and necessarily
within the pleader’s knowledge or means of knowing is as ineffective as no
denial at all.[47][47]
Respondents’ ineffective denial thus failed to properly tender an issue and the
averments contained in the petition for forfeiture were deemed judicially
admitted by them.
As
held in J.P. Juan & Sons, Inc. vs. Lianga Industries, Inc.:
Its
“specific denial” of the material allegation of the petition without setting
forth the substance of the matters relied upon to support its general denial,
when such matters were plainly within its knowledge and it could not logically
pretend ignorance as to the same, therefore, failed to properly tender on
issue.[48][48]
Thus,
the general denial of the Marcos children of the allegations in the petition
for forfeiture “for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth of the allegations since they were not privy to the
transactions” cannot rightfully be accepted as a defense because they are the
legal heirs and successors-in-interest of Ferdinand E. Marcos and are therefore
bound by the acts of their father vis-a-vis the Swiss funds.
Ø Ø PRE-TRIAL
BRIEF DATED OCTOBER 18, 1993
The
pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos was adopted by the three Marcos children. In
said brief, Mrs. Marcos stressed that the funds involved were lawfully
acquired. But, as in their answer, they failed to state and substantiate how
these funds were acquired lawfully. They failed to present and attach even a
single document that would show and prove the truth of their allegations.
Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
The parties
shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party, x x x their
respective pre-trial briefs which shall contain, among others:
x
x x
(d) the
documents or exhibits to be presented, stating the purpose thereof;
x
x x
(f) the number
and names of the witnesses, and the substance of their respective testimonies.[49][49]
It
is unquestionably within the court’s power to require the parties to submit
their pre-trial briefs and to state the number of witnesses intended to be
called to the stand, and a brief summary of the evidence each of them is
expected to give as well as to disclose the number of documents to be submitted
with a description of the nature of each. The tenor and character of the
testimony of the witnesses and of the documents to be deduced at the trial thus
made known, in addition to the particular issues of fact and law, it becomes
apparent if genuine issues are being put forward necessitating the holding of a
trial. Likewise, the parties are obliged not only to make a formal
identification and specification of the issues and their proofs, and to put
these matters in writing and submit them to the court within the specified
period for the prompt disposition of the action.[50][50]
The
pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos, as subsequently adopted by respondent Marcos
children, merely stated:
x
x x
WITNESSES
4.1
Respondent Imelda will present herself as a witness and reserves the right to
present additional witnesses as may be necessary in the course of the trial.
x
x x
DOCUMENTARY
EVIDENCE
5.1
Respondent Imelda reserves the right to present and introduce in evidence
documents as may be necessary in the course of the trial.
Mrs.
Marcos did not enumerate and describe the documents constituting her evidence.
Neither the names of witnesses nor the nature of their testimony was stated.
What alone appeared certain was the testimony of Mrs. Marcos only who in fact
had previously claimed ignorance and lack of knowledge. And even then, the
substance of her testimony, as required by the rules, was not made known
either. Such cunning tactics of respondents are totally unacceptable to this
Court. We hold that, since no genuine issue was raised, the case became ripe
for summary judgment.
Ø Ø OPPOSITION
TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
DATED
MARCH 21, 2000
The
opposition filed by Mrs. Marcos to the motion for summary judgment dated March
21, 2000 of petitioner Republic was merely adopted by the Marcos children as
their own opposition to the said motion. However, it was again not accompanied
by affidavits, depositions or admissions as required by Section 3, Rule 35 of
the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure:
x x x The
adverse party may serve opposing affidavits, depositions, or admissions at
least three (3) days before hearing. After hearing, the judgment sought shall
be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and
admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law.[51][51]
The
absence of opposing affidavits, depositions and admissions to contradict the
sworn declarations in the Republic’s motion only demonstrated that the
averments of such opposition were not genuine and therefore unworthy of belief.
Ø Ø Demurrer to
Evidence dated May 2, 2000;[52][52]
Motions for Reconsideration;[53][53]
and Memoranda
of Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos
children[54][54]
All
these pleadings again contained no allegations of facts showing their lawful
acquisition of the funds. Once more, respondents merely made general denials
without alleging facts which would have been admissible in evidence at the
hearing, thereby failing to raise genuine issues of fact.
Mrs.
Marcos insists in her memorandum dated October 21, 2002 that, during the
pre-trial, her counsel stated that his client was just a beneficiary of the
funds, contrary to petitioner Republic’s allegation that Mrs. Marcos disclaimed
ownership of or interest in the funds.
This
is yet another indication that respondents presented a fictitious defense
because, during the pre-trial, Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos children denied
ownership of or interest in the Swiss funds:
PJ Garchitorena:
Make of record that as
far as Imelda Marcos is concerned through the statement of Atty. Armando M. Marcelo
that the US$360 million more or less subject matter of the instant lawsuit as
allegedly obtained from the various Swiss Foundations do not belong to the
estate of Marcos or to Imelda Marcos herself. That’s your statement of facts?
Atty. MARCELO:
Yes, Your Honor.
PJ Garchitorena:
That’s it. Okay.
Counsel for Manotoc and Manotoc, Jr. What is your point here? Does the estate
of Marcos own anything of the $360 million subject of this case.
Atty. TECSON:
We joined the
Manifestation of Counsel.
PJ Garchitorena:
You do not own
anything?
Atty. TECSON:
Yes, Your Honor.
PJ Garchitorena:
Counsel for Irene
Araneta?
Atty. SISON:
I join the position
taken by my other compañeros here, Your Honor.
xxx
Atty. SISON:
Irene Araneta as heir
do (sic) not own any of the amount, Your Honor.[55][55]
We
are convinced that the strategy of respondent Marcoses was to confuse
petitioner Republic as to what facts they would prove or what issues they
intended to pose for the court's resolution. There is no doubt in our mind that
they were leading petitioner Republic, and now this Court, to perplexity, if
not trying to drag this forfeiture case to eternity.
Ø Ø Manifestation
dated May 26, 1998 filed by MRS.
Marcos;
General/Supplemental Compromise
Agreement dated December 28, 1993
These pleadings of respondent Marcoses presented nothing but
feigned defenses. In their earlier pleadings, respondents alleged either that
they had no knowledge of the existence of the Swiss deposits or that they could
no longer remember anything as it happened a long time ago. As to Mrs. Marcos,
she remembered that it was lawfully acquired.
In
her Manifestation dated May 26, 1998, Mrs. Marcos stated that:
COMES NOW
undersigned counsel for respondent Imelda R. Marcos, and before this Honorable
Court, most respectfully manifests:
That
respondent Imelda R, Marcos owns 90% of the subject matter of the
above-entitled case, being the sole beneficiary of the dollar deposits in the
name of the various foundations alleged in the case;
That in
fact only 10% of the subject matter in the above-entitled case belongs to the
estate of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
In
the Compromise/Supplemental Agreements, respondent Marcoses sought to implement
the agreed distribution of the Marcos assets, including the Swiss deposits.
This was, to us, an unequivocal admission of ownership by the Marcoses of the
said deposits.
But,
as already pointed out, during the pre-trial conference, respondent Marcoses
denied knowledge as well as ownership of the Swiss funds.
Anyway
we look at it, respondent Marcoses have put forth no real defense. The “facts”
pleaded by respondents, while ostensibly raising important questions or issues
of fact, in reality comprised mere verbiage that was evidently wanting in
substance and constituted no genuine issues for trial.
We
therefore rule that, under the circumstances, summary judgment is proper.
In
fact, it is the law itself which determines when summary judgment is called
for. Under the rules, summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine
issues of fact requiring the presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial.
