"The Last Temptation of Christ" Case, Judgment of February 5, 2001, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 73 (2001).


 

 

 

In the “Last Temptation of Christ” (Olmedo Bustos et al.) case,

 

the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (hereinafter “the Court” or “the Inter-American Court”), composed of the following judges:    

 

            Antônio A. Cançado Trindade, President

            Máximo Pacheco Gómez, Vice President

            Hernán Salgado Pesantes, Judge

            Oliver Jackman, Judge

            Alirio Abreu Burelli, Judge

            Sergio García Ramírez, Judge and

            Carlos Vicente de Roux Rengifo, Judge;

 

also present,    

 

            Manuel E. Ventura Robles, Secretary and

            Renzo Pomi, Deputy Secretary

 

pursuant to Articles 29 and 55 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court (hereinafter “the Rules of Procedure”), delivers the following judgment in this case.

 

I

Introduction of the case

 

1.         On January 15, 1999, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter “the Commission” or “the Inter-American Commission”) submitted to the Court an application against the Republic of Chile (hereinafter “the State” or “Chile”), arising from a petition (No. 11,803), received by the Secretariat of the Commission on September 3, 1997. The Commission invoked Articles 50 and 51 of the American Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter “the Convention” or “the American Convention”) and Articles 32 ff. of the Rules of Procedure in its application.  The Commission filed this case for the Court to decide whether Chile had violated Articles 13 (Freedom of Thought and Expression) and 12 (Freedom of Conscience and Religion) of the Convention.  The Commission also requested the Court to declare that, as a result of the alleged violations of the said articles, Chile had failed to fulfill Articles 1(1) (Obligation to Respect Rights) and 2 (Domestic Legal Effects) of the Convention.

 

2.         According to the petition, the said violations were committed to the detriment of Chilean society and, in particular, Juan Pablo Olmedo Bustos, Ciro Colombara López, Claudio Márquez Vidal, Alex Muñoz Wilson, Matías Insunza Tagle and Hernán Aguirre Fuentes, as a result of the “judicial censorship of the cinematographic exhibition of the film “The Last Temptation of Christ”, confirmed by the Supreme Court of Chile [...] on June 17, 1997.”

 

3.         The Commission also requested the Court to order the State:

 

1.             To authorize the normal cinematographic exhibition and publicity of the film “The Last Temptation of Christ.”

               

2.             To adapt its constitutional and legal norms to the standards of freedom of expression embodied in the American Convention, [in order] to eliminate prior censorship of cinematographic productions and their publicity.       

               

3.             To ensure that, in the exercise of their different powers, public bodies [,] their authorities and officials [effectively] exercise the rights and freedoms of expression, conscience and religion recognized in the American Convention and [...] abstain from imposing prior censorship on cinematographic productions.    

               

4.             To make reparations to the victims in this case for the damage suffered.

               

5.             To pay the costs and reimburse the expenses incurred by the victims when litigating this case in both [the] domestic sphere and before the Commission and the Court, as well as reasonable fees for their representatives.

 

 

II

Competence

 

4.         Chile has been a State Party to the American Convention since August 21, 1990, and recognized the contentious jurisdiction of the Court the same day.  Therefore, the Court is competent to hear this case.  

 

III

Proceeding before the Commission

 

5.         On September 3, 1997, the Secretariat of the Commission received a petition filed by the Asociación de Abogados por las Libertades Públicas A.G., representing Juan Pablo Olmedo Bustos, Ciro Colombara López, Claudio Márquez Vidal, Alex Muñoz Wilson, Matías Insunza Tagle and Hernán Aguirre Fuentes and “the other inhabitants of the Republic of Chile.” The Commission informed the State of the petition and asked it to submit the corresponding information within 90 days. 

 

6.         On January 8, 1998, the State transmitted its answer to the Commission, which forwarded it to the petitioners, who submitted their reply on February 23, 1998.  On June 16, 1998, having been granted an extension, the State submitted a brief answering the reply that the petitioners had submitted to the Commission.         

 

7.         On February 27, 1998, a hearing was held at the seat of the Commission, attended by the petitioners’ representatives, but not by the State, although it had been duly convened.

 

8.         During its 99th regular session, the Commission adopted Report No. 31/98, in which it declared the case admissible. The report was forwarded to the State on May 18, 1998. 

