[Chapter I] [Chapter II] [Chapter III] [Chapter IV] [Chapter V] [Annex IV]


CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.         The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

1.  This Judgement in the case of The Prosecutor v. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gérard Ntakirutimana is rendered by Trial Chamber I ("the Chamber") of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("the Tribunal"), composed of Judges Erik Mřse, presiding, Navanethem Pillay, and Andrésia Vaz.

2.  The Tribunal was established by United Nations Security Council Resolution 955 of 8 November 1994, [1] after official UN reports that genocide and other widespread, systematic, and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law had been committed in Rwanda. [2] The Security Council determined that the situation constituted a threat to international peace and security, and that the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law in Rwanda would contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace in the country. Accordingly, and pursuant to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council established the present Tribunal.

3.  The Tribunal is governed by the Statute annexed to Security Council Resolution 955 ("the Statute"), and by the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the Tribunal’s Judges on 5 July 1995 and subsequently amended ("the Rules"). [3]

2.         Jurisdiction of the Tribunal

4.  Under Article 1 of the Statute, the Tribunal is empowered to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations committed in neighbouring States of Rwanda. Article 7 of the Statute limits the Tribunal’s temporal jurisdiction to acts committed between 1 January and 31 December 1994.

5.  The Tribunal’s material jurisdiction is circumscribed by Articles 2, 3, and 4 of the Statute. The Tribunal’s personal jurisdiction is limited to natural persons (Article 5) and to the forms of individual criminal responsibility in Article 6. These provisions are reproduced below.

6.  Although the Tribunal and national courts have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute persons suspected of serious violations of international humanitarian law, the Tribunal has primacy over national courts, in accordance with Article 8 of the Statute, and may request a national court to defer to the competence of the Tribunal.

3.         The Indictments

7.  On 22 February 2001, the Chamber granted the Prosecution’s motion for a joint trial pursuant to Rule 48 bis of the Rules, in respect of two Indictments: [4]

(i) Indictment no. ICTR-96-10-I, as amended on 27 March 2000 and on 20 October 2000, in the case of Prosecutor v. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, Gérard Ntakirutimana, and Charles Sikubwabo ("the Mugonero Indictment");

(ii) Indictment no. ICTR-96-17-I, as amended on 7 July 1998, in the case of Prosecutor v. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gérard Ntakirutimana ("the Bisesero Indictment").

8.  The third person named in the ICTR-96-10-I Indictment, Charles Sikubwabo, was at large at the time of writing. At the pre-trial conference on 17 September 2001, the Chamber granted the Prosecution’s request to have the charges against Mr.  Sikubwabo severed. [5]

9.  The Indictments are set out in full in Annexes I and II to this Judgement. They charge the two Accused with genocide, complicity in genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, crimes against humanity, and with violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II. [6]

10.      Individual responsibility for the above crimes was brought in both Indictments under Article 6(1) of the Statute. Additionally, the Mugonero Indictment charges Gérard Ntakirutimana with responsibility under Article 6(3) (command responsibility) for all counts except conspiracy to commit genocide. The charges against the Accused are considered in detail in Chapter III of this Judgement.

4.         Statutory Provisions

11.  The provisions of the Statute defining the crimes and forms of individual criminal responsibility with which the Accused are charged in the Indictments are set out below: [7]

Article 2: Genocide

1. The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons committing genocide as defined in paragraph 2 of this article or of committing any of the other acts enumerated in paragraph 3 of this article.

2. Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

a) Killing members of the group;

b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;

c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;

d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

3. The following acts shall be punishable:

a) Genocide;

b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;

c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;

d) Attempt to commit genocide;

e) Complicity in genocide.

Article 3: Crimes against Humanity

The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds:

a) Murder;

b) Extermination;

c) Enslavement;

d) Deportation;

e) Imprisonment;

f) Torture;

g) Rape;

h) Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;

i) Other inhumane acts.

Article 4: Violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II

The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons committing or ordering to be committed serious violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims, and of Additional Protocol II thereto of 8 June 1977. These violations shall include, but shall not be limited to:

a) Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment;

b) Collective punishments;

c) Taking of hostages;

d) Acts of terrorism;

e) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault;

f) Pillage;

g) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples;

h) Threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.

