Constantine et al. Case, Judgment of September 1, 2001, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 82 (2001).



 

 

In the Constantine et al. case,

 

the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (hereinafter “the Inter-American Court”, “the Court” or “the Tribunal”), composed of the following judges:

 

            Antônio A. Cançado Trindade, President;

            Máximo Pacheco-Gómez, Vice-President;

            Hernán Salgado-Pesantes, Judge;

            Oliver Jackman, Judge;

            Alirio Abreu-Burelli, Judge;

            Sergio García-Ramírez, Judge, and

            Carlos Vicente de Roux-Rengifo, Judge;

 

also present,

 

            Manuel E. Ventura-Robles, Secretary, and

            Pablo Saavedra-Alessandri, Deputy Secretary;

 

pursuant to Article 36 of its Rules of Procedure[1] (hereinafter “the Rules of Procedure”), delivers the following judgment on the preliminary objection filed by the State of Trinidad and Tobago (hereinafter “the State” or “Trinidad and Tobago”).

 

 

I

INTRODUCTION OF THE CASE

 

1)         The present case was submitted to the Court by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter “the Inter-American Commission” or “the Commission”) on February 22, 2000.  The Commission’s application originates from petitions number 11,787 (George Constantine), 11,814 (Wenceslaus James), 11,840 (Denny Baptiste), 11,851 (Clarence Charles), 11,853 (Keiron Thomas), 11,855 (Anthony Garcia), 12,005 (Wilson Prince), 12,021 (Darrin Roger Thomas), 12,042 (Mervyn Edmund), 12,043 (Samuel Winchester), 12,052 (Martin Reid), 12,072 (Rodney Davis), 12,073 (Gangadeen Tahaloo), 12,075 (Noel Seepersad), 12,076 (Wayne Matthews), 12,082 (Alfred Frederick), 12,093 (Natasha De Leon), 12,111 (Vijay Mungroo), 12,112 (Phillip Chotalal), 12,129 (Naresh Boodram and Joey Ramiah), 12,137 (Nigel Mark), 12,140 (Wilberforce Bernard) and 12,141 (Steve Mungroo), received by its Secretariat between July 1997 and February 1999.

 

 

II

FACTS SET FORTH IN THE APPLICATION

 

2)         The Inter-American Commission set forth in its application the facts on which it is based.  In the following paragraphs, the Court summarizes the facts and claims relevant to the consideration of the preliminary objection:

 

The State of Trinidad and Tobago is responsible for the violation of the following articles of the American Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter “the American Convention” or “the Convention”) (infra 18):

 

4(1), 5(1), 5(2), and 8(1), for sentencing George Constantine, Wenceslaus James, Denny Baptiste, Clarence Charles, Keiron Thomas, Anthony Garcia, Wilson Prince, Darrin Roger Thomas, Mervyn Edmund, Samuel Winchester, Martin Reid, Rodney Davis, Gangadeen Tahaloo, Noel Seepersad, Wayne Matthews, Alfred Frederick, Natasha De Leon, Vijay Mungroo, Phillip Chotalal, Joey Ramiah and Naresh Boodram, Nigel Mark, Wilberforce Bernard and Steve Mungroo (hereinafter “the alleged victims”) to a “mandatory death penalty”;

 

4(1), 5(1), and 5(2), for applying the death penalty to one of the alleged victims while his case was pending before the Inter-American System of Human Rights;

 

4(6), for failing to provide these twenty-four alleged victims with an effective right to apply for amnesty, pardon, or commutation of sentence;

 

7(5) and 8(1), for the delay in the criminal process of seventeen of the alleged victims;

 

25 and 2, for failing to adopt legislative or other measures necessary to give effect to the right to be tried before a competent tribunal within a reasonable time for the same seventeen alleged victims under Articles 7(5) and 8(1) of the Convention;

 

5(1) and 5(2), for reason of sixteen of the alleged victims’ conditions of detention;

8(2)(c), for failing to disclose a highly probative witness statement to one of the alleged victims prior to his trial, and consequently for denying the alleged victim adequate means by which to prepare his defence;

 

8(2)(d) and 8(2)(e), for denying one of the alleged victims the right to defend himself personally or to be properly assisted by legal counsel of his choice in the course of his appeal before the Trinidad and Tobago Court of Appeal;

 

8(1) and 25, for failing to make legal aid effectively available to nine of the alleged victims to pursue constitutional motions in the domestic courts in connection with their criminal proceedings;

 

all in relation to Article 1(1) of the Convention.

 

The Inter-American Commission supports its statements, inter alia, with the following facts:

 

a)                  On February 17, 1995, Mr. George Constantine (case 11,787) was convicted and sentenced to a “mandatory death penalty” by hanging for the murder of Elsa Constantine;

 

b)         On June 21, 1996, Mr. Wenceslaus James (case 11,814) was convicted and sentenced to a “mandatory death penalty” by hanging for the murder of Siewdath Ramkissoon;

 

c)                  On May 29, 1995, Mr. Denny Baptiste (case 11,840) was convicted and sentenced to a “mandatory death penalty” by hanging for the murder of Alexander Jordan;

 

d)         On March 16, 1989, Mr. Clarence Charles (case 11,851) was convicted and sentenced to a “mandatory death penalty” by hanging for the murder of Roger Charles;

 

e)         On July 27, 1994, Mr. Keiron Thomas (case 11,853) was convicted and sentenced to a “mandatory death penalty” by hanging for the murder of Wayne Gerry Williams;

 

f)          On October 30, 1996, Mr. Anthony Garcia (case 11,855) was convicted and sentenced to a “mandatory death penalty” by hanging for the murder of Cyril Roberts;

 

g)         On November 26, 1996, Mr. Wilson Prince (case 12,005) was convicted and sentenced to a “mandatory death penalty” by hanging for the murder of Ida Sebastien Richardson;

 

h)         On November 9, 1995, Mr. Darrin Roger Thomas (case 12,021) was convicted and sentenced to a “mandatory death penalty” by hanging for the murder of Chandranath Maharaj;

 

i)          On December 10, 1990, Mr. Mervyn Edmund (case 12,042) was convicted and sentenced to a “mandatory death penalty” by hanging for the murder of Minerva Sampson;

 

j)          On March 4, 1997, Mr. Samuel Winchester (case 12,043) was convicted and sentenced to a “mandatory death penalty” by hanging for the murder of Esma Darlington;

 

k)         On November 15, 1995, Mr. Martin Reid (case 12,052) was convicted and sentenced to a “mandatory death penalty” by hanging for the murder of Fabrina Alleyne;

 

l)          On January 31, 1997, Mr. Rodney Davis (case 12,072) was convicted and sentenced to a “mandatory death penalty” by hanging for the murder of Nicole Bristol;

 

m)        On May 26, 1995, Mr. Gangadeen Tahaloo (case 12,073) was convicted and sentenced to a “mandatory death penalty” by hanging for the murder of Janetta Peters;

 

n)         On February 7, 1997, Mr. Noel Seepersad (case 12,075) was convicted and sentenced to a “mandatory death penalty” by hanging for the murders of Candace Scott and Karen Sa Gomes;

 

o)         On November 16, 1988, Mr. Wayne Matthews (case 12,076) was convicted and sentenced to a “mandatory death penalty” by hanging for the murder of Norris Yorke;

 

p)         On September 29, 1997, Mr. Alfred Frederick (case 12,082) was convicted and sentenced to a “mandatory death penalty” by hanging for the murder of Rahiman Gopaul;

