Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 153795 August 17, 2006
MA. ESTRELITA D. MARTINEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
Director General LEANDRO MENDOZA, Chief Superintendent NESTORIO GUALBERTO,
SR., Superintendent LEONARDO ESPINA, SR., Superintendent JESUS VERSOZA, and
JOHN DOES, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, CJ.:
When respondents deny
custody of an allegedly detained person, petitioners have the duty of
establishing the fact of detention by competent and convincing evidence;
otherwise, the writ of habeas corpus cannot be issued. Nonetheless, when the
disappearance of a person is indubitable, the law enforcement authorities are
duty-bound to investigate it with due diligence and to locate the missing
person. When the wrongdoing is attributable to the police agencies and/or their
agents, the aggrieved may secure the assistance of the People’s Law Enforcement
Board or the Commission on Human Rights.
The Case
Before us is a
Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to reverse the March 22, 2002 Decision2 and the May 30, 2002 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR
SP No. 68170. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the
decision of the court a quo is REVERSED and the petition for habeas corpus is
DISMISSED."4
The assailed
Resolution denied reconsideration.
The Facts
The antecedent facts
are narrated by the CA in this wise:
"Petitioners are
the mother and wife, respectively, of Michael Martinez, a resident of 4570
Cattleya Road, Sun Valley Subdivision, Parañaque City, who was allegedly
abducted and taken away by seven (7) persons around 7:30 in the morning of
November 19, 2001 while he was walking along Magnolia Street, on his way to his
mother's house at 3891 Marigold Street of the same subdivision. The abduction
was reported by petitioners to the Barangay, the Parañaque Police and the
Anti-Kidnapping Task Force at Camp Crame.
"It appears that
in the evening of November 19, 2001, the Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group (CIDG) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) presented before the media
a certain Phillip Medel, Jr., who allegedly executed a statement confessing to
his participation in the killing of Dorothy Jones, a.k.a. Nida Blanca,
naming Michael Martinez as the person who introduced him to Rod Lauren Strunk,
the husband of Nida Blanca and alleged mastermind in her killing. In a
televised interview with a media reporter on November 26, 2001, Medel narrated
that he saw Michael Martinez at the CIDG at Camp Crame where he was being
detained, and which the former allegedly reiterated when he talked to Robert
Paul Martinez, a brother of Michael, on November 27, 2001 and he even described
the clothes Michael was then wearing, which were the same clothes worn by him
when he was abducted. Petitioners then made representations with CIDG for the
release of Michael Martinez or that they be allowed to see him, but the same
were not granted.
"In view thereof,
petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 78, Quezon City against respondents PNP Director General Leandro
Mendoza; Chief Superintendent Nestorio Gualberto, Sr., Chief of the CIDG;
Senior Superintendent Leonardo Espina, Sr. and Senior Superintendent Jesus
Versoza of the CIDG and members of Task Force Marsha, which is investigating
the Nida Blanca murder case, for them to produce before said court the person
of Michael Martinez or to justify the continued detention of his liberty.
"In an Order dated
November 29, 2001, the court a quo set the petition for hearing on December 3,
2001 and directed respondents to show cause why the writ of habeas corpus should
not issue.
"At the hearing
on December 3, 2001, respondents submitted a RETURN wherein they vehemently and
categorically denied any participation or involvement in the alleged abduction
or disappearance of Michael Martinez as the latter was never confined and
detained by them or in their custody at any given time. Respondents thus prayed
for the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus.
"At the hearing
conducted by the court a quo, respondents reiterated their claim that
Michael Martinez is not and was never in their custody. On the other hand,
petitioners presented Phillip Medel, Jr. who insisted that he saw Michael
Martinez inside a room at the CIDG where he was brought before midnight of
November 19, 2001 or the wee hours of November 20, 2001, that Sr. Supts.
Verzosa (sic) and Espina were also in said room and that the latter even boxed
Michael in the stomach.