Even if on their face the pleadings appear to raise issue, if the affidavits,
depositions and admissions show that such issues are not genuine, then summary
judgment as prescribed by the rules must ensue as a matter of law.[56][56]
In
sum, mere denials, if unaccompanied by any fact which will be admissible in
evidence at a hearing, are not sufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and
will not defeat a motion for summary judgment.[57][57]
A summary judgment is one granted upon motion of a party for an expeditious
settlement of the case, it appearing from the pleadings, depositions,
admissions and affidavits that there are no important questions or issues of
fact posed and, therefore, the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law. A motion for summary judgment is premised on the assumption that the
issues presented need not be tried either because these are patently devoid of
substance or that there is no genuine issue as to any pertinent fact. It is a
method sanctioned by the Rules of Court for the prompt disposition of a civil
action where there exists no serious controversy.[58][58]
Summary judgment is a procedural device for the prompt disposition of actions
in which the pleadings raise only a legal issue, not a genuine issue as to any
material fact. The theory of summary judgment is that, although an answer may
on its face appear to tender issues requiring trial, if it is established by
affidavits, depositions or admissions that those issues are not genuine but
fictitious, the Court is justified in dispensing with the trial and rendering
summary judgment for petitioner.[59][59]
In
the various annexes to the petition for forfeiture, petitioner Republic attached
sworn statements of witnesses who had personal knowledge of the Marcoses'
participation in the illegal acquisition of funds deposited in the Swiss
accounts under the names of five groups or foundations. These sworn statements
substantiated the ill-gotten nature of the Swiss bank deposits. In their answer
and other subsequent pleadings, however, the Marcoses merely made general
denials of the allegations against them without stating facts admissible in
evidence at the hearing, thereby failing to raise any genuine issues of fact.
Under
these circumstances, a trial would have served no purpose at all and would have
been totally unnecessary, thus justifying a summary judgment on the petition
for forfeiture. There were no opposing affidavits to contradict the sworn
declarations of the witnesses of petitioner Republic, leading to the
inescapable conclusion that the matters raised in the Marcoses’ answer were
false.
Time
and again, this Court has encountered cases like this which are either only
half-heartedly defended or, if the semblance of a defense is interposed at all,
it is only to delay disposition and gain time. It is certainly not in the
interest of justice to allow respondent Marcoses to avail of the appellate
remedies accorded by the Rules of Court to litigants in good faith, to the
prejudice of the Republic and ultimately of the Filipino people. From the
beginning, a candid demonstration of respondents’ good faith should have been
made to the court below. Without the deceptive reasoning and argumentation,
this protracted litigation could have ended a long time ago.
Since
1991, when the petition for forfeiture was first filed, up to the present, all
respondents have offered are foxy responses like “lack of sufficient knowledge
or lack of privity” or “they cannot recall because it happened a long time ago”
or, as to Mrs. Marcos, “the funds were lawfully acquired.” But, whenever it
suits them, they also claim ownership of 90% of the funds and allege that only
10% belongs to the Marcos estate. It has been an incredible charade from
beginning to end.
In
the hope of convincing this Court to rule otherwise, respondents Maria Imelda
Marcos-Manotoc and Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. contend that "by its positive
acts and express admissions prior to filing the motion for summary judgment on
March 10, 2000, petitioner Republic had bound itself to go to trial on the
basis of existing issues. Thus, it had legally waived whatever right it had to
move for summary judgment."[60][60]
We
do not think so. The alleged positive acts and express admissions of the
petitioner did not preclude it from filing a motion for summary judgment.
Rule
35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Rule
35
Summary
Judgment
Section 1.
Summary judgment for claimant. - A party seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at
any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move
with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in
his favor upon all or any part thereof.
Section 2.
Summary judgment for defending party. - A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may,
at any time, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or
admissions for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.
(Emphasis ours)[61][61]
Under
the rule, the plaintiff can move for summary judgment “at any time after the
pleading in answer thereto (i.e., in answer to the claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim) has been served." No fixed reglementary period is provided by
the Rules. How else does one construe the phrase "any time after the
answer has been served?”
This
issue is actually one of first impression. No local jurisprudence or authoritative
work has touched upon this matter. This being so, an examination of foreign
laws and jurisprudence, particularly those of the United States where many of
our laws and rules were copied, is in order.
Rule
56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party seeking to
recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim may move for summary judgment
at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the
action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse
party, and that a party against whom a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim is
asserted may move for summary judgment at any time.
However,
some rules, particularly Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice of New York,
specifically provide that a motion for summary judgment may not be made until
issues have been joined, that is, only after an answer has been served.[62][62]
Under said rule, after issues have been joined, the motion for summary judgment
may be made at any stage of the litigation.[63][63]
No fixed prescriptive period is provided.
Like
Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice of New York, our rules also provide
that a motion for summary judgment may not be made until issues have been
joined, meaning, the plaintiff has to wait for the answer before he can move
for summary judgment.[64][64]
And like the New York rules, ours do not provide for a fixed reglementary
period within which to move for summary judgment.
This
being so, the New York Supreme Court's interpretation of Rule 113 of the Rules
of Civil Practice can be applied by analogy to the interpretation of Section 1,
Rule 35, of our 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Under
the New York rule, after the issues have been joined, the motion for summary
judgment may be made at any stage of the litigation. And what exactly does the
phrase "at any stage of the litigation" mean? In Ecker vs. Muzysh,[65][65]
the New York Supreme Court ruled:
"PER
CURIAM.
Plaintiff
introduced her evidence and the defendants rested on the case made by the
plaintiff. The case was submitted. Owing to the serious illness of the trial
justice, a decision was not rendered within sixty days after the final
adjournment of the term at which the case was tried. With the approval of the
trial justice, the plaintiff moved for a new trial under Section 442 of the
Civil Practice Act. The plaintiff also moved for summary judgment under Rule
113 of the Rules of Civil Practice. The motion was opposed mainly on the
ground that, by proceeding to trial, the plaintiff had waived her right to
summary judgment and that the answer and the opposing affidavits raised
triable issues. The amount due and unpaid under the contract is not in dispute.
The Special Term granted both motions and the defendants have appealed.
The Special
Term properly held that the answer and the opposing affidavits raised no
triable issue. Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice and the Civil
Practice Act prescribe no limitation as to the time when a motion for summary
judgment must be made. The object of Rule 113 is to empower the court to
summarily determine whether or not a bona fide issue exists between the
parties, and there is no limitation on the power of the court to make such a
determination at any stage of the litigation." (emphasis ours)
On the basis of
the aforequoted disquisition, "any stage of the litigation" means
that "even if the plaintiff has proceeded to trial, this does not preclude
him from thereafter moving for summary judgment."[66][66]
In
the case at bar, petitioner moved for summary judgment after pre-trial and
before its scheduled date for presentation of evidence. Respondent Marcoses
argue that, by agreeing to proceed to trial during the pre-trial conference,
petitioner "waived" its right to summary judgment.
This argument must fail in the light of the New York Supreme
Court ruling which we apply by analogy to this case. In Ecker,[67][67] the defendant opposed the motion for summary judgment on a
ground similar to that raised by the Marcoses, that is, "that plaintiff
had waived her right to summary judgment" by her act of proceeding to
trial. If, as correctly ruled by the New York court, plaintiff was allowed to
move for summary judgment even after trial and submission of the case
for resolution, more so should we permit it in the present case where
petitioner moved for summary judgment before trial.
Therefore,
the phrase "anytime after the pleading in answer thereto has been
served" in Section 1, Rule 35 of our Rules of Civil Procedure means
"at any stage of the litigation." Whenever it becomes evident at any
stage of the litigation that no triable issue exists, or that the defenses
raised by the defendant(s) are sham or frivolous, plaintiff may move for
summary judgment. A contrary interpretation would go against the very objective
of the Rule on Summary Judgment which is to "weed out sham claims or
defenses thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a
trial."[68][68]
In
cases with political undertones like the one at bar, adverse parties will often
do almost anything to delay the proceedings in the hope that a future
administration sympathetic to them might be able to influence the outcome of
the case in their favor. This is rank injustice we cannot tolerate.
The
law looks with disfavor on long, protracted and expensive litigation and
encourages the speedy and prompt disposition of cases. That is why the law and
the rules provide for a number of devices to ensure the speedy disposition of
cases. Summary judgment is one of them.
Faithful
therefore to the spirit of the law on summary judgment which seeks to avoid
unnecessary expense and loss of time in a trial, we hereby rule that petitioner
Republic could validly move for summary judgment any time after the
respondents’ answer was filed or, for that matter, at any subsequent stage of
the litigation. The fact that petitioner agreed to proceed to trial did not in
any way prevent it from moving for summary judgment, as indeed no genuine issue
of fact was ever validly raised by respondent Marcoses.
