CHAPTER I

THE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF THE STATE

IN THE CHILEAN LEGAL SYSTEM

A. GENERAL ASPECTS

1. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the political organization of the Chilean State as it results from the changes that have taken place since September 11, 1973 to the present. For the purposes of its exposition, the Commission has deemed it advisable to divide that evolution into two stages: the first stage, running from that date to the entry into force of the 1980 Constitution, during which major changes were introduced into the existing institutional system. The second is the present stage, in which the structure of the state is established by the 1980 Constitution.

2. With respect to the aspects considered, the Commission has deemed it advisable to refer to the new organs established beginning September 11, 1973 and, especially, the Government Junta, its membership, structure and functions. Among those functions special emphasis will be placed on the exercise of legislative and constituent powers and a brief account will be given of how that exercise has affected the functions of the Judiciary. The evolution of the powers granted to the President of the Republic will also be examined in detail.

3. With respect to its treatment of the 1980 Constitution, the Commission has taken into account the fact that it provides for two types of institutional arrangements: the permanent-which will come into effect in 1989-and the present, which will be in force until that date; the Commission will examine only the second since it is that which is of interest for the purposes of this report. This chapter will also include an account of the origin of the 1980 Constitution.

B. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE STATE IN THE FIRST STAGE

a. The Reasons Invoked

4. After the military coup of September 11, 1973, the Government Junta was established and took supreme command of the nation, its purpose being to restore the Chilean way of life, justice, and the institutions destroyed, aware that that was the only way of being faithful to national traditions, the legacy of the Founding Fathers, and the history of Chile and of enabling the country to progress and develop vigorously in the way that the dynamics of modern times demand of Chile in the concert of nations of which it forms part. [1]

5. In addition, on September 11, 1973, the Government Junta stated that the action it had taken reflected its “moral duty” to remove a government that had become “fragrantly illegitimate” and that, to that end, it was taking office “solely for the period the circumstances so require”. [2]

6. To sum up, to restore the Constitutional State, to incorporate Chile into the international community of which it formed part, and to ensure the progress of the country were the reasons invoked to justify the military coup of 1973. To that end the Government Junta took office for a period it itself considered strictly limited.

b. The Government Junta: Membership and Structure

7. Pursuant to Decree Law No. 1, the Government Junta took supreme command of the nation and was made up of the Commander in Chief of the Army, Army General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte; the Commander in Chief of the Navy, Admiral Jose Toribio Merino Castro; the Commander in Chief of the Air Force, General Gustavo Leigh Guzmán and the Director General of Carabineros (Uniformed Police), General César Mendoza Duran. [3] Article 2 of that Decree designated General Pinochet Ugarte President of the Government Junta.

8. Decree Law No. 527 of June 26, 1974 approved the Statute of the Government Junta and established the order of precedence, the subrogation and the replacement of its members. Article 2 stipulated that the government Junta would adopt its decisions by unanimous vote.

9. With effect from December 17, 1974, the Government Junta granted General Augusto Pinochet the title of President of the Republic of Chile, and in that capacity he was the supreme authority of the nation and the administration of the State, with the powers, attributions, and prerogatives the Statute of the government Junta conferred on him. [4] In this first stage, General Pinochet Continued to be a member of the Government Junta, over which he presided. Under Decree No. 1426 of 1976, the government Junta regulated the system of subrogation of the President of the Republic and kept the order of precedence established in the Statute.

10. Pursuant to Decree Law No. 1.640 of 1976, the Government Junta stipulated that the grounds for temporary or definitive retirement, in force for the Armed Forces and Carabineros, did not apply to its members. In accordance with that stipulation, its four members would continue to serve unless on e of the grounds for termination of office embodied in the Statute occurred: death, resignation, or any other kind of permanent disability.

