Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 184461-62 May 31, 2011
LT. COL. ROGELIO BOAC, LT. COL. FELIPE ANOTADO AND LT. FRANCIS
MIRABELLE SAMSON, Petitioners,
vs.
ERLINDA T. CADAPAN AND CONCEPCION E. EMPEñO, Respondents.
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G.R. No. 184495
ERLINDA T. CADAPAN AND CONCEPCION E. EMPEñO, Petitioners,
vs.
GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR.GEN. AVELINO RAZON, (RET.) GEN. ROMEO
TOLENTINO, (RET.) GEN. JOVITO PALPARAN, LT. COL. ROGELIO BOAC, LT. COL.
FELIPE ANOTADO, ET AL., Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 187109
ERLINDA T. CADAPAN AND CONCEPCION E. EMPEñO, Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR.GEN. AVELINO RAZON,
(RET.) GEN. ROMEO TOLENTINO, (RET.) GEN. JOVITO PALPARAN, LT. COL. ROGELIO
BOAC, LT. COL. FELIPE ANOTADO, DONALD CAIGAS, A.K.A. ALAN OR ALVIN, ARNEL
ENRIQUEZ AND LT. FRANCIS MIRABELLE SAMSON, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
At 2:00 a.m. of June
26, 2006, armed men abducted Sherlyn Cadapan (Sherlyn), Karen Empeño (Karen)
and Manuel Merino (Merino) from a house in San Miguel, Hagonoy, Bulacan. The
three were herded onto a jeep bearing license plate RTF 597 that sped towards
an undisclosed location.
Having thereafter
heard nothing from Sherlyn, Karen and Merino, their respective families scoured
nearby police precincts and military camps in the hope of finding them but the
same yielded nothing.
On July 17, 2006,
spouses Asher and Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeño filed a petition for
habeas corpus1 before the Court, docketed as G.R. No.
173228, impleading then Generals Romeo Tolentino and Jovito Palparan (Gen.
Palparan), Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac (Lt. Col. Boac), Arnel Enriquez and Lt.
Francis Mirabelle Samson (Lt. Mirabelle) as respondents. By Resolution of July
19, 2006,2 the Court issued a writ of habeas
corpus, returnable to the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals.
The habeas corpus
petition was docketed at the appellate court as CA-G.R. SP No. 95303.
By Return of the Writ
dated July 21, 2006,3 the respondents in the habeas corpus
petition denied that Sherlyn, Karen and Merino are in the custody of the
military. To the Return were attached affidavits from the respondents, except
Enriquez, who all attested that they do not know Sherlyn, Karen and Merino;
that they had inquired from their subordinates about the reported abduction and
disappearance of the three but their inquiry yielded nothing; and that the
military does not own nor possess a stainless steel jeep with plate number RTF
597. Also appended to the Return was a certification from the Land
Transportation Office (LTO) that plate number RTF 597 had not yet been
manufactured as of July 26, 2006.
Trial thereupon ensued
at the appellate court.
Witness Wilfredo
Ramos, owner of the house where the three were abducted, recounted that on June
26, 2006, while he was inside his house in Hagonoy, he witnessed armed men
wearing bonnets abduct Sherlyn and Karen from his house and also abduct Merino
on their way out; and that tied and blindfolded, the three were boarded on a
jeep and taken towards Iba in Hagonoy.4
Witness Alberto
Ramirez (Ramirez) recalled that on June 28, 2006, while he was sleeping in his
house, he was awakened by Merino who, in the company of a group of unidentified
armed men, repaired to his house; that onboard a stainless jeep bearing plate number
RTF 597, he (Ramirez) was taken to a place in Mercado, Hagonoy and was asked by
one Enriquez if he knew "Sierra," "Tanya,"
"Vincent" and "Lisa"; and that Enriquez described the
appearance of two ladies which matched those of Sherlyn and Karen, whom he was
familiar with as the two had previously slept in his house.5
Another witness, Oscar
Leuterio, who was himself previously abducted by armed men and detained for
five months, testified that when he was detained in Fort Magsaysay in Nueva
Ecija, he saw two women fitting the descriptions of Sherlyn and Karen, and also
saw Merino, his kumpare.6
Lt. Col. Boac, the
then commander of Task Force Malolos, a special operations team tasked to
neutralize the intelligence network of communists and other armed groups,
declared that he conducted an inquiry on the abduction of Sherlyn, Karen and
Merino but his subordinates denied knowledge thereof.7
While he denied having
received any order from Gen. Palparan to investigate the disappearance of
Sherlyn, Karen and Merino, his assistance in locating the missing persons was
sought by the mayor of Hagonoy.
Major Dominador
Dingle, the then division adjutant of the Philippine Army’s 7th Infantry
Division in Fort Magsaysay, denied that a certain Arnel Enriquez is a member of
his infantry as in fact his name did not appear in the roster of troops.8
Roberto Se, a
supervisor of the Equipment, Plate Number and Supply Units of the LTO, denied
that his office manufactured and issued a plate number bearing number RTF 597.9
On rebuttal, Lt. Mirabelle, Lt. Col. Boac and Gen. Palparan
took the witness stand as hostile witnesses.