 

9.         On June 22, 1998, the Commission made itself available to the parties in order to reach a friendly settlement in the case, pursuant to Article 48(1)(f) of the American Convention.  However, it was not possible to reach this type of settlement.  

 

10.       On September 29, 1998, during its 100th regular session, the Commission, pursuant to Article 50 of the Convention, adopted report No. 69/98.  In this report, the Commission concluded:

 

95.           That the judgment of the Court of Appeal of Santiago, Chile, of January 20, 1997, and its confirmation by the Supreme Court of Chile on June 17, 1997, annulling the administrative decision of the National Cinematographic Classification Council that approved the exhibition of the film “The Last Temptation of Christ”, on November 11, 1996, when the American Convention on Human Rights, ratified by the State on August 21, 1990, had already entered into force in Chile, are incompatible with the provisions of the American Convention on Human Rights, and violate the provisions of Articles 1(1) and 2 of the Convention.     

 

96.           With regard to the persons in whose name this case has been filed, the State of Chile has failed to comply with its obligation to recognize and guarantee the rights established in Articles 12 and 13 in relation to Articles 1(1) and 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights, to which Chile is a State Party.                      

 

97.           When a constitutional provision is not compatible with the Convention, pursuant to Article 2, the State Party is obliged to adopt the necessary legislative measures (of either a constitutional or ordinary nature) to make effective the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention.

 

98.           The Chilean State has not complied with the provisions of Article 2 of the American Convention, since it has not adopted the necessary legislative or other measures, in accordance with its constitutional procedures, to make effective the rights and freedoms contained in the Convention.

 

99.           The Commission evaluates positively the democratic Government of Chile’s initiatives aimed at the adoption by the competent organs of the necessary legislative or other measures, in accordance with its existing constitutional and legal procedures, to make effective the right to freedom of expression.

 

And the Commission recommended that Chile should: 

 

1.             Abolish the censorship in force with regard to the exhibition of the film “The Last Temptation of Christ”, in violation of Article 13 of the American Convention.

2.             Adopt the necessary measures to adapt its domestic legislation to the provisions of the American Convention on Human Rights, so that the right to freedom of expression and all the other rights and freedoms contained in it are fully valid and applicable in the Republic of Chile.

 

11.       On October 15, 1998, the Commission transmitted this report to the State, and granted it a period of two months to comply with the recommendations.  When the period elapsed, the State had not submitted any information on compliance with the recommendations and it did not comply with them.

 

IV

Procedure before the Court

 

12.       The application in this case was submitted to the Court on January 15, 1999.  The Commission appointed Carlos Ayala Corao, Robert K. Goldman and Alvaro Tirado Mejía as its delegates, Manuel Velasco Clark and Verónica Gómez as its advisors, and Viviana Krsticevic, Executive Director of the Center for Justice and International Law (CEJIL) as its assistant.  The Commission also advised that Juan Pablo Olmedo Bustos and Ciro Colombara López would represent themselves and that the other alleged victims, Claudio Márquez Vidal, Alex Muñoz Wilson, Matías Insunza Tagle and Hernán Aguirre Fuentes, would be represented by the Asociación de Abogados por las Libertades Públicas A.G., through Pablo Ruiz Tagle Vial, Javier Ovalle Andrade, Julián López Masle, Antonio Bascuñan Rodríguez and Macarena Sáez Torres.

 

13.       On January 27, 1999, after the President of the Court (hereinafter “the President”) had made a preliminary examination of the application, the Secretariat notified it to the State, and informed the State of the periods to answer it, file preliminary objections and appoint its representatives.

 

14.       The same day, the Secretariat requested the Commission to forward the address of the Asociación de Abogados por las Libertades Públicas A.G., the powers of attorney certifying that Pablo Ruiz Tagle Vial, Javier Ovalle Andrade, Julián López Masle, Antonio Bascuñan Rodríguez and Macarena Sáez Torres López were the representatives of Claudio Márquez Vidal, Alex Muñoz Wilson, Matías Insunza Tagle and Hernán Aguirre Fuentes; and the addresses of Juan Pablo Olmedo Bustos and Ciro Colombara López, in order to advise them of the contents of the application, in accordance with Article 35(1)(e) of the Rules of Procedure.

 

15.       On January 27, 1999, the Commission submitted Annex V to its application, which corresponded to the book entitled “The Last Temptation” by Nikos Kazantzakis.  The following day, this annex was forwarded to the State.