 

q)         On November 9, 1995, Mrs. Natasha De Leon (case 12,093) was convicted and sentenced to a “mandatory death penalty” by hanging for the murder of Chandranath Maharaj;

 

r)          On December 13, 1996, Mr. Vijay Mungroo (case 12,111) was convicted and sentenced to a “mandatory death penalty” by hanging for the murder of Edmund Mitchell;

 

s)         On December 13, 1996, Mr. Phillip Chotalal (case 12,112) was convicted and sentenced to a “mandatory death penalty” by hanging for the murder of Edmund Mitchell;

 

t)          On November 27, 1996, Messrs. Joey Ramiah and Naresh Boodram (case 12,129) were convicted and sentenced to a “mandatory death penalty” by hanging for the murders of Anthony Curtis Greenridge and Steven Sandy; in addition, Mr. Joey Ramiah was sentenced to death under the Offences Against the Person Act in relation to Dole Chaddee and on June 4, 1999, the State executed Mr. Ramiah pursuant to this second conviction;

 

u)         On November 11, 1997, Mr. Nigel Mark (case 12,137) was convicted and sentenced to a “mandatory death penalty” by hanging for the murder of Bhagirath Singh;

 

v)         On January 22, 1996, Mr. Wilberforce Bernard (case 12,140) was convicted and sentenced to a “mandatory death penalty” by hanging for the murder of Ramnarine Saroop;

 

w)        On December 13, 1996, Mr. Steve Mungroo (case 12,141) was convicted and sentenced to a “mandatory death penalty” by hanging for the murder of Edmund Mitchell;

 

x)         In all 23 cases, the alleged victims were tried by Trinidad and Tobago for the crime of murder, were convicted, and sentenced to death by hanging under the Offences Against the Person Act.  Once an offender is found guilty of murder, section 4 of the said Act “mandates the death penalty”, establishing that “all persons sentenced for murder will suffer death”;

 

y)         The Offences Against the Person Act provides a definition of “murder”, permits a jury to consider certain specific circumstances of a killing in determining whether the offender ought to be found guilty of murder or of a lesser offence, mandates the imposition of the death penalty on an offender found guilty of murder, but does not permit a judge or jury to consider the personal circumstances of an offender or his or her offence;

 

z)         Domestic judicial review proceedings for criminal convictions may take two forms: a criminal appeal against conviction or a constitutional motion under Section 14 of the Constitution. Article 6 of the Trinidad and Tobago Constitution shields from challenge, under sections 4 and 5 of the Constitution, any claim that a law or any action taken under the authority of any law existing in 1976, the date of commencement of the Constitution, violates the fundamental rights under sections 4 and 5 of the Constitution. This includes any argument that the executive act of carrying out a death sentence pronounced by a court under a law that was in force in 1976 abrogates, abridges or infringes in any way a condemned individual’s Constitutional rights or freedoms;

 

aa)       In addition, section 4 of the Trinidad and Tobago Constitution only guarantees the right to a fair trial, and not a speedy trial, within a reasonable time. Consequently, a lengthy pre-trial delay in a criminal case cannot, in and of itself, raise an issue under the Trinidad and Tobago Constitution, rather, it is simply a factor for the trial judge to take into account when assessing the overall question of fairness;

 

bb)       The Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago provides for an Advisory Committee on the Power of Pardon, which is charged with considering and making recommendations to the Minister of National Security as to whether an offender sentenced to death ought to benefit from the President’s discretionary power of pardon under the said Constitution.  No criteria are prescribed in law for the exercise of the Committee’s functions or the President’s discretion, and the offender has no legal right to make submissions to the Committee to present, receive or challenge evidence the Committee chooses to take into account. The exercise of the power of pardon is an act of clemency that is not a matter of legal right, and therefore not subject to judicial review.

 

 

III

PROCEEDING BEFORE THE COMMISSION

 

3)         Between July 1997 and April 1999, the Commission received 23 petitions from various British law firms (hereinafter “the petitioners”) on behalf of 24 alleged victims whose rights were alleged to have been violated by the State.  The Commission began the proceedings of the cases that are the subject of this application on various dates between August 1997 and April 1999, and subsequently opened cases 11,787; 11,814; 11,840; 11,851; 11,853; 11,855; 12,005; 12,021; 12,042; 12,043; 12,052; 12,072; 12,073; 12,075; 12,076; 12,082; 12,093; 12,111; 12,112; 12,129; 12,137; 12,140; and 12,141, and transmitted the pertinent parts of the petitions to the State, and requested a reply.

 

4)         The Commission received responses from the State in cases 11,787 (George Constantine), 11,814 (Wenceslaus James), 11,840 (Denny Baptiste), 11,851 (Clarence Charles), 11,853 (Keiron Thomas), 11,855 (Anthony Garcia), 12,005 (Wilson Prince), 12,042 (Mervyn Edmund), 12,052 (Martin Reid), 12,072 (Rodney Davis), 12,073 (Gangadeen Tahaloo), 12,075 (Noel Seepersad), 12,082 (Alfred Frederick), 12,093 (Natasha De Leon), 12,111 (Vijay Mungroo), 12,112 (Phillip Chotalal), 12,129 (Joey Ramiah and Naresh Boodram), 12,137 (Nigel Mark) and 12,140 (Wilberforce Bernard), on various dates between December 1997 and October 1999, and in the remaining four (12,021; 12,043; 12,076 and 12,141), the State did not provide the Commission with any observations respecting the petitions.  In the 19 cases in which the State delivered a response, the Commission decided to transmit the pertinent parts to the petitioners, in accordance with Article 34(7) of its Rules of Procedure, and requested their comments.

 

5)         In 18 cases, the petitioners delivered comments on the State’s response.  The Commission transmitted these communications to the State and requested a reply.  In two cases, 11,814 (Wenceslaus James) and 11,840 (Denny Baptiste), the State delivered replies to the petitioners’ observations. 

 

6)         In eight cases, 11,814 (Wenceslaus James), 11,840 (Denny Baptiste), 11,853 (Keiron Thomas), 11,855 (Anthony Garcia), 12,005 (Wilson Prince), 12,021 (Darrin Roger Thomas), 12,042 (Mervyn Edmund), and 12,129 (Naresh Boodram and Joey Ramiah), the Commission received supplementary materials from the petitioners and transmitted the pertinent parts to the State. In two cases, 11,840 (Denny Baptiste) and 11,853 (Keiron Thomas), the State delivered responses to the petitioners’ supplementary submissions.  In both cases, the Commission transmitted the pertinent parts of the State’s response to the petitioners, and the petitioners presented observations on the State’s response.

 

7)         During its 103rd Period of Sessions, the Commission scheduled oral hearings in several cases involving condemned prisoners, which the State did not attend. During the abovementioned period of sessions, the petitioners in cases 11,787 (George Constantine), 11,840 (Denny Baptiste), 12,005 (Wilson Prince), 12,021 (Darrin Roger Thomas), 12,042 (Mervyn Edmund), 12,043 (Samuel Winchester), 12,072 (Rodney Davis), and 12,075 (Noel Seepersad) presented the Commission with a joint submission, dated March 17, 1999.  By communication dated April 15, 1999, the Commission transmitted the petitioners’ additional submissions to the State and requested its observations.

