REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
SUPREME COURT
MANILA
EN.BANC
MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA,
Petitioner,
-versus-
P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, in
his capacity as the PNP-Provincial
Director of Ilocos Norte, and
P/SUPT. WILLIAM 0. FANG, in
his capacity as Chief~ Intelligence
Division, PNP Provincial Office,
Ilocos Norte,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 193636
Present:
CARPIO, J.,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*
BRION**
PERALTA***'
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA**
SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
Promulgated:
JULY 24, 2012
)(- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -)(
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before this Court is an Appeal by
Certiorari (Under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court) filed pursuant to Rule 19
1 of the Rule on the Writ
of Habeas
1 Sec. 19. Appeal. - Any party may appeal from the
final judgment or order to the Supreme Court under
Data,2 seeking a review of the
9 September 2010 Decision in Special Proc.
No. 14979 of the Regional Trial Court,
First Judicial Region, Laoag City,
Branch 13 (RTC Br. 13).3 The questioned Decision
denied petitioner the
privilege of the writ of habeas data.4
At the time the present Petition was
filed, petitioner Marynette R.
Gamboa (Gamboa) was the Mayor of Dingras,
Ilocos Norte.5
Meanwhile,
respondent Police Senior Superintendent
(P/SSUPT.) Marlou C. Chan was
the Officer-in-Charge, and respondent
Police Superintendent (P/SUPT.)
William O. Fang was the Chief of the
Provincial Investigation and Detective
Management Branch, both of the Ilocos
Norte Police Provincial Office.6
On 8 December 2009, former President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
issued Administrative Order No. 275 (A.O.
275), “Creating an Independent
Commission to Address the Alleged
Existence of Private Armies in the
Country.”7 The body, which was later on referred to as the
Zeñarosa
Commission,8 was formed to investigate the existence of
private army
groups (PAGs) in the country with a view
to eliminating them before the 10
May 2010 elections and dismantling them
permanently in the future.9
Upon
the conclusion of its investigation, the
Zeñarosa Commission released and
submitted to the Office of the President
a confidential report entitled “A
Journey Towards H.O.P.E.: The Independent
Commission Against Private
Armies’ Report to the President” (the
Report).10
The period of appeal shall be five (5)
working days from the date of notice of the judgment or final
order.
The appeal shall be given the same
priority as in habeas corpus and amparo cases.
2 A.M. No. 08-1-06-SC, 22 January 2008.
3 Rollo, pp. 36-47; Decision dated 9 September 2010.
4 Id. at 47.
5 Id. at 4, Appeal by Certiorari.
6 Id. at 39-40, Decision; id. at 142-143,
Affidavit of P/SSupt. Chan dated 21 July 2010; id. at 144-145,
Affidavit of P/Supt. Fang dated 21 July
2010.
7 108 O.G. 310 (Jan., 2010).
8 Named after the Chairperson, retired Court of
Appeals Associate Justice Monina Arevalo-Zeñarosa. The
other members of the body included Bishop
Juan de Dios Pueblos, D.D., Alleem Mahmod Mala L. Adilao,
(Ret.) General Virtus V. Gil, (Ret.)
Lieutenant General Edilberto Pardo Adan, (Ret.) Herman Zamora
Basbaño, Dante Lazaro Jimenez, and
General Jaime Callada Echeverria(+).
Rollo, pp. 292-299.
9 Supra note 7.
10 Rollo, pp. 287-563; rollo, p. 20, Appeal by
Certiorari; rollo, p. 591, Comment.
