Cesti Hurtado Case, Judgment of January 29, 2000, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 65 (2000).
In the Cesti Hurtado case,
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (hereinafter
“the Court” or “the Inter-American Court”), composed of the following judges
(*):
Antônio A. Cançado Trindade, President
Máximo Pacheco Gómez, Vice-President
Oliver Jackman, Judge
Alirio Abreu Burelli, Judge
Sergio García Ramírez, Judge and
Carlos Vicente de Roux Rengifo, Judge;
also present,
Manuel E. Ventura Robles, Secretary and
Renzo Pomi, Deputy Secretary
pursuant to Article 67 of the American Convention
on Human Rights (hereinafter “the Convention” or “the American Convention”)
and Article 58 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court (hereinafter “the Rules
of Procedure”) rules on the request for interpretation of the judgment on
the merits delivered by the Court on September 29, 1999, in the Cesti Hurtado
case (hereinafter “the judgment on merits”), presented by the State of Peru
(hereinafter “the State” or “Peru”) on October 13, 1999.
I
Competence and Composition of the Court
1. Article 67 of the Convention stipulates
that
[t]he judgment of the Court shall
be final and not subject to appeal. In
case of disagreement as to the meaning or scope of the judgment, the Court
shall interpret it at the request of any of the parties, provided the request
is made within ninety days from the date of notification of the judgment.
In accordance with the article mentioned, the Court
is competent to interpret its judgments and, when considering the request
for interpretation, it shall have the same composition, whenever possible,
that it had when it delivered the respective judgment (Article 58.3 of the
Rules of Procedure). On this occasion,
the Court is composed of judges who pronounced the judgment on the merits,
interpretation of which has been requested by Peru.
II
Introduction
of the Request for Interpretation
2. On October 13, 1999, pursuant to Article
67 of the American Convention and Article 58 of the Rules of Procedure, the
State submitted a request for interpretation of the judgment on the merits.
Furthermore, Peru stated that “the suspension of the effect of the
judgment prohibited by Article 58.4 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court
[was] not applicable in the instant case [...] insofar as the present request
for interpretation and clarification related [...] to aspects regarding execution
of the judgment.”
III
Proceeding
before the Court
3. In a note of October 15, 1999, the Secretariat
of the Court forwarded a copy of the request for interpretation to the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter “the Commission” or “the Inter-American
Commission”) and, pursuant to Article 58.2 of the Rules of Procedure, invited
it to submit its comments on the request for interpretation filed by Peru,
by December 15, 1999, at the latest.
4. On October 27, 1999, the Commission submitted
a brief in which it requested the Court to take into consideration “that the
State [was] incurring in non-compliance with the judgment [on the merits]”
since, as at that date, it had not liberated Mr. Cesti Hurtado or complied
with the rulings of the Court in the said judgment. In this respect, the Commission declared that,
as the State had not complied immediately with the judgment on the merits
it should not “file the [...] request for interpretation because this [was]
absolutely disallowed by the provisions of Article 58.4 of the Rules of Procedure
of the H[onorable] Court.”
5. On
November 19, 1999, pursuant to Articles 29.2 and 58 of the Rules of Procedure,
the Court issued an order in which it declared that the request for interpretation
submitted by the State did not suspend the effect of the judgment on the merits
and authorized the President of the Court to invite the parties to a public
audience on the interpretation.
6. On
December 6, 1999, the President of the Court (hereinafter “the President”)
issued an order in which he invited the State and the Commission to a public
hearing to be held on January 25, 2000, at the seat of the Court in order
to hear the points of view of both parties on the request for interpretation
of the judgment on the merits filed by the State.
7. On December 14, 1999, the Inter-American
Commission submitted its written arguments on the request for interpretation.
8. On
January 10, 2000, the State presented a brief dated January 6, 2000, in which
it requested the Court “if it saw fit, to direct that [the] hearing should
be suspended”, because:
1) Gustavo Cesti Hurtado now enjoys unrestricted liberty[;]
2) The prohibition to leave the country in effect against
the said Mr. Cesti has been lifted[;]
3) The Peruvian Government is devoting itself to studying
friendly settlements aimed at concluding all the proceedings relating to human
rights.
and
requested a “prudent lapse to allow [it] to fine tune the arrangements to
be made in order to achieve this end.”