 

8)         Between May 1998 and March 1999, the Commission adopted Reports Nos. 36/98, 62/98, 45/98, 35/99, 36/99, and 37/99, in the cases 11,814; 11,840; 11,855; 12,005; 12,042 and 12,052.  In these reports the Commission declared these petitions to be admissible. 

 

9)         On November 19, 1999, the Commission adopted Report No. 128/99, in accordance with Article 50 of the Convention, and transmitted it to the State on November 22, of the same year.  In this report, the Commission determined that the remaining seventeen cases were admissible[2] and, in the operative part of the report, recommended that the State, in relation to the 23 cases that are the subject of this application[3]:

 

1.                  Grant the victims in the cases that are subject of [this] Report an effective remedy which includes commutation of sentence and compensation;

 

2.                  Provide adequate compensation to the next of kin of Joey Ramiah (Case No. 12,129) for the violations referred to in [this Report] in relation to Mr. Ramiah;

 

3.                  Adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to ensure that the death penalty is imposed in compliance with the rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Convention, including and in particular, Articles 4, 5 and 8;

 

4.                  Adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to ensure that the right under Article 4(6) of the Convention to apply for amnesty, pardon or commutation of sentence is given effect in Trinidad and Tobago;

 

5.                  Adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to ensure that the right to trial within a reasonable time under Articles 7(5) and 8(1) of the Convention is given effect in Trinidad and Tobago, including effective recourse to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate those rights;

 

6.                  Adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to ensure that the right to a fair hearing under Article 8(1) of the Convention and the right to judicial protection under Article 25 of the Convention are given effect in Trinidad and Tobago, in relation to recourse to constitutional motions.

 

10)       By communication dated January 22, 2000, the State replied to the Commission’s request for information on the measures taken to comply with the recommendations.

 

11)       On February 22, 2000, the Inter-American Commission, pursuant to Article 51 of the American Convention, decided to submit the case to the Court.

 

IV

PROVISIONAL MEASURES

 

12)       On May 22, 1998, prior to the submission of the application, the Commission requested that the Court adopt provisional measures to preserve the lives and physical integrity of Wenceslaus James and Anthony Garcia, among others[4]. 

 

13)       By Order of May 27, 1998, the President of the Court (hereinafter “the President”) ordered the adoption of the requested measures in the matter of James et al., and, on June 14 of the same year, the Court ratified this Order.

 

14)       On August 29, 1999, the Court expanded the provisional measures in the matter of James et al. to include Darrin Roger Thomas, Haniff Hilaire and Denny Baptiste[5].

 

15)       On May 3, 1999, the Commission requested that the Court expand the provisional measures ordered in the matter of James et al. in order to include twenty additional persons, namely: Wilberforce Bernard, Naresh Boodram, Joey Ramiah, Clarence Charles, Phillip Chotalal, George Constantine, Rodney Davis, Natasha De Leon, Mervyn Edmund, Alfred Frederick, Nigel Mark, Wayne Mathews, Steve Mungroo, Vijay Mungroo, Wilson Prince, Martin Reid, Noel Seepersad, Gangadeen Tahaloo, Keiron Thomas and Samuel Winchester.

 

16)       On May 11, 1999, the President of the Court ordered the State, inter alia, to take all measures necessary to preserve the lives of the alleged victims (supra 15), so that the Court could examine the pertinence of the Commission’s request for amplification.  On May 25, 1999, the plenary of the Court ratified the President’s Order of May 11, 1999.

 

17)       As of this date, the State has been filing the relevant reports with respect to the situation of the persons protected, and the Commission has filed its observations on the State’s reports.

 

V

PROCEEDING BEFORE THE COURT

 

18)       On February 22, 2000, the Inter-American Commission presented its application in the following terms:

 

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights respectfully petitions the Honorable Inter-American Court of Human Rights to declare violations of the Convention by the State, establish reparations for those violations, and determine costs and expenses to be paid to the representatives of the victims.

 

A.              Declarations of Violations

 

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights respectfully petitions the Honorable Inter American Court of Human Rights to:

 

Find that the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago is responsible for:

 

1.               In Cases 11,787 (George Constantine), 11,814  (Wenceslaus James), 11,840 (Denny Baptiste), 11,851 (Clarence Charles), 11,853 (Keiron Thomas), 11,855 (Anthony Garcia), 12,005 (Wilson Prince), 12,021 (Darrin Roger Thomas), 12,042 (Mervyn Edmund), 12,043 (Samuel Winchester), 12,052 (Martin Reid), 12,072 (Rodney Davis), 12,073 (Gangadeen Tahaloo), 12,075 (Noel Seepersad), 12,076 (Wayne Matthews), 12,082 (Alfred Frederick), 12,093 (Natasha De Leon), 12,111 (Vijay Mungroo), 12,112 (Phillip Chotalal), 12,129 (Naresh Boodrarn and Joey Ramiah), 12,137 (Nigel Mark), 12,140 (Wilberforce Bernard), and 12,141 (Steve Mungroo) the State is responsible for the violation of the rights under Articles 4(1), 5(1), 5(2) and 8(l), in conjunction with Article 1(1) of the American Convention, for sentencing these victims to mandatory death penalties.

 

2.               In Case 12,129 (Naresh Boodram and Joey Ramiah), the State is responsible for violating the rights of the victim Joey Ramiah under Articles 4(l), 5(1) and 5(2) of the Convention, in conjunction with Article 1(1) of the Convention by executing Mr. Ramiah pursuant to a mandatory death penalty and while his case was pending before the Inter-American human rights system.

 

3.               In Cases 11,787 (George Constantine), 11,814 (Wenceslaus James), 11,840 (Denny Baptiste), 11,851 (Clarence Charles), 11,853 (Keiron Thomas), 11,855 (Anthony Garcia), 12,005 (Wilson Prince), 12,021 (Darrin Roger Thomas), 12,042 (Mervyn Edmund), 12,043 (Samuel Winchester), 12,052 (Martin Reid), 12,072 (Rodney Davis), 12,073 (Gangadeen Tahaloo), 12,075 (Noel Seepersad), 12,076 (Wayne Matthews), 12,082 (Alfred Frederick), 12,093 (Natasha De Leon), 12,111 (Vijay Mungroo), 12,112 (Phillip Chotalal), 12,129 (Naresh Boodram and Joey Ramiah), 12,137 (Nigel Mark), 12,140 (Wilberforce Bernard), and 12,141 (Steve Mungroo) the State is responsible for violation of the right under Article 4(6) of the Convention, in conjunction with Article 1(1) of the Convention, by failing to provide these victims with an effective right to apply for amnesty, pardon or commutation of sentence.

 

4.               In Cases 11,787 (George Constantine), 11,840 (Denny Baptiste), 11,851 (Clarence Charles), 12,005 (Wilson Prince), 12,021 (Darrin Roger Thomas), 12,042 (Mervyn Edmund), 12,072 (Rodney Davis), 12,073 (Gangadeen Tahaloo), 12,075 (Noel Seepersad), 12,076 (Wayne Matthews), 12,082 (Alfred Frederick), 12,093 (Natasha De Leon) 12,111 (Vijay Mungroo), 12,112 (Phillip Chotalal), 12,137 (Nigel Mark), 12,140 (Wilberforce Bernard) and 12,141 (Steve  Mungroo), the State is responsible for the violation of the rights of the victims to be tried within a reasonable time and to a fair  trial under Articles 7(5) and 8(1) of the Convention, in conjunction with violations of Article 1(1) of the Convention, by reason of the delays in the victims' criminal proceedings.