 

16.       On January 29, 1999, the Commission forwarded the addresses of the Asociación de Abogados por las Libertades Públicas A.G., and of Juan Pablo Olmedo Bustos and Ciro Colombara López.  On February 2, 1999, the Secretariat notified the application to them. 

 

17.       On February 9, 1999, the Commission submitted the powers of attorney granted by Claudio Márquez Vidal, Alex Muñoz Wilson, Matías Insunza Tagle and Hernán Aguirre Fuentes to the Asociación de Abogados por las Libertades Públicas A.G. 

 

18.       On March 26, 1999, the State requested the Court to grant it an additional period of 30 days from March 27, 1999, to file preliminary objections and appoint its agent.  On March 27, 1999, the Secretariat informed the State that the period for appointing its agent had expired on February 27, 1999, and that the period for filing preliminary objections expired on March 27, 1999.  Lastly, it informed the State that its request would be submitted to the President for consideration, as soon as possible.  On April 5, 1999, on the instructions of the President, the Secretariat informed the State that an extension had been granted until April 12, 1999.

 

19.       On April 12, 1999, the State advised that it was “preparing a proposal intended to end the dispute and the respective litigation” and requested “an additional period of 30 days for that purpose.”  The same day, on the instructions of the President, the Secretariat informed the State that an extension had been granted until April 24, 1999.

 

20.       On April 26, 1999, Chile submitted a brief in which it expressed its willingness to “eliminate and/or modify any legislation that harms or violates freedom in its highest form” and proposed some elements for an agreement to settle the case.       

 

21.       On April 30, 1999, Jorge Reyes Zapata submitted a brief, signed by himself and by Sergio García Valdés, Vicente Torres Irarrázabal, Francisco Javier Donoso Barriga, Matías Pérez Cruz, Cristian Heerwagen Guzmán and Joel González Castillo, asking to be heard by the Inter-American Court in the capacity of amici curiae.  Moreover, they requested to be heard “in all the oral and written instances that the rules of procedures allow.”  On June 1, 1999, on the instructions of the President, the Secretariat informed Mr. Reyes Zapata that “until the reparations stage, the possibility of participating in the proceedings before [the] Court was restricted to the parties to the respective case, that is, to the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights and the respondent State” and, consequently, it was not possible to accede to their request to be heard as collaborating third parties.

 

22.       On May 25, 1999, the Commission submitted its observations on the State's brief of April 26, 1999.

 

23.       On May 27, 1999, the State appointed Edmundo Vargas Carreño, Chilean Ambassador to Costa Rica, as its agent and indicated that it would receive notifications at the Chilean Embassy in Costa Rica.

 

24.       On September 2, 1999, the State submitted its answer to the application.

 

25.       On October 12, 1999, the Commission submitted a brief in which it stated that the answer to the application submitted by Chile was “manifestly time-barred” and requested the Court to reject it and to abstain from considering it when examining the case.

 

26.       On October 25, 1999, the Commission submitted the final list of witnesses and expert witnesses offered in its application and requested the Court to substitute the expert witness, Lucas Sierra Iribarren, with the expert witness, Juan Agustín Figueroa Yávar.  On October 26, 1999, on the instructions of the President, the Secretariat granted the State until November 1, 1999, to submit its observations on the substitution requested by the Commission.

 

27.       On October 26, 1999, the President issued an order in which he convened the Commission and the State to a public hearing to be held at the seat of the Court at 10 a.m. on November 18, 1999, and summoned to the hearing the witnesses, Ciro Colombara López, Matías Insunza Tagle and Alex Muñoz Wilson, alleged victims in the case, and also the expert witnesses, Humberto Nogueira Alcalá, José Zalaquett Daher and Jorge Ovalle Quiroz, all of them proposed by the Commission in its application.  In the same order, the parties were notified that they could present their final oral arguments on the merits of the case immediately after the evidence had been received.

 

28.       The State did not submit observations on the substitution of the expert witness named by the Commission within the period granted to it.  On November 6, 1999, the President issued an order convening Juan Agustín Figueroa Yávar to appear before the Court to give an expert report.

 

29.       On November 8, 1999, Chile submitted a brief indicating that it had no objection to Juan Agustín Figueroa Yávar appearing before the Court.  It also requested the Court to convene José Luis Cea Egaña and Francisco Cumplido, the persons it had proposed in its answer to the application, to give an expert report in the public hearing on the merits of the case.

