Hilaire Case, Judgment of September 1, 2001, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 80 (2001).



 

 

In the Hilaire case,

 

the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (hereinafter “the Inter-American Court”, “the Court” or “the Tribunal”), composed of the following judges:*

 

            Antônio A. Cançado Trindade, President;

            Máximo Pacheco-Gómez, Vice-President;

            Hernán Salgado-Pesantes, Judge;

            Alirio Abreu-Burelli, Judge;

            Sergio García-Ramírez, Judge, and

            Carlos Vicente de Roux-Rengifo, Judge;

 

also present,

 

            Manuel E. Ventura-Robles, Secretary, and

            Pablo Saavedra-Alessandri, Deputy Secretary;

 

pursuant to Article 36(6) of its Rules of Procedure[1] (hereinafter “the Rules of Procedure”), delivers the following judgment on the preliminary objection filed by the State of Trinidad and Tobago (hereinafter “the State” or “Trinidad and Tobago”).

 

 

 

 

 

I

INTRODUCTION OF THE CASE

 

1)         The present case was submitted to the Court by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter “the Inter-American Commission” or “the Commission”) on May 25, 1999.  The Commission’s application originates from petition number 11,816 (Haniff Hilaire), received by its Secretariat on October 9, 1997.

 

 

II

FACTS SET FORTH IN THE APPLICATION

 

2)         The Inter-American Commission set forth in its application the facts on which it is based.  In the following paragraphs, the Court summarizes the facts and claims relevant to the consideration of the preliminary objection:

 

The State of Trinidad and Tobago has violated the American Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter “the American Convention” or “the Convention”) by sentencing Mr. Haniff Hilaire (hereinafter “Mr. Hilaire”) to a “mandatory death penalty”, thereby violating his rights under Articles: 4(1), 5(1), 5(2), 5(6), 7(5) and 25; all in relation to Article 1(1) of the Convention.  The State is also in breach of Article 2, which requires the State to adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Convention, in relation to Article 25 of the same (infra 16).

 

The Inter-American Commission supports its statements, inter alia, with the following facts:

 

a)         On May 29, 1995, Mr. Hilaire was convicted, together with his two co-defendants, Mrs. Indravani Ramjattan and Mr. Denny Baptiste, of the murder of Mr. Alexander Jordan on February 13, 1991. This conviction was delivered by the First Criminal Court of Port of Spain (Assizes), Trinidad and Tobago;

 

b)         Mr. Alexander Jordan was the common-law husband of Mrs. Indravani Ramjattan, who “according to the record”, was the victim of spousal abuse at the hands of Mr. Jordan;

 

c)         “Owing in part to the abusive nature of the marriage”, a relationship developed between Mrs. Ramjattan and Mr. Baptiste, and she became pregnant with his child.  When her husband discovered this, he further abused her and, as a result, she fled her house with their two children and moved to Mr. Baptiste’s home.  Mr. Hilaire was also living with Mr. Baptiste and, during her time with the two, Mrs. Ramjattan confided in them about the abusive relationship to which she was subjected;

 

d)         Mr. Jordan subsequently discovered where his wife was, broke into Mr. Baptiste’s home and took her back to his house, where he held her as a virtual hostage.  Mrs. Ramjattan was able to send a message to Mr. Hilaire, imploring him to rescue her.  Consequently, Messrs. Hilaire and Baptiste went to Mr. Jordan’s house “with the intent to beat him”.  The beating had consequences much more severe than anticipated, and Mr. Jordan died as a result thereof;

 

e)         The record discloses no evidence that Mr. Hilaire had a prior criminal record or a tendency to re-offend;

 

f)          Mr. Hilaire and his co-defendants were found guilty of murder under the Trinidad and Tobago Offences Against the Person Act and, on May 29, 1995, the trial judge “was required to impose upon the defendants the sentence of death” pursuant to section 4 of the said Act, and stated:  “The jury has found each of you guilty of murder.  The sentence of this Court upon each of you is that you be taken from this place to a lawful prison and there to a place of execution and that you will there suffer death by hanging, and may the Lord have mercy upon your souls”;

 

g)         On May 29, 1995, Mr. Hilaire applied for leave to appeal his conviction to the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago.  This application was dismissed on November 7, 1996.  On October 30, 1997, Mr. Hilaire filed a petition for special leave to appeal his conviction to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London, which dismissed it on November 6, 1997. Mr. Hilaire filed a second petition for special leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London on or about January 25, 1999.  This second petition was also dismissed on February 3, 1999;

 

h)         The Offences Against the Person Act provides a definition of “murder”, permits a jury to consider certain circumstances of a killing in determining whether the offender ought to be found guilty of murder or of a lesser offence, mandates the imposition of the death penalty on an offender found guilty of murder, but does not permit a judge or jury to consider the personal circumstances of an offender or his or her offence;

 

i)          The Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago provides for an Advisory Committee on the Power of Pardon, which is charged with considering and making recommendations to the Minister of National Security as to whether an offender sentenced to death ought to benefit from the President’s discretionary power of pardon under the said Constitution.  No criteria are prescribed in law for the exercise of the Committee’s functions or the President’s discretion, and the offender has no legal right to make submissions to the Committee to present, receive or challenge evidence the Committee chooses to take into account. The exercise of the power of pardon is an act of clemency not a matter of legal right, and therefore not subject to judicial review.

 

 

III

PROCEEDING BEFORE THE COMMISSION

 

3)         On October 9, 1997, the British firm of Solicitors, Simmons & Simmons (hereinafter “the petitioners”), presented to the Commission a petition against Trinidad and Tobago on behalf of Mr. Haniff Hilaire.  On October 16, 1997, the Commission opened case No. 11,816, sent the State the pertinent parts of the petition and requested a reply.  The Commission also requested the State, pursuant to Article 29(2) of its Rules of Procedure, to stay the execution of Mr. Hilaire, until such time as the Commission had an opportunity to examine the case and issue a decision.

 

4)         On October 30, 1997, the petitioners informed the Commission that they were awaiting a decision by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on Mr. Hilaire’s application for special leave to appeal.  On November 6 of the same year, the petitioners informed the Commission that leave to appeal to the Privy Council had been refused.

 

5)         On December 19, 1997, the State submitted its observations on the petition, making reference to the merits. On January 12, 1998, these observations were transmitted to the petitioners, who filed their own observations on February 25 of the same year.  On March 16, 1998, the Commission forwarded the petitioners’ observations to the State and requested a reply.