This
interpretation conforms with the guiding principle enshrined in Section 6, Rule
1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure that the "[r]ules should be
liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding."[69][69]
Respondents
further allege that the motion for summary judgment was based on respondents'
answer and other documents that had long been in the records of the case. Thus,
by the time the motion was filed on March 10, 2000, estoppel by laches had
already set in against petitioner.
We
disagree. Estoppel by laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable or
unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could
or should have been done earlier, warranting a presumption that the person has
abandoned his right or declined to assert it.[70][70]
In effect, therefore, the principle of laches is one of estoppel because
"it prevents people who have slept on their rights from prejudicing the
rights of third parties who have placed reliance on the inaction of the
original parties and their successors-in-interest".[71][71]
A
careful examination of the records, however, reveals that petitioner was in
fact never remiss in pursuing its case against respondent Marcoses through
every remedy available to it, including the motion for summary judgment.
Petitioner
Republic initially filed its motion for summary judgment on October 18, 1996.
The motion was denied because of the pending compromise agreement between the
Marcoses and petitioner. But during the pre-trial conference, the Marcoses
denied ownership of the Swiss funds, prompting petitioner to file another
motion for summary judgment now under consideration by this Court. It was the
subsequent events that transpired after the answer was filed, therefore, which
prevented petitioner from filing the questioned motion. It was definitely not
because of neglect or inaction that petitioner filed the (second) motion for
summary judgment years after respondents' answer to the petition for
forfeiture.
In
invoking the doctrine of estoppel by laches, respondents must show not only
unjustified inaction but also that some unfair injury to them might result
unless the action is barred.[72][72]
This,
respondents failed to bear out. In fact, during the pre-trial conference, the
Marcoses disclaimed ownership of the Swiss deposits. Not being the owners, as
they claimed, respondents did not have any vested right or interest which could
be adversely affected by petitioner's alleged inaction.
But
even assuming for the sake of argument that laches had already set in, the
doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply when the government sues as a
sovereign or asserts governmental rights.[73][73]
Nor can estoppel validate an act that contravenes law or public policy.[74][74]
As
a final point, it must be emphasized that laches is not a mere question of time
but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a
right or claim to be enforced or asserted.[75][75]
Equity demands that petitioner Republic should not be barred from pursuing the
people's case against the Marcoses.
(2) The Propriety
of Forfeiture
The
matter of summary judgment having been thus settled, the issue of whether or
not petitioner Republic was able to prove its case for forfeiture in accordance
with the requisites of Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379 now takes center stage.
The
law raises the prima facie presumption that a property is unlawfully
acquired, hence subject to forfeiture, if its amount or value is manifestly
disproportionate to the official salary and other lawful income of the public
officer who owns it. Hence,
Sections 2 and 6 of RA 1379[76][76] provide:
x
x x x x x
Section 2.
Filing of petition. – Whenever any public officer or employee has
acquired during his incumbency an amount or property which is manifestly out of
proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other
lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property
shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired.
x
x x x x x
Sec. 6.
Judgment – If the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction of the
court that he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court
shall declare such property in question, forfeited in favor of the State, and
by virtue of such judgment the property aforesaid shall become the property of
the State. Provided, That no judgment shall be rendered within six
months before any general election or within three months before any special
election. The Court may, in addition, refer this case to the corresponding
Executive Department for administrative or criminal action, or both.
From
the above-quoted provisions of the law, the following facts must be established
in order that forfeiture or seizure of the Swiss deposits may be effected:
(1) ownership by the public
officer of money or property acquired during his incumbency, whether it be in
his name or otherwise, and
(2) the extent to which the
amount of that money or property exceeds, i. e., is grossly disproportionate
to, the legitimate income of the public officer.
That
spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were public officials during the time
material to the instant case was never in dispute. Paragraph 4 of respondent
Marcoses' answer categorically admitted the allegations in paragraph 4 of the
petition for forfeiture as to the personal circumstances of Ferdinand E. Marcos
as a public official who served without interruption as Congressman, Senator,
Senate President and President of the Republic of the Philippines from December
1, 1965 to February 25, 1986.[77][77]
Likewise, respondents admitted in their answer the contents of paragraph 5 of
the petition as to the personal circumstances of Imelda R. Marcos who once
served as a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa from 1978 to 1984
and as Metro Manila Governor, concurrently Minister of Human Settlements, from
June 1976 to February 1986.[78][78]
Respondent
Mrs. Marcos also admitted in paragraph 10 of her answer the allegations of
paragraph 11 of the petition for forfeiture which referred to the accumulated
salaries of respondents Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos.[79][79]
The combined accumulated salaries of the Marcos couple were reflected in the
Certification dated May 27, 1986 issued by then Minister of Budget and
Management Alberto Romulo.[80][80]
The Certification showed that, from 1966 to 1985, Ferdinand E. Marcos and
Imelda R. Marcos had accumulated salaries in the amount of P1,570,000 and
P718,750, respectively, or a total of P2,288,750:
Ferdinand
E. Marcos, as President
1966-1976
at P60,000/year P660,000
1977-1984
at P100,000/year 800,000
1985 at P110,000/year 110,000
P1,570,00
Imelda R.
Marcos, as Minister
June
1976-1985 at P75,000/year P718,000
In
addition to their accumulated salaries from 1966 to 1985 are the Marcos
couple’s combined salaries from January to February 1986 in the amount of P30,833.33.
Hence, their total accumulated salaries amounted to P2,319,583.33.
Converted to U.S. dollars on the basis of the corresponding peso-dollar
exchange rates prevailing during the applicable period when said salaries were
received, the total amount had an equivalent value of $304,372.43.
The
dollar equivalent was arrived at by using the official annual rates of exchange
of the Philippine peso and the US dollar from 1965 to 1985 as well as the
official monthly rates of exchange in January and February 1986 issued by the
Center for Statistical Information of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
Prescinding
from the aforesaid admissions, Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court
provides that:
Section 4.
– Judicial admissions – An admission, verbal or written, made by a
party in the course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof.
The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.[81][81]
It
is settled that judicial admissions may be made: (a) in the pleadings filed by
the parties; (b) in the course of the trial either by verbal or written
manifestations or stipulations; or (c) in other stages of judicial proceedings,
as in the pre-trial of the case.[82][82]
Thus, facts pleaded in the petition and answer, as in the case at bar, are
deemed admissions of petitioner and respondents, respectively, who are not
permitted to contradict them or subsequently take a position contrary to or
inconsistent with such admissions.[83][83]
The
sum of $304,372.43 should be held as the only known lawful income of respondents
since they did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL), as
required by law, from which their net worth could be determined. Besides, under
the 1935 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not receive “any
other emolument from the Government or any of its subdivisions and
instrumentalities”.[84][84]
Likewise, under the 1973 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could
“not receive during his tenure any other emolument from the Government or any
other source.”[85][85]
In fact, his management of businesses, like the administration of foundations
to accumulate funds, was expressly prohibited under the 1973 Constitution:
Article
VII, Sec. 4(2) – The President and the Vice-President shall not, during
their tenure, hold any other office except when otherwise provided in this
Constitution, nor may they practice any profession, participate directly or
indirectly in the management of any business, or be financially interested
directly or indirectly in any contract with, or in any franchise or special
privilege granted by the Government or any other subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government owned or controlled
corporation.
Article
VII, Sec. 11 – No Member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel
before any court inferior to a court with appellate jurisdiction, x x x.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any
contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof including
any government owned or controlled corporation during his term of office. He
shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the government for his
pecuniary benefit.
Article IX,
Sec. 7 – The Prime Minister and Members of the Cabinet shall be subject
to the provision of Section 11, Article VIII hereof and may not appear as
counsel before any court or administrative body, or manage any business, or
practice any profession, and shall also be subject to such other
disqualification as may be provided by law.
Their
only known lawful income of $304,372.43 can therefore legally and fairly serve
as basis for determining the existence of a prima facie case of
forfeiture of the Swiss funds.
Respondents
argue that petitioner was not able to establish a prima facie case for
the forfeiture of the Swiss funds since it failed to prove the essential
elements under Section 3, paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) of RA 1379. As the Act is
a penal statute, its provisions are mandatory and should thus be construed
strictly against the petitioner and liberally in favor of respondent Marcoses.
