In the
Blake case,
the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (hereinafter “the Court” or “the Inter-American Court”),
composed of the following judges:
Antônio A. Cançado Trindade, President
Máximo Pacheco Gómez, Vice-President
Hernán Salgado Pesantes, Judge
Oliver Jackman, Judge
Alirio Abreu Burelli, Judge
Sergio García Ramírez, Judge
Carlos Vicente de Roux Rengifo, Judge and
Alfonso Novales Aguirre, Judge ad hoc;
also present,
Manuel
E. Ventura Robles, Secretary and
Renzo
Pomi, Deputy Secretary
in accordance
with Article 67 of the American Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter “the
Convention” or “the Inter-American Convention”) and Articles 29.2 and 58 of
the Rules of Procedure of the Court (hereinafter “the Rules of Procedure”)
decides on the request for interpretation of the judgement pronounced by the
Court on January 22, 1999, in the Blake case (hereinafter “the judgement on
reparations”), presented by the State of Guatemala (hereinafter “the State”
or “Guatemala”) on April 21, 1999.
I
1. In
accordance with Article 67 of the Convention, the Court is competent to interpret
its judgements and, when considering the request for interpretation, it shall
be composed, whenever possible, of the same judges who delivered the respective
judgement (Article 58.3 of the Rules of Procedure). On this occasion, the Court is composed of
the judges who delivered the judgement on reparations, the interpretation
of which has been requested by Guatemala.
II
2. On April 21, 1999, the State presented a request for interpretation
of the judgement on reparations, in accordance with Article 67 of the American
Convention.
3. In a note of April 23, 1999, the Secretariat of the Court (hereinafter
“the Secretariat”), forwarded copies of the request for interpretation to
the next of kin of Nicholas Blake and to the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (hereinafter “the Commission” or “the Inter-American Commission”)
and, in accordance with the instructions of the President of the Court (hereinafter
“the President”), invited them to present their comments by May 21, 1999,
at the latest.
4. On May 21, 1999, the Commission presented its written comments
on the request for interpretation. The
same day, the next of kin of Nicholas Blake presented their comments.
III
5. In the request for interpretation, the
State declared that “[f]rom the literal transcription of the relevant parts
of [the judgement on merits and the judgement on reparations], it is determined
that the judgement on reparations contains an assessment of economic compensation
that is totally distinct from the one indicated in the judgement on merits”,
because the latter establishes that Guatemala should compensate the victim’s
next of kin for expenses “incurred in their representations to the Guatemalan
authorities in connection with this process”, while the judgement on reparations
orders payment of expenses of an extrajudicial nature and the reimbursement
of expenses incurred in processing the case before the inter-American human
rights system.
6. In the relevant ruling of the judgement
on merits the Courts resolved unanimously to,
[...]
4. declare[.] that the State of Guatemala
[i]s obliged to pay a fair compensation to the relatives of Mr. Nicholas Chapman
Blake and reimburse them for the expenses incurred in their representations
to the Guatemalan authorities in connection with this process;
7. In the relevant ruling of the judgement on reparations, the
Court decided unanimously,
[...]
2. To order the State of Guatemala to pay:
a) US$151,000.00 (one hundred and fifty-one
thousand United States dollars) or the equivalent in Guatemalan currency,
to the injured parties, Richard Blake, Mary Blake, Richard Blake Jr. and Samuel
Blake, for reparations distributed as indicated in paragraphs 58, 50 and 49
of this judgement;..
[...]
iii. US$16,000.00 (sixteen thousand United States
dollars) for expenses of an extrajudicial nature.
b) And also, US$10,000.00 (ten thousand United
States dollars) or the equivalent in Guatemalan currency to the injured parties,
Richard Blake, Mary Blake, Richard Blake Jr. and Samuel Blake, to reimburse
the expenses they incurred in processing the case before the inter-American
system for the protection of human rights, as established in paragraph 70
of this judgement.