 

6)         Also on December 19, 1997, the petitioners supplied the Commission with a supplementary written submission providing further evidence, case law and other information in support of the admissibility of the petition, and specified the relief sought on behalf of Mr. Hilaire.  The communication was forwarded to the State on January 12, 1998 and it presented its rejoinder on April 1, of the same year.  This rejoinder was transmitted to the petitioners on May 13, 1998.  On June 24, 1998, the petitioners filed their observations and these were transmitted to the State on July 13, 1998, accompanied by a request for a reply.

 

7)         On September 25, 1998, the Commission issued Report No. 43/98, in which it concluded that the petition was admissible.  On October 23 of the same year, the Commission forwarded this Report to the State and the petitioners, and placed itself at their disposal with a view to seeking a friendly settlement of the matter.

 

8)         On September 28, 1998, the petitioners presented a second supplementary written submission, which was transmitted to the State on October 6 of the same year, with a request for a reply.

 

9)         On or about February 12, 1999, the petitioners delivered a third supplementary written submission with appendices, and on or about March 12 of the same year, they delivered additional written submissions to the Commission.  On April 5, 1999, the Commission forwarded the pertinent parts of the additional written submissions to the State with a request for observations.  The State did not respond to this request.

 

10)       On April 21, 1999, the Commission adopted the Report on the merits No. 66/99, which it transmitted to the State on April 26, 1999. In the operative part of the said Report, the Commission recommended that the State:

 

(I)                  Grant the petitioner an effective remedy which includes consideration for an early release or commutation of sentence and compensation;

 

(II)               Adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to insure that the death penalty is imposed in compliance with the rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Convention; [and]

 

(III)             Adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to ensure that the right under Article 7(5) of the Convention to trial within a reasonable time or to be released is given effect in Trinidad and Tobago, including effective recourse to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate that right.

 

11)       On May 18, 1999, the State delivered to the Commission its response to this Report.

 

12)       On May 23, 1999, the Inter-American Commission, pursuant to Article 51 of the American Convention, decided to submit the case to the Court.

 

 

IV

PROVISIONAL MEASURES[2]

 

13)       On July 10, 1998, prior to the submission of the application, the Commission requested that the Court expand the provisional measures that had been ordered by the President in the matter of James et al. on May 27, 1998, and ratified by the Court on June 14 of the same year, in order to include Mr. Hilaire in such provisional measures.  The Commission considered that the circumstances of Mr. Hilaire were similar to those of the other inmates to whom the existing Order for provisional measures in Trinidad and Tobago applied, and that because Mr. Hilaire’s execution was imminent, he was particularly vulnerable to irreparable harm.

 

14)       On July 13, 1998, the President of the Court (hereinafter “the President”) ordered the State, inter alia, to take all measures necessary to preserve Mr. Hilaire’s life so that the Court could examine the pertinence of the Commission’s request for extension of the provisional measures.  On August 29, 1998, the plenary of the Court ratified the President’s Order of July 13, 1998 in relation to Mr. Hilaire, among others[3].

 

15)       As of this date, the State has presented the relevant reports with respect to the situation of Mr. Hilaire and the Commission has delivered its observations on the State’s reports. 

 

 

 

 

V

PROCEEDING BEFORE THE COURT

 

16)       On May 25, 1999, the Inter-American Commission filed its application in the following terms:

 

 

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights respectfully petitions the Honorable Inter-American Court of Human Rights to declare violations of the Convention by the State, establish reparations for those violations, and determine costs and expenses to be paid to the representatives of the victims.

 

A.                  Declarations of violations

 

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights respectfully petitions the Honorable Inter-American Court of Human Rights to:

 

Find that the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago is responsible for violating Mr. Hilaire’s right:

 

(I)                  not to be arbitrarily deprived of his life in violation of Article 4(1) of the American Convention.

 

(II)               to have his physical, mental and moral integrity respected in violation of Article 5(1) of the American Convention.

 

(III)             not to be subjected to cruel, inhumane, or degrading punishment or treatment in violation of Article 5(2) of the American Convention.

 

All in conjunction with a violation of Article 1(1) of the American Convention;

 

Find that the State of Trinidad and Tobago is responsible for violating Article 5(6), in conjunction with Article 1(1) of the American Convention, by failing to have as an essential aim of Mr. Hilaire’s punishment his reform and social readaptation;

 

Find that the State of Trinidad and Tobago is responsible for violating the right of Mr. Haniff Hilaire to be tried within a reasonable time or to be released, contrary to Article 7(5), in conjunction with Article 1(1) of the American Convention;

 

Find that, by failing to adopt legislative or other measures necessary to give effect to the right to be tried within a reasonable time or to be released under Article 7(5) of the Convention, the State of Trinidad and Tobago has violated its obligation under Article 2 to provide the Convention with domestic legal effect, as well as Mr. Hilaire’s right to judicial protection under Article 25, in conjunction with Article 1(1) of the Convention.

 

B.                  Reparations

 

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights respectfully petitions the Honorable Inter-American Court of Human Rights to:

 

Direct that the State of Trinidad and Tobago grant the petitioner an effective remedy which includes early release or commutation of sentence and compensation;

 

Direct that the State of Trinidad and Tobago adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to ensure that the death penalty is imposed in compliance with the rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Convention;

Direct that the State of Trinidad and Tobago adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to ensure that the right under Article 7(5) of the Convention to trial within a reasonable time or to be released is given effect in Trinidad and Tobago, including effective recourse to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate that right.

 

C.                  Compensation

 

The Commission has requested that the Honorable Court require the State of Trinidad and Tobago to remedy the consequences of the violations which are the subject of this application.

 

Article 63(1) of the American Convention provides:

 

If the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or freedom protected by this Convention, the Court shall rule that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated.  It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured party. 

 

                This Honorable Court has stated that Article 63(1) of the Convention codifies a rule of customary law and constitutes one of the fundamental principles of customary law (Aloeboetoe Case, Judgment of September 10, 1993, para. 43).  The obligation to repair a breach may give rise to a number of measures to remedy the consequences.  The State must, to the extent possible, reestablish the statu quo ante, which in the present case could be achieved by commuting the complainant’s death sentence and adjusting the domestic law of Trinidad and Tobago accordingly.  Where reestablishing the statu quo ante is no longer possible, the consequences must be remedied through other means.  The Commission therefore seeks to obtain a decision of the Court as to the compensation owing to the victim as a result of the State’s violation of his rights under the Convention. 