 

30.       On November 9, 1999, the Court issued an order in which it decided to reject the brief answering the application as it had been presented by the State after the statutory time limit had expired and, based on the provisions of Article 44(1) of the Rules of Procedure, to convene José Luis Cea Egaña and Francisco Cumplido to appear before the Court to give expert reports.

 

31.       On November 15, 1999, Hermes Navarro del Valle submitted a brief to the Court, in the capacity of amicus curiae. 

 

32.       On November 11, 1999, the Commission advised that Alex Muñoz Wilson and Jorge Ovalle Quiroz, respectively witness and expert witness offered by the Commission, could not be present at the public hearing on merits convened by the Court.

 

33.       On November 18, 1999, the Court received the statements of the witnesses and also the reports of the expert witnesses proposed by the Inter-American Commission and the expert witnesses convened by the Court itself, in accordance with Article 44(1) of the Rules of Procedure, in the public audience on merits.  It also heard the final oral arguments of the Commission and the State.

 

 

 

 

 

There appeared before the Court:

 

For the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights:

           

            Carlos Ayala Corao, delegate

            Manuel Velasco Clark, advisor

            Verónica Gómez, advisor

            Juan Pablo Olmedo Bustos, assistant

            Javier Ovalle Andrade, assistant

            Viviana Krsticevic, assistant, and

            Carmen Herrera, assistant

 

For the State of Chile:

           

            Ambassador Edmundo Vargas Carreño, agent; and

            Alejandro Salinas, advisor

 

As witnesses proposed by the Inter-American Commission:

           

            Ciro Colombara López, and

            Matías Insunza Tagle.

 

As expert witnesses proposed by the Inter-American Commission:

           

            José Zalaquett Daher

            Humberto Nogueira Alcalá, and

            Juan Agustín Figueroa Yávar.

 

As expert witnesses called by the Inter-American Court (Article 44(1) of the Rules of Procedure)[1]:

           

            José Luis Cea Egaña, and

            Francisco Cumplido.

 

34.       On September 18, 2000, Sergio García Valdés submitted a brief as an amicus curiae. 

 

35.       On October 6, 2000, on instructions from the President, the Secretariat notified the Commission and the State that it granted them until November 6, 2000, to submit their final written arguments on the merits of the case.  On October 23, the Commission requested an extension of 20 days.  On October 24, the Secretariat informed the parties that the President had granted them an extension until November 27, 2000.

 

36.       On November 27, 2000, the Commission submitted its final written arguments.

 

37.       On November 30, 2000, on the instructions of the Court in plenary and in accordance with Article 44 of the Rules of Procedure, the Secretariat requested the Commission to submit the documentary evidence that justified the request for payment of costs and expenses submitted in the petitionary clauses of its application, together with the corresponding arguments, by December 13, 2000, at the latest.  On December 12, 2000, the Commission requested an extension of one month to submit that information.  On December 13, 2000, the Secretariat informed the Commission that the President had granted it a non-extendable period until January 8, 2001.                         

 

38.       On January 8, 2001, the Commission submitted the documentary evidence that, in its opinion, justified the request for the payment of expenses, submitted in the petitionary clauses of its application, together with the corresponding arguments.  The following day, the Secretariat acknowledged reception and, on the instructions of the President, granted the State until January 24, 2001, to submit its observations.

 

39.       On January 22, 2001, the State submitted a note providing information on the procedure being followed for the draft constitutional reform that would eliminate cinematographic censorship in Chile.  The same day, the Secretariat transmitted this brief to the Commission.

 

40.       On January 25, 2001, Ambassador Guillermo Yunge Bustamante submitted a copy of the note issued by Heraldo Muñoz Valenzuela, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chile, a.i., advising that Alejandro Salinas Rivera, Director of Human Rights of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile had been appointed agent and the Chilean Ambassador to Costa Rica, Guillermo Yunge Bustamante, deputy agent.

 

41.       On January 31, 2001, the State submitted its observations on the Commission’s brief of January 8 that year, with regard to the request for payment of expenses submitted in the petitionary clauses of the application.  Although the State's brief was presented seven days after the statutory time limit, the Court admitted it, applying the criteria of reasonableness and considering that the delay did not impair the balance that the Court should ensure between the protection of human rights and legal security and procedural equity.  The Secretariat informed the State of this on February 3, 2001. 

