VIII.        Sentencing

554.          Having found the Accused guilty, the Chamber now turns to the question of sentencing. The appropriate sentence serves to further the goals of retribution, deterrence, stigmatization, rehabilitation, protection of society, and national reconciliation. Pursuant to Articles 22 and 23 of the Statute and Rule 101 of the Rules, the Chamber will take into account the gravity of the offences and the individual circumstances of the Accused, as well as any other aggravating or mitigating circumstances, and the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of Rwanda. The Chamber will also give credit to the Accused for the period he was detained in custody pending trial. Pursuant to the decision of the Appeals Chamber, the Trial Chamber will reduce the sentence for the violation of the Accused’s rights during pre-trial detention. [712]

A.     Gravity of the Offences

555.          The penalty must, first and foremost, be commensurate with the gravity of the offence. [713] All of the crimes in the Statute are crimes of an extremely serious nature, rising to the level of international prohibition. Thus, in assessing the gravity of the offence, the Chamber ought to go beyond the abstract gravity of the crime to take into account the particular circumstances of the case, as well as the form and degree of the participation of the Accused in the crime.

556.          The Chamber has found the Accused guilty of participating in genocide and extermination, murder, rape, and torture as crimes against humanity. These are, by definition, crimes of the most serious gravity, which affect the very foundations of society and shock the conscience of humanity. Through his participation in these crimes, the Accused contributed to the harming and killing of many civilian Tutsi.

557.          With the exception of his personal participation in the torture and murder of Rusanganwa, the Accused was not a principal perpetrator of the other crimes for which he has been found guilty, nor was he found to be in a position of hierarchical authority. The Accused has been convicted of complicity in genocide, of aiding and abetting extermination as a crime against humanity, and of instigating the murder of seven people and the rape and torture of one victim. The Accused’s acts of complicity, aiding and abetting, and instigating are crimes of indirect participation.

558.          The Prosecutor submitted that the Accused should be sentenced to life imprisonment. [714] The Prosecutor argued that the murder of a single person is sufficient to warrant the imposition of the maximum sentence and stressed that she could have brought hundreds of counts against the Accused, one for each person killed in the massacres. [715] The Prosecutor urged that anything less than a life sentence would diminish the value of the lives of the victims and will attract cynicism towards international criminal tribunals. [716]

559.          Considering the totality of the evidence, the Chamber is not convinced that a life sentence is necessary to reflect the gravity of the crimes of which the Accused has been found guilty. The penalty of life imprisonment, the highest penalty available at this Tribunal, should be reserved for the most serious offenders. [717] The principle of gradation in sentencing requires the Chamber to differentiate criminal conduct on the basis of its gravity. [718] Having regard to the nature of the offences, and the role and the degree of participation of the Accused, the Chamber does not consider that the criminal acts of the Accused deserve the highest sentence.

1.      Sentencing Ranges

560.          The Chamber has also taken into consideration the sentencing practice in the Rwandan courts, as evidenced by the penalties for similar crimes prescribed in the Rwandan Penal Code and the Organic Law, [719] as well as the sentencing practices of this Tribunal and of the ICTY. In doing so, the Chamber has not lost sight of its overarching obligation to tailor the sentence to the gravity of the crime and to the individual circumstances of the offender. [720]

561.          The Rwandan Penal Code provides for fixed term sentences of up to a maximum of twenty years’ imprisonment or, exceptionally, up to thirty years’ imprisonment in cases of concurrent offences. [721] The most serious crimes, such as murder, may be punished by life imprisonment or death. [722] Rape is generally punishable by a sentence of five to ten years, which may be doubled for certain prescribed aggravating elements such as the young age of the victim, the position of authority of the accused, or the severity of the physical harm. [723] The Code specifically provides that accomplices may be subject to the same penalties as the principal authors of the crime. [724] The Rwandan Organic Law indicates that, even for genocide and crimes against humanity, the ordinary Penal Code sentences shall apply with certain modifications, which include heightened penalties of death and life imprisonment, respectively, for Categories 1 and 2 perpetrators. [725]

562.          The Chamber has also examined the sentencing practice of this Tribunal and of the ICTY. The Chamber notes that the practice of awarding a single sentence for the totality of an accused’s conduct makes it difficult to determine the range of sentences for each specific crime. Notwithstanding this difficulty, it is possible to ascertain general ranges of sentences which may provide useful guidance to the Chamber in determining the appropriate sentence in this case.