Lt. Mirabelle
testified that she did not receive any report on the abduction of Sherlyn,
Karen and Merino nor any order to investigate the matter. And she denied
knowing anything about the abduction of Ramirez nor who were Ka Tanya or Ka
Lisa.10
Gen. Palparan
testified that during a debate in a televised program, he mentioned the names
of Ka Lisa and Ka Tanya as the ones involved in revolutionary tax activities;
and that he ordered Lt. Col. Boac to conduct an investigation on the
disappearance of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino.11 When pressed to elaborate, he stated:
"I said that I got the report that it stated that it was Ka Tanya and Ka
Lisa that, I mean, that incident happened in Hagonoy, Bulacan was the abduction
of Ka Lisa and Ka Tanya, Your Honor, and another one. That was the report
coming from the people in the area."12
By Decision of March
29, 2007,13 the Court of Appeals dismissed the
habeas corpus petition in this wise:
As Sherlyn Cadapan,
Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino are indeed missing, the present petition for
habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy since the main office or
function of the habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one’s
detention which presupposes that respondents have actual custody of the persons
subject of the petition. The reason therefor is that the courts have
limited powers, means and resources to conduct an investigation. x x x.
It being the
situation, the proper remedy is not a habeas corpus proceeding but criminal
proceedings by initiating criminal suit for abduction or kidnapping as a crime
punishable by law. In the case of Martinez v. Mendoza, supra, the Supreme Court
restated the doctrine that habeas corpus may not be used as a means of
obtaining evidence on the whereabouts of a person, or as a means of finding out
who has specifically abducted or caused the disappearance of a certain person.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus the appellate
court disposed:
WHEREFORE, the
petition for habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED, there being no strong evidence
that the missing persons are in the custody of the respondents.
The Court, however,
further resolves to refer the case to the Commission on Human Rights, the
National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine National Police for
separate investigations and appropriate actions as may be warranted by
their findings and to furnish the Court with their separate reports on
the outcome of their investigations and the actions taken thereon.
Let copies of this
decision be furnished the Commission on Human Rights, the National Bureau of
Investigation and the Philippine National Police for their appropriate actions.
SO ORDERED. (emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Petitioners in CA-G.R.
SP No. 95303 moved for a reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision.
They also moved to present newly discovered evidence consisting of the
testimonies of Adoracion Paulino, Sherlyn’s mother-in-law who was allegedly
threatened by soldiers; and Raymond Manalo who allegedly met Sherlyn, Karen and
Merino in the course of his detention at a military camp.
During the pendency of
the motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 95303, Erlinda Cadapan and
Concepcion Empeño filed before this Court a Petition for Writ of Amparo14 With Prayers for Inspection of Place
and Production of Documents dated October 24, 2007, docketed as G.R. No.
179994. The petition impleaded the same respondents in the habeas corpus
petition, with the addition of then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, then
Armed Forces of the Phil. (AFP) Chief of Staff Hermogenes Esperon Jr., then
Phil. National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Avelino Razon (Gen. Razon), Lt. Col.
Felipe Anotado (Lt. Col. Anotado) and Donald Caigas.
Then President Arroyo
was eventually dropped as respondent in light of her immunity from suit while
in office.
Petitioners in G.R.
No. 179994 also prayed that they be allowed to inspect the detention areas of
the following places:
1. 7th Infantry Division at Fort Magsaysay, Laur, Nueva Ecija
2. 24th Infantry Batallion at Limay, Bataan
3. Army Detachment inside Valmocina Farm, Pinaod, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan
4. Camp Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan
5. The Resthouse of Donald Caigas alias Allan or Alvin of the 24th
Infantry Batallion at Barangay Banog, Bolinao, Pangasinan
6. 56th Infantry Batallion Headquarters at Iba, Hagonoy, Bulacan
7. Army Detachment at Barangay Mercado, Hagonoy, Bulacan
8. Beach House [at] Iba, Zambales used as a safehouse with a
retired military personnel as a caretaker;
By Resolution of
October 25, 2007, the Court issued in G.R. No. 179994 a writ of amparo
returnable to the Special Former Eleventh Division of the appellate court, and
ordered the consolidation of the amparo petition with the pending habeas
corpus petition.
Docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 002, respondents in the amparo case, through the Solicitor General, filed
their Return of the Writ on November 6, 2007.15 In the Return, Gen. Palparan, Lt. Col.
Boac and Lt. Mirabelle reiterated their earlier narrations in the habeas corpus
case.
Gen. Hermogenes
Esperon Jr. stated in the Return that he immediately caused to investigate and
verify the identities of the missing persons and was aware of the earlier decision
of the appellate court ordering the police, the Commission on Human Rights and
the National Bureau of Investigation to take further action on the matter.16
Lt. Col. Felipe
Anotado, the then battalion commander of the 24th Infantry Battalion based in
Balanga City, Bataan, denied any involvement in the abduction. While the 24th
Infantry Battalion detachment was reported to be a detention site of the
missing persons, Lt. Col. Anotado claimed that he found no untoward incident
when he visited said detachment. He also claimed that there was no report of
the death of Merino per his inquiry with the local police.17
Police Director
General Avelino Razon narrated that he ordered the compilation of pertinent
records, papers and other documents of the PNP on the abduction of the three,
and that the police exhausted all possible actions available under the
circumstances.18
In addition to the
witnesses already presented in the habeas corpus case, petitioners called on
Adoracion Paulino and Raymond Manalo to testify during the trial.
Adoracion Paulino
recalled that her daughter-in-law Sherlyn showed up at home on April 11,
2007, accompanied by two men and three women whom she believed were
soldiers. She averred that she did not report the incident to the police nor
inform Sherlyn’s mother about the visit.19
Raymond Manalo
(Manalo) claimed that he met the three abducted persons when he was illegally
detained by military men in Camp Tecson in San Miguel, Bulacan. His group was
later taken to a camp in Limay, Bataan. He recalled that Lt. Col. Anotado was
the one who interrogated him while in detention.20
In his Sinumpaang
Salaysay,21 Manalo recounted:
x x x x
59. Saan ka dinala
mula sa Sapang?