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine
National Police in Ilocos Norte
(PNP–Ilocos Norte) conducted a
series of surveillance operations against
her and her aides,11 and classified her as
someone who keeps a
PAG.12 Purportedly without the benefit of data
verification, PNP–Ilocos
Norte forwarded the information gathered
on her to the Zeñarosa
Commission,13 thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s
enumeration of
individuals maintaining PAGs.14 More specifically, she
pointed out the
following items reflected therein:
(a) The Report cited the PNP as its
source for the portion
regarding the status of PAGs in the
Philippines.15
(b) The Report stated that “x x x the PNP
organized one
dedicated Special Task Group (STG) for
each private armed group
(PAG) to monitor and counteract their
activities.”16
(c) Attached as Appendix “F” of the
Report is a tabulation
generated by the PNP and captioned as
“Status of PAGs Monitoring
by STGs as of April 19, 2010,” which
classifies PAGs in the country
according to region, indicates their
identity, and lists the prominent
personalities with whom these groups are
associated.17
The first
entry
in the table names a PAG, known as the
Gamboa Group, linked to
herein petitioner Gamboa.18
(d) Statistics on the status of PAGs were
based on data from
the PNP, to wit:
The resolutions were the subject of a
national press conference
held in Malacañang on March 24, 2010 at
which time, the Commission
was also asked to comment on the PNP
report that out of one hundred
seventeen (117) partisan armed groups
validated, twenty-four (24) had
11 Id. at 6, Appeal by Certiorari; id. at 51-52,
Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data.
12 Id. at 20-23, Appeal by Certiorari; id. at 52,
Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 20-23, Appeal by Certiorari.
15 Id. at 20, Appeal by Certiorari; id. at 337,
Report.
16 Id. at 20-21, Appeal by Certiorari; id. at 338,
Report.
17 Id. at 21, Appeal by Certiorari; id. at 430-463,
Appendix “F” of the Report.
18 Id. at 431, Appendix “F” of the Report.
been dismantled with sixty-seven (67) members
apprehended and more
than eighty-six (86) firearms
confiscated.
Commissioner Herman Basbaño qualified
that said statistics were
based on PNP data but that the more
significant fact from his report is that
the PNP has been vigilant in monitoring
the activities of these armed
groups and this vigilance is largely due
to the existence of the Commission
which has continued communicating with
the [Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP)] and PNP personnel in
the field to constantly provide
data on the activities of the PAGs.
Commissioner Basbaño stressed that
the Commission’s efforts have preempted
the formation of the PAGs
because now everyone is aware that there
is a body monitoring the
PAGs[’] movement through the PNP.
Commissioner [Lieutenant General
Edilberto Pardo Adan] also clarified that
the PAGs are being destabilized
so that their ability to threaten and sow
fear during the election has been
considerably weakened.19
(e) The Report briefly touched upon the
validation system of
the PNP:
Also, in order to provide the Commission
with accurate data which
is truly reflective of the situation in
the field, the PNP complied with the
Commission’s recommendation that they
revise their validation system to
include those PAGs previously listed as
dormant. In the most recent
briefing provided by the PNP on April 26,
2010, there are one hundred
seven (107) existing PAGs. Of these
groups, the PNP reported that seven
(7) PAGs have been reorganized.20
On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted
on its evening news
program the portion of the Report naming
Gamboa as one of the politicians
alleged to be maintaining a PAG.21 Gamboa averred that her
association with
a PAG also appeared on print media.22 Thus, she was publicly
tagged as
someone who maintains a PAG on the basis
of the unverified information
that the PNP-Ilocos Norte gathered and
forwarded to the Zeñarosa
Commission.23 As a result, she claimed that her malicious or
reckless
inclusion in the enumeration of
personalities maintaining a PAG as
published in the Report also made her, as
well as her supporters and other
19 Id. at 21-22, Appeal by Certiorari; id. at
348-349, Report.
20 Id. at 22, Appeal by Certiorari; id. at 364,
Report.
21 The records refer to two different television
news programs: the Position Paper indicates TV Patrol
World, while the Return of the Writ
mentions Bandila; id. at 6-7, Appeal by Certiorari; id. at 37, Decision;
id. at 59, Affidavit of Demijon Castillo
dated 9 July 2010; id. at 133, Return of the Writ; id. at 147-148,
Position Paper of Gamboa; id. at 591,
Comment.
22 Id. at 6-7, Appeal by Certiorari; id. at 166,
Position Paper of Gamboa.
23 Id. at 52-53, Petition for the Writ of Habeas
Data.
people identified with her, susceptible
to harassment and police surveillance
operations.24
Contending that her right to privacy was
violated and her reputation
maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a
Petition dated 9 July 2010 for the
issuance of a writ of habeas data against
respondents in their capacities as
officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.25 In her Petition, she
prayed for the
following reliefs: (a) destruction of the
unverified reports from the PNPIlocos
Norte database; (b) withdrawal of all
information forwarded to higher
PNP officials; (c) rectification of the
damage done to her honor; (d) ordering
respondents to refrain from forwarding
unverified reports against her; and
(e) restraining respondents from making
baseless reports.26
The case was docketed as Special Proc.