"Finding that
respondents denial pale beside Medel's positive assertion that Michael Martinez
is in their custody, the court a quo, in a Decision dated December 10,
2001 directed respondents to produce the body of Michael Martinez before it on
December 11, 2001 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon. A copy of said decision was
received by respondents on December 10, 2001
"On December 11,
2001, respondents filed a notice of appeal on the ground that the Decision is
contrary to law and the evidence."5
Ruling of the Court of
Appeals
The CA agreed with the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that Medel’s credibility was highly
suspect. The appellate court opined that he had contradicted himself as to
material facts. Further negating his testimony was Superintendent Espina’s
positive testimony that he was at home between midnight of November 19, 2001,
and early morning of November 20, 2001.
The CA relied on the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. It held that,
"[a]s aptly pointed out by respondents, ‘the CIDG itself is equally
concerned with the safety of Michael Martinez relative to the final resolution
of the Nida Blanca slay. For he is definitely a vital witness to his case. The
PNP-CIDG has no motive whatsoever to abduct him as it never did.’"6
Hence, this Petition.7
Issue
Petitioner has failed
to make a categorical statement of the issues for the Court’s consideration.
She has also failed to state what relief she prays for.
Nonetheless, the Court
will resolve the case on the issue of whether the CA erred in reversing the
trial court and dismissing the Petition for habeas corpus.
The Court’s Ruling
The present Petition
for Review has no merit.
Sole Issue:
Reversible Error of
the Court of Appeals
Petitioner contends
that it is the evaluation of the RTC -- not the CA -- that should be upheld,
because the trial court had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and to
determine whether they were telling the truth when they testified.
On the other hand,
respondents aver that their candor and the veracity of their denial of the
custody or detention of Michael cannot be doubted by the Court. Their argument
is even strengthened in the face of the incredible and contradictory testimony
of petitioner’s witness, Phillip Medel Jr.
Propriety of
Habeas Corpus
At the outset, it must
be stressed that petitioner’s anchor for the present case is the disappearance
of Michael. The matter of his alleged detention is, at best, merely
consequential to his disappearance.
Ostensibly, his
disappearance has been established. However, the grant of relief in a habeas
corpus proceeding is not predicated on the disappearance of a person, but on
his illegal detention. Habeas corpus generally applies to "all cases of
illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty
or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person
entitled thereto."8
Said this Court in
another case:
"The ultimate
purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from
unlawful restraint. It is devised as a speedy relief from unlawful restraint.
It is a remedy intended to determine whether the person under detention is held
under lawful authority."9
If the respondents are
neither detaining nor restraining the applicant or the person on whose behalf
the petition for habeas corpus has been filed, then it should be dismissed.
This Court has ruled that this remedy has one objective -- to inquire into the
cause of detention of a person:
"The purpose of
the writ is to determine whether a person is being illegally deprived of his
liberty. If the inquiry reveals that the detention is illegal, the court orders
the release of the person. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then
the habeas corpus proceedings terminate. The use of habeas corpus
is thus very limited."10
Habeas corpus may not
be used as a means of obtaining evidence on the whereabouts of a person,11 or as a means of finding out who has
specifically abducted or caused the disappearance of a certain person.
When respondents
making the return of the writ state that they have never had custody over the
person who is the subject of the writ, the petition must be dismissed, in the
absence of definite evidence to the contrary. "The return of the writ must
be taken on its face value considering that, unless it is in some way
[convincingly] traversed or denied, the facts stated therein must be taken
as true"12 for purposes of the habeas corpus
proceedings.
Forcible Taking and Disappearance
When forcible taking
and disappearance -- not arrest and detention -- have been alleged, the proper
remedy is not habeas corpus proceedings, but criminal investigation and
proceedings.