 

5.               In Cases 11,787 (George Constantine), 11,840 (Denny Baptiste), 11,851 (Clarence Charles), 12,005 (Wilson Prince), 12,021 (Darrin Roger Thomas), 12,042 (Mervyn Edmund), 12,072 (Rodney Davis), 12,073 (Gangadeen Tahaloo), 12,075 (Noel Seepersad), 12,076 (Wayne Matthews), 12,082  (Alfred Frederick), 12,093 (Natasha De Leon) 12,111 (Vijay Mungroo), 12,112  (Phillip Chotalal), 12,137 (Nigel Mark), 12,140 (Wilberforce Bernard), and 12,141 (Steve Mungroo), the State is responsible for the violation of Article 25 of the Convention, in conjunction with the violation of the State's obligations under Article 2 of the Convention, all in conjunction with violation of article 1(1) of the Convention, by failing to adopt legislative or other measures necessary to give effect to the right to be  tried within a reasonable time under Articles 7(5) and 8(1) of the Convention.

 

6.               In Cases 11,853 (Keiron Thomas), 11,855 (Anthony Garcia), 12,021 (Darrin Roger Thomas), 12,043 (Samuel Winchester), 12,072 (Rodney Davis), 12,073 (Gangadeen Tahaloo), 12,075 (Noel Seepersad), 12,076 (Wayne Matthews), 12,082 (Alfred Frederick), 12,111 (Vijay Mungroo), 12,112 (Phillip Chotalal), 12,129 (Naresh Boodram and Joey Ramiah), 12,137 (Nigel Mark), 12,140 (Wilberforce Bernard) and 12,141 (Steve Mungroo), the State is responsible for the violation of Articles 5(1) and 5(2) of the Convention, in conjunction with violations of Article 1(1) of the Convention, by reason of the victims' conditions of detention before and after their convictions.

 

7.               In Case 12,052 (Martin Reid), the State is responsible for the violation of Article 8(2)(c) of the Convention, in conjunction with Article 1(1) of the Convention, for failing to disclose a highly probative witness statement to the victim prior to his trial.

 

8.               In Case 11,853 (Keiron Thomas), the State is responsible for the violations of the rights of the victim under Articles 8(2)(d) and 8(2)(e) of the Convention, in conjunction with Article 1(1) of the Convention, by denying the victim the right to defend himself personally or to be properly assisted by legal counsel of his choice during his appeal before the Trinidad and Tobago Court of Appeal.

 

9.               In Cases 11,787 (George Constantine), 12,005 (Wilson Prince), 12,042 (Mervyn Edmund), 12,052 (Martin Reid), 12,073 (Gangadeen Tahaloo), 12,075 (Noel Seepersad), 12,093 (Natasha De Leon), 12,112 (Phillip Chotalal), and 12,140 (Wilberforce Bernard), the State is responsible for the violation of Articles 8 and 25 of the Convention, in conjunction with Article 1(1) of the Convention, for failing to make legal aid effectively available to these victims to pursue Constitutional Motions in the domestic courts in connection with their criminal proceedings.

 

B.              Reparations

 

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights respectfully petitions the Honorable Inter American Court of Human Rights to:

 

Direct that the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago grant the victims in 21 of the cases that are the subject of this application, Cases 11,787 (George Constantine), 11,814 (Wenceslaus James), 11,840 (Denny Baptiste, 11,851 (Clarence Charles), 11,853 (Keiron Thomas), 11,855 (Anthony Garcia) 12,005 (Wilson Prince), 12,021 (Darrin Roger Thomas), 12,042 (Mervyn Edrnund) 12,043 (Samuel Winchester), 12,072 (Rodney Davis), 12,073 (Gangadeen Tahaloo), 12,075 (Noel Seepersad), 12,082 (Alfred Frederick), 12,093 (Natasha De Leon), 12,111 (Vijay Mungroo), 12,112 (Phillip Chotalal), 12,129 (Naresh Boodram. and Joey Ramiah), 12,137 (Nigel Mark), 12,140 (Wilberforce Bernard), and 12,141 (Steve Mungroo) an effective remedy which includes commutation of sentence and compensation.

Direct that the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago grant the victim in Case 12,076 (Wayne Matthews), whose death sentence the State has agreed to commute, an effective remedy that includes compensation.

 

Direct that the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago grant the victim in Case 12,052 (Martin Reid) an effective remedy which includes a re-trial in accordance with the due process protections prescribed under Article 8 of the Convention or, if a re-trial in compliance with these protections is not possible, release.

 

Direct that the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago provide adequate compensation to the next of kin of Joey Ramiah (Case 12,129) for the violations referred to in Part VII.B above relating to Mr. Ramiah.

 

Direct that the Republic of Trinidad and, Tobago adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to ensure that the death penalty is imposed in compliance with the rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Convention, including and in particular Articles 4, 5 and 8.

 

Direct that the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to ensure that the right under Article 4(6) of the Convention to apply for amnesty, pardon or commutation of sentence is given effect in Trinidad and Tobago.

 

Direct that the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to ensure that the right to trial within a reasonable time under Articles 7(5) and 8(1) of the Convention is given effect in Trinidad and Tobago, including effective recourse to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate that right.

 

Direct that the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to ensure that the right to a fair hearing under Article 8(1) of the Convention and the right to judicial protection under Article 25 of the Convention are given effect in Trinidad and Tobago in relation to recourse to Constitutional Motions.

 

C.            Compensation

 

The Commission has requested that the Honorable Court require the State of Trinidad and Tobago to remedy the consequences of the violations that are the subject of this application.

 

Article 63(1) of the American Convention provides:

 

If the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or freedom protected by this Convention, the Court shall rule that the injured party be insured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated.  It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured party. 

 

This Honorable Court has stated that Article 63(1) of the Convention codifies a rule of customary law and constitutes one of the fundamental principles of customary law (Aloeboetoe Case, Judgment of September 10, 1993, para. 43).  The obligation to repair a breach may give rise to a number of measures to remedy the consequences.  The State must, to the extent possible, reestablish the status quo ante, which in the present case could be achieved by commuting the complainant’s death sentence and adjusting the domestic law of Trinidad and Tobago accordingly.  Where reestablishing the status quo ante is no longer possible, the consequences must be remedied through other means.  The Commission therefore seeks to obtain a decision of the Court as to the compensation owing to the victim as a result of the State’s violation of his rights under the Convention.

 

D.            Costs and expenses

 

The Commission seeks a determination from the Court respecting the costs and expenses incurred by the representatives during the processing of the case before the domestic courts and the organs of the Inter-American system.

 

19)       The Commission appointed Messrs. Robert K. Goldman and Nicholas Blake as delegates, and Messrs. David J. Padilla and Brian D. Tittemore as legal advisors.  The Commission also designated Julian Knowles, Keir Starmer, Saul Lehrfreund, Belinda Moffat, Yasmin Waljee, and James Oury as assistants.

 

20)       On April 14, 2000, the Secretariat of the Court (hereinafter “the Secretariat”), following the preliminary examination of the application by the President of the Court, notified the State of the application and its annexes. The same date, the Secretariat, following instructions of the President, informed the State of its right to designate an ad hoc judge pursuant to Articles 18 of the Rules of Procedure, and 10(3) of the Statute of the Court (hereinafter “the Statute”).