We
hold that it was not for petitioner to establish the Marcoses’ other lawful
income or income from legitimately acquired property for the presumption to
apply because, as between petitioner and respondents, the latter were in a
better position to know if there were such other sources of lawful income. And
if indeed there was such other lawful income, respondents should have
specifically stated the same in their answer. Insofar as petitioner Republic
was concerned, it was enough to specify the known lawful income of respondents.
Section
9 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations provides that, in determining prima
facie evidence of ill-gotten wealth, the value of the accumulated assets,
properties and other material possessions of those covered by Executive Order
Nos. 1 and 2 must be out of proportion to the known lawful income of
such persons. The respondent Marcos couple did not file any Statement of Assets
and Liabilities (SAL) from which their net worth could be determined. Their
failure to file their SAL was in itself a violation of law and to allow them to
successfully assail the Republic for not presenting their SAL would reward them
for their violation of the law.
Further,
contrary to the claim of respondents, the admissions made by them in their
various pleadings and documents were valid. It is of record that respondents
judicially admitted that the money deposited with the Swiss banks belonged to
them.
We
agree with petitioner that respondent Marcoses made judicial admissions of
their ownership of the subject Swiss bank deposits in their answer, the
General/Supplemental Agreements, Mrs. Marcos' Manifestation and Constancia
dated May 5, 1999, and the Undertaking dated February 10, 1999. We take note of
the fact that the Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan were unanimous in
holding that respondents had made judicial admissions of their ownership of the
Swiss funds.
In
their answer, aside from admitting the existence of the subject funds,
respondents likewise admitted ownership thereof. Paragraph 22 of
respondents' answer stated:
22.
Respondents specifically DENY PARAGRAPH 23 insofar as it alleges that
respondents clandestinely stashed the country's wealth in Switzerland and hid
the same under layers and layers of foundations and corporate entities for
being false, the truth being that respondents' aforesaid properties were
lawfully acquired. (emphasis supplied)
By
qualifying their acquisition of the Swiss bank deposits as lawful, respondents
unwittingly admitted their ownership thereof.
Respondent
Mrs. Marcos also admitted ownership of the Swiss bank deposits by failing to
deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of certain actionable
documents bearing her signature attached to the petition. As discussed earlier,
Section 11, Rule 8[86][86]
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that material averments in the
complaint shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied.
The
General[87][87]
and Supplemental[88][88]
Agreements executed by petitioner and respondents on December 28, 1993 further
bolstered the claim of petitioner Republic that its case for forfeiture was
proven in accordance with the requisites of Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379. The
whereas clause in the General Agreement declared that:
WHEREAS,
the FIRST PARTY has obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on
December 21, 1990, that the $356 million belongs in principle to the Republic
of the Philippines provided certain conditionalities are met, but even after 7
years, the FIRST PARTY has not been able to procure a final judgment of
conviction against the PRIVATE PARTY.
While
the Supplemental Agreement warranted, inter alia, that:
In
consideration of the foregoing, the parties hereby agree that the PRIVATE PARTY
shall be entitled to the equivalent of 25% of the amount that may be eventually
withdrawn from said $356 million Swiss deposits.
The
stipulations set forth in the General and Supplemental Agreements undeniably indicated
the manifest intent of respondents to enter into a compromise with petitioner.
Corollarily, respondents’ willingness to agree to an amicable settlement with
the Republic only affirmed their ownership of the Swiss deposits for the simple
reason that no person would acquiesce to any concession over such huge dollar
deposits if he did not in fact own them.
Respondents
make much capital of the pronouncement by this Court that the General and
Supplemental Agreements were null and void.[89][89]
They insist that nothing in those agreements could thus be admitted in evidence
against them because they stood on the same ground as an accepted offer which,
under Section 27, Rule 130[90][90]
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that “in civil cases, an offer of
compromise is not an admission of any liability and is not admissible in
evidence against the offeror.”
We
find no merit in this contention. The declaration of nullity of said agreements
was premised on the following constitutional and statutory infirmities: (1) the
grant of criminal immunity to the Marcos heirs was against the law; (2) the PCGG’s commitment to exempt from all forms of taxes
the properties to be retained by the Marcos heirs was against the Constitution;
and (3) the government’s undertaking to cause the dismissal of all cases filed
against the Marcoses pending before the Sandiganbayan and other courts
encroached on the powers of the judiciary. The reasons relied upon by the
Court never in the least bit even touched on the veracity and truthfulness of
respondents’ admission with respect to their ownership of the Swiss funds.
Besides, having made certain admissions in those agreements, respondents cannot
now deny that they voluntarily admitted owning the subject Swiss funds,
notwithstanding the fact that the agreements themselves were later declared
null and void.
The
following observation of Sandiganbayan Justice Catalino Castañeda, Jr. in the
decision dated September 19, 2000 could not have been better said:
x x x The
declaration of nullity of the two agreements rendered the same without legal
effects but it did not detract from the admissions of the respondents contained
therein. Otherwise stated, the admissions made in said agreements, as quoted
above, remain binding on the respondents.[91][91]
A
written statement is nonetheless competent as an admission even if it is
contained in a document which is not itself effective for the purpose for which
it is made, either by reason of illegality, or incompetency of a party thereto,
or by reason of not being signed, executed or delivered. Accordingly, contracts
have been held as competent evidence of admissions, although they may be
unenforceable.[92][92]
The
testimony of respondent Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. during the hearing on the motion
for the approval of the Compromise Agreement on April 29, 1998 also lent
credence to the allegations
of petitioner Republic that respondents admitted ownership of the Swiss bank
accounts. We quote the salient portions of Ferdinand Jr.’s formal declarations
in open court:
ATTY. FERNANDO:
Mr. Marcos, did you ever have any meetings with PCGG Chairman
Magtanggol C. Gunigundo?
F. MARCOS, JR.:
Yes. I have had very many meetings in fact with Chairman.
ATTY. FERNANDO:
Would you recall when the first meeting occurred?
PJ GARCHITORENA:
In connection with what?
ATTY. FERNANDO:
In connection with the ongoing talks to compromise the various cases
initiated by PCGG against your family?
F. MARCOS, JR.:
The nature of our meetings was solely concerned with negotiations
towards achieving some kind of agreement between the Philippine government and
the Marcos family. The discussions that led up to the compromise agreement were
initiated by our then counsel Atty. Simeon Mesina x x x.[93][93]
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. FERNANDO:
What was your reaction when Atty. Mesina informed you of this
possibility?
F. MARCOS, JR.:
My reaction to all of these approaches is that I am always open, we are
always open, we are very much always in search of resolution to the problem of
the family and any approach that has been made us, we have entertained. And so
my reaction was the same as what I have always … why not? Maybe this is the one
that will finally put an end to this problem.[94][94]
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. FERNANDO:
Basically, what were the true amounts of the assets in the bank?
PJ GARCHITORENA:
So, we are talking about liquid assets here? Just Cash?
F. MARCOS, JR.:
Well, basically, any assets. Anything that was under the Marcos name in
any of the banks in Switzerland which may necessarily be not cash.[95][95]
xxx xxx xxx
PJ GARCHITORENA:
x x x What did you do in other words, after being apprised of this
contract in connection herewith?