11. The Statute of the Government Junta did not set forth-governmental accountability, of the members of the Junta. Or of the President of the Republic and only the civil liability of the Ministers of State, which would be effective with the prior agreement of the President of the Republic and of the Government Junta.

c. The Powers of the Government Junta

12. Article 3 of the above-mentioned Decree Law No. 1 stated that:

In the discharge of its duties, the Junta shall guarantee the full effectiveness of the attributions of the Judiciary and shall respect the constitution and the Laws of the Republic insofar as the present state of the country so permits, for the better achievement of the purpose it proposes.

13. Decree Law No. 128 was published on November 16, 1973 to clarify the scope of the expression “Supreme Authority of the Nation” used in Decree Law No. 1. In that regard, Decree No. 128 stipulates that “with effect from September 11, 1973 the Government Junta has taken on the exercise of the constituent, legislative and executive powers”. With respect to the functions in the manner and with the independence and authority specified in the Constitution of 1925.

14. Decree Law No. 527 was published on June 26, 1974. It approved the “Statute of the Government Junta”. According to that Decree Law, the Government Board would exercise the constituent power and the legislative power through decree laws. The executive power would be exercised by the President of the Government Junta.

d. The Exercise of the Legislative Power

15. In the exercise of the broad authority it had assumed, the Government Junta adopted various important measures: It dissolved the National Congress with effect from September 21, 1973 and discharged the Deputies and Senators serving at that date; [5] dismissed the mayor and municipal councilors of the municipalities of the country with effect from September 11, 1973; [6] cancelled the legal status of the Central Unica de Trabajadores; [7] declared the political parties that made up the Popular Unity to be illegal and dissolved them; [8] declared all the other political parties to be in recess; [9] dissolved the Constitutional Court; [10] declared the electoral rolls invalid; [11] declared all employees of the State Administration except those of the Judiciary and of the Office of the General Comptroller of the Republic to be temporary employees; [12] stipulated that the public sector was in the process of reorganization; [13] appointed rectores delegados in all the universities of the country; [14] established transitory provisions governing trade union activity; [15] and dissolved the national Education Council. [16]

16. In addition, the Government Junta declared the country to be in a state of siege [17] and a state of emergency, [18] both with effect from September 11, 1973 and, pursuant to Decree Law No. 5 of September 12, 1973, decreed that the state of siege established was to be construed as “A state or time of war”.

17. The Government Junta of Chile also stipulated that the mayors of the municipalities would be appointed by it and that such appointments would go to persons that enjoyed its exclusive confidence; [19] issued the Statute of the Internal Government and Administration of the State; [20] established a new regional organization of the country; [21]established the National Committee on Administrative Reform; [22] set up the Advisory Committee of the Government Junta; [23] and instituted the National Intelligence Agency (DINA), [24].

18. Under Decree Law No. 1,697, published in the Official Gazette of March 12, 1977, the Government Junta declared all political parties, institutions, groups, factions, and political movements existing at the date to be dissolved. And prohibited the execution or promotion of any public or private activity, action or undertaking of a party political nature, either by natural or artificial persons, organizations, institutions or groups of persons. [25]

19. For its part, Decree Law No. 1,319 of 1976 established the Council of State as the supreme consultative body of the President of the Republic in matters of government and civil administration. The Council of State was composed of the former presidents of the Republic, as of right, and of prominent persons appointed by the President of the Republic.

e. The Exercise of Executive power

20. With respect to the Executive Power, its exercise was granted to General Pinochet, first as president of the Government Junta and then--with effect from December 17, 1974--as president of the Republic. Together with that office, he retained the Presidency of the Junta. This last-mentioned designation meant that he became the Supreme Chief of the nation which presupposed the discharge of the following functions, among others: To appoint the ministers of State, diplomatic agents, intendants and governors, with the agreement of the Junta; to appoint the magistrates of the higher courts of justice and the professionally qualified judges, with the agreement of the Junta; to exercise per se the regulator power; to dispose of the air, sea and land forces, to organize them and distribute them with the agreement of the Junta. To that was added the power of the President to appoint mayors as his confidential agents, in accordance with the Organic Law of Municipalities approved by Decree Law No. 1,289 published in the Official Gazette of January 14, 1976. [26]

f. The Exercise of the Constituent Power

21. The exercise of the legislative and executive powers, assumed by the Government Junta, also determined the exercise of the constituent power. Decree Law No. 128 of November 12, 1973 stipulated:

Article 2. The juridical system contained in the Constitution (of 1925) and in the laws of the Republic shall continue in effect until it is or has been amended as provided for in the following article.

Article 3. The Constituent Power and the Legislative Power, shall be exercised by the government junta through decree laws bearing the signatures of all its members…

The provisions of the decree laws that amend the Political Constitution of the State shall form part of its text and shall be considered embodied in it.

22. The foregoing decree law was subsequently complemented by Decree Law No. 788, published on December 4, 1974. It stipulated:

Article 1. It is hereby declared that the decree laws issued so far by the Government Junta, insofar as they are contrary to or conflict with or are different from any provision of the Constitution of the State. Have been and are rules that amend, expressly or tacitly, in part or in whole, the corresponding provision of this Constitution.

23. Decree Law No. 788 added that, in the future, only those decree laws that explicitly stated that the Government Junta was issuing them in the exercise of the constituent power would have the status of amendments to the Constitution.

24. On the occasion of the third anniversary of the military coup on September 11, 1976 the Government Junta approved three Constitutionals Acts in the exercise of the constituent power it had allegedly assumed. Constitutional Act. No. 2 (No. 1 is assigned to that which established the Council of State) established the “Essential Bases of the Chilean Institutional System” and repeals Chapter I of the Constitution of 1925. This Constitutional Act maintains the structure of the State resulting from the changes introduced since then. Sets forth the purpose pursued by the State and declares that sovereignty resides in the nation and is exercised in accordance with the Constitutional Act of the Government Junta and all the regulations that have been issued or will be issued in conformity with it. In accordance with that Constitutional Act, this sovereignty does not recognize any limitation other than respect for the rights emanating from human nature. In addition, it declares that Chile is a Republic that is structured as a new democracy in which the community participates and which is endowed with mechanisms for ensuring its protection, consolidation, and authority.

25. Constitutional Acts No. 3 and No. 4 establish, respectively, the rights and duties of the human person and the limitations to which they may be subject when states of emergency are in effect. These constitutional acts will be dealt with in detail in Chapter II of this report and are therefore only mentioned here.

26. The Judiciary and the way in which its functions were affected by the changes introduced into the structure of the state during this first stage will be specifically considered din Chapter VIII in this report.

27. As may be noted, the broad powers assumed by the authorities arising from the military coup of 1973, enabled them to carry out a through reorganization of the institutional structure of the State. In this task, those authorities were not subordinated to the Constitution and its laws, which enabled them to significantly limit the functions of the Judiciary and to remove from the political arena any groups that could represent divergent points of view. During this first stage, therefore, power was completely concentrated in the Government junta and, within it, in the person of President of the Republic. These features are embodied in and formalized by the Constitution of 1980, which will be examined in the following section.

C. THE CONSTITUTION OF 1980: BACKGROUND

28. Supreme Decree No. 1,064 of the Ministry of the Interior, published on November 12, 1973. Made explicit the early concern of the new authorities about the “need to reconstitute, renew, and perfect the fundamental institutional system of the Republic for the full attainment of the goals set forth in the Act of Constitution of the Government Junta.”

29. To that end, a Committee set up to study, prepare and propose a preliminary draft of a new constitution had been working since September 24, 1973. The initial efforts of that Committee appointed by the Government Junta were limited to collecting opinions and identifying the major subject-matter areas that required detailed consideration.