 

 

V

The Evidence

 

*

*        *

 

Documentary Evidence

 

42.       With the application brief, the Commission presented copies of five documents in five annexes (supra paras. 1 and 12).[2]

43.       The State did not present any evidence, because its brief answering the application was rejected by the Court as time-barred (supra paras. 24 and 30).

 

44.       The Commission forwarded five annexes containing five documents with the brief concerning expenses requested by the Court (supra para. 38).[3]

 

 

*

*        *

 

Testimonial and Expert Evidence

 

45.       In a public hearing held on November 18, 1999, the Court received the declarations of two witnesses and the reports of three expert witnesses proposed by the Inter-American Commission, and also the reports of two expert witnesses convened by the Court, by virtue of the authority indicated in Article 44(1) of the Rules of Procedure.  These statements are summarized below, in the order in which they occurred.

 

 

            a.         Testimony of Ciro Colombara López, alleged victim in the case.

 

He was 28 years of age when the film “The Last Temptation of Christ” was censored.  He was, and still is, a lawyer in private practice, and performed academic duties in the Catholic University of Chile.  He has not seen the film “The Last Temptation of Christ”.  Professionally and academically he is very interested in criminal law, freedom of expression and international human rights law.  He has published a book in Chile on punitive measures relating to freedom of expression.

 

When the proceeding designed to prohibit the exhibition of the film was filed in Chile, through a remedy for protection filed by seven lawyers purporting to represent the Catholic Church and Jesus Christ, he decided to become involved for several reasons.  He felt that it was “tremendously serious” that someone would claim to represent the Catholic Church and

 

 

Jesus Christ and attempt to prohibit the exhibition of a film; an issue that was decisive for freedom of expression in Chile, because it would establish a precedent, was going to be decided; he believed that it was important that, when deciding the case, the Chilean court should give special attention to the applicable rules of international human rights law; and he believed it was particularly serious that artistic freedom of expression was violated.       

 

The judgment that prohibited the exhibition of the film prejudiced him directly and indirectly.  Although it cannot be imputed to the State, his academic career at the Catholic University ended as a result of his professional involvement in the case, because he was told that his participation was not compatible with the performance of his academic functions.  He believes that it is extremely serious that the Chilean courts made no reference to the American Convention or to international human rights law.  The fact that the film was prohibited caused him serious harm, due to his academic activities and his professional interests in freedom of expression, because he now gives classes on freedom of expression in the School of Journalism of the University of Chile and is in contact with academics in other countries.  He was prejudiced as an individual, because he was prevented from having access to an artistic film with an apparently religious content.  Consequently, he was deprived of the possibility of having elements of judgment, forming an opinion and having access to information that was relevant to him.  Lastly, as he is not a Catholic, he considers that his freedom of conscience was violated, because a group of people of a specific religion attempted to impose their own vision about what others may see.

 

            b.         Testimony of Matías Insunza Tagle, alleged victim in the case.

 

When the exhibition of the film “The Last Temptation of Christ” was censored, he was in his fourth year of law studies at the University of Chile and was a student representative.  He has not seen the film “The Last Temptation of Christ”, owing to the judgment of the Supreme Court of Chile. 

 

When the proceeding designed to prohibit the exhibition of the film through a remedy of protection was filed in Chile, he had two reasons for becoming involved.  One was personal, and was that, by filing a remedy of protection, a group of lawyers attempted to impede access to information.  The second reason was that he had been a student representative, since the University he attended was public and tolerant, open to different ideas and expressions, and this prompted him to become part of a remedy for protection to prevent censorship of the exhibition of the film.

 

The judgment that prohibited the exhibition of the film caused him a moral prejudice and impaired his intellectual development, because, owing to the censorship that was imposed, he was prevented from having access to information that was fundamental in order to be able to form an opinion based on solid arguments and not on prejudices.  Owing to his education and because he was a law student, he needed to have an opinion based on legal arguments and on “civic arguments.”  His possibility of intellectual development in order to take part in the public discussion that was generated was restricted.

 

His freedom of conscience was affected by the impossibility of having access to information, and also of thinking in a specific way and establishing, maintaining or changing his own ideas and convictions on a subject.  He was deprived of the possibility of growing and developing intellectually.     

 

c.         Expert report of José Zalaquett Daher, lawyer, specializing in human rights.   

 

The protection of freedom of expression in Chile, in accordance with international law, has two stages.  The first was prior to the State of Chile’s ratification of the American Convention, when the legislation had serious defects in relation to international standards.  The second stage began when the American Convention was ratified, which is when the standards established in that treaty were incorporated into domestic law.  