F. MARCOS, JR.:
I assumed that we are beginning to implement the agreement because this
was forwarded through the Philippine government lawyers through our lawyers and
then, subsequently, to me. I was a little surprised because we hadn’t really
discussed the details of the transfer of the funds, what the bank accounts,
what the mechanism would be. But nevertheless, I was happy to see that as far
as the PCGG is concerned, that the agreement was perfected and that we were
beginning to implement it and that was a source of satisfaction to me because I
thought that finally it will be the end.[96][96]
Ferdinand
Jr.'s pronouncements, taken in context and in their entirety, were a
confirmation of respondents’ recognition of their ownership of the Swiss bank
deposits. Admissions of a party in his testimony are receivable against him. If
a party, as a witness, deliberately concedes a fact, such concession has the
force of a judicial admission.[97][97]
It is apparent from Ferdinand Jr.’s testimony that the Marcos family agreed to
negotiate with the Philippine government in the
hope of finally putting an end to the problems besetting the Marcos family
regarding the Swiss accounts. This was doubtlessly an acknowledgment of
ownership on their part. The rule is that the testimony on the witness stand
partakes of the nature of a formal judicial admission when a party testifies
clearly and unequivocally to a fact which is peculiarly within his own
knowledge.[98][98]
In
her Manifestation[99][99]
dated May 26, 1998, respondent Imelda Marcos furthermore revealed the
following:
That
respondent Imelda R. Marcos owns 90% of the subject matter of the
above-entitled case, being the sole beneficiary of the dollar deposits in the
name of the various foundations alleged in the case;
That in
fact only 10% of the subject matter in the above-entitled case belongs to the
estate of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos;
xxx xxx xxx
Respondents’
ownership of the Swiss bank accounts as borne out by Mrs. Marcos' manifestation
is as bright as sunlight. And her claim that she is merely a beneficiary of the
Swiss deposits is belied by her own signatures on the appended copies of the
documents substantiating her ownership of the funds in the name of the
foundations. As already mentioned, she failed to specifically deny under oath
the authenticity of such documents, especially those involving “William
Saunders” and “Jane Ryan” which actually referred to Ferdinand Marcos and
Imelda Marcos, respectively. That failure of Imelda Marcos to specifically deny
the existence, much less the genuineness and due execution, of the instruments
bearing her signature, was tantamount to a judicial admission of the
genuineness and due execution of said instruments, in accordance with Section
8, Rule 8[100][100]
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Likewise,
in her Constancia[101][101]
dated May 6, 1999, Imelda Marcos prayed for the approval of the Compromise Agreement
and the subsequent release and transfer of the $150 million to the rightful
owner. She further made the following manifestations:
xxx xxx xxx
2. The
Republic’s cause of action over the full amount is its forfeiture in favor of
the government if found to be ill-gotten. On the other hand, the Marcoses
defend that it is a legitimate asset. Therefore, both parties have an
inchoate right of ownership over the account. If it turns out that the account
is of lawful origin, the Republic may yield to the Marcoses. Conversely, the
Marcoses must yield to the Republic. (underscoring supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
3.
Consistent with the foregoing, and the Marcoses having committed themselves to
helping the less fortunate, in the interest of peace, reconciliation and unity,
defendant MADAM IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, in firm abidance thereby, hereby
affirms her agreement with the Republic for the release and transfer of the US
Dollar 150 million for proper disposition, without prejudice to the final
outcome of the litigation respecting the ownership of the remainder.
Again,
the above statements were indicative of Imelda’s admission of the Marcoses’
ownership of the Swiss deposits as in fact “the Marcoses defend that it (Swiss
deposits) is a legitimate (Marcos) asset.”
On
the other hand, respondents Maria Imelda Marcos-Manotoc, Ferdinand Marcos, Jr.
and Maria Irene Marcos-Araneta filed a motion[102][102]
on May 4, 1998 asking the Sandiganbayan to place the res (Swiss
deposits) in custodia legis:
7. Indeed,
the prevailing situation is fraught with danger! Unless the aforesaid Swiss
deposits are placed in custodia legis or within the Court’s protective mantle,
its dissipation or misappropriation by the petitioner looms as a distinct
possibility.
Such
display of deep, personal interest can only come from someone who believes that
he has a marked and intimate right over the considerable dollar deposits.
Truly, by filing said motion, the Marcos children revealed their ownership of
the said deposits.
Lastly,
the Undertaking[103][103]
entered into by the PCGG, the PNB and the Marcos foundations on February 10,
1999, confirmed the Marcoses’ ownership of the Swiss bank deposits. The subject
Undertaking brought to light their readiness to pay the human rights victims
out of the funds held in escrow in the PNB. It stated:
WHEREAS,
the Republic of the Philippines sympathizes with the plight of the human rights
victims-plaintiffs in the aforementioned litigation through the Second Party,
desires to assist in the satisfaction of the judgment awards of said human
rights victims-plaintiffs, by releasing, assigning and or waiving US$150
million of the funds held in escrow under the Escrow Agreements dated August
14, 1995, although the Republic is not obligated to do so under final judgments
of the Swiss courts dated December 10 and 19, 1997, and January 8, 1998;
WHEREAS,
the Third Party is likewise willing to release, assign and/or waive all its
rights and interests over said US$150 million to the aforementioned human
rights victims-plaintiffs.
All
told, the foregoing disquisition negates the claim of respondents that
“petitioner failed to prove that they acquired or own the Swiss funds” and that
“it was only by arbitrarily isolating and taking certain statements made by
private respondents out of context that petitioner was able to treat these as
judicial admissions.” The Court is fully aware of the relevance, materiality
and implications of every pleading and document submitted in this case. This
Court carefully scrutinized the proofs presented by the parties. We analyzed,
assessed and weighed them to ascertain if each piece of evidence rightfully
qualified as an admission. Owing to the far-reaching historical and political
implications of this case, we considered and examined, individually and totally,
the evidence of the parties, even if it might have bordered on factual
adjudication which, by authority of the rules and jurisprudence, is not usually
done by this Court. There is no doubt in our mind that respondent Marcoses
admitted ownership of the Swiss bank deposits.
We
have always adhered to the familiar doctrine that an admission made in the
pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and becomes
conclusive on him, and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or
inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether an objection is interposed by
the adverse party or not.[104][104]
This doctrine is embodied in Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 4. Judicial
admissions. ─ An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the
course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The
admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made.[105][105]
In
the absence of a compelling reason to the contrary, respondents’ judicial
admission of ownership of the Swiss deposits is definitely binding on them.
The
individual and separate admissions of each respondent bind all of them pursuant
to Sections 29 and 31, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 29. Admission
by co-partner or agent. ─ The act or declaration of a partner or
agent of the party within the scope of his authority and during the existence
of the partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against such party after
the partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. The same rule applies to the act or declaration of a joint owner,
joint debtor, or other person jointly interested with the party.[106][106]
SEC. 31. Admission
by privies. ─ Where one derives title to property from another, the
act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in
relation to the property, is evidence against the former.[107][107]
The
declarations of a person are admissible against a party whenever a “privity of
estate” exists between the declarant and the party, the term “privity of
estate” generally denoting a succession in rights.[108][108]
Consequently, an admission of one in privity with a party to the record is
competent.[109][109]
Without doubt, privity exists among the respondents in this case. And where
several co-parties to the record are jointly interested in the subject matter
of the controversy, the admission of one is competent against all.[110][110]
Respondents
insist that the Sandiganbayan is correct in ruling that petitioner Republic has
failed to establish a prima facie case for the forfeiture of the Swiss
deposits.
We
disagree. The sudden turn-around of the Sandiganbayan was really strange, to
say the least, as its findings and conclusions were not borne out by the
voluminous records of this case.
Section
2 of RA 1379 explicitly states that “whenever any public officer or employee
has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly
out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his
other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said
property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired.
x x x”
The
elements which must concur for this prima facie presumption to apply
are:
(1) the
offender is a public officer or employee;
(2) he
must have acquired a considerable amount of money or property during his
incumbency; and
(3) said
amount is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or
employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately
acquired property.
It
is undisputed that spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were former public
officers. Hence, the first element is clearly extant.
The
second element deals with the amount of money or property acquired by the
public officer during his incumbency. The Marcos couple indubitably acquired
and owned properties during their term of office. In fact, the five groups of
Swiss accounts were admittedly owned by them. There is proof of the existence
and ownership of these assets and properties and it suffices to comply with the
second element.
The
third requirement is met if it can be shown that such assets, money or property
is manifestly out of proportion to the public officer’s salary and his other
lawful income. It is the proof of this third element that is crucial in
determining whether a prima facie presumption has been established in
this case.
Petitioner
Republic presented not only a schedule indicating the lawful income of the
Marcos spouses during their incumbency but also evidence that they had huge
deposits beyond such lawful income in Swiss banks under the names of five
different foundations. We believe petitioner was able to establish the prima
facie presumption that the assets and properties acquired by the Marcoses
were manifestly and patently disproportionate to their aggregate
salaries as public officials. Otherwise stated, petitioner presented enough
evidence to convince us that the Marcoses had dollar deposits amounting to US
$356 million representing the balance of the Swiss accounts of the five
foundations, an amount way, way beyond their aggregate legitimate income of
only US$304,372.43 during their incumbency as government officials.