No. 14979 and was raffled to
RTC Br. 13, which issued the
corresponding writ on 14 July 2010 after
finding the Petition meritorious on its
face.27 Thus, the trial court
(a)
instructed respondents to submit all
information and reports forwarded to
and used by the Zeñarosa Commission as
basis to include her in the list of
persons maintaining PAGs; (b) directed
respondents, and any person acting
on their behalf, to cease and desist from
forwarding to the Zeñarosa
Commission, or to any other government
entity, information that they may
have gathered against her without the approval
of the court; (c) ordered
respondents to make a written return of
the writ together with supporting
affidavits; and (d) scheduled the summary
hearing of the case on 23 July
2010.28
In their Return of the Writ, respondents
alleged that they had acted
within the bounds of their mandate in
conducting the investigation and
24 Id. at 52-54.
25 Id. at 48-58.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 113-114, Writ of Habeas Data dated
14 July 2010; id. at 115-117, Order dated 14 July 2010.
28 Id.
surveillance of Gamboa.29 The information stored
in their database
supposedly pertained to two criminal
cases in which she was implicated,
namely: (a) a Complaint for murder and
frustrated murder docketed as NPS
DOC No. 1-04-INQ-091-00077, and (b) a
Complaint for murder, frustrated
murder and direct assault upon a person
in authority, as well as indirect
assault and multiple attempted murder,
docketed as NPS DOCKET No. 1-
04-INV-10-A-00009.30
Respondents likewise asserted that the
Petition was incomplete for
failing to comply with the following
requisites under the Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data: (a) the manner in
which the right to privacy was violated or
threatened with violation and how it
affected the right to life, liberty or
security of Gamboa; (b) the actions and
recourses she took to secure the data
or information; and (c) the location of
the files, registers or databases, the
government office, and the person in
charge, in possession or in control of the
data or information.31 They also contended that
the Petition for Writ of
Habeas Data, being limited to cases
of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, was not the proper remedy
to address the alleged
besmirching of the reputation of Gamboa.32
RTC Br. 13, in its assailed Decision
dated 9 September 2010,
dismissed the Petition.33 The trial court
categorically ruled that the inclusion
of Gamboa in the list of persons
maintaining PAGs, as published in the
Report, constituted a violation of her
right to privacy, to wit:
In this light, it cannot also be disputed
that by her inclusion in the
list of persons maintaining PAGs,
[Gamboa]’s right to privacy indubitably
has been violated. The violation
understandably affects her life, liberty and
security enormously. The untold misery
that comes with the tag of having
a PAG could even be insurmountable. As
she essentially alleged in her
petition, she fears for her security that
at any time of the day the unlimited
29 Id. at 118-145, Return of the Writ dated 22 July
2010.
30 Id. at 125.
31 Id. at 126-131.
32 Id. at 131-132.
33 Id. at 36-47, Decision.
powers of respondents may likely be
exercised to further malign and
destroy her reputation and to transgress
her right to life.
By her inclusion in the list of persons
maintaining PAGs, it is
likewise undisputed that there was
certainly intrusion into [Gamboa]’s
activities. It cannot be denied that
information was gathered as basis
therefor. After all, under Administrative
Order No. 275, the Zeñarosa
Commission was tasked to investigate the
existence of private armies in
the country, with all the powers of an
investigative body under Section 37,
Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative
Code of 1987.
x x x x x x x x x
By her inclusion in the list of persons
maintaining PAGs,
[Gamboa] alleged as she accused
respondents, who are public officials, of
having gathered and provided information
that made the Zeñarosa
Commission to include her in the list.
Obviously, it was this gathering and
forwarding of information supposedly by
respondents that petitioner barks
at as unlawful. x x x.34
Despite the foregoing findings, RTC Br.