Pagkalipas ng humigit
kumulang 3 buwan sa Sapang, dinala ako sa Camp Tecson sa ilalim ng 24th IB.
x x x x
Sa loob ng barracks ko
nakilala si Sherlyn Cadapan, isang estudyante ng UP.
Ipinapalinis din sa
akin ang loob ng barracks. Sa isang kwarto sa loob ng barracks, may nakita
akong babae na nakakadena[.] Noong una, pinagbawalan akong makipag-usap sa
kanya. Sa ikatlo o ikaapat na araw, nakausap ko yung babaeng nagngangalang
Sherlyn. Binigyan ko siya ng pagkain. Sinabi niya sa akin na dinukot si[ya] sa
Hagonoy, Bulacan at matindi ang tortyur na dinaranas niya. Sabi niya gusto
niyang umuwi at makasama ang kanyang magulang. Umiiyak siya. Sabi niya sa akin
ang buong pangalan niya ay Sherlyn Cadapan, mula sa Laguna. Sa araw tinatanggal
ang kanyang kadena at inuutusan si Sherlyn na maglaba.
x x x x.
61. Sino ang mga
nakilala mo sa Camp Tecson?
Dito sa Camp Tecson
naming nakilala si ‘Allan Alvin’ (maya-maya nalaman naming na siya pala si
Donald Caigas), ng 24th IB, na tinatawag na ‘master’ o ‘commander’ ng kanyang
mga tauhan.
Pagkalipas ng 2 araw
matapos dalhin si Reynaldo sa Camp Tecson dumating sina Karen Empeño at Manuel
Merino na mga bihag din. Inilagay si Karen at Manuel sa kwarto ni
‘Allan[.]’ Kami naman ni Reynaldo ay nasa katabing kwarto, kasama si Sherlyn.
x x x x
62. x x x x
Kaming mga lalake
(ako, si Reynaldo at si Manuel) ay ginawang utusan, habang sina Sherlyn at
Karen ay ginawang labandera.
Si Sherlyn ang
pinahirapan nina Mickey, Donald at Billy. Sabi ni Sherlyn sa akin na siya’y
ginahasa.
x x x x
63. x x x x
x x x x
Kaming lima (ako, si
Reynaldo, si Sherlyn, si Karen at si [Merino]) ang dinala sa Limay. Sinakay
ako, si Reynaldo, si Sherlyn at si [Merino] sa isang stainless na jeep. Si
Karen ay isinakay sa itim na sasakyan ni Donald Caigas. x x x x
x x x x
66. Saan pa kayo dinala
mula sa Limay, Bataan?
Mula sa Limay, kaming
5 (ako, si Reynaldo, si Sherlyn, Si Karen at si Manuel) ay dinala sa isang
safehouse sa Zambales, tabi ng dagat. x x x x (underscoring supplied; italics
and emphasis in the original)
On rebuttal, Lt. Col. Anotado and Col. Eduardo Boyles Davalan were called to
the witness stand.
Lt. Col. Anotado
denied seeing or meeting Manalo. He posited that Manalo recognized him because
he was very active in conducting lectures in Bataan and even appeared on
television regarding an incident involving the 24th Infantry Batallion. He
contended that it was impossible for Manalo, Sherlyn, Karen and Merino to be
detained in the Limay detachment which had no detention area.
Col. Eduardo Boyles
Davalan, the then chief of staff of the First Scout Ranger Regiment in Camp
Tecson, testified that the camp is not a detention facility, nor does it
conduct military operations as it only serves as a training facility for scout
rangers. He averred that his regiment does not have any command relation with
either the 7th Infantry Division or the 24th Infantry Battalion.22
By Decision of
September 17, 2008,23 the appellate court granted the Motion
for Reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 95303 (the habeas corpus case) and
ordered the immediate release of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino in CA-G.R. SP No.
00002 (the amparo case). Thus it disposed:
WHEREFORE, in CA-G.R.
SP NO. 95303 (Habeas Corpus case), the Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED.
Accordingly, in both
CA-G.R. SP NO. 95303 (Habeas Corpus case) and in CA-G.R. SP NO. 00002 (Amparo
case), the respondents are thereby ordered to immediately RELEASE, or cause the
release, from detention the persons of Sher[lyn] Cadapan, Karen Empeño and
Manuel Merino.
Respondent Director
General Avelino Razon is hereby ordered to resume [the] PNP’s unfinished
investigation so that the truth will be fully ascertained and appropriate
charges filed against those truly responsible.
SO ORDERED.
In reconsidering its
earlier Decision in the habeas corpus case, the appellate court relied heavily
on the testimony of Manalo in this wise:
With the additional
testimony of Raymond Manalo, the petitioners have been able to convincingly
prove the fact of their detention by some elements in the military. His
testimony is a first hand account that military and civilian personnel under
the 7th Infantry Division were responsible for the abduction of Sherlyn
Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino. He also confirmed the claim of
Oscar Leuterio that the latter was detained in Fort Magsaysay. It was there
where he (Leuterio) saw Manuel Merino.
His testimony that
Leuterio saw Manuel Merino in Fort Magsaysay may be hearsay but not with
respect to his meeting with, and talking to, the three desaparecidos. His
testimony on those points was no hearsay. Raymond Manalo saw the three with his
very own eyes as they were detained and tortured together. In fact, he claimed
to be a witness to the burning of Manuel Merino. In the absence of confirmatory
proof, however, the Court will presume that he is still alive.
The testimony of Raymond Manalo can no longer be ignored and
brushed aside. His narration and those of the earlier witnesses, taken together,
constitute more than substantial evidence warranting an order that the three be
released from detention if they are not being held for a lawful cause. They may
be moved from place to place but still they are considered under detention and
custody of the respondents.