 

21)       On June 14, 2000, Trinidad and Tobago submitted a preliminary objection to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in this case. The following day, the Secretariat transmitted a copy of the preliminary objection to the Inter-American Commission.

 

22)       On July 15, 2000, the Commission responded to the communication with respect to the raising of the preliminary objection on the part of the State, which was transmitted to Trinidad and Tobago on July 17 of the same year.

 

23)       On September 1, 2000, the Inter-American Commission waived the convening of a hearing on the preliminary objection raised by the State. On September 5, 2000, the Secretariat transmitted this communication to the State, and on September 12, 2000, requested its observations, granting it until September 29 of the same year to provide them.

 

24)       The State did not present observations on the Commission’s petition despite the fact that the Secretariat requested the said observations again on October 2, 2000.

 

25)       On October 9, 2000, the President of the Court issued an Order in the following terms:

 

1.             To grant the request of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to waive the convening of a special hearing on the preliminary objection raised by the State of Trinidad and Tobago in the present Case.

 

2.             To continue with the consideration of the Constantine et al. Case at its present phase.

 

26)       On May 7, 2001, the Secretariat received from the Commission copies of two decisions pertinent to cases on the imposition of the “mandatory death penalty”, issued by the United Nations Human Rights Committee and the Court of Appeals for the Eastern Caribbean.  These decisions were transmitted to the State on May 15, 2001.

 

VI

JURISDICTION

 

27)       Trinidad and Tobago deposited its instrument of ratification to the American Convention on May 28, 1991.  On the same date, the State recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. 

 

28)       On May 26, 1998, Trinidad and Tobago denounced the Convention and pursuant to Article 78 of the same, this denunciation took effect one year later, on May 26, 1999.  The facts, to which the instant case refers, occurred prior to the effective date of the State’s denunciation.  Consequently, the Court has jurisdiction, under the terms of Articles 78(2) and 62(3) of the Convention, to entertain the present case and render a judgment on the State’s preliminary objection.

 

VII

PRELIMINARY OBJECTION:

FAILURE OF THE COURT TO “ACCEPT JURISDICTION” WITHIN THE STIPULATED PERIOD AND LACK OF JURISDICTION

 

29)       In its preliminary objection, Trinidad and Tobago sustained that the Inter-American Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the case in light of three main arguments:

 

I.             The Court did not accept jurisdiction of the case within the three-month period stipulated under Article 51 of the American Convention on Human Rights.

 

II.            The State’s second reservation precludes any jurisdiction of the Court in this case.

 

III.          Alternatively, the State has never recognized the jurisdiction of the Court.

 

30)       The Court will now consider the arguments presented by the State in the case sub judice.

 

A.        FAILURE OF THE COURT TO “ACCEPT JURISDICTION” WITHIN THE STIPULATED PERIOD

 

Arguments of the State

 

31)       The State alleged that Article 51(1) of the Convention requires that, for the Court to have jurisdiction, not only must the Commission’s Report have been submitted to the Court within three months of the date of transmittal of the said Report to the State concerned, but that the Court must also have accepted jurisdiction in respect of the matter within the three month period.

 

32)       In this regard, the State noted that Article 51(1) of the Convention provides that

 

[i]f, within a period of three months from the date of the transmittal of the report of the Commission to the states concerned, the matter has not either been settled or submitted by the Commission or by the state concerned to the Court and its jurisdiction accepted, the Commission may, by the vote of an absolute majority of its members, set forth its opinion and conclusions concerning the question submitted for its consideration. (emphasis added)

 

33)       Trinidad and Tobago maintained that the Confidential Report No. 128/99, issued pursuant to Article 50 of the Convention, was submitted to the State on November 22, 1999. Consequently, the three-month time period stipulated in Article 51(1) expired on February 22, 2000, and the Court should therefore have accepted jurisdiction on the matter before that date. However, the State received notification that the Court had “accepted jurisdiction” on April 14, 2000.

 

Arguments of the Commission

 

34)       The Commission stated that the phrase “its jurisdiction accepted” in Article 51(1) of the Convention cannot be interpreted so as to require the Court to make an express act of acceptance of jurisdiction in each application, much less to require it to do so within the three-month period prescribed in the article.

 

35)       The Commission also argued that the interpretation of Article 51(1) of the Convention advocated by the State would not accord with the ordinary meaning of the terms of the provision in their context, or with the object and purpose of the Convention. It would be inconsistent with other provisions of the Convention, the Court’s Statute, and the Court’s procedure and jurisprudence.

 

36)       It added that the State’s interpretation of Article 51(1) of the Convention would necessarily require the Court to make a determination as to whether it has jurisdiction to entertain a case within the same three-month period prescribed for the Commission or a State to submit a matter to the Court. Such an interpretation is plainly not viable, as it would inevitably provide parties with insufficient time to raise preliminary objections, for a hearing on preliminary issues, or for the Court to make a determination respecting its jurisdiction in a given case. As a consequence, the Court would lose jurisdiction in most, if not all, of the cases submitted to it. Such an interpretation of Article 51(1) would be irrational in the context of the Convention as a whole, and is plainly contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention.

 

37)       Interpreting Article 51(1) as speaking to the acceptance by the State of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction under Article 62 of the Convention, on the other hand, is consistent with the Convention’s object and purpose, and is reinforced by it, the Court’s Statute, and the procedure and jurisprudence of the Court. Article 61 of the Convention, for example, expressly contains instructions to comply with Articles 48 to 50, but not Article 51, as a precondition for the Court to hear a case.  Similarly, Article 2 of the Statute defines the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction in terms of Articles 61, 62, and 63, but not Article 51, of the Convention.

 

38)       Further, the Commission indicated that Article 36 of the Court’s Rules of Procedure provides a period of two months from the date of notification of an application for parties to raise preliminary objections, and a further thirty days for the submission of any additional written briefs on the preliminary objections. The timing of this process is clearly incompatible with an interpretation of Article 51(1) that would require preliminary objections to be filed within three months of the date of transmission of the Commission’s Article 50 Report. Moreover, the Court has determined in its jurisprudence that Article 51 of the Convention requires a matter to be filed before the Court within the three-month period under Article 51, but has never interpreted said article in a manner that requires the Court to determine its jurisdiction over the case within this same three-month period.

 

39)       Given the urgency of the issues raised in the present application before the Court, particularly the legitimacy of the pending executions, the Commission requested that the State should not be permitted to defeat the Court’s jurisdiction over the case based upon an erroneous interpretation of the procedural period under Article 51 of the Convention.


Considerations of the Court

 

40)       The Court finds it appropriate to clarify, in light of the State’s arguments, that what took place on April 14, 2000 was a notification of the application (supra 20).  Consequently, it should not be interpreted that the three-month time period stipulated in Article 51(1) of the Convention applies to the Court’s actions in the exercise of its own jurisdiction, as this emanates from the American Convention. Article 51(1) only refers to a time limit for the submission of the application to the Court, and does not directly relate to the Court’s actions relative to the determination of its jurisdiction.  When the text of Article 51(1) says “its jurisdiction accepted”, this refers to the acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction on the part of the State, and not the Court’s actions in the exercise of its own jurisdiction.

 

41)       For the foregoing considerations, the Court dismisses the first argument of the State’s preliminary objection, in which it refers to the timeliness of the application and the “acceptance of jurisdiction” on the part of the Court.