 

Freedom of expression may be subject to restrictions, but these must respect certain limits.

 

Article 19(12) of the Constitution of Chile stipulates that the law will establish a system of censorship for the exhibition and publicity of cinematographic productions, while article 60 says that only those issues that the Constitution expressly indicates are a matter of law.  If the provisions of the Convention and the rights that it regulates are considered to be of constitutional rank, the Convention would have modified article 19(12) of the Chilean Constitution, in the sense that the censorship system could only relate to classifying public entertainments in order to protect children and adolescents.  Even if we believe that the Convention and the rights regulated in it only have force of law, it is to that law - the Convention  - that the Constitution defers when establishing the censorship system.  Also, it is a law, subsequent to Decree Law No. 679 of 1974, which establishes the obligation of the Cinematographic Censorship Council “to reject films for [numerous] reasons.”

 

As for the role of the Chilean courts in regard to freedom of expression, there have been various decisions on cinematographic censorship.  The Supreme Court’s arguments establishing censorship relate to a possible conflict of rights, because, in case of doubt, when distinguishing between apparent or possible conflict between the right to privacy or honor and the right to freedom of expression, it tends to favor restriction over freedom.  Furthermore, although it is of a permanent nature, the protection of honor by a precautionary measure is not considered a measure of censorship.  The judgment of the Court of Appeal of Santiago of January 20, 1997, established that precautionary protection is not censorship, even when it is indefinitely extended.  

 

Regarding the grounds for the Supreme Court of Chile’s decision in this case, he believed that it used legal remedies and norms of substantive law improperly, for purposes for which they were not created.  When establishing that the honor of the person of Jesus Christ has been violated by a specific artistic or philosophical interpretation and that this affects dignity and freedom of self-determination, according to a person’s beliefs and values, it is confusing the issues, and this signifies that it is not regulating the possible conflict of rights appropriately.  Although many people find the film shocking, others find it illustrative and instructive, and it should not be classified as blasphemy. He considers that the Supreme Court decided to suppress declarations made in the film as blasphemous or at least heretical because, in that Court's opinion, they were shocking.  However, as it was unable to suppress those declarations, the Supreme Court found an indirect way of doing this, which runs counter to the rational sense of conflict of laws and juridical reasoning.  Blasphemy, which is different from heresy, supposes insulting or ridiculing religious figures or beliefs, with no intention of making an artistic reflection or contributing to a debate. 

 

With regard to freedom of conscience, in this case we are speaking of freedom of belief, conscience and religion in two ways: one that coincides with freedom of expression and another that implies the freedom to seek and receive information.  The freedom to form an opinion or a religious belief and to change it exists; consequently, the ability to receive and seek information is necessary; to the contrary, a person would not have access to all the currents of information and, therefore, could not use them to maintain a belief, to change it, to contest it, or to discuss it with others.  In this restricted meaning, he believes that it may be said that the Supreme Court’s judgment violates Article 12 of the Convention.

 

As regards the reform of constitutional legislation, the good faith of the State of Chile is evident.  It is also evident that Chilean justice disregards international law, owing to several factors; domestic law and its alleged supremacy, and an excess of work and the resulting difficulty to study new law.  It could be counterproductive for the domestic legal system if laws are reformed or a law is enacted every time the Supreme Court disregards the fact that there has been a tacit derogation, because it would be considered that self-executing de jure norms are not applicable in this sphere.  The most important reform would be one which authoritatively reminds the Judiciary that de jure incorporation exists.  If this reform were carried out, together with the reform of article 19(12) of the Constitution, they would both be more effective. 

 

Regarding the self-executing character of international laws in domestic law, laws that establish a mandate to codify and those of a programmatic nature are not self-executing; however, laws that establish a subjective right, affirming a right and limiting its restrictions, are self-executing.  He indicated that the case of the law that prohibits imprisonment for debt is an example of the practice of the Chilean courts concerning the self-execution of norms contained in human rights treaties ratified by Chile.