 

D.                  Costs and expenses

 

The Commission seeks a determination from the Court respecting the costs and expenses incurred by the representatives of the victims during the processing of the case before the domestic courts and the organs of the Inter-American system.

 

17)       The Commission appointed Messrs. Jean Joseph Exumé, Robert K. Goldman and Nicholas Blake as delegates, and as legal advisors Messrs. David J. Padilla and Brian D. Tittemore.  The Commission also designated Messrs. Peter Carter, Owen Davies and Mrs. Andrea Dahlberg as assistants.

 

18)       On June 11, 1999, the Secretariat of the Court (hereinafter “the Secretariat”), following the preliminary examination of the application by the President of the Court, notified the State of the application and its annexes. On the same day, the Secretariat, following instructions of the President, informed the State of its right to designate an ad hoc judge, pursuant to Articles 18 of the Rules of Procedure and 10(3) of the Statute of the Court (hereinafter “the Statute”).

 

19)       On August 16, 1999, Trinidad and Tobago submitted a preliminary objection to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in this case and requested a two-month extension in order to present its legal arguments.  It also requested the Court to convene a special hearing on the preliminary objection in accordance with Article 36(6) of the Rules of Procedure and to suspend proceedings on the merits until the Court rendered a judgment on the preliminary objection.

 

20)       On August 19, 1999, the Secretariat acknowledged receipt of the State’s communication of August 16 and informed the State and the Commission that the President of the Court had granted an extension until October 15, 1999, in order for Trinidad and Tobago to present its legal arguments with respect to the submitted preliminary objection.  At this time, the Court advised that the State’s request for a special hearing and suspension of the proceedings would be considered in its XLV Regular Period of Sessions.

 

21)       On October 1, 1999, the Court issued an Order in the following terms:

 

1.             To grant the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago an extension for the presentation of its Reply to the Application in the Hilaire Case until December 15, 1999, due to the particular circumstances of the [...] case.

 

2.             To decline the request of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago for a postponement of the proceedings on the merits of the Hilaire Case until the preliminary objection has been decided.

 

3.             To continue the consideration of the Hilaire Case in its current procedural stage.

 

4.             To commission the President of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to summon the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in due course to a public hearing on the preliminary objection in the Hilaire Case, to be held at the seat of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.

 

22)       On October 15, 1999, the State presented its legal arguments with respect to the preliminary objection to the Court’s jurisdiction in the instant case. 

 

23)       On October 20, 1999, the Secretariat of the Court transmitted to the Inter-American Commission the State’s arguments in relation to the preliminary objection.  The Commission responded on November 19, 1999.

 

24)       On June 16, 2000, the President of the Court resolved to convene the parties to a public hearing, to take place at the seat of the Court on August 10, 2000, to hear the arguments on the preliminary objection.

 

25)       The public hearing was held at the seat of the Court on the established date.

 

There appeared:

 

for the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago

 

            Russell Martineau, S.C.;

            Howard Stevens, Barrister; and

            Peter Pursglove, Barrister and Attorney-at-Law, Legal Adviser in the Ministry

of the Attorney General and Legal Affairs. 

 

 

for the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights

 

            Robert K. Goldman, Delegate;

            Nicholas Blake Q.C., Delegate; and

            Brian Tittemore, Legal Advisor.

 

26)       On May 7, 2001, the Secretariat received from the Commission copies of two decisions pertinent to cases on the imposition of the “mandatory death penalty”, issued by the United Nations Human Rights Committee and the Court of Appeals for the Eastern Caribbean.  These decisions were transmitted to the State on May 15, 2001.  On December 13, 1999 and August 10, 2000, Messrs. Vaughan Lowe and Carlos Vargas Pizarro, respectively, also filed amicus curiae briefs.

 

 

VI

JURISDICTION

 

27)       Trinidad and Tobago deposited its instrument of ratification to the American Convention on May 28, 1991.  On the same date, the State recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. 

 

28)       On May 26, 1998, Trinidad and Tobago denounced the Convention and, pursuant to Article 78 of the same instrument, this denunciation took effect one year later, on May 26, 1999.  The facts, to which the instant case refers, occurred prior to the effective date of the State’s denunciation.  Consequently, the Court has jurisdiction, under the terms of Articles 78(2) and 62(3) of the Convention, to entertain the present case and render a judgment on the State’s preliminary objection.

 

 

VII

PRELIMINARY OBJECTION: 

INADMISSIBILITY OF THE COMPLAINT AND LACK OF JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

 

29)       In its preliminary objection, Trinidad and Tobago sustained that the Inter-American Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the case in light of three main arguments:

 

I.              The application in so far as it alleges a breach of Article 4(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights is inadmissible for breach of Article 46(1)(b) of the Convention.

 

II.            The State’s second reservation precludes any jurisdiction of the Court in this case.

 

III.          Alternatively, the State has never recognised the jurisdiction of the Court.

 

30)       The Court will consider the arguments presented by the State in the case sub judice.

 

 

 

A.  INADMISSIBILITY OF THE COMPLAINT

 

Written arguments of the State

 

31)       The State notes that Article 46 of the American Convention establishes that:

 

1.             Admission by the Commission of a petition or communication lodged in accordance with Articles 44 or 45 shall be subject to the following requirements:

 

[…]

 

b.             that the petition or communication is lodged within a period of six months from the date on which the party alleging violation of his rights was notified of the final judgment[.]

           

32)       According to Trinidad and Tobago, one of the allegations in the Commission’s application states that the imposition of the death penalty in the present case constituted a violation of Article 4(1) of the Convention.  This argument was not presented in the original petition or in the complementary petition lodged by the petitioner before the Commission, but rather in a “second supplementary petition” lodged before it on September 28, 1998.

 

33)       This “second supplementary petition” was presented ten months after the final domestic judgment, and therefore outside the six-month time period provided for in Article 46(1)(b) and after the Commission’s September 25, 1998 Report on the admissibility of the petition and complementary petition.  It also contains an argument that the petitioner could have presented in his petition and his complementary petition and, as a result, the allegation in reference to Article 4(1) of the Convention is in breach of Article 46(1)(b) of the same.  For the aforementioned reasons, this should be considered a separate petition requiring a separate decision on admissibility.  Moreover, the State indicated that the date of the Privy Council’s dismissal of Mr. Hilaire’s petition and the date accepted by the Commission as the date of the final judgment was November 6, 1997.  As a result, the six-month time period to present the petition before the Commission expired on May 5, 1998.