13 nevertheless dismissed the
Petition on the ground that Gamboa failed
to prove through substantial
evidence that the subject information
originated from respondents, and that
they forwarded this database to the
Zeñarosa Commission without the
benefit of prior verification.35 The trial court also
ruled that even before
respondents assumed their official
positions, information on her may have
already been acquired.36 Finally, it held that
the Zeñarosa Commission, as
the body tasked to gather information on
PAGs and authorized to disclose
information on her, should have been
impleaded as a necessary if not a
compulsory party to the Petition.37
Gamboa then filed the instant Appeal by
Certiorari dated 24
September 2010,38 raising the following
assignment of errors:
1. The trial court erred in ruling that
the Zeñarosa Commission be
impleaded as either a necessary or
indispensable party;
34 Id. at 41-42.
35 Id. at 44.
36 Id. at 44-46.
37 Id. at 47.
38 Id. at 3-34.
2. The trial court erred in declaring
that [Gamboa] failed to present
sufficient proof to link respondents as
the informant to [sic] the
Zeñarosa Commission;
3. The trial court failed to satisfy the
spirit of Habeas Data;
4. The trial court erred in pronouncing that
the reliance of the
Zeñarosa Commission to [sic] the PNP as
alleged by [Gamboa] is
an assumption;
5. The trial court erred in making a
point that respondents are distinct
to PNP as an agency.39
On the other hand, respondents maintain
the following arguments: (a)
Gamboa failed to present substantial
evidence to show that her right to
privacy in life, liberty or security was
violated, and (b) the trial court
correctly dismissed the Petition on the
ground that she had failed to present
sufficient proof showing that respondents
were the source of the report
naming her as one who maintains a PAG.40
Meanwhile, Gamboa argues that although
A.O. 275 was a lawful
order, fulfilling the mandate to
dismantle PAGs in the country should be
done in accordance with due process, such
that the gathering and forwarding
of unverified information on her must be
considered unlawful.41
She also
reiterates that she was able to present
sufficient evidence showing that the
subject information originated from
respondents.42
In determining whether Gamboa should be
granted the privilege of the
writ of habeas data, this Court is
called upon to, first, unpack the concept of
the right to privacy; second, explain the
writ of habeas data as an
extraordinary remedy that seeks to
protect the right to informational privacy;
and finally, contextualize the right to
privacy vis-à-vis the state interest
involved in the case at bar.
39 Id. at 7-8, Appeal by Certiorari.
40 Id. at 589-622, Comment dated 3 January 2011.
41 Id. at 647-656, Reply dated 29 January 2012.
42 Id.
The Right to Privacy
The right to privacy, as an inherent
concept of liberty, has long been
recognized as a constitutional right.
This Court, in Morfe v. Mutuc,43 thus
enunciated:
The due process question touching on an
alleged deprivation of
liberty as thus resolved goes a long way
in disposing of the objections
raised by plaintiff that the provision on
the periodical submission of a
sworn statement of assets and liabilities
is violative of the constitutional
right to privacy. There is much to be
said for this view of Justice Douglas:
“Liberty in the constitutional sense
must mean more than freedom
from unlawful
governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well,
if it is to be a
repository of freedom.
The right to be let alone is indeed
the beginning of all freedom.” As a
matter of fact, this right to be let alone
is, to quote from Mr. Justice Brandeis
“the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized
men.”
The concept of liberty would be
emasculated if it does not likewise
compel respect for his personality as a
unique individual whose claim to
privacy and interference demands respect.
x x x.
x x x x x x x x x
x x x [I]n the leading case of Griswold
v. Connecticut, Justice
Douglas, speaking for five members of the
Court, stated: “Various
guarantees create zones of privacy. The
right of association contained in
the penumbra of the First Amendment is
one, as we have seen. The Third
Amendment in its prohibition against the
quartering of soldiers ‘in any
house’ in time of peace without the
consent of the owner is another facet
of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment
explicitly affirms the ‘right of the
people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.’ The
Fifth Amendment in its Self-
Incrimination Clause enables the citizen
to create a zone of privacy which
government may not force him to surrender
to his detriment. The Ninth
Amendment provides: ‘The enumeration in
the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the
people.” After referring to various
American Supreme Court
decisions, Justice Douglas continued:
“These cases bear witness that the
right of privacy which presses for
recognition is a legitimate one.”
x x x x x x x x x
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction.