563.          Principal perpetrators convicted of either genocide or extermination as a crime against humanity, or both, have been punished with sentences ranging from fifteen years’ imprisonment [726] to life imprisonment. [727] Secondary or indirect forms of participation have generally resulted a lower sentence. For example, Georges Ruggiu received a twelve year sentence for incitement to commit genocide after a plea of guilty, [728] and Elizaphan Ntakirutimana received a ten year sentence for aiding and abetting genocide, with a special emphasis on his advanced age. [729]

564.          In the jurisprudence of the two Tribunals, rape as a crime against humanity has resulted in specific sentences between twelve years [730] and fifteen years. [731] Torture as a crime against humanity has been punished with specific sentences between five years [732] and twelve years. [733] Murder as a crime against humanity has been punished by specific fixed term sentences ranging from twelve years [734] to twenty years. [735] In other cases, convictions for these crimes have formed part of a single sentence of a fixed term or of life imprisonment for the totality of the conduct of the Accused.

B.     Aggravating Factors

565.          The Prosecutor alleged several aggravating factors for the Chamber to consider in determining the appropriate sentence. [736] The Chamber notes, however, that only those matters that have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt may be considered in aggravation of the sentence. [737]

1.      Criminal Acts Not Alleged in the Indictment

566.          The Prosecutor submitted that the Chamber should consider allegations of criminal activity by the Accused, which were not charged in the Indictment, as aggravating factors in sentencing. [738] The Prosecutor argued that the following allegations should be considered: (i) the Accused personally killed a Tutsi woman in gruesome circumstances at Muymbu health centre; (ii) the Accused had captives crawl on their knees to be beheaded by a machete-wielding executioner at Muyumbu health centre; (iii) the Accused drove a vehicle over the bodies of wounded people; (iv) the Accused ordered “his” Interahamwe to shoot Tutsis who were seeking refuge at his home; and (v) the Accused threatened to have a victim’s nose cut off during an interrogation.

567.          The ICTY Appeals Chamber has allowed that allegations of criminal activity not specifically pleaded in the indictment may be considered as aggravating factors when the accused has received sufficient notice, when the Prosecution makes a specific request for a factual finding in relation to the additional crimes, and when these allegations have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. [739]

568.          The evidence of the Accused’s criminal activity advanced by the Prosecutor in aggravation of the Accused’s sentence, but not included in the Indictment, was led during the testimony of Prosecution Witnesses VAQ, [740] VM, [741] and VI. [742] No objections that these allegations were outside the scope of the Indictment were raised by the Defence at the time when this evidence was led. The Defence cross-examined these witnesses about the allegations, [743] which the Accused refuted during his testimony, [744] and to which the Defence referred in its Closing Brief. [745] Therefore, it is clear that the Accused had notice of the substance of the allegations. The Prosecution Closing Brief specifically requests the Chamber to consider the allegations as aggravating factors. [746]

569.          However, the Chamber is not satisfied that the Accused was put on notice that additional crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, but not charged in the Indictment, could be considered as aggravating factors in relation to his eventual sentence. No such indication was made by the Prosecutor prior to her Closing Brief. It is a matter of fundamental importance that the Defence ought to be able to focus its attention on the crimes contained within the Indictment. Ordinarily, crimes not charged in the Indictment are not relevant to the proceedings.