 

Written arguments of the Commission

 

34)       The Inter-American Commission contended that the State should be estopped from raising issues of admissibility in the instant case because, during the proceedings before the Inter-American Commission, Trinidad and Tobago “waived its right to challenge the admissibility of the petition based upon the exhaustion of domestic remedies rule and submitted its observations on the merits of the case”.  It alleged that the circumstances in which the Commission determined a violation of Article 4(1) conformed to the Convention and the Commission’s Statute and Rules of Procedure. 

 

35)       When the petitioners presented their complaint before the Commission, they did not state a specific violation of Article 4(1).  However, in the “second supplementary petition” of September 28, 1998, the petitioners alleged a violation of Article 4(2) of the Convention with respect to Mr. Hilaire.  It was the Commission, through its Article 50 Report, that determined that the State had violated Article 4(1) of the Convention, based on the petitioner’s original complaint, and for this reason the violation should be considered by the Court.

 

36)       The Commission considered that the six-month period stipulated in Article 46(1)(b) of the Convention is not applicable to the breach of Article 4(1) because the domestic legislation of the State does not provide due process for the protection of rights that have been violated.  This is the case because Article 46(2)(a) of the Convention establishes that the provisions of paragraphs 1(a) and 1(b) of the above mentioned article shall not be applicable when “the domestic legislation of the State concerned does not afford due process of law for the protection of the right or rights that have allegedly been violated.”

 

37)       In the instant case, the Commission determined a violation of Article 4(1) of the Convention based on the fact that Mr. Hilaire was sentenced to a “mandatory death penalty”.  Article 6 of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago[4] hinders individuals from challenging laws that were part of the domestic legislation of Trinidad and Tobago before the Constitution entered into force.  The “mandatory death penalty” for the crime of murder was part of the law of Trinidad and Tobago before the Constitution went into effect and for this reason is not open to challenge before the courts.

 

Oral arguments of the State

 

38)       In the public hearing held before the Court, Trinidad and Tobago refuted the arguments presented by the Commission in its written memorial.  The State indicated that the doctrines of waiver and estoppel do not apply in the instant case because the “second complementary petition” was submitted outside the six-month time limit.  It also alleged that although the Commission had determined the admissibility of the complaint based on the first petition, it had determined that there was a violation of Article 4(1) based on the “second supplementary petition.”  Finally, it stated that in Trinidad and Tobago there exists due process under the law and that the State’s Constitution provides for the right to not be arbitrarily deprived of life.

 

Oral arguments of the Commission

 

39)       At the said hearing, the Commission stated that the six-month rule with respect to exhaustion of domestic remedies established in Article 46(1)(b) could be waived expressly or implicitly.  In the instant case, the State did not object to the admissibility of the petition and, by its conduct it should be considered to have irrevocably waived its right to do so and hence should be estopped from disputing the admissibility before the Court.  In the same manner, the Commission indicated that, in accordance with the Convention, the petitioner needed only to present the facts or the situation which constituted a possible violation of his rights; he was not obligated to name the specific articles which were considered violated.  Finally, the Commission argued that the domestic law of Trinidad and Tobago does not provide due process of law for the protection of rights alleged to have been violated and that the “mandatory death penalty” for the crime of murder could not be challenged before the courts under the Constitution of the State.

 

Considerations of the Court

 

40)       Article 46(1) of the American Convention establishes the necessary requirements for a petition to be admitted by the Inter-American Commission.  Article 32 of the Commission’s Rules of Procedures, in effect at the time when the complaint was initially lodged, lists the elements that the petition must contain at the time of its presentation.  Neither Article 46(1) nor Article 32 establishes that the petitioners must specify the articles they consider to have been violated.  Moreover, Article 32(c) of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure[5] allows for the possibility that “no specific reference [be] made to the article(s) alleged to have been violated” and, paragraph (b) of the said Article 46 refers to a deadline for the lodging of the complaint.

 

41)       In their original application the petitioners set out the facts on which they based their claims of violations of the Convention.  They were under no legal obligation to specify which precise provisions of the Convention were violated in order to justify their complaint.  In subsequent submissions they made reference to the same facts, adding certain legal considerations.  In sum, the original petition contained all the facts that might be relevant for the purposes of a legal determination.

 

42)       For this reason, and in the light of the guarantees contained in the American Convention on Human Rights, as well as the Rules of Procedure and Statutes governing the organs of the Inter-American system, the Court is of the opinion that the proper interpretation is that, when there are additional arguments, with respect to rights, on the same essential facts as are pleaded in the petitioner’s original complaint, such a pleading cannot be dismissed for the mere failure to invoke a specific article of the Convention.  Article 32(c) of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure, in effect when the complaint was lodged before it, expressly allows for the possibility that “no specific reference [need be] made to the article(s) alleged to have been violated” in order for a complaint to be processed before it.  Therefore, the Court dismisses the first argument of the State’s preliminary objection regarding the inadmissibility of the complaint.

 

B.  LACK OF JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

 

Written arguments of the State

 

43)       As previously stated by Trinidad and Tobago, the State deposited its instrument of adherence of the Convention on May 28, 1991, dated April 3, 1991, recognizing the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, but subjected this recognition to a “reservation.”  The State’s “reservation” reads that

 

[a]s regards Article 62 of the Convention, the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, recognizes the compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, as stated in the said article, only to such extent that recognition is consistent with the relevant sections of the Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago; and provided that Judgment of the Court does not infringe, create or abolish any existing rights or duties of any private citizen.

 

44)       The State indicated that Article 75 of the Convention declares that it can only be subject to reservations in conformity with the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties signed on May 23, 1969 (hereinafter “the Vienna Convention”). In this respect, Article 19 of the same provides

 

[a] State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, formulate a reservation unless:

 

a)             the reservation is prohibited by the treaty;

 

b)            the treaty provides, that only specified reservations, which do not include the reservation in question, may be made; or

 

c)              in cases not falling under subparagraphs (a) and (b), the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.

 

45)       The State also mentioned that in its Advisory Opinion on The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention on Human Rights (OC-2/82), the Court had stated that the reference in Article 75 to the Vienna Convention was intended to be a reference to paragraph (c) of Article 19 of the Vienna Convention and “makes sense only if it is understood as an express authorization designed to enable States to make whatever reservations they deem appropriate, provided the reservations are not incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.  As such they can be said to be governed by Article 20(1) of the Vienna Convention and, consequently, do not require acceptance by any other State party” [6].

