PANAMA
Combined second
and third periodic reports dated 17 January 1997
Panama is located
in the southernmost part of Central America, bordering Costa
Rica in the north and Colombia in the south. The country's 2.69
million population is seventy percent mestizo (of mixed indigenous
and European ancestry), fourteen percent West Indian, ten percent
criollo, or Caucasian, and six percent indigenous (main indigenous
groups are: Ngobe-Buglé or Guaymí, Kuna, Emberá, Wounaan).
Spanish is the official language but English and several indigenous
languages are also spoken. The country is eighty six percent
Catholic and eight percent Protestant.
Despite its geographic
location, in the past Panama was a part of Central American
organizations, such as the Central American Common Market. The
1990s brought a greater integration into the region, and in
1992 the country joined the System of Central American Integration
(SICA)1 and became a member
of the Central American Parliament (PARLACEN).
Panama more than
other countries in Central America has been dominated by the
United States in an "informal colonialism."2
Despite the high incidence of poverty, the socio-economic indicators,
such as access to health, education and utilities, are higher
in Panama than in other Central American nations with the exception
of Belize and Costa Rica. 3
One of the most important issues is the upcoming (May 1999)
presidential election and the scheduled handover of the Panama
Canal and of US military and other facilities to Panama on 31
December 1999.
Government and Politics
Ernesto "El Toro"
(the Bull) Pérez Balladares, an economist and businessman
of the Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD), the party of the
former dictator Manuel Noriega, won the first post-1989 US invasion
(for a more detailed discussion of the 1989 invasion see section
"December 1989 US Invasion" below) presidential elections in
1994 by attracting public support with his campaign slogan "people
to the power."4 Pérez
Balladares, who promised to end government corruption and to
fight poverty and pledged to negotiate US military presence
in the Panama Canal Zone, was a welcome change to the Panamanians
disillusioned with the former US-installed Guillermo Endara
government. Despite low voter turnout (33 percent), these first
open, nonviolent and contested elections in recent history (with
seven candidates for the presidency including legendary salsa
star Rubén Blades, founder of the Papa Egoró Movement)
that did not include military interference, were a landmark
contest for Panama.
The 1994 elections
improved Panama's self-image and self-esteem following the 1989
US invasion and the General Manuel Noriega years. It also improved
Panama's image at the international level. In the first post-election
months Pérez Balladares improved relations with the US,
continued the economic program of his predecessor, Guillermo
Endara, and in general received favorable marks in the polls.5
As his term is due to expire in May 1999, he has expressed an
intention to seek re-election in order "not to lose momentum"
following the transfer of the Panama Canal. Under the terms
of the Constitution he is barred from running for reelection,
but he has been trying to rally support for a constitutional
change that would make reelection possible. In April 1998, a
powerful coalition of the ruling parties consisting of PRD,
National Liberal Party (PLN), Solidarity and the Democratic
Change backed the president. At the same time, opinion polls
indicate that public support for him is low. According to polls
conducted at the end of 1997, sixty percent of the country's
population oppose his plans to run again.6
Media
Press freedom in
Panama is currently threatened as the legislature debates a
new administrative bill that was sent to Congress in April 1998.
The measure provides for high fines (US $1,000 to 5,000) and
up to two-month jail sentences for both domestic and international
journalists who are considered to "incite the closure of public
ways." 7 This means that
a reporter who publicizes evidence of corruption or malfeasance
that affects global ship lines or the international trade community
could be jailed. According to Juan Alberto-Arias, a director
of the main daily La Prensa, the proposed administrative change
poses risks for the press and the attempt to pass the bill indicates
that the country is "moving towards civilian dictatorship."8
Economy
Panama has experienced
relatively high rates of economic growth in the 1990s. The economy
has been fueled by the booming construction industry, expansion
of the financial sector and growing import-export activity in
the Colón Free Zone. The country is expected to have a
four-percent GDP growth in 1998, which is slightly lower than
last year (4.4 percent) because of the impact of East Asian
crisis and drought caused by El Niño. The country historically
has had low rates of inflation because of its use of US currency,
and it is estimated to remain at 1.5 percent in 1998.9
Even though Panama
has the highest per capita income in the region, it has the
second worst rating in income distribution in the hemisphere
after Brazil. Since 1995, Panama's government has been pressing
for the implementation of the next phase of structural adjustment
reforms.