570.          It would circumvent the proper course of justice to rely on allegations of further uncharged criminality to increase the sentence of the Accused. Where the Prosecutor has reliable evidence of criminal activity falling within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, then she may choose to include those matters in the indictment against an accused. Where such matters arise only during the trial, the Prosecutor may request to have the indictment amended to include the new allegations. Having failed to include these crimes in the Indictment, the Prosecutor should not be permitted to achieve a similar effect by having them considered as aggravating factors. [747] In these circumstances, the Chamber will not place any reliance on criminal acts outside the scope of the Indictment and on which it has not made any factual findings.

2.      The Number of Deaths

571.          The Prosecutor also submitted that the number of victims is an aggravating factor. [748] Since the number of victims is an element of extermination as a crime against humanity, the Chamber already considered it in assessing the gravity of the offence of extermination and cannot also consider it as an aggravating factor in sentencing for extermination. [749] However, the number of victims may be an aggravating factor in relation to genocide, a crime with no numeric minimum of victims. The Chamber, therefore, considers the number of victims killed as a result of the Accused’s conduct at Musha church and Mwulire Hill as an aggravating factor in determining the appropriate sentence for complicity in genocide.

3.      The Conduct of the Defence

572.          The Prosecutor also urged the Chamber to consider that the “defence was conducted in a rather abusive fashion, in a manner that exacerbated the situation to the point that such would constitute aggravating circumstances.” [750] In particular, the Prosecutor alleged that Defence Expert Witness Ndengejeho perpetuated dangerous stereotypes by testifying that Tutsi culture was based on lying. [751] The Chamber does not consider that either this testimony or the allegedly abusive conduct of the Defence is an aggravating factor in this case.

4.      Influence of the Accused

573.          The Chamber has, on its own initiative, also considered the influence and relative importance of the Accused in his commune as an aggravating factor. The Accused was a prominent and influential person in Bicumbi commune in 1994. Though he no longer held the post of bourgmestre, the Accused had been appointed to serve in the parliament that was to be established pursuant to the Arusha Accords, and he was still widely regarded in his locality as an influential person. [752] The Chamber was not satisfied that the Accused held any hierarchical position of superior responsibility over persons in his community. Nevertheless, the Accused’s prominence and influence made it more likely that others would follow his negative example. [753] The Chamber thus considers this to be an aggravating factor.

C.     Mitigating Factors

574.          The Defence submitted that a number of factors relating to the personal circumstances of the Accused and the violation of the Accused’s rights should mitigate his sentence. [754] Mitigating factors must be proved on a balance of probabilities. [755]

575.          The Defence argued that the Accused’s detention caused grave, though unspecified, prejudice to his family, whom the Accused greatly missed. [756] The Defence further submitted that the Accused was also a victim in the events of 1994, having lost his property and two of his daughters. [757] In the circumstances of this case, the Chamber does not consider these arguments as mitigating factors relevant to sentencing.

576.          The Defence also submitted that the detention of the Accused has affected his health. [758] The Chamber has reviewed the statements of Dr. Belai, the Medical Officer of the Tribunal, dated 4 December 2000 [759] and 6 December 2000, [760] and his confidential medical report filed on 6 December 2000, which revealed no serious health consideration and which found the Accused sufficiently healthy to stand trial. In these circumstances, the Chamber finds that the health condition of the Accused does not bear on sentencing.

577.          The Defence submitted that the twenty years of development efforts by the Accused should be considered in deciding on the appropriate sentence. [761] The Chamber has noted the evidence from both Prosecution and Defence witnesses that the Accused was a successful bourgmestre in Bicumbi over a twenty year period. The Chamber heard that the Accused brought prosperity and development to his region. The Chamber thus considers the prior character and accomplishments of the Accused in mitigation of his sentence.