 

B.  LACK OF JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

 

Arguments of the State

 

42)       As previously stated by Trinidad and Tobago, the State deposited its instrument of adherence of the Convention on May 28, 1991, dated April 3, 1991, recognizing the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, but subjected this recognition to a “reservation”.  The State’s “reservation” reads that

 

[a]s regards Article 62 of the Convention, the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, recognizes the compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, as stated in the said article, only to such extent that recognition is consistent with the relevant sections of the Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago; and provided that Judgment of the Court does not infringe, create or abolish any existing rights or duties of any private citizen.

 

43)       The State indicated that Article 75 of the Convention declares that it can only be subject to reservations in conformity with the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties signed on May 23, 1969 (hereinafter “the Vienna Convention”). In this respect, Article 19 of the same provides

 

[a] State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, formulate a reservation unless:

 

a)             the reservation is prohibited by the treaty;

 

b)            the treaty provides, that only specified reservations, which do not include the reservation in question, may be made; or

 

c)              in cases not falling under subparagraphs (a) and (b), the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.

 

44)       The State also mentioned that in its Advisory Opinion on The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention on Human Rights (OC-2/82), the Court had stated that the reference in Article 75 to the Vienna Convention was intended to be a reference to paragraph (c) of Article 19 of the Vienna Convention and “makes sense only if it is understood as an express authorization designed to enable States to make whatever reservations they deem appropriate, provided the reservations are not incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.  As such they can be said to be governed by Article 20(1) of the Vienna Convention and, consequently, do not require acceptance by any other State party” [6].

 

45)       The State argued that its “reservation” was made relative to its acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction and is limited to Article 62 of the American Convention.  According to Trinidad and Tobago, Article 62 of the Convention is an optional clause that States can freely “accept or reject”.  Those States that accept and so declare are expressly authorized to do so subject to conditions.  The Convention permits restrictions at the moment of acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction under Article 62, which does not affect the enjoyment or exercise of the rights and liberties recognized in the Convention.  Consequently, given that the “reservation” does not deny the exercise of any of the rights provided for in the Convention, it can be considered compatible with the object and purpose of the same.

 

46)       Trinidad and Tobago contended that, in accordance with universally recognized principles of International Law, the exercise of the jurisdiction by an international court with respect to a State is not a right but a privilege only exercisable with the express consent of the State.  Article 62 of the Convention reflects this position.

 

47)       The State added that the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago is and was, at the moment of ratification of the Convention, compatible with the Convention.  It argued that its “reservation” cannot be interpreted as contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention because the “reservation” is only related to the optional procedure contained in Article 62 of the Convention, which in no way affects the substantive rights guaranteed in the Convention.  The “reservation,” as presented, it argued, does not restrict the obligations assumed by the State under the Convention in relation to individuals within its jurisdiction.

48)       Trinidad and Tobago also maintained that, if the Court declares the State’s Article 62 “reservation” incompatible with the object and purpose of the American Convention, the effect of such a determination would be to render the State’s declaration accepting the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction null and void ab initio.

 

49)       The State added that the International Court of Justice, in its Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1951), indicated that

 

[…] if a party to the Convention objects to a reservation which it considers to be incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention, it can in fact consider the reserving State is not a party to the Convention […]

 

50)       The State indicated out that, in its legal system, it is the Legislative Power that makes the laws.  The Executive cannot, at the moment of ratification of a treaty, alter the laws of the Republic or create a constitutional breach.  For this reason, the Executive, at the time of accession to the Convention and acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, formulated the “reservation” under Article 62.  In this same manner, the State denounced the Convention in May of 1998, in virtue of the need to observe the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago.

 

51)       If the “reservation” of the State were, for any reason, considered invalid, it would not mean that the State declared its unlimited acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.  On the contrary, it is clear that the State never intended to accept, in its totality, the jurisdiction of the Court.  If the “reservation” is invalid, then the declaration was invalid, and the State never made a declaration.

 

Arguments of the Commission

 

52)       The Commission sustained that the impugned term in the State’s declaration of acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction should be considered invalid because it is impossible to determine its exact nature or scope.  It is excessively vague and should not be interpreted in a manner that affects the Court’s jurisdiction to decide cases against the State. If a meaning is to be attributed, it should be interpreted in a manner that limits the legal effects of the Court’s judgments, and not the Court’s jurisdiction to decide cases against the State.

 

53)       The Commission indicated that the United Nations Human Rights Committee has stated that reservations to human rights treaties must be specific and transparent so that courts, individuals under the jurisdiction of a reserving State, and other States parties can know which human rights obligations have or have not been undertaken.  The term contained in the State’s “reservation” appears to modify the degree of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.  However, a simple reading of the term makes it difficult to determine the restrictions that the State has purported to establish under Article 62 to its obligations assumed under the Convention.

 

54)       The term can also be interpreted in various ways.  For example, it could be interpreted to mean that the Court is precluded from hearing and deciding a case related to allegations of violations of a Convention right if the same right is not protected under the State’s Constitution.  Alternatively, it could be interpreted to mean that while the Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine a matter, the Court’s judgment must be consistent with certain unstipulated sections of Trinidad and Tobago’s Constitution.

 

55)       The Commission noted that the State only relies upon the first part of the declaration in concluding that the Court has no jurisdiction.  It pointed out that the State makes no reference to the portion of the declaration, which reads “and provided that any judgment of the Court does not infringe, create, or abolish any existing rights or duties of any private citizen”, and considered that it is apparent that the State specifically acknowledges in this second part of the declaration that the Court has competence to give judgments in cases against Trinidad and Tobago.  It may therefore be that, taking the first and second parts of the declaration together, the State was concerned that the giving effect in Trinidad and Tobago to the judgments of the Court should not have an adverse effect on the existing private rights of the citizens, and deprive them of rights they already enjoyed or impose on them duties to which they were not already subject.

 

56)       The term could be interpreted to mean that, provided that there is no provision in the Constitution expressly prohibiting the State from accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, the recognition of this jurisdiction is complete and effective.  In this sense, the State does not suggest that there are provisions of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago that prohibit the State from accepting the jurisdiction of the Court.

 

57)       In light of the various possible interpretations of the term, it appears so ambiguous that its meaning and scope will depend upon a subjective judgment by the State as to what provisions of the Constitution are “relevant” and in what respect the State’s acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction must be “consistent” with those provisions, the term, would undermine the Court’s exclusive authority to determine its own jurisdiction, and thereby also render the term invalid.

 

58)       The Commission also indicated that the term in the State’s declaration of acceptance is not authorized by Articles 62 or 75 of the Convention and is incompatible with the Convention’s object and purpose.

 

59)       In conformity with Article 62(2) of the Convention, the “declaration may be made unconditionally, on the condition of reciprocity, for a specific period or for specific cases”.  The State’s “reservation” does not invoke the requirement of reciprocity, or temporal limitations, nor does it define specific cases in which the Court will apply its jurisdiction.

 

60)       Secondly, and in conformity with Article 75 of the Convention and, specifically Article 19 of the Vienna Convention, the State’s “reservation” is not permitted, as it is contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention.  The “reservation” is also contrary to general principles of International Law.

 

61)       Finally, the term, as interpreted by the State, would limit the ability of the Court to interpret and apply certain provisions of the Convention in all cases against Trinidad and Tobago before the Court, as it would permit the Tribunal to interpret and apply Convention rights only to the extent that such rights are protected in the State’s Constitution.