His testimony was clear, consistent and convincing. x x x.
x x x x
The additional testimonies of Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado and
Col. Eduardo Boyles Davalan were of no help either. Again, their averments were
the same negative ones which cannot prevail over those of Raymond Manalo.
Indeed, Camp Tecson has been utilized as a training camp for army scout
rangers. Even Raymond Manalo noticed it but the camp’s use for purposes other
than training cannot be discounted.
x x x x
In view of the
foregoing, there is now a clear and credible evidence that the three missing
persons, [Sherlyn, Karen and Merino], are being detained in military camps and
bases under the 7th Infantry Division. Being not held for a lawful cause,
they should be immediately released from detention. (italic in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Meanwhile, in the
amparo case, the appellate court deemed it a superfluity to issue any inspection
order or production order in light of the release order. As it earlier ruled in
the habeas corpus case, it found that the three detainees’ right to life,
liberty and security was being violated, hence, the need to immediately release
them, or cause their release. The appellate court went on to direct the PNP to
proceed further with its investigation since there were enough leads as
indicated in the records to ascertain the truth and file the appropriate
charges against those responsible for the abduction and detention of the three.
Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac,
et al. challenged before this Court, via petition for review, the September 17,
2008 Decision of the appellate court. This was docketed as G.R. Nos.
184461-62, the first above-captioned case- subject of the present Decision.
Erlinda Cadapan and
Concepcion Empeño, on the other hand, filed their own petition for review also
challenging the same September 17, 2008 Decision of the appellate court only
insofar as the amparo aspect is concerned. Their petition, docketed as G.R.
No. 179994, was redocketed as G.R. No. 184495, the second above-captioned case.
By Resolution of June
15, 2010, the Court ordered the consolidation of G.R. No. 184495 with G.R. Nos.
1844461-62.24
Meanwhile, Erlinda
Cadapan and Concepcion Empeño filed before the appellate court a Motion to Cite
Respondents in Contempt of Court for failure of the respondents in the amparo
and habeas corpus cases to comply with the directive of the appellate court to
immediately release the three missing persons. By Resolution of March 5, 2009,25 the appellate court denied the motion,
ratiocinating thus:
While the Court, in
the dispositive portion, ordered the respondents "to immediately RELEASE,
or cause the release, from detention the persons of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen
Empeño and Manuel Merino," the decision is not ipso facto executory.
The use of the term "immediately" does not mean that that it is
automatically executory. There is nothing in the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
which states that a decision rendered is immediately executory. x x x.
Neither did the decision become final and executory considering
that both parties questioned the Decision/Resolution before the Supreme Court. x x x.
Besides, the Court has
no basis. The petitioners did not file a motion for execution pending appeal
under Section 2 of Rule 39. There being no motion, the Court could not have
issued, and did not issue, a writ of execution. x x x. (underscoring supplied)
Via a petition for
certiorari filed on March 30, 2009 before this Court, Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion
Empeño challenged the appellate court’s March 5, 2009 Resolution denying their
motion to cite respondents in contempt. The petition was docketed as G.R.
No. 187109, the last above-captioned case subject of the present Decision.
Only Lt. Col. Anotado
and Lt. Mirabelle remained of the original respondents in the amparo and habeas
corpus cases as the other respondents had retired from government service.26 The AFP has denied that Arnel Enriquez
was a member of the Philippine Army.27 The whereabouts of Donald Caigas remain
unknown.28
In G.R. Nos.
184461-62, petitioners posit as follows:
I
…THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY MISAPPRECIATED THE VALUE OF THE
TESTIMONY OF RAYMOND MANALO.
II
THE PETITION[S] FOR HABEAS CORPUS AND WRIT OF AMPARO SHOULD BE
DISMISSED BECAUSE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PROVE BY THE REQUIRED QUANTUM OF
EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONERS HAVE SHERLYN CADAPAN, KAREN EMPEñO AND MANUEL MERINO
ARE IN THEIR CUSTODY.
III
PETITIONERS’ DENIALS PER SE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN TAKEN AGAINST THEM
BECAUSE THEY DID NOT REALLY HAVE ANY INVOLVEMENT IN THE ALLEGED ABDUCTION;
MOREOVER, THE SUPPOSED INCONSISTENCIES IN THEIR TESTIMONIES ARE ON POINTS
IRRELEVANT TO THE PETITION.
IV
THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE ASSAILED DECISION IS VAGUE AND INCONGRUENT
WITH THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS.
V
THE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED AND FAILED TO RULE UPON THE FATAL
PROCEDURAL INFIRMITIES IN THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF AMPARO.29
In G.R. No. 184495,
petitioners posit as follows:
5. The Court of Appeals erred in not granting the Interim Relief
for Inspection of Places;
6. The Court of Appeals erred in not granting the Interim Relief
for Production of Documents;
7. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Police
Director Gen. Avelino Razon did not make extraordinary diligence in
investigating the enforced disappearance of the aggrieved parties…
8. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that this was not the
command coming from the highest echelon of powers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, Philippine Army and the Seventh Infantry Division of the
Philippine Army to enforcibly disappear [sic] the aggrieved parties…
9. The Court of Appeals erred in dropping President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent in this case;
10. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo had command responsibility in the enforced disappearance and
continued detention of the three aggrieved parties…
11. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Armed Forces
Chief of Staff then Hermogenes Esperon and the Present Chief of Staff as having
command responsibility in the enforced disappearance and continued detention of
the three aggrieved parties…30
In G.R. No. 187109,
petitioners raise the following issues:
[1] Whether… the decision in the Court of Appeals has become final
and executory[.]