The right to privacy as such is
accorded recognition independently of its
identification with liberty; in
itself, it is fully deserving of
constitutional protection. The language of
Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: “The
concept of limited government
has always included the
idea that governmental powers stop short of
certain intrusions into
the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed
43 130 Phil. 415 (1968).
one of the basic distinctions
between absolute and limited government.
Ultimate and pervasive control of the
individual, in all aspects of his life,
is the hallmark of the absolute state. In
contrast, a system of limited
government, safeguards a private sector,
which belongs to the individual,
firmly distinguishing it from the public
sector, which the state can control.
Protection of this private sector —
protection, in other words, of the
dignity and integrity of the individual
— has become increasingly
important as modern society has
developed. All the forces of a
technological age —
industrialization, urbanization, and organization —
operate to narrow the area of privacy and
facilitate intrusion into it. In
modern terms, the capacity to maintain
and support this enclave of private
life marks the difference between a
democratic and a totalitarian
society.”44 (Emphases supplied)
In Ople v. Torres,45 this Court traced the
constitutional and statutory
bases of the right to privacy in
Philippine jurisdiction, to wit:
Indeed, if we extend our
judicial gaze we will find that the
right of privacy is
recognized and enshrined in several provisions of
our Constitution. It is expressly
recognized in section 3 (1) of the Bill of
Rights:
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication
and
correspondence shall be inviolable except
upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety
or order requires
otherwise as prescribed by law.
Other facets of the right to privacy are
protected in various
provisions of the Bill of Rights, viz:
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty,
or property without due process of law,
nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of
the laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be
secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge
after examination
under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
x x x x x x x x x
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of
changing the
same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the
court. Neither
shall the right to travel be impaired
except in the interest of
44 Id. at 433-436.
45 354 Phil. 948 (1998).
national security, public safety, or
public health as may be
provided by law.
x x x x x x x x x
Sec. 8. The right of the people,
including those
employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes
not contrary to law
shall not be abridged.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to
be a
witness against himself.
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized
and protected in our
laws. The Civil Code provides that
“[e]very person shall respect the
dignity, personality, privacy and peace
of mind of his neighbors and other
persons” and punishes as actionable torts
several acts by a person of
meddling and prying into the privacy of
another. It also holds a public
officer or employee or any private
individual liable for damages for any
violation of the rights and liberties of
another person, and recognizes the
privacy of letters and other private
communications. The Revised Penal
Code makes a crime the violation of
secrets by an officer, the revelation of
trade and industrial secrets, and
trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy
is an offense in special laws like the
Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy
of Bank Deposits Act and the Intellectual
Property Code. The Rules of
Court on privileged communication
likewise recognize the privacy of
certain information.
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from
the premise that the right
to privacy is a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution,
hence, it is the burden of government to
show that A.O. No. 308 is
justified by some compelling state
interest and that it is narrowly drawn.
x x x.46 (Emphases supplied)
Clearly, the right to privacy is
considered a fundamental right that
must be protected from intrusion or
constraint. However, in Standard
Chartered Bank v. Senate
Committee on Banks,47 this Court underscored
that
the right to privacy is not absolute,
viz:
With respect to the right of privacy
which petitioners claim
respondent has violated, suffice it to
state that privacy is not an absolute
right. While it is true that Section 21,
Article VI of the Constitution,
guarantees respect for the rights of
persons affected by the legislative
investigation, not every invocation of
the right to privacy should be
allowed to thwart a legitimate
congressional inquiry. In Sabio v. Gordon,
we have held that the right of the people
to access information on matters
of public concern generally prevails over
the right to privacy of ordinary
financial transactions. In that case, we
declared that the right to privacy is
46 Id. at 972-975.
47 G.R. No. 167173, 27 December 2007, 541 SCRA 456.
not absolute where there is an overriding
compelling state interest.
Employing the rational basis relationship
test, as laid down in Morfe v.
Mutuc, there is no
infringement of the individual’s right to privacy as the
requirement to disclosure information is
for a valid purpose, in this case, to
ensure that the government agencies
involved in regulating banking
transactions adequately protect the
public who invest in foreign securities.