Abduction or
kidnapping is a crime punishable by law. Investigations with regard to crimes
are first and foremost the duty of the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), not the courts. There are instances
when members of the PNP -- the agency tasked with investigating crimes -- are
suspected of being responsible for the disappearance of a person, who is the
subject of habeas corpus proceedings. This fact will not convert the courts
into -- or authorize them through habeas corpus proceedings to be -- forefront
investigators, prosecutors, judges and executioners all at the same time. Much
as this Court would want to resolve these disappearances speedily -- as in the
present case, when it is interested in determining who are responsible for the
disappearance and detention of Michael (if, indeed, he is being detained) -- it
would not want to step beyond its reach and encroach on the duties of other
duly established agencies. Instead of rendering justice to all,13 it may render injustice if it resorts
to shortcuts through habeas corpus proceedings. In fine, this proceeding for
habeas corpus cannot be used as a substitute for a thorough criminal
investigation.
The Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG), specifically the People’s Law Enforcement
Board (PLEB),14 is tasked to investigate abuses or
wrongdoings by members of the PNP. Thus, if they or the NBI abuse or fail to
perform their duties, as indicated in this case, people may refer their
complaints to the PLEB, which should be part of their arsenal in the battle to
resolve cases in which members of the PNP are suspected of having caused the
disappearance of anyone. Removing criminals from the ranks of those tasked to
promote peace and order and to ensure public safety would be a big axe blow to
the mighty oak of lawlessness. Let each citizen contribute a blow, puny though
it may be when done alone; but collectively we can, slowly but surely, rid our
society of disorder and senseless disappearances.
Going back to the
present case, petitioner must establish by competent and convincing evidence
that the missing person, on whose behalf the Petition was filed, is under the
custody of respondents. Unfortunately, her evidence is insufficient to convince
the Court that they have Michael in their custody. Moreover, "a writ of
habeas corpus should not issue where it is not necessary to afford the petitioner
relief or where it would be ineffective."15
Considering that
respondents have persistently denied having Michael in their custody, and
absent any decisive proof to rebut their denial, the Court is constrained to
affirm the CA’s dismissal of the Petition for habeas corpus.
In view of the
established fact of Michael’s suspiciously felonious disappearance, we exhort
the NBI and the National Anti-Kidnapping Task Force (NAKTAF) to continue their
investigation into the matter, so that all persons responsible can be
prosecuted for whatever crime they have committed.
WHEREFORE, the
Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED. No costs in this instance.
Let a copy of this
Decision be furnished the Commission on Human Rights and the Department of
Interior and Local Government for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson, First Division
W E C O N C U R:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO, MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ROMEO J. CALLEJO SR., MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section
13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 4-31.
2 Annex "A" of the Petition;
id. at 34-35. Penned by Justice Marina L. Buzon and concurred in by Justices
Cancio C. Garcia (Division chair) and Eliezer E. de los Santos.
3 Annex "C" of the Petition;
id. at 55-59.
4 Assailed CA Decision, p. 11; rollo,
p. 44.
5 Assailed CA Decision, pp. 1-3; rollo,
pp. 34-36.
6 Id. at 11; id. at 44.
7 To resolve old cases, the Court created
the Committee on Zero Backlog of Cases on January 26, 2006. Consequently, the
Court resolved to prioritize the adjudication of long-pending cases by
redistributing them among all the justices. This case was recently re-raffled
and assigned to the undersigned ponente for study and report.
8 Rules of Court, Rule 102, Sec. 1.
9 Ngaya-an v. Balweg, 200 SCRA
149, 154-155, August 5, 1991, per Paras, J.
10 Alejano v. Cabuay, 468 SCRA 188, 200, August 25, 2005, per Carpio, J.
11 Subayno v. Ponce Enrile, 145 SCRA 282, October 28, 1986.
12 Id. at 288. Unsigned Resolution. Italics supplied.
13 All parties -- not only petitioner, but
even respondents -- are entitled to justice, which includes the
constitutionally enshrined right to due process.
14 Republic Act No. 6975 (1990), Secs. 41
and 43.
15 Subayno v. Ponce Enrile, supra note 11 at 288.