[...]
8. After examining Guatemala’s presentation, the Court concludes
that the request seeks the interpretation of two points in the judgement on
reparations in relation to the judgement on merits.
9. The first issue refers to determining whether the compensation
ordered by the Court under the heading “expenses of an extrajudicial nature”
(judgement on reparations), may be considered within the concept of “expenses
incurred in their representations to the Guatemalan authorities in connection
with this process” (judgement on merits) (supra 6).
10. A second aspect of the request for interpretation refers to the
Court’s ruling that the injured parties should be paid $10.000.00 (ten thousand
United States dollars) to “reimburse expenses they incurred in processing
the case before the inter-American system for the protection of human rights”.
In this respect, the State’s request inquires whether the Commission
and the Court can be included in the “category of Guatemalan authorities”.
11. Having determined the aspects of the judgement on reparations
on which the State has requested its interpretation, the Court will now proceed
to consider admissibility.
IV
12. As a condition of the admissibility of a request for interpretation
of judgement, Article 67 of the Convention requires that it should be presented
“within ninety days from the date of notification of the judgement”.
In the instant case, the Court has verified that the judgement on reparations
was notified to the State on January 25, 1999.
Therefore, the request for interpretation of April 21, 1999, was presented
within the time limit (supra 2 ).
13. With regard
to the comments presented by the Commission and by the next of kin of Nicholas
Blake, they were also presented within the appropriate period and, therefore,
the Court considers that it is admissible to examine them.
14. It now corresponds to the Court to verify whether the request
for interpretation complies with the regulatory requirements. In this respect, Article 58.1 of the Rules
of Procedure establishes that
[t]he
request for interpretation, referred to in Article 67 of the Convention, may
be made in connection with judgements on the merits or on reparations and
shall be filed with the Secretariat. It
shall state with precision the issues relating to the meaning or scope of
the judgement of which the interpretation is requested.
According to the provision in
the Convention that this Article refers to, the Court is authorized to interpret
its judgements should there be a disagreement as to their meaning or scope.
15. As mentioned above (supra
5), the State alleges that its request for interpretation is founded on discrepancies
between the judgement on merits delivered by the Court on January 24, 1998,
and the judgement on reparations delivered on January 22, 1999, since “[f]rom
the literal transcription of the relevant parts of both judgements, it is
determined that the judgement on reparations contains an assessment of economic
compensation that is totally distinct from the one indicated in the judgement
on merits”.
16. Regarding the request
filed by the State, the Inter-American Commission indicated that it is “indisputable
that the ‘expenses of an extrajudicial nature’ that the […] Court ordered
to be paid are included among the expenses incurred by the next of kin of
[the] victim ‘in their representations to the Guatemalan authorities’. As the Court has already mentioned in the judgement
on reparations “such expenses are of an extrajudicial nature since, as has
been proved, the next of kin of Nicholas Blake did not have recourse to the
domestic tribunals”[1]. The Commission added that the Court was clear
when it stated the reasons that justified the payment of the expenses in this
case, and cited paragraphs 42 to 50, 69 and 70, among others, of the judgement
on reparations. Moreover, it indicated
that this reimbursement was included in the concept of “fair compensation”.
17. The next of kin of Nicholas
Blake stated that there was no impreciseness in the judgement on reparations,
which, in their opinion, specifically incorporated the terms of the Convention.
They therefore requested the Court to declare the request inadmissible.
18. The Court has stated that
[the]
interpretation of a judgement implies not only the precision of the text of
the rulings of the judgement, but also the determination of the scope, meaning
and intention of the ruling, according to the relevant considerations. This has been the criterion of international
jurisprudence (Eur. Court H. R., Ringeisen
case (Interpretation of the Judgment of 22 June 1972), judgment of 23
June 1973, Series A, Vol. 16)[2].
19. Likewise, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights
has established that the subject matter of the interpretation of a judgement
cannot modify obligatory aspects of the judgement[3].