Considering,
therefore, that the total amount of the Swiss deposits was considerably out of
proportion to the known lawful income of the Marcoses, the presumption that
said dollar deposits were unlawfully acquired was duly established. It was
sufficient for the petition for forfeiture to state the approximate amount of
money and property acquired by the respondents, and their total government
salaries. Section 9 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations states:
Prima Facie
Evidence. – Any accumulation of assets, properties, and other
material possessions of those persons covered by Executive Orders No. 1 and No.
2, whose value is out of proportion to their known lawful income is prima
facie deemed ill-gotten wealth.
Indeed,
the burden of proof was on the respondents to dispute this presumption and show
by clear and convincing evidence that the Swiss deposits were lawfully acquired
and that they had other legitimate sources of income. A presumption is prima
facie proof of the fact presumed and, unless the fact thus prima facie
established by legal presumption is disproved, it must stand as proved.[111][111]
Respondent
Mrs. Marcos argues that the foreign foundations should have been impleaded as
they were indispensable parties without whom no complete determination of the
issues could be made. She asserts that the failure of petitioner Republic to
implead the foundations rendered the judgment void as the joinder of
indispensable parties was a sine qua non exercise of judicial power.
Furthermore, the non-inclusion of the foreign foundations violated the
conditions prescribed by the Swiss government regarding the deposit of the
funds in escrow, deprived them of their day in court and denied them their
rights under the Swiss constitution and international law.[112][112]
The
Court finds that petitioner Republic did not err in not impleading the foreign
foundations. Section 7, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,[113][113]
taken from Rule 19b of the American Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides
for the compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Generally, an
indispensable party must be impleaded for the complete determination of the
suit. However, failure to join an indispensable party does not divest the court
of jurisdiction since the rule regarding indispensable parties is founded on
equitable considerations and is not jurisdictional. Thus, the court is not divested
of its power to render a decision even in the absence of indispensable parties,
though such judgment is not binding on the non-joined party.[114][114]
An
indispensable party[115][115]
has been defined as one:
[who] must
have a direct interest in the litigation; and if this interest is such that it
cannot be separated from that of the parties to the suit, if the court cannot
render justice between the parties in his absence, if the decree will have an
injurious effect upon his interest, or if the final determination of the
controversy in his absence will be inconsistent with equity and good
conscience.
There
are two essential tests of an indispensable party: (1) can relief be afforded
the plaintiff without the presence of the other party? and (2) can the case be
decided on its merits without prejudicing the rights of the other party?[116][116]
There is, however, no fixed formula for determining who is an indispensable
party; this can only be determined in the context and by the facts of the
particular suit or litigation.
In
the present case, there was an admission by respondent Imelda Marcos in her May
26, 1998 Manifestation before the Sandiganbayan that she was the sole
beneficiary of 90% of the subject matter in controversy with the remaining 10%
belonging to the estate of Ferdinand Marcos.[117][117]
Viewed against this admission, the foreign foundations were not indispensable
parties. Their non-participation in the proceedings did not prevent the court
from deciding the case on its merits and according full relief to petitioner
Republic. The judgment ordering the return of the $356 million was neither
inimical to the foundations’ interests nor inconsistent with equity and good
conscience. The admission of respondent Imelda Marcos only confirmed what was
already generally known: that the foundations were established precisely to
hide the money stolen by the Marcos spouses from petitioner Republic. It
negated whatever illusion there was, if any, that the foreign foundations owned
even a nominal part of the assets in question.
The
rulings of the Swiss court that the foundations, as formal owners, must be
given an opportunity to participate in the proceedings hinged on the assumption
that they owned a nominal share of
the assets.[118][118] But this was already refuted by no less than Mrs. Marcos
herself. Thus, she cannot now argue that the ruling of the Sandiganbayan
violated the conditions set by the Swiss court. The directive given by the
Swiss court for the foundations to participate in the proceedings was for the
purpose of protecting whatever nominal interest they might have had in the
assets as formal owners. But inasmuch as their ownership was subsequently
repudiated by Imelda Marcos, they could no longer be considered as
indispensable parties and their participation in the proceedings became
unnecessary.
In
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan,[119][119]
this Court ruled that impleading the firms which are the res of the
action was unnecessary:
“And as to
corporations organized with ill-gotten wealth, but are not themselves guilty of
misappropriation, fraud or other illicit conduct – in other words, the
companies themselves are not the object or thing involved in the action, the
res thereof – there is no need to implead them either. Indeed, their
impleading is not proper on the strength alone of their having been formed with
ill-gotten funds, absent any other particular wrongdoing on their part…
Such
showing of having been formed with, or having received ill-gotten funds,
however strong or convincing, does not, without more, warrant identifying the
corporations in question with the person who formed or made use of them to give
the color or appearance of lawful, innocent acquisition to illegally amassed
wealth – at the least, not so as place on the Government the onus
of impleading the former with the latter in actions to recover such wealth.
Distinguished in terms of juridical personality and legal culpability from
their erring members or stockholders, said corporations are not themselves
guilty of the sins of the latter, of the embezzlement, asportation, etc., that
gave rise to the Government’s cause of action for recovery; their creation or
organization was merely the result of their members’ (or stockholders’)
manipulations and maneuvers to conceal the illegal origins of the assets or
monies invested therein. In this light, they are simply the res in the
actions for the recovery of illegally acquired wealth, and there is, in
principle, no cause of action against them and no ground to implead them as
defendants in said actions.”
Just
like the corporations in the aforementioned case, the foreign foundations here
were set up to conceal the illegally acquired funds of the Marcos spouses.
Thus, they were simply the res in the action for recovery of ill-gotten
wealth and did not have to be impleaded for lack of cause of action or ground
to implead them.
Assuming arguendo, however, that the
foundations were indispensable parties, the failure of petitioner to implead
them was a curable error, as held in the previously cited case of Republic
vs. Sandiganbayan:[120][120]
“Even in
those cases where it might reasonably be argued that the failure of the
Government to implead the sequestered corporations as defendants is indeed a
procedural abberation, as where said firms were allegedly used, and actively
cooperated with the defendants, as instruments or conduits for conversion of
public funds and property or illicit or fraudulent obtention of favored
government contracts, etc., slight reflection would nevertheless lead to the
conclusion that the defect is not fatal, but one correctible under applicable
adjective rules – e.g., Section 10, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court
[specifying the remedy of amendment during trial to authorize or to conform to
the evidence]; Section 1, Rule 20 [governing amendments before trial], in
relation to the rule respecting omission of so-called necessary or indispensable
parties, set out in Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. It is relevant in
this context to advert to the old familiar doctrines that the omission to
implead such parties “is a mere technical defect which can be cured at any
stage of the proceedings even after judgment”; and that, particularly in the
case of indispensable parties, since their presence and participation is
essential to the very life of the action, for without them no judgment may be
rendered, amendments of the complaint in order to implead them should be freely
allowed, even on appeal, in fact even after rendition of judgment by this
Court, where it appears that the complaint otherwise indicates their identity
and character as such indispensable parties.”[121][121]
Although
there are decided cases wherein the non-joinder of indispensable parties in
fact led to the dismissal of the suit or the annulment of judgment, such cases
do not jibe with the matter at hand. The better view is that non-joinder is not
a ground to dismiss the suit or annul the judgment. The rule on joinder of
indispensable parties is founded on equity. And the spirit of the law is
reflected in Section 11, Rule 3[122][122]
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It prohibits the dismissal of a suit on
the ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties and allows the amendment of
the complaint at any stage of the proceedings, through motion or on order of
the court on its own initiative.[123][123]
Likewise,
jurisprudence on the Federal Rules of Procedure, from which our Section 7, Rule
3[124][124]
on indispensable parties was copied, allows the joinder of indispensable
parties even after judgment has been entered if such is needed to afford the
moving party full relief.[125][125]
Mere delay in filing the joinder motion does not necessarily result in the
waiver of the right as long as the delay is excusable.[126][126]
Thus, respondent Mrs. Marcos cannot correctly argue that the judgment rendered
by the Sandiganbayan was void due to the non-joinder of the foreign
foundations. The court had jurisdiction to render judgment which, even in the
absence of indispensable parties, was binding on all the parties before it
though not on the absent party.[127][127]
If she really felt that she could not be granted full relief due to the absence
of the foreign foundations, she should have
moved for their inclusion, which was allowable at any stage of the proceedings.