Article 5: Personal jurisdiction

The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to the provisions of the present Statute.

Article 6: Individual criminal responsibility

1. A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in Articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime.

2. The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of state or government or as a responsible government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.

3. The fact that any of the acts referred to in Articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of criminal responsibility if he or she knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.

4. The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a government or of a superior shall not relieve him or her of criminal responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the International Tribunal for Rwanda determines that justice so requires.

12.      The elements of the above crimes are set out in Chapter III.

5.         Confirmation and Initial Appearance

13.      On 20 June 1996, the original ICTR-96-10-I (Mugonero) Indictment was confirmed by Judge Khan. [8] It charged Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, Gérard Ntakirutimana, Obed Ruzindana, and Charles Sikubwabo with genocide, complicity in genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, and crimes against humanity for their alleged involvement in massacres at Mugonero Complex in Gishyita commune, Kibuye prefecture. By decision of 30 June 1998, addressing a motion by the Defence alleging that the Mugonero Indictment was too vague, the Chamber ordered that the Indictment be amended. [9] On 10 March 2000, the Prosecution moved to amend the Indictment to delete charges against Ruzindana, who had been convicted on a separate indictment. The Chamber granted the Prosecution’s request on 27 March 2000.

14.      On 7 April 2000, the Prosecution filed another motion for leave to amend the Mugonero Indictment. It requested, inter alia, that the first two counts (on genocide and on complicity in genocide) be charged in the alternative rather than cumulatively; and that the alleged individual responsibility of Gérard Ntakirutimana be expanded to include command responsibility for acts of his subordinates, pursuant to Article 6(3) of the Statute. The Chamber granted these requests. [10]

15.      The ICTR-96-17-I (Bisesero) Indictment was confirmed by Judge Sekule on 7 September 1996. [11] Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and Gérard Ntakirutimana were thereby jointly charged with genocide, complicity in genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, crimes against humanity, and serious violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II. The Bisesero Indictment dealt with the alleged involvement of the two Accused in massacres in the area of Bisesero, in the Gisovu and Gishyita communes of Kibuye prefecture. By decision of 23 March 1998, concerning a Defence motion challenging the Bisesero Indictment for vagueness, the Chamber ordered that the Indictment be amended. [12]

16.      Gérard Ntakirutimana was arrested in the Ivory Coast on 29 October 1996 and transferred to the Tribunal’s detention facility in Arusha on 30 November 1996. On 2 December 1996, the Accused made his initial appearance before a Trial Chamber composed of judges Ostrovsky, Aspegren, and Pillay. He pleaded not guilty to the five counts in the Mugonero Indictment and the seven counts in the Bisesero Indictment. [13]

17.      The second Accused, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, was transferred to the Tribunal’s detention facility from the United States on 24 March 2000, having failed in his attempt to challenge the transfer. [14] His initial appearance was held before Judge Gunawardana, on 31 March 2000; he pleaded not guilty to all counts. [15]

6.         Other Pre-Trial Proceedings

18.      On 22 August 2000, the Chamber granted the Prosecution’s request for witness protection. The decision also granted protection to Defence witnesses. [16]

19.      At the pre-trial conference on 2 November 2000, the Prosecution requested leave of the Chamber to bring the Mugonero and Bisesero Indictments within a single trial pursuant to Rule 48 bis of the Rules. The basis of this request was that the offences alleged in the Indictments were committed in furtherance of a common transaction and that a single trial would be in the best interests of the administration of justice. On 22 February 2001, the Chamber granted the Prosecution’s request. [17]

20.      On 28 May 2001, the Prosecution filed a motion for contempt of court allegedly arising from a violation of the Chamber’s order of 22 August 2000 relating to witness protection. The Prosecution alleged that a statement of a protected witness in the present case, which was disclosed to the Defence, had subsequently been produced in appeal proceedings in the case of Alfred Musema. On 8 June 2001, the Defence opposed the motion for contempt as an attempt to deny the Accused their rights to prepare a defence, and stated inter alia that a witness statement could find its way into the hands of another detainee by numerous means.