Due to Panama's
geographic location, the economy historically has relied on
commerce and services related to the operation of the canal
and transit operations between the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific
Ocean. The country has relied on imported food and manufactured
goods. Panama has never developed a strong industrial sector
of its own. Mining and manufacturing represent only eight percent
of the gross national product and employ ten percent of the
work force. The mining industry has been at the center of controversy
in the last two decades as the government-sponsored mining companies
expanded to territories claimed by indigenous groups.10
Agriculture and cattle ranching employs twenty six percent of
the work force, but its role in the economy has been diminishing.
Local food production and support for farmers are being de-emphasized
under structural adjustment.11
Bananas are the country's important export and constitute forty
percent of all export and the industry is dominated by the Chiriquí
Land Company owned by United Brands. Other important agro-exports
include seafood, sugar, beef and coffee.
Panama Canal
"We shall
have a treaty...vastly advantageous to the United States, and,
we must confess, not so advantageous to Panama. You and I know
too well how many points there are in this treaty to which a
Panamanian patriot could object."
--John Hay, Roosevelt's Secretary of State12
The Panama Canal
was opened in 1914, based on the 1903 Hay-Bunau Varilla Treaty
between the United States and Panama which authorized the US
to "build, maintain, and protect a canal and canal zone."13
It has been one of the most important waterways in global commerce
and an important source of country's income. Approximately six
percent of Panama's national product comes from its operations
and this amount has been increasing steadily. Income from port
services in Panama City and Colón account for overall economic
benefit to Panama. The Panama Canal Commission that administers
the operations employs approximately 800 US citizens and about
6,500 Panamanians.14
Operation of the
Panama Canal is due to be transferred to the Panamanian government
on 31 December 1999. The large base Fort Amador already was
handed over to Panama, in October 1996. But Panama and US have
also been negotiating a setting up of a "Multinational Counter-Narcotics
Center" to provide antidrug training to officials from the Americas
on the Howard Air Force Base. It is estimated that setting up
such a drug-fighting program, would mean that 2,500 US soldiers
would remain in the zone beyond 2000.15
While some public opinion polls show support for continued US
military presence, to many this means a continued US domination.
Prominent Panamanian political analyst, Miguel Antonio Bernal,
stated that "what the Panamanian government thinks makes good
economic sense and what the US thinks serves its geopolitical
interests, does not fit our vision of an independent Panama."16
While the 1997 constitutional
amendment was supposed to keep the area independent of politics,
it gave the president the authority to hire and fire in the
zone. According to press reports, there are already questionable
practices that should be examined. For instance, the post-1999
Panama Canal Authority (ACP) is being comprised of friends of
president Pérez Balladares.17
The major canal users, including the US, also have criticized
the appointment of Jorge Ritter as Minister for Canal Affairs
and chair of the ACP. Ritter was former foreign minister under
Noriega and has been accused of links with drug traffickers.18
Despite statements
made by Pérez Balladares that the canal "never will be
sold, taxed, or privatized," the political opposition and the
canal workers union fear that the government has privatization
plans. That may mean loss of job security and layoffs of many
workers.19
Colón Free
Zone
The Colón Free
Zone (CFZ) was established in 1948 and it is the second largest
free zone in the world after Hong Kong. About 1600 companies
operate in the Zone20
(mainly from Japan, Taiwan, the US and Hong Kong) that employ
more than 5,000 people in warehousing, regional distribution,
manufacturing and wholesale trade.21
Currently, CFZ generates close to ninety percent of Panama's
total export revenue.22
Ironically, the nearby city of Colón has an unemployment
rate triple the national average. As a former general manager
of the free trade zone, stated: "The free zone is an island
of wealth surrounded by a sea of poverty."23
Off-Shore Banking
Although the financial
sector suffered during the 1986-89 currency crisis, the banking
center in Panama is an important part of the country's economy
and provides employment for more than 7,000 Panamanians. The
1970 banking law, including non-taxation of bank deposits and
exemption of profits from local income tax, stimulated the growth
of an international offshore financial center in Panama which
has formed along the Calle 50 in Panama City. In March 1998,
the government published a new banking law establishing firmer
supervision (the office of banking superintendency) of the sector
and introducing other changes designed to attract business.24
Labor
Panama's previously
isolated and repressed labor movement received official support
during the populist military regime of General Omar Torrijos
(1968-1981).25 During
that time, the government created the Ministry of Labor and
consulted the unions about its labor policies.26
Since the 1980s, however, the labor movement declined and became
fragmented, partly as a result of the debt crisis and the strengthened
influence of international lending over Panama's economic policy.