30. On July 9, 1977, the President of the Republic made a speech in which he defined the new democracy his government was bent on constructing. He stated that it was necessary to repeal the Constitution of 1925 as a corollary of the process that had led to the enactment of the Constitutional Acts. [27] Subsequently, General Pinochet announced his decision to hold a plebiscite to adopt a new Constitution as a first step in a transition stage that would culminate in the establishment of an “authoritarian and protected” democracy. [28]

31. On November 10, 1977 the President of the Republic sent a letter to the Committee for the Study of the Constitutional Reform in which he set forth the basic ideas it should take into account when preparing its preliminary draft. [29] This Committee invited a number of professors of constitutional law and representatives of trade associations and union organizations to express their opinions. The meetings of the Committee were private and its proceedings were confidential. The result of those efforts was the report of the above-mentioned Committee issued on August 16, 1978 and published on September 7 of that year in El Mercurio of Santiago.

32. On October 31, 1978, the President of the Republic requested the Council of state to give its opinion on the preliminary draft. To perform its consultative function, that Council requested the public to submit suggestions, comments or criticisms of the preliminary draft of the Study Committee. According to the Report of the Council of State, about 150 suggestions wee received; in addition, consultations were held with official circles and experts in various fields. It should be pointed out that there were no opinions from political parties since they had been dissolved. [30] In accordance with the rules of procedure of the Council of State the consultations the President of the Republic held with it were confidential and therefore no publicity was given to the pertinent discussions in the Council of State. On July 8, 1980, the Chairman of the Council of State submitted its report to the President of the Republic, in official letter C.P.R. No. 13 of July 1, 1980.

33. Because of the unanimity required by its Stature, the Government Junta approved the definitive text of the draft of the new constitution under Decree Law No. 3,464 published in the Official Gazette on August 11, 1980. Although that text was not identical with that of the Study Committee and that of the Council of State, many of its provisions were taken form those two texts. The transitory provisions of the final draft, dealing with the special period running up to 1989, were substantially different from those proposed by the Council of State.

34. Under Decree Law No. 3,465, published on August 12, 1980, the Government Junta, in the exercise of the Constituent Power, convoked a plebiscite to be held one month later. All Chileans over 18 years of age, including those who could not read or write or were blind, would be entitled to vote, as would be aliens over 18 years of age who were legally resident in Chile. For Chileans, participation was obligatory. Since there were no electoral rolls, an identity card was sufficient for voting. The above-mentioned decree law also provided that ballots in which two preferences were indicated would be null and void and blank votes would be counted as affirmative votes.

35. In view of the convocation of a plebiscite, various groups and prominent persons issued statements both on the act itself and on the conditions in which it tool place; in addition, there were demonstrations subsequent to the holding of the plebiscite. An exhaustive examination of these aspects will be made in the chapter dealing with political rights in this report.

36. After the plebiscite was held, the result announced by the national OF Tellers College (Colegio Escrutural Nacional) was the following: For, 4,204,879 (67.04%), against, 1,893,420 (30.19%); votes null and void, 173,569 (2.77%). Under Supreme Decree No. 1.150 of the Ministry of interior, published in the Official Gazette of October 24, 1980, the text of the Constitution of 1980 was promulgated; it entered into effect on March 11, 1981.

D. THE PRESENT POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF THE STATE

37. The 1980 Constitution establishes the present structure of the State in Chile. As already pointed out, the articles of the Constitution are divided into permanent and transitory provisions. The latter take precedence over the former and establish the system, which, as they envision, will be in effect in Chile during the period described in the following section. As regards the structure of the state, this hierarchy of rules follows from the stipulations of transitory provisions 13 which provides that, during that period “all the previsions of the Constitution, with the amendments and exceptions indicated in the (following) transitory provisions, shall be applicable”.

a. The Special Period: timetable and Procedures

38. The Constitution entered into force on March 11, 1981 and, in accordance with transitory provision 13, the presidential period it envisions will last for the eight years stipulated in Article 25 of the permanent provisions, that is, until March 11, 1989. This period may be extended for a further year if the situation envisaged in transitional provisions 29 occurs. That transitory provision will be examined later.