She never did. Instead she assailed the judgment rendered.
In
the face of undeniable circumstances and the avalanche of documentary evidence
against them, respondent Marcoses failed to justify the lawful nature of their
acquisition of the said assets. Hence, the Swiss deposits should be considered
ill-gotten wealth and forfeited in favor of the State in accordance with
Section 6 of RA 1379:
SEC. 6. Judgment.─
If the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he
has lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court shall declare
such property forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of such judgment
the property aforesaid shall become property of the State x x x.
THE FAILURE TO
PRESENT AUTHENTICATED
TRANSLATIONS
OF THE SWISS DECISIONS
Finally,
petitioner Republic contends that the Honorable Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice
Francis Garchitorena committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing himself
on the ground that the original copies of the authenticated Swiss decisions and
their authenticated translations were not submitted to the court a quo.
Earlier PJ Garchitorena had quoted extensively from the unofficial translation
of one of these Swiss decisions in his ponencia dated July 29, 1999 when
he denied the motion to release US$150 Million to the human rights victims.
While
we are in reality perplexed by such an incomprehensible change of heart, there
might nevertheless not be any real need to belabor the issue. The presentation
of the authenticated translations of the original copies of the Swiss decision
was not de rigueur for the public respondent to make findings of fact
and reach its conclusions. In short, the Sandiganbayan’s decision was not
dependent on the determination of the Swiss courts. For that matter, neither is
this Court’s.
The
release of the Swiss funds held in escrow in the PNB is dependent solely on the
decision of this jurisdiction that said funds belong to the petitioner
Republic. What is important is our own assessment of the sufficiency of the
evidence to rule in favor of either petitioner Republic or respondent Marcoses.
In this instance, despite the absence of the authenticated translations of the
Swiss decisions, the evidence on hand tilts convincingly in favor of petitioner
Republic.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated
January 31, 2002 is SET ASIDE. The Swiss deposits which were transferred to and
are now deposited in escrow at the Philippine National Bank in the estimated
aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of January 31, 2002, plus interest,
are hereby forfeited in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines.
SO
ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo,
Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Puno, and Vitug, JJ., in the result
Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.,
on official leave.
Carpio, J., no part.
[1][1] An Act Declaring Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any Property To Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing For the Procedure Therefor.
[2][2] E.O. No. 1 - promulgated on February 28, 1986, only two (2) days after the Marcoses fled the country, creating the PCGG which was primarily tasked to assist the President in the recovery of vast government resources allegedly amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates, both here and abroad.
[3][3] E.O. No. 2 – issued twelve (12) days later, warning all persons and entities who had knowledge of possession of ill-gotten assets and properties under pain of penalties prescribed by law, prohibiting them from concealing, transferring or dissipating them or from otherwise frustrating or obstructing the recovery efforts of the government.
[4][4] E.O. No. 14 – Series of 1986, as amended by E.O. No. 14-A.
[5][5] Also series of 1986, vested Sandiganbayan the exclusive and original jurisdiction over cases, whether civil or criminal, to be filed by the PCGG with the assistance of the Office of the Solicitor General. The law also declared that the civil actions for the recovery of unlawfully acquired property under Republic Act No. 1379 or for restitution, reparation of damages, or indemnification for consequential and other damages or any other civil action under the Civil Code or other existing laws filed with the Sandiganbayan against Ferdinand Marcos et. al., may proceed independently of any criminal proceedings and may be proved by preponderance of evidence.
[6][6] Declared null and void by this Court on December 9, 1998 in the case of “Francisco I. Chavez vs. PCGG and Magtanggol Gunigundo", docketed as G.R. No. 130716.
[7][7] In April 1986, pursuant to E.O. No. 2,
the Republic of the Philippines through the PCGG filed a request for mutual
assistance with the Swiss Federal Police Department, under the procedures of
the International Mutual Assistance in Criminal Proceedings (IMAC) to freeze
the bank deposits of the Marcoses located in Switzerland.
IMAC is a
domestic statute of Switzerland which generally affords relief to the kind of
request from foreign governments or entities as authorized under E.O. No. 2.
The various Swiss local authorities concerned granted the request of petitioner Republic, and ordered the Swiss deposits to be “blocked” until the competent Philippine court could decide on the matter.
[8][8] Volume III, Rollo, p. 2195.
[9][9] Penned by Justice Catalino R. Castañeda, Jr. and concurred in by Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena and Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong.
[10][10] Volume III, Rollo, p. 2218.
[11][11] Penned by Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena with the separate concurring opinions of Associate Justice Nicodemo T. Ferrer and Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong. Associate Justices Catalino R. Castañeda, Jr. and Francisco H. Villaruz, Jr. both wrote their respective dissenting opinions.
[12][12] Volume I, Rollo, pp. 145-146.
[13][13] Volume I, Rollo, pp. 60-62.
[14][14] Volume IV, Rollo, p. 2605.
[15][15] Sec. 3 – the petition shall contain the following information
xxx
(c) The approximate amount of property he has acquired during his incumbency in his past and present offices and employments.
[16][16] (d) A description of said property, or such thereof as has been identified by the Solicitor General.
[17][17] (e) The total amount of his government salary and other proper earnings and incomes from legitimately acquired property xxx.
[18][18] Volume IV, Rollo, pp. 2651-2654.
[19][19] Same as Section 1, Rule 65 of the old Rules of Court.
[20][20] Filoteo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 263 SCRA 222 [1996].
[21][21] Central Bank vs. Cloribel, 44 S 307, 314 [1972].
[22][22] 240 SCRA 376 [1995].
[23][23] Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 269 SCRA 316 [1997].
[24][24] 69 SCRA 524 [1976].
[25][25] Substantially the same as Section 1, Rule 34 of the old Rules of Court.
[26][26] Agcanas vs. Nagum, L-20707, 143 Phil 177 [1970].
[27][27] Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 22-37.
[28][28] Substantially the same as Section 10, Rule 8 of the old Rules of Court.
[29][29] 16 Phil., 315, 321-322 [1910].
[30][30] 197 SCRA 391 [1991].
[31][31] Philippine Advertising vs. Revilla, 52 SCRA 246 [1973].
[32][32] Petition, Annex C, Volume I, Rollo, p. 236.
[33][33] Answer, Annex D, Volume II, Rollo, p. 1064.
[34][34] 61A Am. Jur., 172-173.
[35][35] Blume vs. MacGregor, 148 P. 2d. 656 [see p.428, Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1995 ed.].
[36][36] Substantially the same as Section 1, Rule 9 of the old Rules of Court.
[37][37] Supra.
[38][38] Supra.
[39][39] “All the five (5) group accounts in the over-all flow chart have a total balance of about Three Hundred Fifty Six Million Dollars ($356,000,000.00) as shown by Annex ‘R-5’ hereto attached as integral part hereof.”
[40][40] 22 SCRA 48 [1968]
[41][41] XANDY-WINTROP-AVERTINA FOUNDATION: (a) Contract for opening of deposit dated March 21, 1968; (b) Handwritten instruction; (c) Letter dated March 3, 1970; (d) Handwritten regulation of Xandy dated February 13, 1970; (e) Letter of instruction dated March 10, 1981; (f) Letter of Instructions dated March 10, 1991.
TRINIDAD-RAYBY-PALMY FOUNDATION: (a) Management agreement dated August 28, 1990; (b) Letter of instruction dated August 26, 1970 to Markers Geel of Furich; (c) Approval of Statutes and By-laws of Trinidad Foundation dated August 26, 1990; (d) Regulations of the Trinidad Foundation dated August 28, 1970; (e) Regulations of the Trinidad Foundation prepared by Markers Geel dated August 28, 1970; (f) Letter of Instructions to the Board of Rayby Foundation dated March 10, 1981; (g) Letter of Instructions to the Board of Trinidad Foundation dated March 10, 1981.