Government's obligations to implement austerity policies and
to privatize state-run companies and give priority to foreign
investments have affected the labor movement.
The union movement
in the 1990s suffered a serious setback when the Supreme Court
of Justice declared several key pro-labor articles of the Labor
Code unconstitutional.27
Although the 1995 labor code reform package increased workers'
ability to establish unions by simplifying the registration
process and reducing the minimum size from 50 to 40, it also
introduced new labor market "flexibility measures" in line with
requirements of the structural adjustment policy. These measures
made it easier to fire workers, reduced severance pay, lowered
the minimum wage and allowed pay reductions in periods of "national
or international economic crisis."28
In January 1996,
the Parliament passed two bills allowing for special provisions
in the export processing zones (EPZs). The laws exempted employers
in EPZs from signing collective agreements and allowed firing
of workers who started "illegal" strikes (that is, without having
fulfilled a lengthy pre-strike procedures). The new law established
special rules for striking which, if implemented, would make
them virtually impossible. It gave employers a three-year exemption
from hiring workers on fixed-term contracts. Even though these
laws were changed in February 1996 after a protest from the
labor unions, an exemption on hiring temporary workers and the
right to fire for instigating a strike under certain conditions
remain. The anti-labor provisions have been used, for instance,
in the arrest of seventeen union members in the Colón Free
Trade Zone in September 1996. They were arrested when workers
attempted to talk to management about their unpaid wages and
social security contributions.29
US-Panama Relations
The US has a long
history of intervention in Panamanian internal affairs. Between
1856 and 1903, the US intervened in Panama ten times and pushed
for country's split from Colombia in 1903. This practice became
sanctioned by the signing of the first canal treaty, the Hay-Bunau
Varilla Treaty, in 1903. The treaty gave the US, for all practical
purposes, the right to act as if it were the sovereign of the
Panama Canal territory, and to intervene militarily to "maintain
public order if necessary."30
In 1936, the treaty was revised and the US right to intervene
in the country's internal affairs was eliminated. It also gave
the Panamanians an increased access to the Canal Zone. The 1977
Torrijos-Carter Treaty eliminated the Canal Zone and mandated
the transfer of the canal and the fourteen US bases to Panama
by the year 2000.31 Despite
these pledges, since the 1980s, the US has intervened militarily
more than twenty times, ostensibly to protect its interests,
but essentially to repress political dissent and to change the
government.
US policy toward
Panama has changed according to its interests in the region.
In the 1980s, the US supported general Manuel Noriega because
it feared that opposition to him would destabilize the situation
in Panama and threaten US use of the military bases when US's
attention was focused on other countries in Central America,
principally Nicaragua and El Salvador. Thus, following the 1984
Panamanian presidential election, despite abundant evidence
that that the election was fraudulent, the US government announced
that the country had successfully transitioned to democratic
rule. On the other hand, the US did not react to the killing
of dissident and "freedom fighter" Dr. Hugo Spadafora by right-wing
military squads.