39. Transitory provision 14 prescribes that:

During the term referred to in the preceding provision, the present President, General of the Army, Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, shall continue as President of the Republic and shall remain in office through the end of said term.

40. At the end of the special presidential period, the appointment of the President of the Republic will be subject to the procedure described below, but the prohibition of reelection provided for in Article 25 of the permanent provisions of the Constitution will not apply to President Pinochet.

41. In accordance with transitory provision 27 it will be incumbent on the Commanders in Chief of the armed Forces and the Director General of the Carabineros unanimously to propose a person who will fill the office of President of the Republic. If there is no unanimity, the proposal will be made by the national Security Council, which will take that decision, by a simple majority of votes.

42. For that purpose, the national Security Council will be composed of its full members in the special presidential period: the President of the Republic, the members of the Government Junta, the President of the Supreme Court and the Chairman of the Council of State. In this particular instance, the Comptroller General of the Republic, an official appointed by the President, with the agreement of the Government Junta, will be a member of the Council.

43. Again in accordance with transitory provision 27, the proposal of the Government Junta or of the National Security Council, as the case may be, must be submitted to a plebiscite. In that connection, transitory provision 28 stipulates that if the body of citizens approves that proposal, the President of the Republic appointed will take office at the end of the presidential period, and will remain in office for a the eight years provided for, that is, up to March 11, 1997.

44. Transitory provision 28 also stipulates that the President appointed will, nine months after taking office, convoke general elections for deputies and senators. He national Congress will be installed three months after the convocation of elections. Meanwhile, the Government Junta will continue during that year and the transitory provisions in effect during the special presidential period will continue to be in effect.

45. If in the plebiscite the body of citizens were not to approve the person proposed for President of the Republic. Transitory provision 29 envisages that the special presidential period will be understood to be automatically extended and the serving President of the Republic and the government Junta will continue in office for one more year. Only when that period has expired will all the provisions of the Constitution, and, therefore, the election of the President by direct vote, be in full effect.

b. The Government Junta: Structure and Functions

46. In addition to what is envisaged in connection with the President of the Republic and already mentioned, transitory provision 14 stipulates that during the special period:

The Government Junta shall, likewise, remain integrated by the Commanders-in-Chief of the Army, Navy and Air Force and by the Director-General of the Armed Police. It will be governed by the norms, which regulate the internal functioning thereof, and shall have the powers set forth in the corresponding transitory provisions.

However, in view of the fact that the Commander-In-Chief of the Army is the President of the Republic, he shall not form part of the government Junta; the Officer General of Arms of the Army who follows him in seniority shall act as the titular member in his stead. Nevertheless, the President of the Republic may replace the latter at any time with another officer General of Arms of his Institutions in the order of seniority.

47. With respect to the attributions of the government Junta during the special period, according to transitory provision 18, by unanimous vote of its members, it exercises the constituent power and the legislative power, it interprets the Constitution and the laws, and it approves or rejects international treaties, among other functions; by and large, these are the functions the legislature would discharge in normal times. To these are added the factions derived from the peculiar characteristics of the special period, and those cases in which it must give its agreement to decisions adopted by the President of the Republic. They will be dealt with in the following section.

48. The above-mentioned transitory provision also stipulates that, in the discharge of the constituent power, the drafts approved by the Government Junta will require approval by plebiscite. In this regard it should be pointed out that, although the President of the Republic does not have the right to veto draft, constitutional reforms and laws. The decisions of the Government Junta must be unanimous and the titular member from the Army is a person who is a confidential agent of the President.