 

46)       The State argued that its “reservation” was made relative to its acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction and is limited to Article 62 of the American Convention.  According to Trinidad and Tobago, Article 62 of the Convention is an optional clause that States can freely “accept or reject”.  Those States that accept and so declare are expressly authorized to do so subject to conditions.  The Convention permits restrictions at the moment of acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction under Article 62, which does not affect the enjoyment or exercise of the rights and liberties recognized in the Convention.  Consequently, given that the “reservation” does not deny the exercise of any of the rights provided for in the Convention, it can be considered compatible with the object and purpose of the same.

 

47)       Trinidad and Tobago contended that the American Convention does not contain a provision parallel to Article 64(c) (sic) of the European Convention[7] and that, in fact, the framers of the American Convention preferred to follow the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which “does not prohibit” (sic) reservations of a general character.

 

48)       The State added that the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago is and was, at the moment of ratification of the Convention, compatible with the same.  It argued that its “reservation” cannot be interpreted as contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention because the “reservation” is only related to the optional procedure contained in Article 62 of the Convention, which in no way affects the substantive rights guaranteed in the Convention.  The “reservation,” as presented, it argued, does not restrict the obligations assumed by the State under the Convention in relation to individuals within its jurisdiction.

 

49)       Trinidad and Tobago also maintained that, if the Court declares the State’s Article 62 “reservation” incompatible with the object and purpose of the American Convention, the effect of such a determination would be to render the State’s declaration accepting the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction null and void ab initio.

 

50)       The State added that the International Court of Justice, in its Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1951), indicated that

 

[…] if a party to the Convention objects to a reservation which it considers to be incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention, it can in fact consider the reserving State is not a party to the Convention […]

 

51)       The State indicated that, in its legal system, it is the Legislative Power that makes the laws.  The Executive cannot, at the moment of ratification of a treaty, alter the laws of the Republic and create a constitutional breach.  For this reason, the Executive, at the time of accession to the Convention and acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, formulated the “reservation” under Article 62.  In this same manner, the State denounced the Convention in May of 1998, in virtue of the need to observe the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago.

 

52)       If the “reservation” of the State were, for any reason, considered invalid, it would not mean that the State declared its unlimited acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.  On the contrary, it is clear that the State never intended to accept, in its totality, the jurisdiction of the Court.  If the “reservation” is invalid, then the declaration was invalid, and the State never made a declaration.

 

Written arguments of the Commission

 

53)       The Commission sustained that the impugned term in the State’s declaration of acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction should be considered invalid because it is impossible to determine its exact nature or scope.  It is excessively vague and should not be interpreted in a manner that affects the Court’s jurisdiction to decide cases against the State. If a meaning is to be attributed, it should be interpreted in a manner that limits the legal effects of the Court’s judgments, and not the Court’s jurisdiction to decide cases against the State.

 

54)       The Commission indicated that the United Nations Human Rights Committee has stated that reservations to human rights treaties must be specific and transparent so that courts, individuals under the jurisdiction of a reserving State, and other States parties can know which human rights obligations have or have not been undertaken.  The term contained in the State’s “reservation” appears to modify the degree of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.  However, a simple reading of the term makes it difficult to determine the restrictions that the State has purported to establish under Article 62 to its obligations assumed under the Convention.

 

55)       The term can also be interpreted in various ways.  For example, it could be interpreted to mean that the Court is precluded from hearing and deciding a case related to allegations of violations of a Convention right if the same right is not protected under the State’s Constitution.  Alternatively, it could be interpreted to mean that “while the Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine a matter, the Court’s judgment must be consistent with certain unstipulated sections of Trinidad and Tobago’s Constitution”.

 

56)       The Commission noted that the State only relies upon the first part of the declaration in concluding that the Court has no jurisdiction.  It pointed out that the State makes no reference to the portion of the declaration, which reads “and provided that any judgment of the Court does not infringe, create, or abolish any existing rights or duties of any private citizen”, and considered that it is apparent that the State specifically acknowledges in this second part of the declaration that the Court has competence to give judgments in cases against Trinidad and Tobago.  “It may therefore be that, taking the first and second parts of the declaration together, the State was concerned that the giving effect in Trinidad and Tobago to the judgments of the Court should not have an adverse effect on the existing private rights of the citizens, and deprive them of rights they already enjoyed or impose on them duties to which the were not already subject”.

 

57)       The term could be interpreted to mean that provided that, there is no provision in the Constitution expressly prohibiting the State from accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, the recognition of this jurisdiction is complete and effective.  In this sense, the State does not suggest that there are provisions of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago that prohibit the State from accepting the jurisdiction of the Court.

 

58)       In light of the various possible interpretations of the term, it appears so ambiguous that its meaning and scope will depend upon a subjective judgment by the State as to what provisions of the Constitution are “relevant” and in what respect the State’s acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction must be “consistent” with those provisions, the term, would undermine the Court’s exclusive authority to determine its own jurisdiction, and thereby also render the term invalid.

 

59)       The Commission also indicated that the term in the State’s declaration of acceptance, as it stands and as interpreted by the State, is not authorized by Articles 62 or 75 of the Convention and is incompatible with the Convention’s object and purpose.

 

60)       In conformity with Article 62(2) of the Convention, the “declaration may be made unconditionally, on the condition of reciprocity, for a specific period or for specific cases”.  The State’s “reservation” does not invoke the requirement of reciprocity, or temporal limitations, nor does it define specific cases in which the Court will apply its jurisdiction.

 

61)       Secondly, and in conformity with Article 75 of the Convention and, specifically Article 19 of the Vienna Convention, the State’s “reservation” is not permitted, as it is contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention.  The “reservation” is also contrary to general principles of International Law.

 

62)       Finally, the term, as interpreted by the State, would limit the ability of the Court to interpret and apply certain provisions of the Convention in all cases against Trinidad and Tobago before the Court, as it would permit the Tribunal to interpret and apply Convention rights only to the extent that such rights are protected in the State’s Constitution.

 

63)       The Commission considered that the State’s position ignores the fact that it is the responsibility of the Court, not the State, to determine whether the domestic laws of the State, including its Constitution, are consistent with the rights protected by the Convention.  It noted that the Inter-American Court has emphasized that the issue of jurisdiction in a particular case is one that only the Court, not States parties, can decide. This clearly extends to the interpretation of the terms included in declarations of acceptance made by various States parties under Article 62 of the Convention.