 

Any of the Powers of the State may engage its international responsibility.  Chile complies with the obligation to guarantee the free and full exercise of the rights embodied in the Convention by incorporating this treaty de jure into its domestic law.  However, in view of the failure of the Judiciary to interpret it adequately, it should be understood that there is an additional obligation for the Legislature to guarantee that interpretation.  This will be achieved by domestic legislation indicating that the international law should be understood to be incorporated into domestic law.  If complied with, this obligation to guarantee could affect reparation but not legal responsibility.  In his opinion, the reform of article 19(12) of the Chilean Constitution does not help, because it will not produce the effect of preventing the Judiciary from censoring films, books or other artistic manifestations, using permanent precautionary measures.  Moreover, the proposed reform “includes an element that distorts the international criteria”; this is the further difficulty that it is incorporated into the Criminal Code regarding crimes when it is committed “in contempt of or offending public authorities.”

 

The Cinematographic Censorship Council has prohibited many films.  In some cases it has revised the classification and allowed films that it had censored to be shown.

 

Using the right to honor as a basis for prohibiting the exhibition of a film is “an indirect and undue use of legal provisions that have been developed for other situations, in order to adapt them to the feelings of the Court.”  When the judgment states that honor is identified with the capacity for self-determination, according to a person’s values and beliefs, it is, at the very least, confusing honor with the freedom to believe, which is religion.

 

d.         Expert report of Humberto Nogueira Alcalá, lawyer, constitutional law expert.

 

The Chilean Constitution does not establish any norm concerning the rank of international treaty law and international common law in relation to domestic law; it only establishes the system of incorporation and applicability of international treaty law to domestic law.  Articles 32(17) and 50(1) of the Constitution indicate that the President of the Republic negotiates and concludes treaties, Congress adopts or rejects them, but does not have the authority to introduce amendments and, subsequently, the President of the Republic ratifies them.  The Chilean legal system, applied in good faith and according to the corresponding hermeneutics criteria, recognized the primacy of international law over domestic law when it ratified the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; that took place before the Constitution entered into effect.  Consequently, should there be normative conflicts between domestic law and international law, Chile is obliged to ensure that international law prevails.

 

With regard to admission of international human rights law into the Chilean legal system being a limitation to sovereignty, the text of article 5(1) of the 1980 Constitution established that sovereignty was inherent in the Nation and was exercised by the people and by the authorities established in accordance with the constitutional system.  Article 5(2) established the essential rights emanating from human nature as the limit to sovereignty.  In the process of transition from the authoritarian regime to democracy, 54 constitutional reforms were made and one of them was to article 5(2), by adding a phrase which stated “that the organs of the State must respect and promote the rights contained in the Constitution, and also in the international treaties that Chile has ratified and that are in force.”  This phrase consolidated the notion that the essential human rights constitute a system with a dual source in the Chilean legal system: one of a domestic nature - the Constitution - and the other of an international nature, which incorporates into Chilean laws, at the very least, those rights contained in the treaties that the State has ratified freely, voluntarily and spontaneously.  This implies that the constitutional bloc is made up of the rights contained in the treaties and the rights embodied in the Constitution itself.

 

With regard to pre-trial detention, Chilean superior courts have accepted that, in accordance with the American Convention, no one may be imprisoned for debt.  They have also indicated that interrogations may not be conducted using torture, invoking the provisions of the Convention.  However, this is exceptional, as there are matters on which the Chilean courts and the Supreme Court disregard international human rights law and when two rights such as the right to freedom of expression and the right to honor are in conflict they favor the right to honor. This is a systematic policy.

 

The source of the right to freedom of expression is article 19(12) of the Constitution, which must be complemented by Article 13 of the Convention; this implies that in Chile this freedom includes freedom of expression and information.  Furthermore, freedom of expression prohibits any type of censorship and only allows subsequent restrictions, except in the case of public entertainments, where an exception is established for the moral protection of children and adolescents.  A second exception could be in states of emergency, because Article 27 of the Convention allows the exercise of freedom of expression to be suspended on a temporary basis.

 

The final sub-paragraph of article 19(12) of the Constitution establishes a system of cinematographic censorship; this resulted in a norm of legal rank establishing a Cinematographic Classification Council that could refuse to allow the exhibition of cinematographic works for adults.  There are also provisions in the Internal State Security Act, the Criminal Code, and the Code of Military Justice that allow the preventive “requisition” of the complete edition of certain types of works and prevention of their circulation and dissemination.  It is not only a normative problem, the jurisprudential criteria of the Chilean superior courts is fundamental and this gives the right to honor predominance over freedom of expression, in clear and evident violation of Article 13(2) of the Convention.