Although nationalism
and anti-US sentiments have been present in Panamanian society
since independence, there also persists, especially among the
middle and upper classes, a degree of identification with US
cultural values, language and consumer products.32
Clearly, the close relationship with the US also has some advantages
for Panama. The US is the country's largest trading partner,
supplies Panama with more than one-third of its imports, and
purchases more than one-third of its exports. Withdrawal of
the US from its bases in the canal area would mean a drastic
loss of jobs and sales income.33
December 1989 US
Invasion
About 27,000 US
airborne and ground troops attacked Panama's armed forces on
20 December 1989. The US invasion aimed at deposing Manuel Noriega,
which the US government had failed to achieve by non-military
means such as economic sanctions, support for the opposition
and attempts to isolate Panama diplomatically. When Washington-encouraged
coups by PDF officers in March 1988 and October 1989 failed,
the US launched a full-scale military invasion, the so-called
"Just Cause" under the pretext34
of "safeguarding the lives of Americans, defending democracy
in Panama, combating drug trafficking, and protecting the integrity
of the Panama Canal treaty."35
The invasion succeeded
in ousting Noriega but resulted in the deaths of 50 Panamanian
soldiers and 300 civilians and injuries to at least 3,000 more.36
The bombing and destruction including arson during the days
following the invasion affected more than 20,000 people and
seriously affected the economy. The poor Panama City district
of El Chorrillo suffered the worst destruction; several blocks
of apartments were completely destroyed and its inhabitants
were forced to move far away from their residence.37
The attack also seriously affected country's government and
politics infrastructure; it ended the twenty one-year military
dominance in Panamanian politics. On another level, the blatant
violation of the 1977 treaty of non-intervention into Panama's
internal affairs, affected the US-Panama relationship and put
into question country's sovereignty and the future of the canal.
38
In the aftermath
of the invasion, the US military installed as president Guillermo
Endara of the Authentic Panameñista Party (PPA), a part of the
Democratic Civic Opposition Alliance (ADOC). He was sworn in
on the US military base in Panama in December 1989.39
Soon after the election the ADOC coalition started falling apart
soon after the election over political and personal differences,
and Endara proved unable to maintain and build a wider base
of support. Moreover, his government was plagued by reports
of corruption and his law firm was accused by the US Drug Enforcement
Administration of links with Cuban-American drug traffickers.40
Military
Following the US
invasion, Panama's military, the Panama Defense Forces (PDF),
was dissolved, replaced by a new Public Force (FP), responsible
for border control and prevention of drug-trafficking, and the
National Police were established instead. Because the had military
exercised either direct or indirect influence in the government
in the course of the previous twenty-one years (1968-1989),
its dissolution left a sudden vacuum in governance. While most
Panamanians welcomed the demise of the military, because of
its growing corruption and repression especially in the 1980s,
it also left a gap of authority, and the country was faced with
challenge of building a state free from US military and interference.41
Although the role of the military in Panama's history has been
a matter of controversy, the question remains how Panama will
be able to defend the canal once the US troops are gone. Some
fear that this may mean a continued dependence on the US military
presence in the region.42
Human Rights
The human rights
situation in Panama attracted international attention when the
human rights activist Dr. Hugo Spadafora was murdered in 1985.
Many in Panama believed that General Noriega was responsible
for ordering the killing (Spadafora had publicly accused the
general of drug trafficking). The Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights of the Organization of American States (OAS)
accused the PDF of the crime and called for an investigation
in 1989.43 In 1987, demonstrations
protesting fraudulent elections and marking the anniversary
of Spadafora's death were broken up by the PDF's riot squads.
In 1993, a jury acquitted seven of the ten PDF soldiers accused
of the murder because of a "lack of evidence," while Noriega
and two other high-level officers were found guilty.