20. With regard to the request for interpretation, the Court considers
that its findings in a previous case are applicable, in the sense
that the
transparency of this Tribunal’s proceedings is enhanced by clarification,
when it so deems appropriate, of the content and scope of its Judgements,
thereby dissipating any doubts about them and that they may not be challenged
by merely formal considerations[4].
21. In its brief, the State affirms that, according
to Article 31.1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the general
rule is that “the terms should be interpreted according to their ordinary
meaning”. The Court observes that
the article mentioned by Guatemala does not establish a sole criterion for
interpretation because, fundamentally, treaties should be interpreted “in
good faith and in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”.
22. In view of the foregoing, the Court considers
that, even when the scope and meaning of the provisions of the judgement on
reparations are clear, it is useful to explain the points raised by the State
in order to eliminate any doubts regarding the payment of expenses of an extrajudicial
nature and the reimbursement of the expenses incurred in processing the case
before the inter-American system for the protection of human rights.
V
reimbursement of expenses
incurred before the inter-American system
23. The Court
proceeds to examine clauses a.iii. and b) of the second ruling of the judgement
on reparations which ordered payment of reparations for extrajudicial expenses
and reimbursement of expenses incurred in processing the case before the inter-American
system (supra 7).
24. In its request for interpretation, the State
referred to the fourth ruling of the judgement on merits and to the second
ruling, clauses a.iii. and b), of the judgement on reparations. On these points, the State alleged that there
are “absolute” discrepancies between them, because the judgement on merits
ordered Guatemala to reimburse “the expenses incurred in their representations
to the Guatemalan authorities in connection with this process” while the judgement
on reparations ordered the State to pay for extrajudicial expenses and to
reimburse the expenses incurred in processing the case before the inter-American
system. In the ordinary sense, the
phrase “expenses in representations to the Guatemalan authorities” does not
include “expenses of an extrajudicial nature” or “expenses incurred in processing
the case before the inter-American system for the protection of human rights”.
The State concludes that neither the Commission nor the Court may be considered
“Guatemalan authorities”.
25. With regard to the first issue raised by
the State, in relation to the payment of US$16,000.00 (sixteen thousand United
States dollars) to the next of kin of Nicholas Blake for “expenses of an extrajudicial
nature”, the Court clarifies that when it ordered this payment, it referred
to expenses incurred by the victim’s next of kin in their personal representations
to the Guatemalan authorities, in particular, military and administrative
Executive authorities, in the process to investigate the whereabouts of Nicholas
Blake. Accordingly, there is no contradiction
in this respect between the judgements on merits and on reparations.
26. With regard to the second issue on the reimbursement
of the expenses incurred in processing the case before the inter-American
system, the Court clarifies that Article 23 of its current Rules of Procedure
recognizes locus standi to the victims,
their next of kin or their representatives, and this condition allows them
to submit their own arguments and evidence independently during the reparations
stage and their right to reimbursement of representation-related expenses
to be recognized.
27. This Court has said that “[i]n practice,
the legal assistance provided to the victim does not begin with the reparations
phase; instead, it begins with the proceedings before the domestic courts
and continues throughout each phase of the proceedings under the inter-American
system for the protection of human rights, in other words, in the proceedings
conducted before the Commission and before the Court [...]”[5]. In its recent jurisprudence, since the entry
into force of the current Rules of Procedure, the Court has recognizes that
costs
are one
element to be considered under the concept of reparations to which Article
63.1 of the Convention refers since they are a natural consequence of the
effort made by the victim, his or her beneficiaries, or representatives to
obtain a court settlement recognizing the violation committed and establishing
its legal consequences[6].
28. In its judgement of January
22, 1999, the Court ordered the reimbursement of the expenses of processing
the case before the institutions of the inter-American human rights system,
by declaring the admissibility of the corresponding petition, which the victim’s
next of kin or representatives presented to the Court, during the reparations
phase.