[2] Whether…there is a need to file a motion for execution in a
Habeas Corpus decision or in an Amparo decision[.]
[3] Whether…an appeal can stay the decision of a Habeas Corpus
[case] [or] an Amparo case[.]31
Essentially, the
consolidated petitions present three primary issues, viz: a) whether the
testimony of Raymond Manalo is credible; b) whether the chief of the AFP, the
commanding general of the Philippine Army, as well as the heads of the
concerned units had command responsibility over the abduction and detention of
Sherlyn, Karen and Merino; and c) whether there is a need to file a motion for
execution to cause the release of the aggrieved parties.
G.R. Nos. 184461-62
Petitioners Lt. Col.
Boac, et al. contend that the appellate court erred in giving full credence to
the testimony of Manalo who could not even accurately describe the structures
of Camp Tecson where he claimed to have been detained along with Sherlyn, Karen
and Merino. They underscore that Camp Tecson is not under the jurisdiction of
the 24th Infantry Batallion and that Manalo’s testimony is incredible and full
of inconsistencies.32
In Secretary of
National Defense v. Manalo,33 an original petition for Prohibition,
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order which was treated as a petition
under the Amparo Rule, said Rule having taken effect during the pendency of the
petition, the Court ruled on the truthfulness and veracity of the personal
account of Manalo which included his encounter with Sherlyn, Kara and Merino
while on detention. Thus it held:
We affirm the factual
findings of the appellate court, largely based on respondent Raymond Manalo’s
affidavit and testimony, viz:
x x x x.
We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalo’s
statements were not corroborated by other independent and credible pieces of
evidence. Raymond’s affidavit
and testimony were corroborated by the affidavit of respondent Reynaldo Manalo.
The testimony and medical reports prepared by forensic specialist Dr. Molino,
and the pictures of the scars left by the physical injuries inflicted on
respondents, also corroborate respondents’ accounts of the torture they endured
while in detention. Respondent Raymond Manalo’s familiarity with the facilities
in Fort Magsaysay such as the "DTU," as shown in his testimony and
confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be the "Division Training Unit,"
firms up respondents’ story that they were detained for some time in said
military facility. (citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On Manalo’s having
allegedly encountered Sherlyn, Karen and Merino while on detention, the Court
in the immediately cited case synthesized his tale as follows:
The next day,
Raymond’s chains were removed and he was ordered to clean outside the barracks.
It was then he learned that he was in a detachment of the Rangers. There were
many soldiers, hundreds of them were training. He was also ordered to clean
inside the barracks. In one of the rooms therein, he met Sherlyn Cadapan
from Laguna. She told him that she was a student of the University of the
Philippines and was abducted in Hagonoy, Bulacan. She confided that she had
been subjected to severe torture and raped. She was crying and longing to go
home and be with her parents. During the day, her chains were removed and she
was made to do the laundry.
After a week, Reynaldo
was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days from his arrival, two other
captives, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino, arrived. Karen and Manuel were
put in the room with "Allan" whose name they later came to know as
Donald Caigas, called "master" or "commander" by his men in
the 24th Infantry Battalion. Raymond and Reynaldo were put in the adjoining
room. At times, Raymond and Reynaldo were threatened, and Reynaldo was beaten
up. In the daytime, their chains were removed, but were put back on at night.
They were threatened that if they escaped, their families would all be killed.
On or about October 6,
2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He told the detainees that they should be
thankful they were still alive and should continue along their "renewed
life." Before the hearing of November 6 or 8, 2006, respondents were
brought to their parents to instruct them not to attend the hearing. However,
their parents had already left for Manila. Respondents were brought back to
Camp Tecson. They stayed in that camp from September 2006 to November 2006, and
Raymond was instructed to continue using the name "Oscar" and holding
himself out as a military trainee. He got acquainted with soldiers of the 24th
Infantry Battalion whose names and descriptions he stated in his affidavit.
On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with Sherlyn, Karen, and
Manuel, were transferred to a camp of the 24th Infantry Battalion in Limay,
Bataan. There were many huts
in the camp. They stayed in that camp until May 8, 2007. Some soldiers of the
battalion stayed with them. While there, battalion soldiers whom Raymond knew
as "Mar" and "Billy" beat him up and hit him in the stomach
with their guns. Sherlyn and Karen also suffered enormous torture in the camp.
They were all made to clean, cook, and help in raising livestock.
Raymond recalled that
when "Operation Lubog" was launched, Caigas and some other soldiers
brought him and Manuel with them to take and kill all sympathizers of the NPA.
They were brought to Barangay Bayan-bayanan, Bataan where he witnessed the
killing of an old man doing kaingin. The soldiers said he was killed because he
had a son who was a member of the NPA and he coddled NPA members in his house.
Another time, in another "Operation Lubog," Raymond was brought to
Barangay Orion in a house where NPA men stayed. When they arrived, only the old
man of the house who was sick was there. They spared him and killed only his
son right before Raymond’s eyes.
From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel were
transferred to Zambales, in a safehouse near the sea. Caigas and some of his men stayed with
them. A retired army soldier was in charge of the house. Like in Limay, the
five detainees were made to do errands and chores. They stayed in Zambales from
May 8 or 9, 2007 until June 2007.
In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in Limay.