21.      In another motion, of 5 July 2001, the Defence raised issues pertaining inter alia to expert and factual witnesses.

22.      In its decision on the two aforementioned motions, dated 16 July 2001, the Chamber emphasised the need to comply with witness protection provisions. However, the Chamber found that in the particular circumstances of the case the breach of the protection order was not serious enough to be tantamount to contempt of court. In relation to the motion of 5 July 2001, the Chamber requested the Prosecution to clarify whether it intended to call expert witnesses and, if so, to communicate forthwith their identity and qualifications to the Defence. [18]

23.      By a motion dated 16 June 2001, the Defence for Elizaphan Ntakirutimana requested that the Chamber direct the Registrar to assign Ephrem Gasasira as co-Counsel to lead Counsel Ramsey Clark. On 13 July 2001, the Chamber granted the motion on the condition that the Defence produce sufficient additional documentation relating to the candidate’s qualifications. [19]

24.      On 10 September 2001, the Defence served a notice of alibi pursuant to Rule 67(ii)(a) of the Rules, to the effect that both Accused would seek acquittal on the ground that the Prosecution’s evidence failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that they were present at the times and places charged. The Prosecution objected to the notice of alibi, alleging that it was vague and provided insufficient particulars. [20] The Chamber ordered the Defence to furnish further particulars not later than the beginning of December 2001. [21]

25.      On 10 September 2001, the Defence filed a motion seeking to preclude the Prosecution from adducing at trial any evidence of rape involving the Accused, on the ground that since neither Accused had been indicted for rape, such evidence would be unduly prejudicial. At the pre-trial conference on 17 September 2001, in response to the Chamber’s ruling that the court would deal with the witnesses whose statements included evidence of rape in such a way as to avoid unnecessary stigmatisation of the Accused, the Defence withdrew its motion. [22]

7.         The Trial

26.      On 16 July 2001, the Prosecution filed a Pre-trial Brief pursuant to Rule 73bis (B)(i) of the Rules. The Prosecution case opened on 18 September 2001. Nineteen witnesses were heard, comprising 16 protected witnesses, two investigators, and one expert witness. The Prosecution case closed on 2 November 2001, after 27 trial days. The Defence case opened on 4 February 2002, was adjourned on 15 February 2002, recommenced on 10 April 2002, and closed on 10 May 2002. [23] Its total duration was 30 trial days, during which 24 witnesses were heard, including the two Accused. A total of 149 Prosecution and Defence exhibits were admitted. Final briefs were filed by the Prosecution on 11 June 2002 and by the Defence on 24 July 2002. Closing oral arguments were heard on 21 and 22 August 2002. The Chamber prepared the judgement in parallel with hearing two other trials. It was announced orally on 19 February 2003.

27.      Several motions were decided in the course of trial. On 28 September 2001, the Defence moved to strike Witness DD from the list of prospective Prosecution witnesses, on the ground that his reconfirmation statement contained a serious allegation not present in his earlier written statement. On 1 October 2001 the Chamber dismissed the motion, noting that witness statements do not purport to give exact and full information about the prospective testimony, and that a testimony often expands upon or provides more detail than do earlier statements recorded by investigators. Moreover, with the case at an early stage, the Defence had ample opportunity to prepare for cross-examination on the additional allegation. [24]

28.      In a motion dated 8 October 2001, the Defence moved to strike in its entirety the testimony of Prosecution Witness YY, on the ground that the witness had made a serious in-court allegation against the two Accused not previously indicated in the Indictments or in the witness’s earlier written statement. In its decision of 5 November 2001, the Chamber noted that the Indictment contained a general clause covering allegations of the kind newly made. It found no evidence that the Prosecution knew that the particular allegation would be made. In the Chamber’s view, the fact that the witness volunteered unexpected information did not justify the drastic measure of striking his entire testimony. The Chamber noted that the Defence had not requested an extension of time to prepare its cross-examination of the witness; it remained entitled to apply to have the witness recalled; and the presentation of its case was not due to commence until 14 January 2002, more than three months later. The Chamber concluded that it would retain the testimony of the witness and make its own assessment of it. [25]