 

64)       In the abovementioned circumstances, interpreting Article 62 of the American Convention as authorizing the terms of the State’s acceptance would contravene Article 29(a) of the Convention because it would effectively permit the State to violate Articles 4(1), 5(1), and 5(2) of the same with respect to Mr. Hilaire.  The State has interpreted its declaration in a manner that prohibits the Court from considering the specific aspects of the “mandatory death penalty”.

 

65)       The Commission also contended that the impugned term could be severed from the State’s acceptance of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction, so that the State is considered to have accepted it absent the condition, “only to the extent that said recognition is compatible with the relevant sections of the Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago”.

 

66)       The Convention protects the human rights of individuals subject to the jurisdiction of the States parties, so the State’s “reservation” should be interpreted in a manner that strengthens rather than weakens this regime, and, as such, increases, not diminishes, the protection of human rights in the entire hemisphere.

 

67)       Severing the impugned term from the State’s declaration of acceptance, instead of annulling the declaration in toto, serves to guarantee Mr. Hilaire's fundamental human rights and those of individuals in similar situations who would not otherwise have effective domestic remedies of protection.

 

68)       Trinidad and Tobago was the only State party at its moment of accession to have attached conditions of this nature to its acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction.  In contrast, the majority of States have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court unconditionally.  It is a principle of International Law and a “fundamental precept of the American Convention”, that States cannot invoke their internal law as a justification for not complying with a treaty.  Nonetheless, this is what the State purports to do with its interpretation of the impugned term.

 

69)       The Inter-American Commission argued that the Court could follow the reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter “the European Court”) in the case of Loizidou v. Turkey, which declared that ratione loci restrictions could be severed from the declaration of acceptance, in a manner that the State could be considered to have accepted the contentious jurisdiction of the Court absent the qualification “only to the extent to which that recognition is compatible with the relevant provisions of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago”.

 

Oral arguments of the State

 

70)       The State sustained in the public hearing held before the Court that Trinidad and Tobago had the intention of accepting, in a limited way, the jurisdiction of the Court, and never accepted nor had the intention of accepting its complete jurisdiction.  This was the case because, in Trinidad and Tobago, any law that is contrary to a provision of the Constitution is invalid.  Any inconsistency between the Constitution and the Convention would require an amendment of the State’s Constitution, and only Parliament can alter the Constitution. The Executive, on behalf of Trinidad and Tobago, ratified the Convention, and for this reason included the “reservation” in its declaration of acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction.

 

71)       The State also indicated that the Court only had jurisdiction if the provision in the Convention under which a violation is alleged is not inconsistent with the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago, in other words, to the extent that it is not inconsistent with the meaning that the courts of the State have given to the relevant sections of the Constitution.

 

72)       The State sustained that its “reservation” is in accordance with Article 62 of the American Convention because the latter authorizes the making of reservations in specific cases; and with Article 19 of the Vienna Convention because its “reservation” is compatible with the object and purpose of the Convention.

 

73)       The State concluded that the requirements of compatibility with the object and purpose refer to the object and purpose of the Convention, and not of the Court; the recognition of the Court’s jurisdiction is optional under the American Convention; the instant case merely addresses the the Court’s jurisdiction, and not the withdrawal of jurisdiction or the denunciation of the Convention; it does not affect the supervisory jurisdiction of the Inter-American Commission; International Law permits reservations, and this is expressly recognized in paragraph 25 of the Advisory Opinion of the Court on The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention on Human Rights (OC-2/82); and, the “reservation” of the State does not deprive the Court of the authority to decide whether or not it has jurisdiction.

 

74)       Finally, the State alleged that the “reservation” is clear, consistent with the object and purpose of the Convention, and was made at the moment of the acceptance; therefore, it forms a part of the terms of Trinidad and Tobago’s acceptance of the Treaty.  In the event that it is considered unclear or incompatible with the Convention, it is clear that the intention of the State was not to accept the jurisdiction of the Court unconditionally.

 

Oral arguments of the Commission

 

75)       In the public hearing before the Court, the Commission presented various general arguments: first, it indicated that it is the Court that should determine its own jurisdiction; second, that in the determination of the nature its jurisdiction and of the meaning that should be given to any declaration, the Court is guided by the nature of the Convention as a human rights instrument, and strives to give practical effect to the object of the treaty; and, finally, that the Court has developed specific jurisprudence in relation to declarations that purport to restrict its jurisdiction.

 

76)       The Commission also indicated that once the jurisdiction of the Court has been accepted, it cannot be terminated or modified by a unilateral act of the State.  It added that the State, in its 1991 declaration, intended to recognize the jurisdiction of the Court in all matters relating to the interpretation of the Convention and did not purport to exclude this jurisdiction.  It argued that, alternatively, any reservation purporting to limit the Court’s jurisdiction to interpret the Convention by vague and ambiguous references to domestic laws is not permitted under the Convention or under general principles of International Law.

 

77)       Finally, it indicated that where there has been recognition of the Court’s jurisdiction subject to impermissible restrictions, these restrictions should be severed from the remainder of the instrument of acceptance, and the recognition should remain intact and effective, unless the State withdraws from the Convention system as a whole.

 

Considerations of the Court

 

78)       The Court must settle the matter of the purported “reservation” with which the State of Trinidad and Tobago accompanied its acceptance of the contentious jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court. The Court, as with any court or tribunal, has the inherent authority to determine the scope of its own competence (compétence de la competence/Kompetenz-Kompetez).

 

79)       The Court must give an interpretation to the declaration of the State, as a whole, that is in accordance with the canons and practice of International Law in general, and with International Human Rights Law specifically, and which awards the greatest degree of protection to the human beings under its guardianship.

 

80)       The Court cannot abdicate this prerogative, as it is a duty that the American Convention imposes upon it, requiring it to exercise its functions in accordance with Article 62(3) thereof.  That provision reads that “[t]he jurisdiction of the Court shall comprise all cases concerning the interpretation and application of the provisions of this Convention that are submitted to it, provided that the States Parties to the case recognize or have recognized such jurisdiction, whether by special declaration pursuant to the preceding paragraphs, or by a special agreement”.