MALER ESTABLISHMENT FOUNDATION: (a) Rules and Regulations of Maler dated October 15, 1968; (b) Letter of Authorization dated October 19, 1968 to Barbey d Suncir; (c) Letter of Instruction to Muler to Swiss Bank dated October 19, 1968.
[42][42] “Where an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading xxx, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts xxx.”
[43][43] Annex A-F, Volume I, Rollo, pp. 193-194.
[44][44] Ice Plant Equipment vs. Martocello, D.C.P., 1941, 43 F. Supp. 281.
[45][45] Phil. Advertising Counselors, Inc. vs. Revilla, L- 31869, Aug. 8, 1973.
[46][46] Warner Barnes & Co., Ltd. vs. Reyes, et. al., 55 O.G. 3109-3111.
[47][47] Philippine Bank of Communications vs. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 567 [1991].
[48][48] 28 SCRA 807, 812 [1969].
[49][49] Rule 20 of the old Rules of Court was amended but the change(s) had no adverse effects on the rights of private respondents.
[50][50] Development Bank of the Phils. vs. CA, G.R. No. L-49410, 169 SCRA 409 [1989].
[51][51] Substantially the same as Section 3, Rule 34 of the old Rules of Court.
[52][52] adopted by the Marcos children.
[53][53] dated September 26, 2000 as filed by Mrs. Marcos; dated October 5, 2000 as jointly filed by Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr.; supplemental motion for reconsideration dated October 9, 2000 jointly filed by Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr.;
[54][54] dated December 12, 2000 and December 17, 2000 as filed by the Marcos children.
[55][55] TSN, pp. 47-48, October 28, 1999.
[56][56] Evadel Realty and Development Corp. vs. Spouses Antera and Virgilio Soriano, April 20, 2001.
[57][57] Plantadosi vs. Loew’s, Inc., 7 Fed. Rules Service, 786, June 2, 1943.
[58][58] Rabaca vs. Velez, 341 SCRA 543 [2000].
[59][59] Carcon Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 348 [1989].
[60][60] Rollo, pp. 2659-70.
[61][61] Substantially the same as Sections 1 and 2, Rule 34 of the old Rules of Court.
[62][62] Rule 113. Summary Judgment. - When an answer is served in an action to recover a debt or a liquidated demand arising,
1. on a contract, express or implied, sealed or not sealed; or
2. on a judgment for a stated sum;
the answer may be struck out and judgment entered thereon on motion, and the affidavit of the plaintiff or of any other person having knowledge of the facts, verifying the cause of action and stating the amount claimed, and his belief that there is no defense to the action; unless the defendant by affidavit or other proof, shall show such facts as may be deemed, by the judge hearing the motion, sufficient to entitle him to defend. (emphasis ours)
[63][63] 73 Am Jur 2d 733, §12; 49 C.J.S. 412, § 224.
[64][64] Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. II. (1996), pp. 183-184.
[65][65] 19 NYS2d 250 [1940].
[66][66] 73 Am Jur 2d 733, §12; 49 C.J.S. 412, § 224.
[67][67] Supra.
[68][68] Gregorio Estrada vs. Hon. Fracisco Consolacion, et. al., 71 SCRA 523 [1976].
[69][69] Substantially the same as Section 2, Rule 1 of the old Rules of Court.
[70][70] Madeja vs. Patcho, 123 SCRA 540 [1983].
[71][71] Mejia de Lucas vs. Gamponia, 100 Phil. 277 [1956].
[72][72] Diaz vs. Gorricho, 103 Phil. 261 [1958].
[73][73] Collado vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.107764, October 4, 2002; Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.
[74][74] Go Tian An vs. Republic of the Philippines, 124 Phil. 472 [1966].
[75][75] Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 [1968].
[76][76] "An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Proceedings Therefor", approved on June 18, 1955.
[77][77] Petition, Annex D, Volume II, p. 1081.
[78][78] Ibid.
[79][79] Id., p. 1062.
[80][80] Exhibit “S.”
[81][81] Substantially the same as Section 2, Rule 129 of the old Rules of Court.
[82][82] Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II, 1997 ed., p. 650.
[83][83] Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Volume V, 1980 ed., p. 64.
[84][84] Section 9, Article VII.
[85][85] Section 4(1), Article VII.
[86][86] Substantially the same as Section 1, Rule 9 of the old Rules of Court.
[87][87] Annex F-1, Volume II, Rollo, pp. 1095-1098.
[88][88] Annex F-2, Volume II, Rollo, pp.1099-1100.
[89][89] Chavez vs. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744, [1998].
[90][90] Substantially the same as Section 24, Rule 130 of the old Rules of Court.
[91][91] Annex HH, Volume III, Rollo, p. 2205.
[92][92] 31A C.J.S., Par. 284, p.721.
[93][93] Annex I, Volume II, Rollo, pp. 1177-1178.
[94][94] Ibid, p. 1181.
[95][95] Ibid, p. 1188.
[96][96] Ibid, p. 1201.
[97][97] 29A Am. Jur., Par. 770, p. 137.
[98][98] 31A C.J.S., Par. 311, p.795.
[99][99] Annex M, Volume II, Rollo, pp.1260-1261.
[100][100] Substantially the same as Section 8, Rule 8 of the old Rules of Court.
[101][101] Annex S, Volume II, Rollo, pp.1506-1507.
[102][102] Annex L, Volume II, Rollo, p. 1256.
[103][103] Annex P-1, Volume II, Rollo, p. 1289.
[104][104] Santiago vs. de los Santos, 61 SCRA 146 [1974].
[105][105] Substantially the same as Section 2, Rule 129 of the old Rules of Court.
[106][106] Substantially the same as Section 26, Rule 130 of the old Rules of Court.
[107][107] Substantially the same as Section 28, Rule 130 of the old Rules of Court.
[108][108] 29 Am Jur 2d Par. 824, p. 211.
[109][109] 31A C.J.S., Par. 322, p. 817.
[110][110] Ibid, p. 814.
[111][111] Miriam Defensor Santiago, Rules of Court Annotated, 1999 ed., p. 857.
[112][112] Rollo, pp. 2255-2265.
[113][113] Sec. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties.—Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The same as Section 7, Rule 3 of the old Rules of Court.
[114][114] 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties §97 (2000).
[115][115] Supra note 3 § 13 (2000).
[116][116] Supra note 3 citing Picket vs. Paine, 230 Ga 786, 199 SE2d 223.
[117][117] Rollo, p. 1260. Manifestation:
“Comes now undersigned counsel for the respondent Imelda R. Marcos, and before this Honorable Court, most respectfully manifests:
That respondent Imelda R. Marcos owns 90% of the subject-matter of the above-entitled case, being the sole beneficiary of the dollar deposits in the name of the various Foundations alleged in the case;
That in fact only 10% of the subject-matter in the above-entitled case belongs to the Estate of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos;”
[118][118] Rollo, p. 2464, quoted from the December 18, 2000 memorandum of respondent Mrs. Marcos:
“On the other hand, the opponent to the appeal, formally the owner of the assets to be seized and restituted, has not been involved in the collecting procedure pending in the Philippines. Even though such opponent is nothing but a legal construction to hide the true ownership to the assets of the Marcos family, they nevertheless are entitled to a hearing as far as the proceedings are concerned with accounts which are nominally theirs. The guarantees of the Republic of the Philippines therefore must include the process rights not only of the defendants but also of the formal owners of the assets to be delivered.”
[119][119] 240 SCRA 376, 469 [1995].
[120][120] Supra.
[121][121] Id at 470-471.
[122][122] Substantially the same as Section 11, Rule 3 of the old Rules of Court.
[123][123] Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. – Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for the dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately.
[124][124] Same as Section 7, Rule 3 of the old Rules of Court.
[125][125] Supra note 3 § 265 (2000)
[126][126] Id citing Gentry vs. Smith (CA5 Fla) 487 F2d 571, 18 FR Serv 2d 221, later app (CA5 Fla) 538 F2d 1090, on reh (CA5 Fla) 544 F2d 900, holding that a failure to request the joinder of a defendant was excused where the moving party’s former counsel, who had resisted the joinder, abruptly withdrew his appearance and substitute counsel moved promptly to join the corporation.