9. On January 17, 2000, the President issued
an order in which he decided to proceed with the public hearing to be held
on January 25, 2000.
10. On January 25, 2000, a public hearing was
held on the request for interpretation of the judgment on the merits at the
seat of the Court.
There
appeared
for the State of Peru:
Rolando
Eyzaguirre, Deputy Agent, and
Alberto
Cortez, Advisor
for
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights:
Christina
Cerna, Lawyer, and
Alberto
Borea Odría, Advisor.
IV
Object of
the Request
11. In the request for interpretation, the State
asked the Court to clarify some matters related to the “meaning and the scope”
of the judgment on merits. In the
following chapters, the Court will proceed to examine the different points
that are the object of the request for interpretation.
V
Admissibility
12. As a prerequisite for the admissibility
of the request for interpretation of judgment, Article 67 of the Convention
requires that this request be made “within ninety days from the date of notification
of the judgment.” The Court has confirmed
that the judgment on the merits in the instant case was notified to the State
on October 4, 1999. Therefore, the
request for interpretation was submitted within the specified time limit (supra
2), as were the Commission’s arguments.
13. The Court must now analyze whether the substantial
aspects of the request for interpretation comply with the applicable rules.
In this respect, Article 58 of the Rules of Procedure establishes that
[t]he request for interpretation,
referred to in Article 67 of the Convention, may be made in connection with
judgments on the merits or on reparations and shall be filed with the Secretariat.
It shall state with precision the issues relating to the meaning or
scope of the judgment of which the interpretation is requested.
Pursuant
to this Article, the Court will proceed to interpret those aspects of its
judgment on which there is a doubt about the meaning or scope.
VI
The Freedom
of Mr. Cesti Hurtado
14. In
the request for interpretation, the State asked for the interpretation of
the first ruling of the judgment on the merits in relation to the eighth ruling
of the judgment. In this respect,
the State requested that the Court interpret whether the judgment on the merits
ha[d] required the immediate liberty
of Captain Cesti Hurtado or [whether], to the contrary, [...] it [did] not
impede the aggrieved parties from filing a complaint, prior to his liberation,
in the jurisdiction that [had] been declared competent in this respect, in
order to prevent the execution of the judgment leading to the situation of
an irreversible evasion of justice by Captain Cesti Hurtado.
During the public hearing, the State requested the
Court to clarify the eighth ruling of the said judgment in relation to paragraph
129 of the judgment.
15. In
this respect, the Court’s first ruling stated that
[...] the State violated Articles
7.6 and 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights with regard to Gustavo
Adolfo Cesti Hurtado, in the terms established in paragraphs 123 to 133 of
this judgment, and […] order[ed Peru to comply with] the decision of the Chamber
of Public Law of Lima of February 12, 1997, on the petition for habeas corpus
filed by Gustavo Adolfo Cesti Hurtado.
In the eighth ruling, the Court stated
[...] that the proceeding against
Gustavo Adolfo Cesti Hurtado under the military justice system [was] incompatible
with the American Convention on Human Rights and [..] order[ed] the State
to annul this action and all the effects that may derive from it.
In paragraph 129 the Court stated that
[t]he decision made by the Public
Law Chamber on the situation of Gustavo Cesti Hurtado concluded the matter
that concerns this Court in relation to Articles 7 and 25 of the Convention,
because a tribunal with competence on protective measures adopted a final,
unappealable decision conceding habeas corpus to the petitioner and protecting
him from the objective threat to his liberty resulting from procedures initiated
under military jurisdiction. This
decision does not impede the competent authorities, if appropriate, from making
decisions on the criminal responsibility of Gustavo Cesti Hurtado with regard
to the illegal acts attributed to him. Such
decisions do not concern the Court, but rather the competent domestic tribunals.
16. The Inter-American Commission indicated
that the first question was beyond the scope of the Court’s competence and,
consequently, a pronouncement was not in order. Moreover, the Commission declared that the judgment on the merits
referred to an act – the liberation of Mr. Cesti Hurtado – that should have
occurred when the Chamber of Public Law issued its decision on the petition
for habeas corpus in his favor, so that any other consideration was not material
to the object of this proceeding.
17.