Raymond, Reynaldo, and Manuel were tasked to bring food to detainees brought to
the camp. Raymond narrated
what he witnessed and experienced in the camp, viz:
x x x x.34 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Court takes judicial notice of its Decision in the just
cited Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo35 which assessed the account of Manalo to
be a candid and forthright narrative of his and his brother Reynaldo’s
abduction by the military in 2006; and of the corroborative testimonies, in the
same case, of Manalo’s brother Reynaldo and a forensic specialist, as well as
Manalo’s graphic description of the detention area. There is thus no compelling
reason for the Court, in the present case, to disturb its appreciation in
Manalo’s testimony. The outright denial of petitioners Lt. Col. Boac, et al.
thus crumbles.
Petitioners go on to
point out that the assailed Decision of the appellate court is "vague and
incongruent with [its] findings" for, so they contend, while the appellate
court referred to the perpetrators as "misguided and self-righteous
civilian and military elements of the 7th Infantry Division," it failed to
identify who these perpetrators are. Moreover, petitioners assert that Donald
Caigas and Arnel Enriquez are not members of the AFP. They furthermore point
out that their co-petitioners Generals Esperon, Tolentino and Palparan have
already retired from the service and thus have no more control of any military
camp or base in the country.36
There is nothing vague
and/or incongruent about the categorical order of the appellate court for
petitioners to release Sherlyn, Karen and Merino. In its discourse, the
appellate court merely referred to "a few misguided self-righteous people
who resort to the extrajudicial process of neutralizing those who disagree with
the country’s democratic system of government." Nowhere did it
specifically refer to the members of the 7th Infantry Division as the
"misguided self-righteous" ones.
Petitioners finally
point out that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen do not have the requisite
standing to file the amparo petition on behalf of Merino. They call attention
to the fact that in the amparo petition, the parents of Sherlyn and Karen
merely indicated that they were "concerned with Manuel Merino" as
basis for filing the petition on his behalf.37
Section 2 of the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo38 provides:
The petition may be
filed by the aggrieved party or by any qualified person or entity in the
following order:
(a) Any member of the immediate family, namely: the spouse,
children and parents of the aggrieved party;
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the
aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in
default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph; or
(c) Any concerned citizen, organization, association or
institution, if there is no known member of the immediate family or relative
of the aggrieved party.
Indeed, the parents of
Sherlyn and Karen failed to allege that there were no known members of the
immediate family or relatives of Merino. The exclusive and successive order
mandated by the above-quoted provision must be followed. The order of priority
is not without reason—"to prevent the indiscriminate and groundless
filing of petitions for amparo which may even prejudice the right to life,
liberty or security of the aggrieved party."39
The Court notes that
the parents of Sherlyn and Karen also filed the petition for habeas corpus on
Merino’s behalf. No objection was raised therein for, in a habeas corpus
proceeding, any person may apply for the writ on behalf of the aggrieved party.40
It is thus only with
respect to the amparo petition that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen are
precluded from filing the application on Merino’s behalf as they are not
authorized parties under the Rule.
G.R. No. 184495
Preliminarily, the
Court finds the appellate court’s dismissal of the petitions against then
President Arroyo well-taken, owing to her immunity from suit at the time the
habeas corpus and amparo petitions were filed.41
Settled is the
doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency,
may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide
for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high
office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court
litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be
freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to
fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the
legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and
anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and
important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the
operation of the Government. x x x 42
Parenthetically, the
petitions are bereft of any allegation that then President Arroyo permitted,
condoned or performed any wrongdoing against the three missing persons.
On the issue of
whether a military commander may be held liable for the acts of his
subordinates in an amparo proceeding, a brief discussion of the concept of
command responsibility and its application insofar as amparo cases already
decided by the Court is in order.
Rubrico v. Macapagal
Arroyo43 expounded on the concept of command
responsibility as follows:
The evolution of the
command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of
war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command
responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the "responsibility of
commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or
other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic
conflict." In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of
criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of
command responsibility, foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a
superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he
be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command
responsibility is "an omission mode of individual criminal liability,"
whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his
subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators (as opposed to
crimes he ordered). (citations omitted; emphasis in the original; underscoring
supplied)44
It bears stressing
that command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity,45 and thus a substantive rule that points
to criminal or administrative liability.
An amparo proceeding
is not criminal in nature nor does it ascertain the criminal liability of
individuals or entities involved. Neither does it partake of a civil or
administrative suit.46 Rather, it is a remedial measure
designed to direct specified courses of action to government agencies to
safeguard the constitutional right to life, liberty and security of aggrieved
individuals.47
Thus Razon Jr. v. Tagitis
48 enlightens:
[An amparo proceeding]
does nor determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the
disappearance [threats thereof or extrajudicial killings]; it determines
responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced
disappearance…for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the
disappearance…49 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Further, Tagitis
defines what constitutes "responsibility" and
"accountability," viz:
x x x. Responsibility
refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial
evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an
enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft,
among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases
against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on
the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to
those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing
the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or
who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who
carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to
discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the
enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo
is justified by our primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that
the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are restored.50 (emphasis in the original; underscoring
supplied)
Rubrico categorically
denies the application of command responsibility in amparo cases to determine
criminal liability.51 The Court maintains its adherence to
this pronouncement as far as amparo cases are concerned.
Rubrico, however,
recognizes a preliminary yet limited application of command responsibility in
amparo cases to instances of determining the responsible or accountable
individuals or entities that are duty-bound to abate any transgression on the
life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.
If command responsibility
were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at most, be
only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable
for, and has the duty to address, the disappearance and harassments complained
of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that may be
appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered by the writ of
amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the determination should not be pursued
to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory to criminal prosecution,
or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under existing
administrative issuances, if there be any.52 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In other words,
command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to
identify those accountable individuals that have the power to effectively
implement whatever processes an amparo court would issue.53 In such application, the amparo court
does not impute criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it
considers to be in the best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved
party.