578.          The Accused also submitted that his low level of command should be considered in mitigation. [762] The Chamber has already considered the role of the Accused in assessing the gravity of the offence. In this case, where the Accused has not been convicted of any crime based on superior responsibility, there is no reason to consider his level of command within an hierarchy. Such an argument is relevant when considering convictions for ordering, pursuant to Article 6(1), or for superior responsibility, pursuant to Article 6(3).

1.      Reduction of Sentence for Violation of Rights

579.          The Appeals Chamber found that prior to his surrender to the Tribunal the Accused suffered a violation of his right to be informed promptly of the nature of the charges against him when he was detained in custody for approximately eighteen days before being informed of the nature of the charges brought against him by the Prosecutor. [763] On a second occasion, the Accused was detained for a further period of eighteen days, before being informed of the nature of the charges, but the Appeals Chamber found this second violation to be less serious since he had already been informed in substance of the nature of the charges during his first period of detention. [764] The Appeals Chamber also found a violation of his right to challenge the lawfulness of his detention, when his writ of habeas corpus was not heard by the Chamber. [765] The Appeals Chamber, however, found that the Accused’s counsel had not acted with the necessary diligence in bringing the matter before the Chamber and that, since the desired results were achieved shortly thereafter, the Accused suffered no material prejudice from the failure to address the motion. [766] Therefore, the Appeals Chamber held:

[T]hat for the violation of his rights, the Appellant is entitled to a remedy which shall be given when judgement is rendered by the Trial Chamber, as follows:

(a)            If he is found not guilty, the Appellant shall be entitled to financial compensation;

(b)            If he is found guilty, the Appellant’s sentence shall be reduced to take into account the violation of his rights, pursuant to Article 23 of the Statute. [767]

580.          The Chamber has fully considered the nature of these violations. The total period of the violation of the Accused’s right to be promptly informed of the charges lasted approximately thirty-six days, while the violation of his right to challenge his detention was found not to cause material prejudice. Considering the importance of these fundamental rights, the Chamber finds that it is appropriate to reduce the Accused’s sentence by a period of six months.

581.          In its Closing Brief, the Defence raised further violations of the Accused’s rights. The Defence proposed that the failure of the Tribunal to provide written translation of all documents into Kinyarwanda for the Accused during trial violated his right to defend himself in a language that he understands. [768] The Chamber considers this argument to be unconvincing. The language rights of the Accused are set out in Article 20(4)(a), (b), and (f) of the Statute and Rule 3(B) and (E) of the Rules. In this case, the Accused, who has an understanding of French, [769] was provided with the free assistance of a Kinyarwanda interpreter for the entire trial proceeding, including his testimony. Many of the important documents were read onto the record and translated into Kinyarwanda for the benefit of the Accused. The Registry is responsible for facilitating, in consultation with the Defence, the timely translation of documents into Kinyarwanda, and the Defence has not made any showing that the Registry has failed to translate any particular document for which a request had been made. Moreover, pursuant to the request of the Defence, the Registry hired a private contractor to provide additional translation services for the Accused. This contractor was arrested by the Tanzanian authorities, [770] and the Defence asserts that this discouraged other potential translators from working for the Defence. The Chamber does not see any merit in this unsupported assertion. The Defence has not made any specific argument that the failure to translate any particular document prejudiced the Accused’s right to defend himself. Thus, the Chamber finds that there has been no breach of the Accused’s language rights which would warrant compensation at sentencing.

582.          The Defence also submits that the Accused’s right to be tried without undue delay has been violated by the long delays in proceedings and the frequent sanctioning of the Defence by the Trial Chamber. [771] As evidence of the delay caused by the Prosecution, the Defence argues that the Prosecutor amended the Indictment three times and that the Prosecutor brought rebuttal witnesses. In the context of this case, the Chamber does not consider either of these arguments to be persuasive. The Rules provide for the amendment of indictments, and the Prosecutor did so in this case with the leave of the Chamber under the Rules. [772] Moreover, it was the failure of the Defence to provide the alibi notice, as required by Rule 67, that precipitated the Chamber’s decision to grant leave for the Prosecution rebuttal in respect of the alibi. [773] In considering the totality of the time spent by the Accused in pre-conviction custody, the Chamber finds that the period between transfer and conviction is indeed regrettable. However, having considered this total period within the context of the complexity of the case, the number of other defendants before the Tribunal, the limited resources of the Tribunal, and the delays occasioned by the Defence, the Chamber does not find that there has been a violation of the Accused’s right to be tried without undue delay.