This Court considers that the judgment on the merits is clear with
regard to meaning and scope when it orders the State to comply with “the decision
of the Chamber of Public Law of Lima of February 12, 1997, on the petition
for habeas corpus filed by Gustavo Adolfo Cesti Hurtado” and “to annul the
proceeding […] under the military justice system […] and all the effects that
may derive from it”, so that the State should immediately comply with the
ruling. Furthermore, the Court has already duly clarified
in its judgment on the merits that “[t]his decision does not impede the competent authorities […] from making
decisions about the criminal responsibility of Gustavo Cesti Hurtado with
regard to the illegal acts attributed to him”.
VII
Embargoes decreed on the property of
Mr. Cesti
Hurtado
18.
In its second point, the State requested the Court to clarify whether,
in accordance with paragraphs 183 and 197 of the judgment on the merits and
the eighth ruling of this judgment, the embargoes decreed on Mr. Cesti Hurtado’s
property should be lifted as a consequence of the judgment on the merits or
“whether it [should] make a decision on this issue as a result of the judgment on reparations that might eventually
be issued.”
19. Paragraph
183 of the judgment on the merits indicates that
[t]he Court considers that, in the
context of Article 21 of the American Convention, it was not proved that there
had been a violation, per se, of the right to property of Gustavo Cesti Hurtado.
The effects on his assets or on his ability to work that his detention,
prosecution and conviction may have produced would derive from the violation
of Articles 7, 8 and 25 of the Convention; therefore, the Court reserves its
decision on such effects until the reparations stage, in such event.
Paragraph
197 of the judgment on the merits establishes that
the consequences on the assets of
Gustavo Cesti Hurtado due to his detention, prosecution and conviction, in
particular, the embargo on his property, is a matter to be considered at the
reparations stage.
20. On
this point, the Commission stated that the expression “all” is sufficiently
clear and covers all the legal effects deriving from the undue proceeding
against Mr. Cesti Hurtado under the military justice system.
21. In
the eighth ruling of the judgment on merits (supra 15), the Court ordered the State “to annul this action and all
the effects that may derive from it.” This
Court observes that the annulling of a proceeding implies the invalidation
of all its legal effects. This is
the case of the embargoes decreed on Mr. Cesti Hurtado’s property.
VIII
Appropriate procedural channel to
establish
competence
22. Points
3 and 4 of the request for interpretation refer essentially to the same matter;
therefore, the Court will proceed to examine them together.
23. In
the third point, the State referred to paragraph 130 of the judgment on the
merits and consulted the Court whether it could be maintained that the said
judgment constituted a precedent that might, in the future, be applied to
similar cases occurring under the national jurisdictions of the States Parties
and under international jurisdiction, in the sense that habeas corpus constituted
the appropriate procedural route for disputing the military jurisdiction when
there was an alleged deprivation of liberty or threat of this.
24.
In its fourth point, the State requested an interpretation of paragraph
132 of the judgment on the merits in order to know what the correct way to
act would be if, for example, someone accused of aggravated terrorism or treason
should dispute the competence of the military jurisdiction when the latter
had initiated a trial, by filing a petition for habeas corpus; and “[w]hat
other channels the military justice system would have had to ‘insist on its
own competence’.”
25. Paragraph
130 of the judgment states that
[a]s the State has alleged, Peruvian
legislation embodies recourses other than habeas corpus to settle jurisdictional
disputes between different judicial organs. However, it is also certain that, according
to the American Convention and Peruvian legislation itself, the judge of the
petition for habeas corpus has the latitude to deal with the competence of
the official who has ordered the deprivation of liberty. Indeed, in the context of the facts of the instant case, the judicial
authority responsible for deciding on habeas corpus should have examined the
information available in order to define whether the intended arrest was arbitrary.
This information necessarily included the competence of the authority
who issued the order of arrest, taking into consideration the alleged facts
and the circumstances of the person to whom they were attributed and, consequently,
the regularity of the proceedings under which the order would be issued.
Paragraph 132 of the judgment indicates “that the
habeas corpus decision never deprived the military justice system of the possibility
of insisting on its own competence, through the adequate legal channels, in
order to definitively resolve the dispute.”