29.      On 22 November 2001, the Chamber decided a Prosecution motion for judicial notice of adjudicated facts pursuant to Rule 94(B) of the Rules. The alleged adjudicated facts included the total number of persons killed in Rwanda in 1994, the existence of a genocidal plan to eliminate the Tutsi ethnic group, and claims relating to serious violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II. The Chamber stated that the term "adjudicated fact" does not refer to judgements made on the basis of guilty pleas or admissions by an accused in other proceedings of the Tribunal. Moreover, only facts in a judgement that is not subject to appeal can be considered "adjudicated". Furthermore, proposed adjudicated facts must "relate" to the matters at issue. Finally, under Rule 94(B), judicial notice is to be taken at the discretion of the Chamber. In striking a balance between the need for judicial economy and the right of an accused to a fair trial, the Chamber held that it would avoid taking judicial notice of, firstly, alleged adjudicated facts that were the subject of reasonable dispute and, secondly, legal characterisations or legal conclusions based on the interpretation of facts. At the time of the decision, the Prosecution had closed its case. The Chamber was not inclined, at that stage of the proceedings, to view judicial notice as having a significant influence on judicial economy. The motion was dismissed. [26]

30.      By letter dated 12 December 2001, Mr. Edward Medvene, lead Counsel for Gérard Ntakirutimana, requested permission to withdraw, for medical reasons, from further representation of his client. On 19 December 2001, the Registrar of the Tribunal, upon the advice of the Presiding Judge, withdrew with immediate effect the assignment of Mr. Medvene, assigning in his place Mr. David Jacobs, who fulfilled the Tribunal’s conditions of assignment and had been formally accepted by Gérard Ntakirutimana. [27] The change of Counsel necessitated postponement of the date of commencement of the Defence case, from 14 January 2002 to 4 February 2002.

31.      To summarise the trial phase, a total of 43 Prosecution and Defence witnesses were heard over 57 trial days. Between commencement of the trial, on 18 September 2001, and 10 May 2002 when the last witness was heard, the Trial Chamber rendered five written and seven oral decisions on motions. This relatively low number of motions and corresponding decisions is attributable in part to weekly informal conferences at which issues of concern to the parties were resolved. Efficiency was also improved by the piloting of simultaneous interpretation between Kinyarwanda and the official languages of the Tribunal.

8.         Evidentiary Matters

32.      In accordance with Rule 89(A) of the Rules, the rules of evidence (which are found in Section 3 of Part 6 of the Rules) govern proceedings before the Trial Chambers. Pursuant to the same rule, the Trial Chambers are not bound by national rules of evidence. When confronted with evidential questions not otherwise provided for by the Rules, the Chamber applied rules of evidence which in its view best favoured a fair determination of the matter before it and which were consonant with the spirit of the Statute and the general principles of law, as authorised by Rule 89(B). The Chamber has taken account of the case law of the Tribunal which has established general principles concerning the assessment of evidence. For example, the Akayesu Judgement contains important statements on, inter alia, the probative value of evidence; the use of witness statements; the impact of trauma on the testimony of witnesses; problems of interpretation from Kinyarwanda into French and English; and cultural factors affecting the evidence of witnesses. [28] Subsequent case law of the Tribunal has developed principles relating to evidentiary matters, the most recent authority being the Judgement in the case of Prosecutor v. Ignace Bagilishema. [29] The Chamber will return to these principles to the extent necessary.

33.      Finally, the Chamber notes that hearsay evidence is not inadmissible per se, even when it is not corroborated by direct evidence. The Chamber has considered hearsay evidence with caution, in accordance with Rule 89 of the Rules. [30]

9.         The Accused

34.      The following information was compiled from the Accused’s own testimony and was not contested by the Prosecution.