2.      Credit for Time Served

583.          The Accused was originally arrested in Cameroon on 26 March 1996, pursuant to an international arrest warrant issued by the Office of the Public Prosecutor of Rwanda. Since that time, the Accused has been detained in custody, first in Cameroon, and then at the United Nations Detention Facility in Arusha.

584.          Pursuant to Rule 101(D), the Accused is entitled to credit for the period during which he was detained in custody pending surrender and trial. The Chamber considers that this period also covers the periods during which the Accused was detained solely on the basis of the Rwandan warrant of arrest, because this warrant was based on the same allegations that form the subject matter of this trial. [774] In such circumstances, fairness requires that account be taken of the total period the Accused spent in custody. Therefore, as of 15 May 2003, the Accused is entitled to credit for time served of seven years, one month, and nineteen days.

D.    Conclusion

1.      Genocide and Extermination (Counts 3 and 5)

585.          For the reasons explained in the foregoing analysis, the Chamber finds that the appropriate sentence for the Accused for complicity in genocide (Count 3) and for aiding and abetting extermination as a crime against humanity (Count 5) is two terms of fifteen years’ imprisonment. Since these crimes are based on identical sets of facts, the massacres at Musha church and Mwulire Hill, the sentences for these two counts will run concurrently.

2.      Rape, Torture, Murder (Counts 10, 11, 12, and 14)

586.          The Accused has been convicted of rape (Count 10), torture (Count 11), and murder (Count 12) as crimes against humanity on the basis of two distinct factual events. The rape conviction is premised on the Accused’s instigation of a crowd to rape Tutsi women before killing them. This is the same factual foundation as part of the torture count and part of the murder count. The counts of torture and murder also encompass the Accused’s personal participation in the torture and murder of Rusanganwa. Since these three counts are based on connected events, the Chamber considers that the sentences for these counts should run concurrently.

587.          The Accused has also been convicted of a separate count of murder as a crime against humanity (Count 14) in relation to his instigation of a group of Interahamwe resulting in six deaths. This event was also part of the same widespread attack as the other crimes against humanity and is similar in nature to the instigation portion of Count 12. Because of the close relationship between the instigation and the substance of Count 12, the Chamber also considers that the sentence for Count 14 should be served concurrently with Counts 10, 11, and 12.

588.          The sentences for Counts 10, 11, 12, and 14 shall be:

Count 10: instigating rape as a crime against humanity - seven years’ imprisonment
Count 11: instigating torture by rape and personally committing torture as a crime against humanity - ten years’ imprisonment
Count 12: instigating one murder and personally committing one murder - ten years’ imprisonment
Count 14: instigating murder of six persons - eight years’ imprisonment

589.          The concurrent sentences for Counts 10, 11, 12, and 14 shall be served consecutively to the concurrent sentences for Counts 3 and 5.

3.      Conclusion

590.          Therefore, the total sentence shall be twenty-five years’ imprisonment. This sentence will be reduced by six months to compensate the Accused for the violations of his rights. The Accused’s final sentence is twenty-four years and six months imprisonment.

591.          Credit for time served has been calculated as seven years, one month, and nineteen days. Therefore, as of 15 May 2003, there will remain seventeen years, four months, and eleven days in the Accused’s sentence.

592.          In accordance with Rules 102(A) and 103, the Accused shall remain in the custody of the Tribunal pending transfer to the State where he will serve his sentence.