26. The
Inter-American Commission stated that paragraph 130 of the judgment on the
merits clearly resolved the question posed by the State in its points 3 and
4, so that it was not in order for the Court to make a pronouncement on them.
27. The
Court considers that domestic legislation usually establishes an appropriate
procedural channel for resolving jurisdictional disputes. Likewise, the judge of a petition for habeas
corpus decides whether a deprivation of liberty is of an arbitrary nature. The judgment on the merits only refers to this.
It is not in order for this Court to make a pronouncement with regard
to the applicability of its judgments in hypothetical future situations.
IX
Jurisprudence
of the Court
28. In
the fifth point, the State requested the Court to clarify whether it should
consider that the judgment on the merits corroborated or modified the criterion
sustained in the Genie Lacayo and Loayza Tamayo cases or the criterion sustained
in the Castillo Petruzzi et al case,
with regard to the military jurisdiction in relation to civilians.
29. The
Commission stated that the cases mentioned by the State involved specific
situations that were substantially different from that of Mr. Cesti Hurtado,
so that it was not necessary to discuss them.
30. The
Court manifests its considerations and criteria through judgments and decisions.
Analysis of these and the comparative study of its jurisprudence are
eminently academic tasks, beyond the functions of this Court.
The State’s fifth query is not a request for interpretation of the
judgment itself, but rather of the latter in comparison with other judgments
delivered by this Court. This comparative
task is outside the provisions of Article 67 of the Convention. Therefore, the Court believes that it is not in order to proceed
to interpret this point and thus, it will not make a pronouncement on the
matter.
X
Role of the
Amici
Curiae
31. In
the last point of its request, the State refers to the fact that Heriberto
Manuel Benítez Rivas had presented a brief, in the capacity of amicus curiae, and had also taken part
in the proceeding as a witness proposed by the Inter-American Commission,
and asked the Court about the “legitimacy” of a persons acting in this dual
role in a proceeding before this Court.
32. On
this point, the Commission stated that, while the Court had referred to the
presentations made by the amici curiae,
“in no way [was it saying] that it ha[d] taken them into consideration; much
less, that it had use[d] their arguments to motivate the judgment. This reference
[was] therefore merely by way of information.”
33. The Court considers that the State’s sixth
request is outside the scope of interpretation of judgment as contemplated
in Article 67 of the American Convention and Article 58 of the Rules of Procedure.
Therefore, this Court will not make a pronouncement on the matter.
XI
For
the above reasons,
The Inter-American
Court of Human Rights
pursuant
to Article 67 of the Convention and Article 58 of the Rules of Procedure
decides:
unanimously,
1. That only the first, second, third and
fourth points of the request for interpretation of the judgment of September
29, 1999, in the Cesti Hurtado case, filed by the State of Peru, are admissible.
2. That the first and eighth rulings of the
judgment of September 29, 1999, in which the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights ordered the State to comply with the decision of the Chamber of Public
Law of Lima of February 12, 1997, and to annul the proceeding, as well as
all the effects deriving from it, were of an obligatory nature and, therefore,
should be complied with immediately, although this did not impede the competent
authorities from making decisions on Mr. Cesti Hurtado’s criminal responsibility
with regard to the illegal acts that are attributed to him.
3. That the eighth ruling of the judgment
of September 29, 1999, by which the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ordered
the annulment of the proceeding against Mr. Cesti Hurtado, implied the invalidation
of all the legal effects of this, including, among others, annulment of the
embargoes decreed on his property.
4. That it is not in order for the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights to make a pronouncement on the applicability of its
judgments in hypothetical future situations and that, in this case, the appropriateness
of the remedy of habeas corpus as a procedural channel to define whether the
detention of Mr. Cesti Hurtado was of an arbitrary nature was clearly and
duly established by the Court in its judgment of September 29, 1999.
Done in Spanish and
English, the Spanish text being authentic, at the seat of the Court in San
José, Costa Rica, on the 29th day of January 2000.
Antônio A. Cançado Trindade
President
Máximo Pacheco-Gómez
Oliver Jackman
Alirio
Abreu-Burelli Sergio García-Ramírez
Carlos Vicente de Roux-Rengifo
Manuel E. Ventura-Robles
Secretary
So
ordered,
Antônio A. Cançado Trindade
President
Manuel E. Ventura-Robles
Secretary