Some of the most
critical human rights problems in Panama include extremely poor
prison conditions, including health-threatening conditions and
overcrowding and the use of excessive force by guards and the
police. In recent years, rioting and gang fighting in prisons
have resulted in a number of inmate deaths.44
In July 1997, Panama
was the last Central American country to establish the office
of human rights ombudsperson (defensor del pueblo). However,
Panama's human rights activist and leaders opposition parties,
such as Mireya Moscoso of the Arnulfista Party (PA), have criticized
the government for making the office a political appointment.
According to the law, the ombud must be elected by majority
vote by the Legislative Assembly. Critics claim that the ombud
should be independent and elected by grassroots and human rights
organizations. According to one commentator, the ombud would
be "the puppet of whatever party is in power."45
Precaristas
Since the 1950s,
as a response to a housing deficit of about 200,000 units, poor
urban Panamanians have been illegally occupying land. These
urban land squatters, called precaristas, have formed one of
the most active militant sectors of the popular movement.46
This group has increased its activities since the 1989 invasion.
Nevertheless, their activities are controversial because there
is some evidence that the ones who least need the land have
been occupying it.
Indigenous People
The indigenous groups
in Panama are in the most difficult socioeconomic situation.
They suffer the highest rates of poverty and have the most limited
access to water, health care, education, and other basic social
services. All of Panama's major indigenous groups have alarmingly
high literacy rates. The Ngobe-Bugle and the Bogotas have the
highest illiteracy rate, which stands at about fifty percent.
The Teribes group has the lowest illiteracy rate, twenty six
percent.47
Several mining companies
that have tried to develop mining on indigenous comarcas (reserves)
met with decisive protest from Panama's indigenous groups. The
Cerro Colorado copper concession in Chiriqui province has been
at the center of the controversy.48
PREVIOUS REVIEW
BY CEDAW:
Panama's review
by the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, Fourth session (January 1985).
Observations:
- Even though the
illiteracy rate was slightly lower for women and over half
of the students were female, including non-traditional fields
such as engineering and geology, women did not enjoy equitable
employment opportunities and had higher unemployment rates
and lower salaries for the same job. For example, in cities
women's unemployment was double that of men. Experts questioned
the prohibition of women's employment in certain positions
"due to the physical nature of women," for instance doing
night work. Domestic employees (54 percent of women in employment)
were neither unionized nor protected by social security)
- Women's retirement
age was five years lower than that of men's (55 to 60), even
though on average women live longer. According to CEDAW experts,
this reflected over-protection and discrimination.
- To the experts'
questions about the reasons for women's low participation
in public life, the government representative responded that
this was due to insufficient awareness of women of those rights.
What measures have been taken to raise the awareness?
- Widows could not
remarry for 300 days following the death of the husband while
the same was not true for widowers. The government representative
said this served to protect the divorced wife in case of pregnancy.
The Committee recommended that the New Code of the Family
and Minor eliminate all the vestiges of discrimination.
- The officials
explained prostitution and trafficking in women by country's
position as an international transit point. According to the
government, legal provisions and sanctions could not eliminate
the phenomenon. Prostitution, exploitation and procuring were
not considered criminal offenses but were dealt with by the
police.
- Abortion was prohibited
except for rape cases or therapeutic reasons.
- Committee noted
the use and abuse of women as sexual objects in the mass media.
- Committee recommended
that the government recognize the importance of rural women's
economic contributions as integrated family members.49
REVIEW OF PANAMA
BY OTHER UN TREATY BODIES:
Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (20 June 1995) (Report on the Technical
Assistance Mission to Panama of the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights). The Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights issued Concluding Observations: Report on the
Technical Assistance Mission: Panama on 20 June 1995. The mission
took place from 16 to 22 April 1995. The mission focused on
the implementation of the right to housing in Panama following
the 1989 US invasion which resulted in the destruction of a
large number of houses and the displacement of thousands of
people especially in the capital, which had already suffered
a serious housing problem. The mission found that the housing
problem affected almost one-third of the population (200,000
to 250,000-unit shortage). The 1989-94 government was unable
to address the problem in an effective manner and the problem
was worsened by a policy of forcible expulsions. Despite attempts
by the government to increase awareness of the problem, the
government has not had a national physical planning scheme and
a national housing plan which would enable it to formulate its
objectives and programs more effectively.