29. This compensation could only be ordered
in the judgement on reparations, as effectively occurred. Consequently, the judgement on merits could
omit all reference to this, without the victim’s next of kin losing the right
to reimbursement of their expenses related to representation before the inter-American
system.
30. For the foregoing reasons, the Court considers
that the contradiction alleged by the State between the provisions of the
judgements on merits (of January 24, 1998) and on reparations (of January
22, 1999) does not exist, and that the compensation ordered in the first of
these decisions for “expenses in representations to the Guatemalan authorities”
does not exclude the possibility of the Court ordering the payment claimed
by the victims’ next of kin for both “expenses of an extrajudicial nature”
and the “reimbursement of expenses incurred in processing the case before
the inter-American system for the protection of human rights”, as it did in
the judgement on reparations.
VI
31. For the aforesaid reasons,
The
Court
decides:
unanimously,
1. To declare admissible the request for interpretation of the
judgement of January 22, 1999, in the Blake case, presented by the State of
Guatemala.
2. To declare that, according to the terms
of the judgement on reparations of January 22, 1999, the State of Guatemala
should pay to the injured parties, Richard Blake, Mary Blake, Richard Blake
Jr. and Samuel Blake, the amounts ordered by the Court in the second ruling,
clauses a.iii. and b), of the said judgement, for expenses of an extrajudicial
nature and for the reimbursement of expenses incurred in processing the case
before the inter-American system for the protection of human rights.
Done,
in Spanish and English, the Spanish text being authentic, at the seat of the
Court in San José, Costa Rica, on the first day of October 1999.
Antônio A. Cançado Trindade
President
Máximo Pacheco Gómez Hernán Salgado Pesantes
Oliver Jackman
Alirio Abreu Burelli
Sergio García Ramírez
Carlos Vicente de Roux Rengifo
Alfonso
Novales Aguirre
Judge
ad hoc
Manuel E. Ventura Robles
Secretary
So ordered,
Antônio A. Cançado Trindade
President
Manuel E. Ventura Robles
Secretary
[1] Blake case, Reparations (Article 63.1 of
the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights), Judgement of January 22,
1999. Series
C No. 48, para. 49.
[2] Velásquez Rodríguez case, Interpretation of
the Judgement on Compensatory Damages (Article 67 of the Inter-American
Convention on Human Rights), Judgement
of August 17, 1990. Series C No. 9, para. 26 and Godínes
Cruz case, Interpretation of the Judgement on Compensatory Damages (Article
67 of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights), Judgement of August
17, 1990. Series C No. 10, para.. 26.
[3] Eur. Court H. R., Allenet de Ribemont v. France Case (Interpretation of the Judgment of
7 August 1996) and Eur. Court H. R.,
Hentrich v. France Case (Interpretation of the Judgment of 3 July 1997),
Reports on Judgments and Decisions 1997-IV.
[4] El Amparo case, Request for Interpretation
of the Judgement on Reparations of September 14, 1996, Order of the
Court of April 16, 1997, p. 123, first ‘considering’ clause.
[5] Garrido
y Baigorria case, Reparations (Article 63.1 of the Inter-American Convention
on Human Rights), Judgement of August 27, 1998. Series C No. 39, para. 81.
[6] Cfr. Garrido y Baigorria case, Reparations, supra note 5, para. 79; Loayza
Tamayo case, Reparations (Article 63.1 of the Inter-American Convention
on Human Rights), Judgement of November 27, 1998.
Series C No. 42, para. 176; Suárez
Rosero case, Interpretation of the Judgement on Reparations (Article
67 of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights), Judgement of May 29,
1999. Series C No. 51, para. 40
and Loayza Tamayo case, Interpretation
of the Judgement on Reparations (Article 67 of the Inter-American Convention
on Human Rights), Judgement of June 3, 1999. Series
C No. 53, para. 24.