35.      Elizaphan Ntakirutimana was born in 1924 in Ngoma secteur, Gishyita commune, Kibuye prefecture, Rwanda. [31] He started his schooling in 1939, at the Ngoma mission of the Seventh-Day Adventist (SDA) Church, and became a member of the SDA around that time. [32] After completing primary school in 1946, he gained employment at the mission office, where he also worked as a teacher. On 22 August 1950, he married Lois (Royisi) Nyirahakizimana. He spent a few years teaching in villages in Rwanda and Zaire before joining the Gitwe Seminary in Rwanda in 1953. [33] After graduating from the seminary in 1956, he returned to teach at Ngoma mission, where he also served as the mission’s accountant and, for a time, acting president.

36.      On 4 August 1961, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana was ordained a pastor. Around 1962 he enrolled in a "leadership" programme at the SDA’s Salisbury College in Rhodesia. Following that he went to Nigeria to study accountancy. [34] In 1967 he was elected president of the West Rwanda Association of the SDA, a position he held until 1970. He was to be elected to that post three more times, the last in 1994. [35] During the period 1970-1994, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana served the SDA in various capacities, including as secretary of the Rwanda-Burundi SDA Union (1970-1975), Union director of fundraising and lay activities (1975-1980), treasurer of the Trans-Africa Division (1985-1989), and president of the South Rwanda Association (1989-1993). In 1980 he was elected to the World Conference, the SDA’s governing body, but withdrew after eight months as a result of his wife’s poor health. [36] In April-July 1994, which is the period covered by the Indictments, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana was president of the West Rwanda Association of the SDA, also known as the West Rwanda "field", and based at the field headquarters in Mugonero Complex, Gishyita commune. [37] The Accused and his wife had eight children, including Gérard Ntakirutimana, of which seven were alive in 2002; four of them earned medical degrees. [38]

37.      Gérard Ntakirutimana was born in 1958 in Ngoma secteur, Gishyita commune, Kibuye prefecture, Rwanda. (Both he and his father, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, stated that their ethnicity was Hutu. [39] ) Gérard Ntakirutimana lived in Ngoma until the age of thirteen. After a year in Burundi he returned to Rwanda to attend the SDA’s Gitwe Secondary School in Gitarama prefecture. In 1979, on a government scholarship, he attended the University of Butare, from where he graduated with a degree in medicine in 1985. [40] He distinguished himself in his studies and the university retained him on the staff of the Centre for Public Health, where he supervised final-year students at the faculty of medicine. On 1 January 1989, Gérard Ntakirutimana married Ann Nzahumunyurwa. They have three children. [41]

38.      In early 1990 the Accused left the University of Butare to continue his education in the United States. He studied English at the University of Illinois and completed a Masters degree in public health at St. Louis, Missouri (1992). After spending a few months in Laredo, Texas, he returned to Rwanda in March 1993 with the intention of assuming his former post at the University of Butare. [42] Finding that the situation in Butare had become "difficult" as a result of the on-going conflict between the government and rebel groups, Gérard Ntakirutimana joined the staff of the SDA’s hospital at Mugonero Complex, Gishyita commune, in April 1993. There he worked as a medical doctor under the supervision of the hospital’s director, until the latter’s departure in April 1994. [43]


[1] UN Doc. S/RES/955(1994).

[2] Interim Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 935 (1994), UN Doc. S/1994/1125; Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 935 (1994), UN Doc. S/1994/1405; and Reports of the Special Rapporteur for Rwanda of the UN Commission on Human Rights, UN Doc. S/1994/1157, Annexes I and II.

[3] At the time of writing, the most recent amendment to the Rules was approved on 5 July 2002. The Statute and the Rules are available at the Tribunal’s website: <http://www.ictr.org>.

[4] Decision of 22 February 2001 on the Prosecutor’s Motion to Join the Indictments ICTR 96-10-I and ICTR 96-17-T. This and selected other decisions referred to below are available at the Tribunal’s website; see <http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/index.htm>.

[5] T. 17 September 2001 p. 45.

[6] The relationship between the Mugonero Indictment and Bisesero Indictment is discussed in greater detail in Chapter II.