Recommendations:
- Accelerate the
studies with a view to the establishment of a national social
housing plan that would take into account the needs of all
communities.
- Speed up the legislative
process for the demarcation of the indigenous Comarca of the
Ngöbe-Buglé in the provinces of Bocas del Toro, Chriquí
and Veraguas.
- End the government's
practice of expulsion, both in the indigenous and other areas.
- Consider ratifying
ILO Convention NO. 169, as requested by indigenous communities.
- Support the bill
which stipulates that low-income housing should not be less
that 36 to 42 square meters in area.
- Give priority
to housing rehabilitation and construction programs for social
groups which have been living in unacceptable conditions for
several years, especially in the El Chorillo district.
- Institutionalize
the policy of consultation with representation of the NGOs
that promote and uphold the right to housing and the "Pobladores"
organizations.
- Accelerate and
extend the policy of regularizing property ownership.
- Give priority
to State investment in the construction of low-income housing
without leaving it entirely to the private sector.
- Establish an entity
for gathering reliable statistics on the national housing
situation (number of homeless, number of deficient dwellings,
number of low-income dwelling built, etc.).50
Convention on the
Rights of the Child (24 January 1997). The Committee on the
Rights of the Child considered the initial report of Panama
on 13 and 14 January 1997.
Suggestions and
Recommendations:
- Accord higher
priority to children's issues within the context of the undertaken
legal reform by adopting a Code on Children.
- Review legislation
on the age of marriage for girls with the view to raising
it (currently 14 years) and take measures to protect children
from sexual exploitation.
- Develop a comprehensive
national strategy on children and strengthen the institutional
framework to promote and protect human rights in general.
Develop a mechanism to monitor and implement the Convention
at national and local levels and in urban and rural areas.
- Consider the establishment
of an independent body, an ombudsperson. Promote closer cooperation
between the government and non-governmental organizations.
- Develop a system
of data collection by age, gender, rural/urban and social
ethnic origin and identify disaggregated indicators with a
view to addressing all areas of the Convention and all groups
of children in society, to evaluate progress achieved and
difficulties in achieving it.
- Take measures
aimed at developing a culture of human rights and at changing
attitude towards children, especially to indigenous children.
Disseminate information and education about children's rights
to children and adults alike (including translation of such
information into various indigenous languages). Use the various
media to disseminate the information because of high level
of illiteracy in the country.
- Train and educate
about the principles and provisions of the Convention, especially
professionals who work with children, such as judges, lawyers,
law enforcement, health professionals, teachers, social workers,
child care institutions staff, etc. Include children's rights
education into school curricula to enhance respect for indigenous
culture, the promotion of multiculturalism and combat paternalistic
attitudes. Seek technical cooperation with international IGOs
and NGOs, including High Commissioner/Center for Human Rights
and UNICEF.
- Make maximum possible
budgetary provisions especially in regard to children belonging
to vulnerable and marginalized groups in order to provide
adequate services (education and health) and to overcome persisting
disparities.
- Ensure active
participation of children and their involvement in decisions
affecting them in the family, at school and in social life.
- Develop effective
public awareness campaigns and adopt measures to provide assistance
to the family in the performance of its child-rearing responsibilities.
- Take measures
to regulate and monitor national and international adoptions
and provide adequate training to concerned professionals.
Consider becoming party to the Hague Convention on Protection
of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption
of 1993.
- Focus on eradicating
illiteracy and increase access to school education by indigenous
children and children in rural areas (including training teachers,
fight school dropouts and ensure retention). Undertake campaigns
to prevent and eliminate child labor by encouraging school
enrollment, retention and returning children to school. Put
in place regulations to prevent child labor and impose severe
penalties on violators.
- Ensure protection
of refugee children including education. Appoint legal representatives
for unaccompanied children and develop procedures with UNHCR
to facilitate family reunification.