 

81)       As this Tribunal has indicated in its judgments on jurisdiction in the Cases of Constitutional Court and Ivcher Bronstein:

 

The jurisdiction of the Court cannot be contingent upon events extraneous to its own actions.  The instruments consenting to the optional clause concerning recognition of the Court’s binding jurisdiction (Article 62(1) of the Convention) presuppose that the States submitting them accept the Court’s right to settle any controversy relative to its jurisdiction.  An objection or any other action taken by the State for the purpose of somehow affecting the Court’s jurisdiction has no consequence whatever, as the Court retains the compétence de la compétence, as it is master of its own jurisdiction[8].

 

82)       Interpreting the Convention in accordance with its object and purpose, the Court must act in a manner that preserves the integrity of the mechanism provided for in Article 62(1) of the Convention.  It would be unacceptable to subordinate the said mechanism to restrictions that would render the system for the protection of human rights established in the Convention and, as a result, the Court’s jurisdictional role, inoperative.

 

 

83)       As this Court has indicated in the Cases of Constitutional Court and Ivcher Bronstein

 

[t]he States Parties to the Convention must guarantee compliance with its provisions and its effects (effet utile) within their own domestic laws.  This principle applies not only to the substantive provisions of human right treaties (in other words, the clauses on the protected rights), but also to the procedural provisions, such as the one concerning recognition of the Tribunal’s contentious jurisdiction. That clause, essential to the efficacy of the mechanism of international protection, must be interpreted and applied in such a way that the guarantee that it establishes is truly practical and effective, given the special nature of human rights treaties [...] and their collective enforcement[9].

 

84)       Article 31(1) of the 1969 Vienna Convention provides that

 

[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.

 

85)       The Court’s duty, at this stage, is to decide, as the present case requires, whether Trinidad and Tobago’s “reservation” has the effect of excluding the Court’s jurisdiction in the manner alleged by the State.

 

86)        As previously noted, the purported “reservation” contains two parts.  The first intends to limit the recognition of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction in the sense that said recognition is only valid to the extent that it is “consistent with the relevant sections” of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago.  These expressions can lead to numerous interpretations.  Nonetheless, it is clear to the Court that they cannot be given a scope that would impede this Tribunal’s ability to judge whether the State had or had not violated a provision of the Convention.  The second part of the purported restriction relates to the State’s “recognition” of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction so that its judgments do not “infringe, create or abolish any existing rights or duties of any private citizen” (sic).  Again, though the precise meaning of this condition is unclear, without a doubt it cannot be utilized with the purpose of suppressing the jurisdiction of the Court to hear and decide an application related to an alleged violation of the State’s conventional obligations.

 

87)       In this respect, paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 62 of the American Convention establish:

 

1.                    A State Party may, upon depositing its instrument of ratification or adherence to this Convention, or at any subsequent time, declare that it recognizes as binding, ipso facto, and not requiring special agreement, the jurisdiction of the Court on all matters relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention.

 

2.                    Such declaration may be made unconditionally, on the condition of reciprocity, for a specified period, or for specific cases.  It shall be presented to the Secretary General of the Organization, who shall transmit copies there to the other states of the Organization and to the Secretary of this Court.

 

88)       The Court observes that the instrument of acceptance of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction on the part of Trinidad and Tobago is not consistent with the hypothesis stipulated in Article 62(2) of the American Convention.  It is general in scope, which completely subordinates the application of the American Convention to the internal legislation of Trinidad and Tobago as decided by its courts.  This implies that the instrument of acceptance is manifestly incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention.  As a result, the said article does not contain a provision that allows Trinidad and Tobago to formulate the “restriction” it made.

 

89)       An interpretation of the American Convention done “in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose” leads this Court to the view that a State party to the Convention can only release itself of its obligations under the Convention by following the provisions that the treaty itself stipulates[10].

 

90)       Article 29(a) of the American Convention stipulates that no provision of the Convention shall be interpreted as “permitting any State Party, group, or person to suppress the enjoyment or exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized in this Convention or to restrict them to a greater extent than is provided for herein”.  Consequently, it would be meaningless to suppose that a State which had freely decided to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court had decided at the same time to restrict the exercise of its functions as foreseen in the Convention.  On the contrary, the mere acceptance by the State leads to the overwhelming presumption that the State will subject itself to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.

 

91)       The effect of the State’s third allegation would be to limit its recognition of the Court’s completely mandatory jurisdiction, with negative consequences for the exercise of the rights protected by the Convention.

 

92)       The declaration formulated by the State of Trinidad and Tobago would allow it to decide in each specific case the extent of its own acceptance of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction to the detriment of this Tribunal’s compulsory functions.  In addition, it would give the State the discretional power to decide which matters the Court could hear, thus depriving the exercise of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction of all efficacy.

 

93)       Moreover, accepting the said declaration in the manner proposed by the State would lead to a situation in which the Court would have the State’s Constitution as its first point of reference, and the American Convention only as a subsidiary parameter, a situation which would cause a fragmentation of the international legal order for the protection of human rights, and which would render illusory the object and purpose of the Convention.

 

94)    The American Convention and the other human rights treaties are inspired by a set of  higher  common  values  (centered   around   the   protection  of  the  human  being),  are endowed with specific supervisory mechanisms, are applied as a collective guarantee, embody essentially objective obligations, and have a special character that sets them apart from other treaties.  The latter govern mutual interests between and among the States parties and are applied by them, with all the juridical consequences that follow there from for the international and domestic systems[11].

 

95)       In this respect, in its Advisory Opinion on The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention on Human Rights (OC-2/82), the Court found that

 

[m]odern human rights treaties in general, and the American Convention in particular, are not multilateral treaties of the traditional type concluded to accomplish the reciprocal exchange of rights for the mutual benefit of the contracting States. Their object and purpose is the protection of the basic rights of individual human beings irrespective of their nationality, both against the State of their nationality and all other contracting States. In concluding these human rights treaties, the States can be deemed to submit themselves to a legal order within which they, for the common good, assume various obligations, not in relation to other States, but towards all individuals within their jurisdiction[12].

 

96)       That finding is consistent with the case law of other international jurisdictional bodies[13].

 

97)       As this Court has stated in the cases of Constitutional Court and Ivcher Bronstein

 

[n]o analogy can be drawn between the State practice detailed under Article 36(2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice and acceptance of the optional clause concerning recognition of the binding jurisdiction of this Court, given the particular nature and the object and purpose of the American Convention. The European Court of Human Rights ruled similarly in its judgment on preliminary objections in the Loizidou v. Turkey case (1995), in connection with optional recognition of the European Court’s binding jurisdiction (Article 46 of the European Convention, before Protocol XI to the European Convention entered into force on 01.11.1998).  The European Court held that the European Convention was a law-making treaty[14].