Such identification of
the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a preliminary
determination of criminal liability which, of course, is still subject to
further investigation by the appropriate government agency.
Relatedly, the
legislature came up with Republic Act No. 985154 (RA 9851) to include command
responsibility as a form of criminal complicity in crimes against international
humanitarian law, genocide and other crimes.55 RA 9851 is thus the substantive law
that definitively imputes criminal liability to those superiors who, despite
their position, still fail to take all necessary and reasonable measures within
their power to prevent or repress the commission of illegal acts or to submit
these matters to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.
The Court finds that
the appellate court erred when it did not specifically name the respondents
that it found to be responsible for the abduction and continued detention of
Sherlyn, Karen and Merino. For, from the records, it appears that the
responsible and accountable individuals are Lt. Col. Anotado, Lt. Mirabelle,
Gen. Palparan, Lt. Col. Boac, Arnel Enriquez and Donald Caigas. They should
thus be made to comply with the September 17, 2008 Decision of the appellate
court to IMMEDIATELY RELEASE Sherlyn, Karen and Merino.
The petitions against
Generals Esperon, Razon and Tolentino should be dismissed for lack of merit as
there is no showing that they were even remotely accountable and responsible
for the abduction and continued detention of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino.
G.R. No. 187109.
Contrary to the ruling
of the appellate court, there is no need to file a motion for execution for an
amparo or habeas corpus decision. Since the right to life, liberty and security
of a person is at stake, the proceedings should not be delayed and execution of
any decision thereon must be expedited as soon as possible since any form of
delay, even for a day, may jeopardize the very rights that these writs seek to
immediately protect.
The Solicitor
General’s argument that the Rules of Court supplement the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo is misplaced. The Rules of Court only find suppletory application in an
amparo proceeding if the Rules strengthen, rather than weaken, the
procedural efficacy of the writ. As it is, the Rule dispenses with dilatory
motions in view of the urgency in securing the life, liberty or security of the
aggrieved party. Suffice it to state that a motion for execution is
inconsistent with the extraordinary and expeditious remedy being offered by an
amparo proceeding.
In fine, the appellate
court erred in ruling that its directive to immediately release Sherlyn, Karen
and Merino was not automatically executory. For that would defeat the very
purpose of having summary proceedings56 in amparo petitions. Summary
proceedings, it bears emphasis, are immediately executory without prejudice to
further appeals that may be taken therefrom.57
WHEREFORE, in light of
the foregoing discussions, the Court renders the following judgment:
1. The Petitions in G.R. Nos. 184461-62 and G.R. No. 184495 are
DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 17, 2008 is
AFFIRMED with modification in that respondents in G.R. No. 184495, namely Lt.
Col. Felipe Anotado, Lt. Francis Mirabelle Samson, Gen. Jovito Palparan, Lt.
Col. Rogelio Boac, Arnel Enriquez and Donald Caigas are ordered to immediately
release Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino from detention.
The petitions against Generals Esperon, Razon and Tolentino are
DISMISSED.
2. The petition in G.R. No. 187109 is GRANTED. The named
respondents are directed to forthwith comply with the September 17, 2008
Decision of the appellate court. Owing to the retirement and/or reassignment to
other places of assignment of some of the respondents herein and in G.R. No.
184495, the incumbent commanding general of the 7th Infantry Division and the
incumbent battalion commander of the 24th Infantry Battalion, both of the
Philippine Army, are enjoined to fully ensure the release of Sherlyn Cadapan,
Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino from detention.1awphi1
Respondents Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado, Lt. Francis Mirabelle Samson,
Gen. Jovito Palparan, Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac, Arnel Enriquez and Donald Caigas
shall remain personally impleaded in the petitions to answer for any
responsibilities and/or accountabilities they may have incurred during their incumbencies.
Let copies of this
Decision and the records of these cases be furnished the Department of Justice
(DOJ), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) for further investigation to determine the respective criminal
and administrative liabilities of respondents.
All the present
petitions are REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action, directed
at monitoring of the DOJ, PNP and AFP investigations and the validation of
their results.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO |
ARTURO D. BRION |
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA |
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO* |
(NO PART) |
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ |
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. |
(NO PART) |
MA. LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Article
VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Footnotes
* On Official Leave.
** No part
*** No part.
1 Entitled IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION
FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF SHERLYN T. CADAPAN, KAREN E. EMPEñO AND MANUEL MERINO,
represented by SPS. ERLINDA T. AND ASHER P. CADAPAN, and CONCEPCION E. EMPEñO.
2 Per Memorandum dated January 5, 2011 by
Atty. Enriqueta Vidal; Vide: rollo (G.R. No. 184461-62) p. 685.
3 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 184461-62), pp.
130-137.
4 Per findings of facts of the Court of
Appeals; Vide: rollo (G.R. Nos. 184461-62), p. 79.
5 Id. at 80.
6 Id. at 84.
7 Rollo (G.R. No. 184495), p. 231-234;
Return of the Writ, p. 15.
8 Per findings of fact of the CA; Vide:
rollo (G.R. Nos. 184461-62), p. 81 citing Transcript of Stenographic Notes
(TSN), August 15, 2006, pp. 22-23.
9 Rollo (G.R. No. 184495), p. 40.
10 Per findings of the CA; rollo (G.R.
Nos. 184461-62) pp. 81-82).
11 As earlier stated, Lt. Col. Boac denied
having received any order from Gen. Palparan to this effect.
12 Id. at 83.
13 Rollo (G.R. No. 184495), pp. 188-209.
Penned by Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza (now a member of the Court)
with Associate Justices Monina Arevalo Zenarosa and Sesinando E. Villon
concurring.