 

62)       The Commission considered that the State’s position ignores the fact that it is the responsibility of the Court, not the State, to determine whether the domestic laws of the State, including its Constitution, are consistent with the rights protected by the Convention.  It noted that the Inter-American Court has emphasized that the issue of jurisdiction in a particular case is one that only the Court, not States parties, can decide. This clearly extends to the interpretation of the terms included in declarations of acceptance made by various States parties under Article 62 of the Convention.

 

63)       In the abovementioned circumstances, interpreting Article 62 of the American Convention as authorizing the terms of the State’s acceptance would contravene Article 29(a) of the Convention because it would effectively permit the State to violate the Convention with respect to the alleged victims in this case.  The State has interpreted its declaration in a manner that prohibits the Court from considering the specific aspects of the “mandatory death penalty”.

 

64)       The Commission also contended that the impugned term could be severed from the State’s acceptance of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction, preserving the validity and effectiveness of the said instrument.

 

65)       The Convention protects the human rights of individuals subject to the jurisdiction of the States parties, so the State’s “reservation” should be interpreted in a manner that strengthens rather than weakens this regime, and, as such, increases, not diminishes, the protection of human rights in the entire hemisphere.

 

66)       Severing the impugned term from the State’s declaration of acceptance, instead of annulling the declaration in toto, serves to guarantee the fundamental human rights of the alleged victims and those of individuals in similar situations who would not otherwise have effective domestic remedies of protection.

 

67)       Trinidad and Tobago noted that it is a principle of international law and a “fundamental precept of the American Convention”, that States cannot invoke their Internal Law as a justification for not complying with a treaty.  Nonetheless, this is what the State purports to do with its interpretation of the impugned term.

 

68)       The Inter-American Commission argued that the Court could follow the reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter “the European Court”) in the case of Loizidou v. Turkey, which declared that ratione loci restrictions could be severed from the declaration of acceptance, leaving intact the acceptance of the optional clauses.

 

Considerations of the Court

 

69)       The Court must settle the matter of the purported “reservation” with which the State of Trinidad and Tobago accompanied its acceptance of the contentious jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court. The Court, as with any court or tribunal, has the inherent authority to determine the scope of its own competence.  (compétence de la competence/Kompetenz-Kompetez).

 

70)       The Court must give an interpretation to the declaration of the State, as a whole, that is in accordance with the canons and practice of International Law in general, and with International Human Rights Law specifically, and which awards the greatest degree of protection to the human beings under its guardianship.

 

71)       The Court cannot abdicate this prerogative, as it is a duty that the American Convention imposes upon it, requiring it to exercise its functions in accordance with Article 62(3) thereof.  That provision reads that “[t]he jurisdiction of the Court shall comprise all cases concerning the interpretation and application of the provisions of this Convention that are submitted to it, provided that the States Parties to the case recognize or have recognized such jurisdiction, whether by special declaration pursuant to the preceding paragraphs, or by a special agreement”.

 

72)       As this Tribunal has indicated in its judgments on jurisdiction in the Cases of Constitutional Court and Ivcher Bronstein:

 

The jurisdiction of the Court cannot be contingent upon events extraneous to its own actions.  The instruments consenting to the optional clause concerning recognition of the Court’s binding jurisdiction (Article 62(1) of the Convention) presuppose that the States submitting them accept the Court’s right to settle any controversy relative to its jurisdiction.  An objection or any other action taken by the State for the purpose of somehow affecting the Court’s jurisdiction has no consequence whatever, as the Court retains the compétence de la compétence, as it is master of its own jurisdiction[7].

 

73)       Interpreting the Convention in accordance with its object and purpose, the Court must act in a manner that preserves the integrity of the mechanism provided for in Article 62(1) of the Convention.  It would be unacceptable to subordinate the said mechanism to restrictions that would render the system for the protection of human rights established in the Convention and, as a result, the Court’s jurisdictional role, inoperative.

 

74)       As this Court has indicated in the Cases of Constitutional Court and Ivcher Bronstein

 

[t]he States Parties to the Convention must guarantee compliance with its provisions and its effects (effet utile) within their own domestic laws.  This principle applies not only to the substantive provisions of human right treaties (in other words, the clauses on the protected rights), but also to the procedural provisions, such as the one concerning recognition of the Tribunal’s contentious jurisdiction. That clause, essential to the efficacy of the mechanism of international protection, must be interpreted and applied in such a way that the guarantee that it establishes is truly practical and effective, given the special nature of human rights treaties [...] and their collective enforcement[8].

 

75)       Article 31(1) of the 1969 Vienna Convention provides that

 

[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.

 

76)       The Court’s duty, at this stage, is to decide, as the present case requires, whether Trinidad and Tobago’s “reservation” has the effect of excluding the Court’s jurisdiction in the manner alleged by the State.

 

77)        As previously noted, the purported “reservation” contains two parts.  The first intends to limit the recognition of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction in the sense that said recognition is only valid to the extent that it is “consistent with the relevant sections” of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago.  These expressions can lead to numerous interpretations.  Nonetheless, it is clear to the Court that they cannot be given a scope that would impede this Tribunal’s ability to judge whether the State had or had not violated a provision of the Convention.  The second part of the purported restriction relates to the State’s “recognition” of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction so that its judgments do not “infringe, create or abolish any existing rights or duties of any private citizen” (sic).  Again, though the precise meaning of this condition is unclear, without a doubt it cannot be utilized with the purpose of suppressing the jurisdiction of the Court to hear and decide an application related to an alleged violation of the State’s conventional obligations.

 

78)       In this respect, paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 62 of the American Convention establish:

 

1.                    A State Party may, upon depositing its instrument of ratification or adherence to this Convention, or at any subsequent time, declare that it recognizes as binding, ipso facto, and not requiring special agreement, the jurisdiction of the Court on all matters relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention.

 

2.             Such declaration may be made unconditionally, on the condition of reciprocity, for a specified period, or for specific cases.  It shall be presented to the Secretary General of the Organization, who shall transmit copies there to the other states of the Organization and to the Secretary of the Court.

 

79)       The Court observes that the instrument of acceptance of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction on the part of Trinidad and Tobago is not consistent with the hypothesis stipulated in Article 62(2) of the American Convention.  It is general in scope, which completely subordinates the application of the American Convention to the internal legislation of Trinidad and Tobago as decided by its courts.  This implies that the instrument of acceptance is manifestly incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention.  As a result, the said article does not contain a provision that allows Trinidad and Tobago to formulate the restriction it made.

 

80)       An interpretation of the American Convention done “in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose” leads this Court to the view that a State party to the Convention can only release itself of its obligations under the Convention by following the provisions that the treaty itself stipulates[9].

 

81)       Article 29(a) of the American Convention stipulates that no provision of the Convention shall be interpreted as “permitting any State Party, group, or person to suppress the enjoyment or exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized in this Convention or to restrict them to a greater extent than is provided for herein”.  Consequently, it would be meaningless to suppose that a State which had freely decided to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court had decided at the same time to restrict the exercise of its functions as foreseen in the Convention.  On the contrary, the mere acceptance by the State leads to the overwhelming presumption that the State will subject itself to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.

 

82)       The effect of the State’s third allegation would be to limit its recognition of the Court’s completely mandatory jurisdiction, with negative consequences for the exercise of the rights protected by the Convention.