49. The Constitution does not establish the governmental accountability of the members of the government Junta. Who however are not explicitly exempt from the application of the measures. The President of the Republic may order in accordance with transitory provision 24, which will be studied in detail in Chapter II of this report and which grants him special powers during the states of emergency he may declare.

c. Powers of the President of the Republic

50. The President of the Republic is responsible for the governance and administration of the States; he also has the status of Head of state. The attributions conferred on hum by the “Constitution is established, with respect to what is valid during the special period, in Article 32 of the permanent provisions. They deal with the powers generically associated with the exercise of the executive power, that is, to appoint and remove ministers, diplomatic representatives, mayors, governors, deputy secretaries and intendants; to conduct foreign relations; to dispose of the Armed Forces; to supervise the conduct of the members of the Judiciary, etc.

51. He also has the powers granted him by Articles 41 and 52 of the Constitution, which deal with the declaration of states of emergency and the measures he may adopt in these circumstances-which will be examined in detail in Chapter II of this report. Those measures include: to arrest, transfer and expel from the country such persons, as he deems advisable; to suspend or restrict freedom of movement and entry into or departure from the country; to suspend or restrict the exercise of the right of assembly, of freedom of information and opinion and to restrict the right of association and trade union affiliation, as well as to impose censorship on correspondence and communications.

52. Without prejudice to the powers mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, during the special period the President of the Republic has the attributions conferred on him by transitory provision 15: to decree on his own authority states of emergency and of disaster and to appoint and remove mayors. In accordance with that transitory provision, the exercise of other attributions will require the agreement of the Government Junta. The appointment of the Commanders in Chief of the Armed Forces and of the Director General of the Carabineros, the Appointment of the Comptroller General of the Republic, the declaration of states of alert and of siege, the declaration of war and decisions on the admissibility of accusations by private individuals against ministers in respect of acts performed in the discharge of their duties.

53. In addition, transitory provision 24 confers on the President of the Republic the power to declare, on his own authority the existence of danger of disturbance of internal peace, which permits him, during a renewable period of six months. To arrest and order the enforced residence of persons, expel them from the country of prohibit them from entering the country and to restrict the right of assembly and information. A more detailed analysis of this transitory provision is presented in Chapter II of this report.

54. It must be pointed out that, during the special period, the President of the Republic is not subject to governmental accountability for his acts since there is no constitutional provision that embodies it. This interpretation was corroborated by the decision of a judge of the Santiago Appeal Court of May 25, 1984--subsequently confirmed by the Appeal Court and the Supreme Court--issued in a criminal case instituted by private individuals against the President of the Republic, General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte. [31]

d. Other State Organs

55. During the Special presidential period that runs until 1989 the Judiciary, the attributions of which are very restricted by the continued exercise of the legislative and constituent powers by the Government Junta, continues to function. The composition of the Constitutional Tribunal, for its part, has been profoundly modified. The Court is composed of three members of the Supreme Court elected by it, a lawyer appointed by the President of the Republic, two lawyers appointed by the National Security Council. Of which, the President of the Republic is the Chairman, and a lawyer appointed by the Government Junta, the principal attributions of this Court are very limited.

56. It should be pointed out that during this special period the National Congress, the Electoral Court, and political parties do not operate. To operate legally, political parties require the approval of a special law whose enactment is a prerogative of the government Junta and which has not yet been issued.

e. Possibility of Amending the 1980 Constitution

57. The 1980 Constitution has been designed to make its amendment possible only if the three Commanders in Chief of the Armed Forces and the Director General of Carabineros and, at a subsequent stage, the President of the Republic, so decide.

58. Apart from an amendment arising directly from the Government Junta, the only legal means available to amend the Constitution is the exercise of the right of petition, embodied in paragraph 14 of Article 19, through a petition to the Government Junta, the depository of the constituent power. Only a proposed constitutional amendment, approved by it, may be submitted to a plebiscite for definitive adoption. However, it should be recalled that the Government Junta must take its decisions unanimously and, therefore, all its members, one of whom, is a confidential agent of the President of the Republic, must agree. In addition, the plebiscite must be convoked by the President. [32] This extreme rigidity can be a serious obstacle in the search for formulas aimed at correcting some of the defects its provisions may suffer from.