- Prevent and combat
sexual abuse and exploitation of children.
- Make widely available
to the public at large Panama's initial report and written
replies along with the concluding observations.51
International Convention
on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (23
April 1997). The Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination
considered the combined tenth, twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth
periodic report of Panama on 18 March 1997.
Suggestions and
Recommendations:
- Include in the
next report information on complaints received and judgments
issued in cases of racial discrimination.
- Take appropriate
measures to disseminate the Convention widely and translate
it into appropriate indigenous languages.
- Continue the improvement
of training of law enforcement officials.
- Take measures
to allow full enjoyment by different groups, such as indigenous
people or members of the black and Asian minorities, of the
rights specified by the Convention.
- Implement the
right of indigenous people to own property and land, and particularly
investigate and monitor the impact of the work of mining companies
and the development of tourism on the enjoyment of basic rights
by indigenous people.
- Explain in the
next report the legal status of the comarcas in comparison
to the status of the provinces.
- Enable indigenous
people to participate in elections and provide them with equal
access to employment in public service.
- Include in the
next report disaggregated data including information and socio-economic
indicators on the demographic composition of the population.
- With regard to
the special status of the Canal Zone, take measures to ensure
that rights are enjoyed fully by all residents and workers
in that area.
- Consider ratifying
the ILO Convention No. 169.52
Endnotes:
1
Tom Barry and John Lindsay-Poland with Marco Gandásegui
and Peter Simonson, Inside Panama (Albuquerquere, New Mexico:
Interhemispheric Resource Center, 1995), 63. back 2
Walter La Feber, The Panama Canal: The Crisis in Historical
Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 58.
back
3
Tom Barry and John Lindsay-Poland with Marco Gandásegui
and Peter Simonson, xiii. back
4
Ibid., 24. back
5
Ibid., 26-27. back
6
"President Eyes Re-election to 'Maintain Momentum'," Financial
Times (London), 5 March 1998, Nexis, 12 March 1998. back
7
Kevin G. Hall, "Corruption Crackdown Lags as Trade Grows;
Panama Bill Threatens Investigative Journalists," Journal of
Commerce, 16 April 1998, on-line, Nexis, 27 April 1998.
back
8
"Panama. A Bull in a China Shop," Economist, 4 April 1998,
on-line, Nexis, 27 April 1998. back
9
"Central American Economy: Market Prospects," Economist
Intelligence Unit ViewsWire, 21 April 1998, on-line, Nexis,
27 April 1998. back
10
Tom Barry and John Lindsay-Poland with Marco Gandásegui
and Peter Simonson, 73. back
11
Ibid., 74-75. back
12
Quoted in: Panama: Sovereignty for a Land Divided (Washington,
DC:Epica Task Force, 1976), 5. back
13
Panama: Sovereignty for a Land Divided (Washington, DC:Epica
Task Force, 1976), 79. back
14
Tom Barry and John Lindsay-Poland with Marco Gandásegui
and Peter Simonson, 65-66. back
15
Howard La Franchi, "Taking Drug War Too Far?" Christian
Science Monitor, 9 April 1998, on-line, Nexis, 27 April 1998.
back
16
Ibid. back
17
Kevin G. Hall, "Corruption Crackdown Lags as Trade Grows;
Panama Bill Threatens Investigative Journalists," Journal of
Commerce, 16 April 1998, on-line, Nexis, 27 April 1998.
back
18
"Canal News in Brief," Eco-Central: Central American Economy,
26 March 1998, on-line, Nexis, 30 April 1998. back
19
Ibid. back
20
Jon Mitchell, "Skeptical of US Criticism, Traders See Colon
Free Zone as global Hub; Area is Concentrating on Better Infrastructure,"
Journal of Commerce, 8 April 1998, on-line, Nexis, 27 April
1998. back
21
Tom Barry and John Lindsay-Poland with Marco Gandásegui
and Peter Simonson, 67-68. back
22
"Central American Economy: Market Prospects," Economist
Intelligence Unit ViewsWire, 21 April 1998, on-line, Nexis,
27 April 1998. back
23
Quoted in: Tom Barry and John Lindsay-Poland with Marco
Gandásegui and Peter Simonson, Inside Panama (Albuquerquere,
New Mexico: Interhemispheric Resource Center, 1995), 68.