 

The principle which states that the norm that is most favorable to the exercise of human rights should be used, should apply even with regard to freedom of expression.  The Supreme Court of Justice and the Court of Appeal of Santiago do not need article 19(12) of the Constitution to be amended in order to give primacy to Article 13(2) of the American Convention over the provisions of domestic law, but should apply Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties directly, that is “the hermeneutic principle of the law which best favors the exercise of the right and also the criteria of the delimitation of the right.”

 

e.         Expert report of Juan Agustín Figueroa Yávar, lawyer, expert in procedural law.       

 

According to the American Convention, judgments delivered by the Inter-American Court are binding.  Based on Article 62(1) and 62(2) of the Convention, States Parties may recognize the jurisdiction of the Court unconditionally or may establish reservations.  Chile deposited the document of ratification on August 21, 1990, and indicated that it recognized as obligatory, de jure, the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court in cases relating to the interpretation and application of the American Convention, pursuant to the provisions of Article 62 of this treaty.  The expression “de jure”, signifies that commitment to the respective decision is not conditioned in any way.

 

The Supreme Court of Chile has stated that international law has precedence over domestic law.  With regard to the ranking of international law, a significant action occurred in 1989 with the constitutional amendment of article 5 of the Constitution; this established that the fundamental rights are not only indicated and recognized in the Constitution itself, but also by international human rights treaties.    

 

No provision in domestic legislation may have pre-eminence or in any way obstruct real and effective compliance with the decisions of the Inter-American Court.  International treaties are understood to be incorporated into the law and most doctrine considers that they are incorporated with at least the same rank as constitutional laws.  That is, treaties may expand the sphere of constitutional law and, furthermore, it should be understood that international laws have pre-eminence over domestic laws.                   

 

In strictly legal matters, Chilean jurisprudence has recognized the pre-eminence of the Convention over domestic laws.  For example, regarding fraudulent emission of cheques “it has understood that domestic laws, which conditioned release on bail to the prior deposit of the amount of the respective document, were invalidated by the provisions [of the Pact] San José”; moreover, it granted release on bail to persons who wished to be extradited, invoking the Chilean constitutional law and the Convention.  This has not been the criterion with regard to prior censorship, because the Convention was violated by applying the constitutional norm, which allowed the exhibition of films to be censored.

 

Chile has said that it has complied by submitting a draft constitutional reform.  However, this is unnecessary because, since international laws are incorporated with a constitutional rank, they produce the tacit annulment of norms such as the one that allows prior censorship, and counterproductive because, by submitting the draft reform, it is implicitly declaring that, in order to admit international norms, a prior internal process is required.  The draft reform is also belated because the international responsibility of the State originated in 1990 with the ratification of the Convention, while the constitutional reform was introduced in 1997, and reactive because it was sent when the judgment in first instance had been delivered by the Court of Appeal of Santiago.

 

Chileans had a right to see the film from the time the Pact of San José was ratified.  If the constitutional reform is an explanatory or interpretive law, it will contribute to legal certainty.

 

f.          Expert report of José Luis Cea Egaña, lawyer, expert in freedom of expression.

 

He is aware of the draft constitutional reform submitted to the Chamber of Deputies by President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle on April 16, 1997, which has already been adopted by that Chamber.  The draft reform establishes two modifications to the first and final paragraphs of article 19 of the Constitution.  In the first paragraph, the reform establishes the freedom to emit opinions and to inform without prior censorship, which is extended to expressions of an artistic or cultural nature.  The final paragraph of the draft replaces prior censorship by a classification system in which the client of cinematographic exhibitions chooses whether he wishes to view this type of spectacle, in accordance with the principle of self-regulation and freedom.  This constitutional reform may be accompanied by complementary reforms to the legislation.

 

Once the constitutional reform has been adopted, Chileans and all the country's inhabitants will be constitutionally and legally able to attend freely the exhibition of the film that was censored.  Under the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution, once the constitutional reform has been adopted, its provisions become mandatory immediately and directly, and the provisions currently in force, together with the judicial decisions that are contrary to the reform are annulled.

 

With regard to freedom of conscience and religion, he considered that Article 12 of the Convention should be respected; this refers to freedom to profess a religion, to manifest one’s religious beliefs, not to be persecuted for one’s religion and to change religions.  Freedom of conscience is closely related to freedom of expression.  In this case, none of these conducts is codified or constituted, and therefore the above-mentioned article was not violated.