593.          Judge Ostrovsky and Judge Dolenc append their separate opinions to this Judgement.

594.          Done in English and French, the English text being authoritative.

Arusha, 15 May 2003.

Yakov Ostrovsky
Lloyd G. Williams, QC
Pavel Dolenc
Presiding Judge
Judge
Judge

 

(Seal of the Tribunal)


[712] Semanza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, Decision, AC, 31 May 2000.

[713] Statute, art. 23(2). Musema, Judgement, AC, para. 382; Akayesu, Judgement, AC, para. 413; Kambanda, Judgement, AC, para. 125; Kupreskic, Judgement, AC, para. 442; Celebici, Judgement, AC, para. 731; Aleksovski, Judgement, AC, para. 182.

[714] Prosecution Closing Brief paras. 156-157.

[715] Prosecution Closing Brief paras. 159-160; T. 17 June 2002 pp. 173-174.

[716] Prosecution Closing Brief paras. 142-144.

[717] Article 77 of the ICC Statute provides for a fixed term sentence not exceeding thirty years and for life imprisonment only when justified by the extreme gravity of the crime and the circumstances of the Accused.

[718] Musema, Judgement, AC, paras. 381-382; Ntakirutimana, Judgement, TC, para. 884.

[719] Loi Organique n° 08/96 du 30/08/96 Sur L’organisation des poursuites des infractions constitutives du crime de génocide ou de crimes contre l’humanité, commises a partir du 1er Octobre 1990, Journal Officiel n° 17 du 1/9/1996 (Rwanda).

[720] Celebici, Judgement, AC, paras. 717, 719 (“[T]he Appeals Chamber notes that as a general principle such comparison is often of limited assistance. While it does not disagree with a contention that it is to be expected that two accused convicted of similar crimes in similar circumstances should not in practice receive very different sentences, often the differences are more significant than the similarities, and the mitigating and aggravating factors dictate different results. They are therefore not reliable as the sole basis for sentencing an individual.”).

[721] C. Pén. arts. 35, 93 (Rwanda).

[722] See, e.g., C. Pén. arts. 311-317 (Rwanda).

[723] C. Pén. arts. 360, 361 (Rwanda).

[724] C. Pén. art. 89 (Rwanda).

[725] Loi Organique n° 08/96 du 30/08/96 Sur L’organisation des poursuites des infractions constitutives du crime de génocide ou de crimes contre l’humanité, commises a partir du 1er Octobre 1990, Journal Officiel n° 17 du 1/9/1996, art. 14 (Rwanda).

[726] Serushago, Sentence, TC, p. 15.

[727] Musema, Judgement, TC, para. 1008; Rutaganda, Judgement, TC, para. 473; Kayishema and Ruzindana, Sentence, TC, para. 27; Akayesu, Sentence, TC, p. 13; Kambanda, Judgement, TC, p. 28.

[728] Ruggiu, Judgement, TC, p. 19.

[729] Ntakirutimana, Judgement, TC, paras. 898, 906, 921.

[730] Kunarac, Judgement, TC, para. 882.

[731] Akayesu, Sentence, TC, p. 13.

[732] Simic, Sentencing Judgement, TC, para. 122.

[733] Kunarac, Judgement, TC, para. 882.

[734] Kupreskic, Judgement, AC, para. 439 (Jospovic was originally sentenced at trial to fifteen years for persecution, murder, and inhumane acts as crimes against humanity. On appeal, this sentence was reduced to twelve years.).

[735] Tadic, Judgement in Sentencing Appeals, AC, para. 58 (Sentence for murder as a crime against humanity reduced from twenty-five years to twenty years on appeal.).

[736] Prosecution Closing Brief para. 156.

[737] Ntakirutimana, Judgement, TC, para. 893; Celebici, Judgement, AC, para. 763.

[738] Prosecution Closing Brief para. 156.

[739] Celebici, Judgement, AC, para. 763.

[740] T. 14 March 2001 pp. 76-85.