Suffice it to state that this purpose
constitutes a reason compelling enough
to proceed with the assailed legislative
investigation.48
Therefore, when the right to privacy
finds tension with a competing
state objective, the courts are required
to weigh both notions. In these cases,
although considered a fundamental right,
the right to privacy may
nevertheless succumb to an opposing or
overriding state interest deemed
legitimate and compelling.
The Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas data is an
independent and summary remedy
designed to protect the image, privacy,
honor, information, and freedom of
information of an individual, and to
provide a forum to enforce one’s right to
the truth and to informational privacy.49 It seeks to protect a
person’s right to
control information regarding oneself,
particularly in instances in which
such information is being collected
through unlawful means in order to
achieve unlawful ends.50 It must be emphasized
that in order for the
privilege of the writ to be granted,
there must exist a nexus between the right
to privacy on the one hand, and the right
to life, liberty or security on the
other. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ
of Habeas Data reads:
Habeas data. – The writ of habeas
data is a remedy available to
any person whose right to privacy in
life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission
of a public official or employee,
or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data information regarding the
person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.
48 Id. at 475-476 [citing Morfe v. Mutuc,
supra note 43; Gordon v. Sabio, 535Phil. 687 (2006)].
49 Manila Electric Co. v. Lim, G.R. No. 184769, 5
October 2010, 632 SCRA 195, 202.
50 Roxas v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 189155, 7
September 2010, 630 SCRA 211, 239.
The notion of informational privacy is
still developing in Philippine
law and jurisprudence. Considering that
even the Latin American habeas
data, on which our own Rule
on the Writ of Habeas Data is rooted, finds its
origins from the European tradition of
data protection,51
this Court
can be
guided by cases on the protection of
personal data decided by the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Of
particular note is Leander v. Sweden,52
in which the ECHR balanced the right of
citizens to be free from
interference in their private affairs with
the right of the state to protect its
national security. In this case, Torsten
Leander (Leander), a Swedish citizen,
worked as a temporary replacement museum
technician at the Naval
Museum, which was adjacent to a
restricted military security zone.53 He was
refused employment when the requisite
personnel control resulted in an
unfavorable outcome on the basis of
information in the secret police register,
which was kept in accordance with the
Personnel Control Ordinance and to
which he was prevented access.54 He claimed, among
others, that this
procedure of security control violated
Article 8 of the European Convention
of Human Rights55 on the right to privacy,
as nothing in his personal or
political background would warrant his
classification in the register as a
security risk.56
The ECHR ruled that the storage in the
secret police register of
information relating to the private life
of Leander, coupled with the refusal
to allow him the opportunity to refute
the same, amounted to an interference
in his right to respect for private life.57 However, the ECHR held
that the
interference was justified on the
following grounds: (a) the personnel
control system had a legitimate aim,
which was the protection of national
51 Guadamuz, A. “Habeas Data vs the European Data
Protection Directive,” 2001 (3) The Journal of
Information, Law and
Technology (JILT).
<http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2001_3/guadamuz/>
52 26 March 1987, 9 EHRR 433.
53 Para. 10.
54 Paras. 12-13, 15-17, 19.
55 Article 8. 1. Everyone has the right to respect
for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a
public authority with the exercise of this right except such as in
accordance with the law and is necessary
in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public
safety or the economic well-being of the
country, for the prevention of disorder of crime, for the protection
of health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
56 Para. 47.
57 Para. 48.
security,58 and (b) the Personnel Control Ordinance gave the
citizens
adequate indication as to the scope and
the manner of exercising discretion
in the collection, recording and release
of information by the authorities.59
The following statements of the ECHR must
be emphasized:
58. The notion of necessity implies
that the interference
corresponds to a
pressing social need and, in particular, that it is
proportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued (see, inter alia, the Gillow
judgment of 24 November 1986, Series A
no. 109, p. 22, § 55).
59. However, the Court recognises that
the national authorities
enjoy a margin of appreciation, the scope
of which will depend not only
on the nature of the legitimate aim
pursued but also on the particular
nature of the interference involved. In
the instant case, the interest of the
respondent State in
protecting its national security must be balanced
against the seriousness
of the interference with the applicant’s right to
respect for his private
life.