 

98)       For the foregoing reasons, the Court considers that Trinidad and Tobago cannot prevail in the limitation included in its instrument of acceptance of the optional clause of the mandatory jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in virtue of what has been established in Article 62 of the American Convention, because this limitation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention.  Consequently, the Court considers that it must dismiss the second and third arguments in the preliminary objection submitted by the State insofar as they refer to the Court’s jurisdiction.

 

VIII

OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS

 

99)       Now therefore,

 

THE COURT

 

DECIDES

 

Unanimously,

 

1.         To dismiss the preliminary objection presented by the State in its totality.

 

2.         To continue to examine and process the instant case.

 

3.         To commission its President, at the appropriate time, to convene the State and the Inter-American Commission to a public hearing on the merits of the case, to be held at the seat of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.

 

4.         To notify the State and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of this judgment.

 

Judges Cançado Trindade, Salgado-Pesantes, and García-Ramírez informed the Court of their Individual Opinions, which are attached to this Judgment.

 

Done in Spanish and English, the Spanish version being the authentic, in San José, Costa Rica, on September 1, 2001.

 

Antônio A. Cançado Trindade

President

                                                                                                                                              

Máximo Pacheco-Gómez                                                               Hernán Salgado-Pesantes

                                                                                                                                            

    Alirio Abreu-Burelli                                                                      Sergio García-Ramírez

 

 

Carlos Vicente de Roux-Rengifo

 

 

Manuel E. Ventura-Robles

Secretary

 

 

So ordered,

 

Antônio A. Cançado Trindade

President

 

Manuel E. Ventura-Robles

Secretary



*               Judge Oliver Jackman informed the Court that because he did not participate in the public hearing on the preliminary objection in this case, he could not participate in the deliberation and signing of this judgment.

 

[1]               In accordance with the Court’s Order of March 13, 2001 regarding Transitory Provisions of the Court’s Rules of Procedure, the instant Judgment on preliminary objections is delivered according to the norms of the Rules of Procedure adopted in the Court’s Order of September 16, 1996.

[2]               On May 22, 1998, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights received from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights a request for provisional measures in the James et al. matter, related to five cases before the Commission which involved five death row inmates in Trinidad and Tobago. On June 14, 1998, during its XL Regular Period of Sessions, the Court ordered the adoption of the requested measures.

 

[3]               In the said Order the Court amplified the Provisional Measures in the matter of James et al in favor of Darrin Roger Thomas, Haniff Hilaire and Denny Baptiste.  Messrs. Thomas and Baptiste are not included in the instant application.

[4]               Article 6 of the Constitution of Trinidad y Tobago indicates:

Exceptions for Existing Law

(1) Nothing in sections 4 and 5 shall invalidate-

(a) an existing law;

(b) an enactment that repeals and re-enacts an existing law without alteration; or

(c) an enactment that alters an existing law but does not derogate from any fundamental right guaranteed by this Chapter in a manner in which or to an extent to which the existing law did not previously derogate from that right.

(2) Where an enactment repeals and re-enacts with modifications an existing law and is held to derogate from any fundamental right guaranteed by this Chapter in a manner in which or to an extent to which the existing law did not previously derogate from that right then, subject to sections 13 and 54, the provisions of the existing law shall be substituted for such of the provisions of the enactment as are held to derogate from the fundamental right in a manner in which or to an extent to which the existing law did not previously derogate from that right.

(3) In this section-

"alters" in relation to an existing law, includes repealing that law and re-enacting it with modifications or making different provisions in place of it or modifying it;

"existing law" means a law that had effect as part of the law of Trinidad and Tobago immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, and includes any enactment referred to in subsection (1);

"right" includes freedom.

[5]               In conformity with Article 32(c) of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure, petitions presented before the Commission must include: “an indication of the state in question which the petitioner considers responsible, by commission or omission, for the violation of a human right recognized in the American Convention on Human Rights in the cases of the States Parties thereto, even if no specific reference is made to the article alleged to have been violated”. 

[6]               The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention on Human Rights (Arts. 74 and 75), Advisory Opinion OC-2/82 of September 24, 1982.  Series A No. 2, para. 35.  To this respect, Article 20 of the Vienna Convention “Acceptance of and objection to reservations” establishes the following in paragraph 1:

 

1.             A reservation expressly authorized by a treaty does not require any subsequent acceptance by the other contracting States unless the treaty so provides.

 

[7]               Article 64(1) of the European Convention before Protocol 11 went into effect corresponds to current Article 57(1) and reads:

 

Any State may, when signing this Convention or when depositing its instrument of ratification, make a reservation in respect of any particular provision of the Convention to the extent that any law then in force in its territory is not in conformity with the  provision.  Reservations of general character shall not be permitted under this article.

[8]               Constitutional Court Case.  Competence.  Judgment of September 24, 1999.  Series C No. 55, para. 33 and  Ivcher Bronstein Case.  Competence. Judgment of September 24, 1999. Series C No. 54, para. 34.

[9]               Cf. Constitutional Court Case.  Competence.  Supra note 8, para. 36 and Ivcher Bronstein Case.  Competence. Supra note 8, para. 37.

[10]             Cf. Constitutional Court Case.  Competence. Supra note 8, para. 39 and Ivcher Bronstein Case.  Competence. Supra note 8, para. 40.

 

[11]             Cf. Constitutional Court Case.  Competence. Supra note 8, para. 41 and Ivcher Bronstein Case.  Competence. Supra note 8, para. 42.

 

[12]             The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-2/82. Supra note 6, para. 29.

 

[13]             Cf. See International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion, Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment for the Crime of Genocide (1951); European Commission of Human Rights, Decision as to the Admissibility of Application No. 788/60, Austria vs. Italy case, Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights, The Hague, M. Nijhoff, 1961; Eur. Court HR, Ireland vs. United Kingdom case, Judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A No. 25; Eur. Court H.R., Soering Case, decision of 26 January 1989, Series A No. 161; Eur. Court of H.R., Case of Loizidou vs. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), judgment of 23 March 1995, Series A Nº 310.

 

[14]             Cf. Constitutional Court Case.  Competence.  Supra note 8, para. 46 and Ivcher Bronstein Case.  Competence. Supra note 8, para. 47.

 


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