[741] T. 6 March 2001 p. 100; T. 7 March 2001 p. 19.

[742] T. 15 November 2000 pp. 64-67.

[743] T. 15 November 2000 pp. 86-87; T. 7 March 2001 p. 19; T. 14 March 2001 pp. 93, 102, 106, 110-112; T. 15 March 2001 pp. 4-12, 23-37.

[744] T. 18 February 2002 pp. 70, 124-125; T. 28 February 2002 p. 98; T. 27 February 2002 pp. 114-115.

[745] Defence Closing Brief pp. 91-93.

[746] Prosecution Closing Brief para. 156.

[747] Kunarac, Judgement, TC, para. 850 (“Either the Prosecutor should charge such conduct as an offence, or, where it is not directly related to another charged offence, she should desist from citing such conduct as an aggravating factor. The Trial Chamber understands that the multiplicity of humanitarian law violations committed during an armed conflict as part of a common criminal scheme often cannot be succinctly captured in an indictment. Considerations of fairness to the accused and judicial economy, however, outweigh the wish to have each and every crime committed during a war brought to light and adjudged in whatever way – that is something which this International Tribunal simply cannot do.”).

[748] Prosecution Closing Brief para. 156.

[749] Ntakirutimana, Judgement, TC, para. 893; Vasiljevic, Judgement, TC, paras. 277-278; Simic, Sentencing Judgement, TC, para. 62; Todorovic, Sentencing Judgement, TC, para. 57.

[750] T. 17 June 2002 pp. 170-171.

[751] T. 17 June 2002 pp. 170-171.

[752] See supra paras. 303, 304.

[753] Simic, Sentencing Judgment, TC, para. 67; Kunarac, Judgement, TC, para. 863.

[754] Defence Closing Brief pp. 166-167.

[755] Ntakirutimana, Judgment, TC, para. 893; Vasiljevic, Judgement, TC, para. 272; Sikirica, Sentencing Judgement, TC, para. 110; Simic, Sentencing Judgment, TC, para. 40; Kunarac, Judgment, TC, para. 857.

[756] Defence Closing Brief p. 166.

[757] Defence Closing Brief p. 167.

[758] Defence Closing Brief p. 166.

[759] T. 4 December 2000 pp. 27-29.

[760] T. 6 December 2000 pp. 39-41, 44.

[761] Defence Closing Brief p. 166.

[762] Defence Closing Brief p. 167.

[763] Semanza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, Decision, AC, 31 May 2000, para. 87.

[764] Semanza, Decision, AC, 31 May 2000, para. 90.

[765] Semanza, Decision, AC, 31 May 2000, para. 114.

[766] Semanza, Decision, AC, 31 May 2000, paras. 121, 124.

[767] Semanza, Decision, AC, 31 May 2000, p. 34.

[768] Defence Closing Brief p. 167.

[769] See, e.g., T. 16 February 1998 p. 19 (“Today I can speak in French, I can express myself in French, but later on I prefer to use my native tongue, my mother tongue, which is Kinyarwanda… Yes, I wish to speak in French today.”); T. 23 September 1999 p. 18; T. 18 June 1999 pp. 6-11; T. 25 April 2001 p. 167; T. 7 July 2000 p. 7 (“He is not really very, very proficient in French, but even if they were translated into the French language, that would be okay.”).

[770] T. 22 November 2001 p. 3.

[771] Defence Closing Brief p. 167.

[772] See supra para. 6.

[773] Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion for Leave to Call Rebuttal Evidence and the Prosecutor’s Supplementary Motion for Leave to Call Rebuttal Evidence, TC, 27 March 2002.

[774] Tadic, Judgement in Sentencing Appeals, AC, para. 38.


Introduction | The Proceedings | Defence Case | Prosecution Case | The Law | Legal Findings | The Verdict | Sentencing | Opinion Judge Ostrovsky | Opinion Judge Dolenc | Annex I | Annex II | Annex III