back
24
James Wilson, "Caution Over Panama's Banking Law," Financial
Times (London), 25 March 1998, on-line, Nexis, 30 April 1998.
back
25
Tom Barry and John Lindsay-Poland with Marco Gandásegui
and Peter Simonson, 19-20. back
26
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, 1997
Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights, 60-61.
back
27
Tom Barry and John Lindsay-Poland with Marco Gandásegui
and Peter Simonson, 96. back
28
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, 1997
Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights, 60-61.
back
29
Ibid. back
30
Tom Barry and John Lindsay-Poland with Marco Gandásegui
and Peter Simonson, 5-6. back
31
Report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry on the
US Invasion of Panama, The US Invasion of Panama: The Truth
Behind Operation "Just Cause" (Boston:South End Press, 1991),
5. back
32
Tom Barry and John Lindsay-Poland with Marco Gandásegui
and Peter Simonson, xv. back
33
Ibid., 81. back
34
In the years preceding the invasion, the US government,
among other things, demanded the renegotiation of the 1977 treaties
in order to continue US military bases after 2000, which the
Noriega government refused. back
35
Quoted in: Physicians for Human Rights, Operation "Just
Cause": The Human Cost of Military Action in Panama (Boston:Physicians
for Human Rights, October 1991), 9. back
36
Physicians for Human Rights, Operation "Just Cause": The
Human Cost of Military Action in Panama (Boston:Physicians for
Human Rights, October 1991), 4-5. back
37
United Nations, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Right, Concluding Observations: Report on the Technical Assistance
Mission: Panama (E/C.12/1995/8), 20 June 1995, on-line, available
from: http:/unhchr.ch, accessed on 15 April 1998. back
38
Tom Barry and John Lindsay-Poland with Marco Gandásegui
and Peter Simonson, 7-8. back
39
Endara had won the May 1989 presidential election by a
two-to-one margin but was denied victory by General Noriega.
Some observers maintain that his victory was more of a protest
vote against Noriega and not a vote of support for the elite
ADOC. back
40
Tom Barry and John Lindsay-Poland with Marco Gandásegui
and Peter Simonson, 22-23. back
41
Ibid., 31. back
42
Ibid., 42-43. back
43
Ibid., 45. back
44
U.S. Department of State, Panama Country Report on Human
Rights Practices for 1997 (Washington D.C.: Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor, 30 January, 1998) back
45
"Human Rights Ombudsman is Locked in Power Struggle with
Attorney General," Eco-Central: Central American Economy, 12
March 1998, on-line, Nexis, 30 April 1998. back
46
Tom Barry and John Lindsay-Poland with Marco Gandásegui
and Peter Simonson, 90. back
47
Contraloria General de la República de Panamá,
Panamá en Cifras (November 1997), pp. 6-7. back
48
"Panama: Americas Review 1998," Janet Matthews Information
Service, March 1998, on-line, Nexis, 30 April 1998. back
49
United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the Committee
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (Fourth Session),
Official Records: Fortieth Session Supplement No. 45 (A/40/45),
New York, 1985, 20-26. back
50
United Nations, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Right, Concluding Observations: Report on the Technical Assistance
Mission: Panama (E/C.12/1995/8), 20 June 1995, on-line, available
from: http:/unhchr.ch, accessed on 15 April 1998. back
51
United Nations, Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding
Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Panama
(CRC/C/15/Add.68), 24 January 1997, on-line, available from:
http:/unhchr.ch, accessed on 15 April 1998. back
52
United Nations, Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, Concluding Observations of the Committee on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Panama (CERD/C/304/Add.
32), 23 April 1997, on-line, available from: http:/unhchr.ch,
accessed on 15 April 1998. back
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