There can be no doubt as to the
necessity, for the purpose of
protecting national security, for the
Contracting States to have laws
granting the competent domestic
authorities power, firstly, to collect and
store in registers not accessible to the
public information on persons and,
secondly, to use this information when
assessing the suitability of
candidates for employment in posts of
importance for national security.
Admittedly, the contested interference
adversely affected Mr.
Leander’s legitimate interests through
the consequences it had on his
possibilities of access to certain
sensitive posts within the public
service. On the other hand, the right of
access to public service is not as
such enshrined in the Convention (see,
inter alia, the Kosiek judgment of
28 August 1986, Series A no. 105, p. 20,
§§ 34-35), and, apart from those
consequences, the interference did not
constitute an obstacle to his leading
a private life of his own choosing.
In these circumstances, the Court accepts
that the margin of
appreciation available to the respondent
State in assessing the pressing
social need in the present case, and in
particular in choosing the means for
achieving the legitimate aim of
protecting national security, was a wide
one.
x x x x x x x x x
66. The fact that the information
released to the military
authorities was not
communicated to Mr. Leander cannot by itself
warrant the conclusion
that the interference was not “necessary in a
democratic society in
the interests of national security”, as it is the
very absence of such
communication which, at least partly, ensures
the efficacy of the
personnel control procedure (see, mutatis mutandis,
the above-mentioned Klass and Others
judgment, Series A no. 28, p. 27, §
58).
58 Para. 49.
59 Para. 56.
The Court notes, however, that various
authorities consulted before
the issue of the Ordinance of 1969,
including the Chancellor of Justice and
the Parliamentary Ombudsman, considered
it desirable that the rule of
communication to the person concerned, as
contained in section 13 of the
Ordinance, should be effectively applied
in so far as it did not jeopardise
the purpose of the control (see paragraph
31 above).
67. The Court, like the Commission, thus
reaches the conclusion
that the safeguards contained in the
Swedish personnel control system
meet the requirements of paragraph 2 of
Article 8 (art. 8-2). Having
regard to the wide margin of appreciation
available to it, the respondent
State was entitled to consider that in
the present case the interests of
national security prevailed
over the individual interests of the
applicant (see paragraph 59
above). The interference to which Mr.
Leander was subjected
cannot therefore be said to have been
disproportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued. (Emphases supplied)
Leander illustrates how the
right to informational privacy, as a
specific component of the right to
privacy, may yield to an overriding
legitimate state interest. In similar
fashion, the determination of whether the
privilege of the writ of habeas data,
being an extraordinary remedy, may be
granted in this case entails a delicate
balancing of the alleged intrusion upon
the private life of Gamboa and the
relevant state interest involved.
The collection and
forwarding of
information by the PNP
vis-à-vis the
interest of the state to
dismantle
private armies
The Constitution explicitly mandates the
dismantling of private armies
and other armed groups not recognized by
the duly constituted authority.60 It
also provides for the establishment of
one police force that is national in
scope and civilian in character, and is
controlled and administered by a
national police commission.61
Taking into account these constitutional
fiats, it is clear that the
issuance of A.O. 275 articulates a
legitimate state aim, which is to
60 Constitution, Art. XVIII, Sec. 24.
61 Constitution, Art. XVI, Sec. 6.
investigate the existence of PAGs with
the ultimate objective of dismantling
them permanently.
To enable the Zeñarosa Commission to
achieve its goals, A.O. 275
clothed it with the powers of an
investigative body, including the power to
summon witnesses, administer oaths, take
testimony or evidence relevant to
the investigation and use compulsory
processes to produce documents,
books, and records.62 A.O. 275 likewise
authorized the Zeñarosa
Commission to deputize the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, the National
Bureau of Investigation, the Department
of Justice, the PNP, and any other
law enforcement agency to assist the
commission in the performance of its
functions.63
Meanwhile, the PNP, as the national
police force, is empowered by
law to (a) enforce all laws and
ordinances relative to the protection of lives
and properties; (b) maintain peace and
order and take all necessary steps to
ensure public safety; and (c) investigate
and prevent crimes.64
Pursuant to the state interest of
dismantling PAGs, as well as the
foregoing powers and functions accorded
to the Zeñarosa Commission and
the PNP, the latter collected information
on individuals suspected of
maintaining PAGs, monitored them and
counteracted their activities.65 One
of those individuals is herein petitioner
Gamboa.