[7] The past judgements of the Trial Chambers of this Tribunal contain separate chapters entitled “Applicable Law”, summarising the jurisprudence relative to Articles 2 to 6 of the Statute. In the present case the Chamber sees no need to recapitulate the applicable law in a separate chapter; rather, it will confine its discussion of the law to the concrete circumstances of this case and to any legal issues arising from it; see, in particular, Chapter III. For Tribunal judgements see <http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/index.htm>.

[8] Decision of 20 June 1996 on the Review of the Indictment.

[9] Decision of 30 June 1998 on a Preliminary Motion Filed by Defence Counsel for an Order to Quash Counts 1, 2, 3, and 6 of the Indictment.

[10] Decision of 6 October 2000 on the Prosecutor’s Request for Leave to File an Amended Indictment.

[11] Decision of 7 September 1996 on the Review of the Indictment.

[12] Decision of 23 March 1998 on a Preliminary Motion Filed (on 16 April 1997) by Defence Counsel for an Order to Quash Counts 1, 2, 3, 6 and 7 of the Indictment.

[13] T. 2 December 1996 pp. 8 and 14.

[14] See Elizaphan Ntakirutimana v. Janet Reno et al., 184 F.3d 419 (United States Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, 5 August 1999); and 528 U.S. 1135 (Supreme Court, 24 January 2000), certiorari denied.

[15] T. 31 March 2000 pp. 13-15 and 27-29.

[16] Decision of 22 August 2000 on Witness Protection.

[17] Decision of 22 February 2001 on the Prosecutor’s Motion to Join the Indictments ICTR 96-10-I and ICTR 96-17-T.

[18] Decision of 16 July 2001 on Prosecution Motion for Contempt of Court and on Two Defence Motions for Disclosure Etc.

[19] Decision of 13 July 2001 on the Motion of the Defence for the Assignment of Co-Counsel for Elizaphan Ntakirutimana. The Registry subsequently concluded that sufficient additional information, as requested in the order, had not been provided.

[20] T. 17 September 2001 pp. 16-18.

[21] Id. pp. 38-39.

[22] Id. pp. 40-44.

[23] Commencement of the Defence case had to be postponed to allow for the replacement of counsel for Gérard Ntakiturimana; see para. 30 below.

[24] T. 1 October 2001 pp. 149-154.

[25] Decision of 5 November 2001 on the motion of the Defence to strike the testimony of Witness YY.

[26] Decision of 22 November 2001 on the Prosecutor’s motion for judicial notice of adjudicated facts.

[27] Decision of 19 December 2001 on Withdrawal of Mr. Edward Medvene as Lead Counsel of Mr. Gérard Ntakirutimana and Assignment of Mr. David Jacobs as Lead Counsel of Mr. Gérard Ntakirutimana.

[28] Akayesu (TC) paras. 130-156. The abbreviation, Akayesu (TC) stands for the Judgement rendered by Trial Chamber I of the Tribunal on 2 September 1998 in the Case The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, No. ICTR-96-4-T. This system of abbreviation (name of Accused, Judgement or Sentence, (TC) for Trial Chamber or (AC) for Appeals Chamber) will be adopted each time a Judgement or Sentence of this Tribunal or the ICTY is referred to. Please consult the Index of Abbreviations of Judgements at Annex IV for full quotation and details of the Judgement or Sentence concerned.

[29] Bagilishema (TC); see also Kayishema and Ruzindana (TC) paras. 65-80; Rutaganda (TC) paras. 15-23; and Musema (TC) paras. 31-105.

[30] See Akayesu (TC) para. 136; confirmed on appeal (Akayesu (AC) paras. 284-309).

[31] Defence exhibit 1D45.

[32] T. 6 May 2002 pp. 18-20.

[33] Id. pp. 22-23.

[34] Id. pp. 24-30.

[35] Id. p. 41.

[36] Id. pp. 42-51.

[37] Id. pp. 71-73.

[38] Id. pp. 33-40.

[39] Defence exhibits 1D45 and 2D56.

[40] T. 8 May 2002 pp. 131-137.

[41] Id. pp. 142-143.

[42] Id. pp. 150-152.

[43] Id. pp. 152-161.


[Chapter I] [Chapter II] [Chapter III] [Chapter IV] [Chapter V] [Annex IV]