 

83)       The declaration formulated by the State of Trinidad and Tobago would allow it to decide in each specific case the extent of its own acceptance of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction to the detriment of this Tribunal’s compulsory functions.  In addition, it would give the State the discretional power to decide which matters the Court could hear, thus depriving the exercise of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction of all efficacy.

 

84)       Moreover, accepting the said declaration in the manner proposed by the State would lead to a situation in which the Court would have the State’s Constitution as its first point of reference, and the American Convention only as a subsidiary parameter, a situation which would cause a fragmentation of the international legal order for the protection of human rights, and which would render illusory the object and purpose of the Convention.

 

85)       The American Convention and the other human rights treaties are inspired by a set of higher common values (centered around the protection of the human being), are endowed with specific supervisory mechanisms, are applied as a collective guarantee, embody essentially objective obligations, and have a special character that sets them apart from other treaties.  The latter govern mutual interests between and among the States parties and are applied by them, with all the juridical consequences that follow there from for the international and domestic systems[10].

 

86)       In this respect, in its Advisory Opinion on The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention on Human Rights (OC-2/82), the Court found that

 

[m]odern human rights treaties in general, and the American Convention in particular, are not multilateral treaties of the traditional type concluded to accomplish the reciprocal exchange of rights for the mutual benefit of the contracting States. Their object and purpose is the protection of the basic rights of individual human beings irrespective of their nationality, both against the State of their nationality and all other contracting States. In concluding these human rights treaties, the States can be deemed to submit themselves to a legal order within which they, for the common good, assume various obligations, not in relation to other States, but towards all individuals within their jurisdiction[11].

 

87)       That finding is consistent with the case law of other international jurisdictional bodies[12].

 

88)       As this Court has stated in the cases of Constitutional Court and Ivcher Bronstein

 

[n]o analogy can be drawn between the State practice detailed under Article 36(2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice and acceptance of the optional clause concerning recognition of the binding jurisdiction of this Court, given the particular nature and the object and purpose of the American Convention. The European Court of Human Rights ruled similarly in its judgment on preliminary objections in the Loizidou v. Turkey case (1995), in connection with optional recognition of the European Court’s binding jurisdiction (Article 46 of the European Convention, before Protocol XI to the European Convention entered into force on 01.11.1998).  The European Court held that the European Convention was a law-making treaty[13].

 

89)       For the foregoing reasons, the Court considers that Trinidad and Tobago cannot prevail in the limitations included in its instrument of acceptance of the optional clause of the mandatory jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in virtue of what has been established in Article 62 of the American Convention.  Consequently, the Court considers that it must dismiss the second and third arguments in the preliminary objection presented by Trinidad and Tobago insofar as they refer to the Court’s jurisdiction.

 

 

VIII

OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS

 

90)       Now therefore,

 

THE COURT

 

DECIDES

 

Unanimously,

 

1.         To dismiss the preliminary objection presented by the State in its totality.

 

2.         To continue to examine and process the instant case.

 

3.         To commission its President, at the appropriate time, to convene the State and the Inter-American Commission to a public hearing on the merits of the case, to be held at the seat of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.

 

4.         To notify the State and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of this judgment.

 

Judges Cançado Trindade, Salgado-Pesantes, and García-Ramírez informed the Court of their Individual Opinions, which are attached to this Judgment.

 

Done in Spanish and English, the Spanish version being the authentic, in San José, Costa Rica, on September 1, 2001.

 

 

 

 

Antônio A. Cançado Trindade

President

 

 

                                                                                                                                              

Máximo Pacheco-Gómez                                                           Hernán Salgado-Pesantes

 

     Oliver Jackman                                                                         Alirio Abreu-Burelli

                                                                                           

Sergio García-Ramírez                                                        Carlos Vicente de Roux-Rengifo

 

 

Manuel E. Ventura-Robles

Secretary

 

 

 

 

 

 

So ordered,

 

Antônio A. Cançado Trindade

President

 

Manuel E. Ventura-Robles

Secretary



[1]               In accordance with the Court’s Order of March 13, 2001 regarding Transitory Provisions of the Court’s Rules of Procedure, the instant Judgment on the preliminary objection is delivered according to the norms of the Rules of Procedure adopted in the Court’s Order of September 16, 1996.

[2]               The remaining 17 cases correspond to the numbers:  11,787 (George Constantine), 11,851 (Clarence Charles), 11,853 (Keiron Thomas), 12,021 (Darrin Roger Thomas), 12,043 (Samuel Winchester), 12,072 (Rodney Davis), 12,073 (Gangadeen Tahaloo), 12,075 (Noel Seepersad), 12,076 (Wayne Matthews), 12,082 (Alfred Frederick), 12,093 (Natasha De Leon), 12,111 (Vijay Mungroo), 12,112 (Phillip Chotalal), 12,129 (Joey Ramiah y Naresh Boodram), 12,137 (Nigel Mark), 12,140 (Wilberforce Bernard) and 12,141 (Steve Mungroo).

 

[3]               In the four cases in which the State did not deliver any observations (12,021; 12,043; 12,076 and 12.141), the Commission applied Article 42 of its Rules of Procedure in determining the admissibility and merits of the cases, presuming the facts reported in the petitions to be true, provided the evidence in each case did not lead to a different conclusion.

[4]               The other persons mentioned by the Commission in its request are not included in the application of the present case.

 

[5]               Mr. Haniff Hilaire was not included in the application of the present case.

[6]               The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention on Human Rights (Arts. 74 and 75), Advisory Opinion OC-2/82 of September 24, 1982.  Series A No. 2, para. 35.  To this respect, Article 20 of the Vienna Convention “Acceptance of and objection to reservations” establishes the following in paragraph 1:

 

1.             A reservation expressly authorized by a treaty does not require any subsequent acceptance by the other contracting States unless the treaty so provides.

[7]               Constitutional Court Case.  Competence.  Judgment of September 24, 1999.  Series C No. 55, para. 33 and  Ivcher Bronstein Case.  Competence. Judgment of September 24, 1999. Series C No. 54, para. 34.

 

[8]               Cf. Constitutional Court Case.  Competence.  Supra note 7, para. 36 and Ivcher Bronstein Case.  Competence. Supra note 7, para. 37.

[9]               Cf. Constitutional Court Case.  Competence. Supra note 7, para. 39 and Ivcher Bronstein Case.  Competence. Supra note 7, para. 40.

[10]             Cf. Constitutional Court Case.  Competence. Supra note 7, para. 41 and Ivcher Bronstein Case.  Competence. Supra note 7, para. 42.

[11]             The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-2/82. Supra note 6, para. 29.

 

[12]             Cf. See International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion, Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment for the Crime of Genocide (1951); European Commission of Human Rights, Decision as to the Admissibility of Application No. 788/60, Austria vs. Italy case, Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights, The Hague, M. Nijhoff, 1961; Eur. Court HR, Ireland vs. United Kingdom case, Judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A No. 25; Eur. Court H.R., Soering Case, decision of 26 January 1989, Series A No. 161; Eur. Court of H.R., Case of Loizidou vs. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), judgment of 23 March 1995, Series A No. 310.

 

[13]             Cf. Constitutional Court Case.  Competence. Supra note 7, para. 46 and Ivcher Bronstein Case.  Competence. Supra note 7, para. 47.


Home / Treaties / Search / Links