59. To sum up, under the 1980 Constitution, power continues to be concentrated during the special presidential period in the government Junta and especially in the President of the Republic. They also control the power to approve any amendment they wish to be introduced. The lack of governmental accountability of both the members of the Junta and the President of the Republic also persists.

60. Individual rights are severally restricted under states of constitutional emergency and the attributions of the Judiciary are significantly reduced by the exercise of the legislative and constituent powers by the government Junta. As will be seen throughout this report, all this adversely affects the exercise and enjoyment of basic human rights.

61. Under this Constitution, party political activity continues to be prohibited, and the legalization of and conditions for such activity is left to the discretion of the Government Junta. The Constitution also grants a decisive role to the Commanders in Chief of the Armed Forces and to the Director General of Carabineros in appointing the President of the Republic in 1989.

62. The body of citizens will elect a National Congress in early 1990 and may elect a President of the Republic from among several candidates only 1997, that is, 27 years after the last presidential election held in Chile. This election could be advanced to 1990 if the nomination submitted to plebiscite in 1989 is rejected. As may be seen, these are extremely lengthy periods that are not consistent with the decision of the Government Junta to take office “solely for the period the circumstances require”.

Notes____________________

[1] Operative paragraph I of Decree Law No. 1.

[2] Preambular paragraph 13 of Proclamation No. 5.

[3] General Leigh resigned in July 1978 and was replaced by General of the Air Fernando Matthei Aubel, the Commander in Chief of the Air Force, who has served as a member of the Government Junta since then to date. In August 2, 1985, General Cesar Mendoza Duran, Director General of Carabineros, resigned and was replaced by General. Rodolfo Stange.

[4] Decree Law No. 806 of 1974.

[5] Decree Law No. 27 of 1973.

[6] Decree Law No. 25 of 1973.

[7] Decree Law No. 12 of 1973.

[8] Decree Law No. 77 of 1973.

[9] Decree Law No. 78 of 1973.

[10] Decree Law No. 119 of 1973.

[11] Decree Law No. 130 of 1973.

[12] Decree Law No. 6 of 1973.

[13] Decree Law No. 98 of 1973.

[14] Decree Law No. 50 of 1973.

[15] Decree Law No. 198 of 1973.

[16] Decree Law No. 403 of 1974.

[17] Decree Law No. 3 of 1973.

[18] Decree Law No. 4 of 1973.

[19] Decree Law No. 25 of 1973.

[20] Decree Law No. 573 of 1974.

[21] Decree Law No. 575 of 1974.

[22] Decree Law No. 212 of 1973.

[23] Decree Law No. 460 of 1974.

[24] Decree Law No. 521 of 1974.

[25] The status of political parties will be examined in greater detail in the chapter dealing with the exercise of political rights.

[26] To these must be added the many functions assigned to the President under the states of emergency, which, for methodological reasons, will be dealt with in Chapter II of this Report.

[27] El Mercurio of Santiago. July 10, 1977.

[28] El Mercurio of Santiago. April 6, 1978.

[29] El Mercurio of Santiago. November 12, 1977.

[30] The Report of the Council of State contains:

a. Comparative version of the texts of the Study Commission and of the Council of State. The provisions that were not unanimously approved by the Council of State are furnished with footnotes containing the reservations or dissenting opinions of the Councilors, who are indicated in each case.

b. Dissenting opinions of the Councilor Hernán Figueroa Anguita and

Minority report presented by Councilor Carlos Francisco Caceres and Pedro Ibañez Ojeda. See El Mercurio of Santiago. July 9, 1980.

[31] Las Ultimas Noticias of Santiago. May 26, 1984.

[32] Transitory Provisions 18 (a) and 21 (d).