14 Rollo (G.R. No. 184461-62), pp.
163-171.
15 Rollo (G.R. No. 184461-62), pp.
172-206.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Per findings of the CA; Vide:
rollo (G.R. Nos. 184461-62) p. 90 citing TSN, November 21, 2007, p. 33.
20 Id. at 89-90.
21 Id. at 99-102.
22 Rollo (G.R. No. 184461-62), pp.
251-252.
23 Rollo (G.R. No. 184461-62), pp. 77-109.
Penned by Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza (now a member of the Court)
with Associate Justices Monina Arevalo Zenarosa and Sesinando E. Villon
concurring.
24 Rollo (G.R. No. 184461-62), p. 533.
25 Rollo (G.R. No. 187109), pp. 12-15.
26 Per Certification from the Philippine
Army dated August 13, 2009, respondents Generals Hermogenes Esperon Jr., Romeo
Tolentino, Jovito Palparan and Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac have retired from the
service. Likewise, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that PNP
Director General Avelino Razon has retired from the service as well. Vide:
Rollo (G.R. No. 184461-62), p. 417.
27 Per Certification dated August 13, 2009
issued by Col. Eduardo Andes, Adjutant General of the Philippine Army. See also
rollo (G.R. Nos. 184461-62), p. 683.
28 Notices sent by the Court to the stated
address of Donald Caigas have been returned. No other address has been
furnished to the Court.
29 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 184461-62), pp. 25-26.
30 Rollo (G.R. No. 184495), pp. 7-8.
31 Rollo (G.R. No. 187109), p.6.
32 Rollo (G.R. No. 184461-62), pp. 27-37.
33 G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008, 568
SCRA 1.
34 Id. at 21-23.
35 In Baguio v. Teofila L. Vda. De
Jalagat, et al., [149 Phil. 436, 440 (1971)], the Court ruled that…
"courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to
determine…whether or not a previous ruling is applicable to the case under
consideration."
36 Rollo (G.R. No. 184461-62), pp. 60-64.
37 Rollo (G.R. No. 184461-62), p. 164.
38 A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC which took effect
on October 24, 2007.
39 Annotation to the Writ of Amparo, p.
51. Visit also http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/Annotation_amparo.pdf .
40 Section 3 of Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court provides that "Application for the writ [of habeas corpus] shall be by
petition signed and verified either by the party for whose relief it is
intended, or by some person on his behalf, and shall set forth x x x."
41 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No.
171396, 489 SCRA 160 (2006).
42 Id. at 224-225.
43 G.R. No. 183871, 613 SCRA 233 (2010).
44 Id. at 251.
45 Rubrico v. Macapagal Arroyo, supra at
251, citing Bernas, Command Responsibility, February 5, 2007 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.oh/publications/summit/Summit%20Papers/Bernas%20-20Responsibility.pdf>
46 Annotation to the Writ of Amparo, p.
65.
47 Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo.
48 G.R. No. 182498, 606 SCRA 598 (2009).
49 Id. at 253.
50 Supra note 48 at 620-621.
51 In Rubrico, the Court ruled that
"x x x. Still, it would be inappropriate to apply to these [amparo]
proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility…as a form of criminal
complicity through omission, for individual respondents’ criminal liability, if
there be any, is beyond the reach of amparo. x x x." Vide also
Roxas v. Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 189155, September 7, 2010.
52 Id. at 254.
53 In Rubrico, J. Morales, in her Separate
Opinion, initially expounded on this limited application of command
responsibility in amparo cases, to wit: That proceedings under the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo do not determine criminal, civil or administrative
liability should not abate the applicability of the doctrine of command
responsibility. Taking Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo and Razon v. Tagitis in proper context, they do
not preclude the application of the doctrine of command responsibility to Amparo
cases.
Manalo was actually emphatic on the importance of the right to security of
person and its contemporary signification as a guarantee of protection of one's
rights by the government. It further stated that protection includes conducting
effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend
protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, or
threats thereof, and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of
justice.
Tagitis, on the other hand, cannot be more categorical on the
application, at least in principle, of the doctrine of command responsibility:
Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members
were the ones who were remiss in their duties when the government completely
failed to exercise the extraordinary diligence that the Amparo Rule
requires. We hold these organizations accountable through their incumbent
Chiefs who, under this Decision, shall carry the personal
responsibility of seeing to it that extraordinary diligence, in the
manner the Amparo Rule requires, is applied in addressing the
enforced disappearance of Tagitis. (emphasis and underscoring in the
original)
54 An Act Defining and Penalizing Crimes
Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide and Other Crimes Against
Humanity, Organizing Jurisdiction, Designating Special Courts, and for Related
Purposes. Approved on July 27, 2009.
55 Section 10 of RA 9851 states that: Responsibility
of Superiors. - In addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility for
crimes defined and penalized under this Act, a superior shall be criminally
responsible as a principal for such crimes committed by subordinates under
his/her effective command and control, or effective authority and control as
the case may be, as a result of his/her failure to properly exercise control
over such subordinates, where:
(a) That superior either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the
time, should have known that the subordinates were committing or about to
commit such crimes;
(b) That superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable
measures within his/her power to prevent or repress their commission or to
submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and
prosecution.
56 Section 13 of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo provides that: "[t]he hearing on the petition shall be summary. x x
x."
57 In Section 21 of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure, it is provided that: "x x x. The decision of the
Regional Trial Court in civil cases governed by this Rule, including forcible
entry and unlawful detainer, shall be immediately executory, without prejudice
to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom. Section 10 of Rule 70 shall be
deemed repealed."