This Court holds that Gamboa was able to
sufficiently establish that
the data contained in the Report listing
her as a PAG coddler came from the
PNP. Contrary to the ruling of the trial
court, however, the forwarding of
information by the PNP to the Zeñarosa
Commission was not an unlawful
act that violated or threatened her right
to privacy in life, liberty or security.
62 A.O. 275, Sec. 5(a).
63 A.O. 275, Sec. 5(f).
64 Republic Act No. 6975, otherwise known as the
Department of Interior and Local Government Act of
1990, Sec. 24(a), (b), (c).
65 Rollo, p. 338; Report.
The PNP was rationally expected to
forward and share intelligence regarding
PAGs with the body specifically created
for the purpose of investigating the
existence of these notorious groups.
Moreover, the Zeñarosa Commission
was explicitly authorized to deputize the
police force in the fulfillment of the
former’s mandate, and thus had the power
to request assistance from the
latter.
Following the pronouncements of the ECHR
in Leander, the fact that
the PNP released information to the
Zeñarosa Commission without prior
communication to Gamboa and without
affording her the opportunity to
refute the same cannot be interpreted as
a violation or threat to her right to
privacy since that act is an inherent and
crucial component of intelligencegathering
and investigation. Additionally, Gamboa
herself admitted that the
PNP had a validation system, which was
used to update information on
individuals associated with PAGs and to
ensure that the data mirrored the
situation on the field.66 Thus, safeguards were
put in place to make sure that
the information collected maintained its
integrity and accuracy.
Pending the enactment of legislation on
data protection, this Court
declines to make any further
determination as to the propriety of sharing
information during specific stages of
intelligence gathering. To do otherwise
would supplant the discretion of
investigative bodies in the accomplishment
of their functions, resulting in an undue
encroachment on their competence.
However, to accord the right to privacy
with the kind of protection
established in existing law and
jurisprudence, this Court nonetheless deems
it necessary to caution these
investigating entities that information-sharing
must observe strict confidentiality.
Intelligence gathered must be released
exclusively to the authorities empowered
to receive the relevant information.
After all, inherent to the right to
privacy is the freedom from “unwarranted
66 Id. at 21-22, Appeal by Certiorari; id. at 364,
Report.
Decision 18 G.R. No. 193636
exploitation of one’s person or from
intrusion into one’s private activities in
such a way as to cause humiliation to a
person’s ordinary sensibilities.”67
In this case, respondents admitted the
existence of the Report, but
emphasized its confidential nature. That
it was leaked to third parties and the
media was regrettable, even warranting
reproach. But it must be stressed that
Gamboa failed to establish that
respondents were responsible for this
unintended disclosure. In any event,
there are other reliefs available to her to
address the purported damage to her
reputation, making a resort to the
extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas
data unnecessary and improper.
Finally, this Court rules that Gamboa was
unable to prove through
substantial evidence that her inclusion
in the list of individuals maintaining
PAGs made her and her supporters
susceptible to harassment and to
increased police surveillance. In this
regard, respondents sufficiently
explained that the investigations
conducted against her were in relation to
the criminal cases in which she was
implicated. As public officials, they
enjoy the presumption of regularity,
which she failed to overcome.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion
that the state interest of
dismantling PAGs far outweighs the
alleged intrusion on the private life of
Gamboa, especially when the collection
and forwarding by the PNP of
information against her was pursuant to a
lawful mandate. Therefore, the
privilege of the writ of habeas data must
be denied.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition
for review is DENIED. The
assailed Decision in Special Proc. No.
14979 dated 9 September 2010 of the
Regional Trial Court, Laoag City, Br. 13,
insofar as it denies Gamboa the
privilege of the writ of habeas data,
is AFFIRMED.
67 Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. Nos. 157870,
158633 and 161658, 3 November
2008, 570 SCRA 410, 431.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A.
SERENO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
PRESBITE~ J. VELASCO, JR.
/ociate Justice
(On leave)
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
(On official leave)
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
Associate Justice
(On official business)
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
Associate J ustlce
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 193636
(On leave)
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
ESTELA PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296
The
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended