Godínez Cruz Case, Judgment of June 26, 1987, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 3 (1987).


In the Godínez Cruz case,


the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, composed of the following judges:


            Thomas Buergenthal, President

            Rafael Nieto-Navia, Vice President

            Rodolfo E. Piza E., Judge

            Pedro Nikken, Judge

            Héctor Fix-Zamudio, Judge

            Héctor Gros Espiell, Judge

            Rigoberto Espinal Irías, Judge ad hoc;



also present:


                        Charles Moyer, Secretary

                        Manuel Ventura, Deputy Secretary


delivers the following judgment pursuant to Article 27(4) of its Rules of Procedure (hereinafter "the Rules of Procedure") on the preliminary objections raised by the Government of Honduras (hereinafter "the Government") in its submissions and in oral argument at the public hearing.








1.         The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter "the Commission") submitted the instant case to the Court on April 24, 1986.  It originated in a petition against Honduras (No. 8097) which the Secretariat of the Commission received on October 9, 1981.


2.         In filing the application with the Court, the Commission invoked Articles 50 and 51 of the American Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter "the Convention" or "the American Convention") and requested that the Court determine whether the State in question had violated Articles 4 (Right to Life), 5 (Right to Humane Treatment) and 7 (Right to Personal Liberty) of the Convention in the case of Saúl Godínez Cruz.  The Commission also asked the Court to rule that "the consequences of the situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured party or parties."


3.         On May 13, 1986, the Secretariat of the Court transmitted the application to the Government.


4.         On July 23, 1986, Judge Jorge R. Hernández Alcerro informed the President of the Court that, pursuant to Article 19(2) of the Statute of the Court, he had "decided to recuse (him)self from hearing the three cases that. . . were submitted to the Inter-American Court."  By a note of that same date, the President informed the Government of its right to appoint a judge ad hoc under Article 10(3) of the Statute of the Court.  The Government named Rigoberto Espinal Irías to that position by note of August 21, 1986.


5.         In a note of July 23, 1986, the President of the Court asked the Government to present its submissions by the end of August 1986.  On August 21, 1986, the Government requested the extension of this deadline to November 1986.


6.         By his Order of August 29, 1986, having heard the views of the parties, the President of the Court set October 31, 1986 as the deadline for the Government's presentation of its submissions.  The President also fixed the deadlines of January 15, 1987 for the filing of the Commission's submissions and March 1, 1987 for the Government's response.


7.         In its submissions of October 31, 1986, the Government objected to the admissibility of the application filed by the Commission.


8.         On December 11, 1986, the President of the Court granted the Commission's request for an extension of the deadline for the presentation of its submissions to March 20, 1987 and extended the deadline for the Government's response to May 25, 1987.


9.         In his Order of January 30, 1987, the President made clear that the application which gave rise to the instant proceeding should be deemed to be the Memorial provided for in Article 30(3) of the Rules of Procedure.  He also specified that the deadline of March 20, 1987 granted to the Commission was the time limit set forth in Article 27(3) of the Rules for the presentation of its observations and conclusions on the preliminary objections interposed by the Government.  Having heard the views of the parties, the President ordered a public hearing on June 16, 1987 for the presentation of oral arguments on the preliminary objections.  The time limits for submissions on the merits were left open to allow for the possibility that the Court might decide to join the preliminary objections to the merits or, in the event they should be decided separately, that the decision adopted would result in the continuation of the proceeding.


10.       By note of March 13, 1987, the Government informed the Court that because "the Order of January 30, 1987 is not restricted to matters of mere procedure nor to the determination of deadlines, but rather involves the interpretation and classification of the submissions (the Government) considers it advisable, pursuant to Article 25 of the Statute of the Court and Article 44(2) of its Rules of Procedure, for the Court to affirm the terms of the President's Order of January 30, 1987, in order to avoid further confusion between the parties.  As these are the first contentious cases submitted to the Court, it is especially important to ensure strict compliance with and the correct application of the procedural rules of the Court."


11.       In a motion contained in its observations of March 20, 1987, the Commission asked the President to rescind paragraph 3 of his Order of January 30, 1987 in which he had set the date for the public hearing.  The Commission also observed that "in no part of its Memorial had the Government of Honduras presented its objections as preliminary objections."  In its note of June 11, 1987, the Government did refer to its objections as "preliminary objections."


12.       By note of May 15, 1987, the President informed the Government that "at the public hearings on the cases, the Government shall proceed first and the Commission shall follow.  In presenting its case, the Government shall be free to make oral arguments and to request or present relevant evidence on the matters under consideration.  The Commission shall have the same right."


13.       By Resolution of June 8, 1987, the Court affirmed the President's Order of January 30, 1987, in its entirety.


14.       The hearing took place at the seat of the Court on June 16, 1987.


There appeared before the Court



for the Government of Honduras:


            Edgardo Sevilla Idiáquez, Agent

            Mario Díaz Bustamante, Representative

            Rubén Darío Zepeda G., Adviser

            Angel Augusto Morales, Adviser

            Mario Boquín, Adviser

            Enrique Gómez, Adviser

            Olmeda Rivera, Adviser

            Mario Alberto Fortín M., Adviser

            Ramón Rufino Mejía, Adviser


for the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights:


            Gilda M. C. M. de Russomano, President, Delegate

            Edmundo Vargas Carreño, Executive Secretary, Delegate

            Claudio Grossman, Adviser

            Juan Méndez, Adviser

            Hugo Muñóz, Adviser

            José Miguel Vivanco, Adviser







15.       The petition filed with the Commission on October 9, 1982 alleges that Saúl Godínez Cruz, a schoolteacher, disappeared on July 22, 1982 after leaving his house by motorcycle at 6:20 a.m. and while in route to his job at the Julia Zelaya Pre-Vocational Institute in Monjarás of Choluteca.  The petition states that an eyewitness saw a man in a military uniform and two persons in civilian clothes arrest a person who looked like Godínez Cruz.  They placed him and his motorcycle in a double-cabin vehicle without license plates.  According to some neighbors, his house had been under surveillance, presumably by government agents, for some days before his disappearance.


16.       That same day, October 9, 1982, a complaint on his disappearance was filed in the First Court of the Department of Choluteca.


17.       On November 2, 1982 the Commission sent the relevant parts of the petition to the Government and requested information on the matter.  By note of November 29, 1982, the Government responded that the request had been "forwarded to the different competent bodies for the proper investigation."


18.       On June 1, 1983, the Commission repeated its request with the admonition that, if the Government did not provide the information, the Commission would apply Article 42 (formerly 39) of its Regulations and presume the allegations to be true.


19.       By note of July 19, 1983, the Government responded to this communication by pointing out that "the competent national authorities are investigating the case and as soon as specific and objective data are available, they will be forwarded to the Commission."


20.       At its 61st Session, the Commission adopted Resolution 32/83 of October 4, 1983, whose operative parts read as follows:



1.         By application of Article 39 of the Regulations, to presume as true the allegations contained in the communication of October 9, 1982, concerning the detention and possible disappearance of Saúl Godínez Cruz in the Republic of Honduras.


2.         To point out to the Government of Honduras that such acts are most serious violations of the right to life (Art. 4) and the right to personal liberty (Art. 7) of the American Convention on Human Rights.


3.         To recommend to the Government of Honduras: (a) that it order a thorough and impartial investigation to determine who is responsible for the acts denounced; (b) that it punish those responsible in accordance with Honduran law; and (c) that it inform the Commission within 60 days, especially about the measures taken to carry out these recommendations.


4.         If the Government of Honduras does not submit its observations within the time limit set out in paragraph 3 supra, the Commission shall include this Resolution in its Annual Report to the General Assembly pursuant to Article 59(g) of its Regulations.


21.       On December 1, 1983 the Government requested reconsideration of Resolution 32/83 on the grounds that a writ of habeas corpus (exhibición personal), brought on behalf of Saúl Godínez Gómez on August 17, 1982, had been denied because the applicant did not complete the procedure in a timely fashion and that another writ, brought on behalf of Saúl Godínez Cruz and others on July 4, 1983, was still pending on the date that the Government requested the reconsideration.  The Government included information received from security officials on the impossibility of determining the whereabouts of Saúl Godínez Cruz.  It also pointed out that Police Sergeant Félix Pedro García Rodríguez, of Monjarás of Choluteca had declared that Godínez was in Cuba, from whence he planned to go to Nicaragua before returning to Honduras.


22.       In his response of February 15, 1984, the petitioner admitted that the writ of habeas corpus filed on August 17, 1982 had not been pursued "because they denied holding anybody by the name of Saúl Godínez Gómez and the investigating judge fell for that trick."  The petitioner also forwarded a written statement by someone who claimed to have seen Saúl Godínez Cruz and other prisoners in the custody of Honduran authorities on July 27, 1983, at the Central Penitentiary of Tegucigalpa.


23.       By note of May 29, 1984, the Commission informed the Government that it had decided "to reconsider Resolution 32/83 and to continue the study of the case."  The Commission also asked the Government to provide information on the exhaustion of domestic legal remedies and on other matters relevant to the case.  The Commission reiterated this request of January 29, 1985.


24.       On March 1, 1985, the Government asked the Commission to postpone consideration of this case because it had set up an "Investigatory Commission" to study the matter.  The Commission granted the Government thirty days in which to present the information requested.


25.       According to the Commission's observations of March 20, 1987, the Government submitted the text of the preliminary report of the "Investigatory Commission" on October 17, 1985.


26.       On April 7, 1986, the Government informed the Commission that "notwithstanding the efforts of the Investigatory Commission . . . no new evidence has been discovered."  It also pointed out that "the information at hand contains no convincing evidence on which to rule on the alleged disappearances with absolute certainty" and that it was impossible "to identify the persons allegedly responsible."


27.       Based on the foregoing, at its 67th Session (April 1986), the Commission adopted Resolution 24/86, confirming Resolution 32/83 and referring the instant case to the Court.







28.       In its submissions of October 31, 1986, the Government concluded that:


(It) has set forth in this document its observations and objections regarding the breach of procedural norms prior to the filing of Case 8097 with the Honorable Inter-American Court of Human Rights.


The incriminating tone of the Resolution, the incorrect mention of certain particulars, the questioning of our country's legal system, the lack of an adequate and impartial evaluation of the evidence and the obvious failure by the Commission to take into account the Central American context and the democratic transition that the State of Honduras was undergoing at that time, are all elements that the Honorable Court cannot ignore.


A reading of Resolution 24/86 leads to the conclusion that the Commission's methodology distorted the truth.  The Commission arrived at very serious negative conclusions and judgments that are totally unfounded . . . .



29.       In its submissions of March 20, 1987, the Commission concluded that:


1.         Officials or agents of the Government of Honduras detained Saúl Godínez Cruz on July 22, 1982, in Choluteca, Honduras and that he has been missing since that date.  This constitutes a most serious violation of the rights to life, to humane treatment and to personal liberty, which are guaranteed by Articles 4, 5 and 7 of the American Convention on Human Rights, to which Honduras is a State Party.


2.         The substantive or procedural objections raised by the Government of Honduras in its Memorial have no legal basis under the provisions of the relevant articles of the American Convention on Human Rights and the standards of international law; and


3.         Since Honduras has recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the Commission again petitions the Honorable Court, pursuant to Article 63 (1) of the American Convention on Human Rights, to find a violation of the rights to life (Article 4), to humane treatment (Article 5) and to personal liberty (Article 7) guaranteed by the Convention.  It also asks the Court to rule that the consequences of the situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured party or parties.







30.       The Court has jurisdiction to hear the instant case.  Honduras has been a Party to the Convention since September 8, 1977, and recognized the contentious jurisdiction of the Court, as set out in Article 62 of the Convention, on September 9, 1981.







31.       Before considering each of the above objections, the Court must define the scope of its jurisdiction in the instant case.  The Commission argued at the hearing that because the Court is not an appellate tribunal in relation to the Commission, it has a limited jurisdiction that prevents it from reviewing all aspects relating to compliance with the prerequisites for the admissibility of a petition or with the procedural norms required in a case filed with the Commission.


32.       That argument does not find support in the Convention, which provides that the Court, in the exercise of its contentious jurisdiction, is competent to decide "all matters relating to the interpretation or application of (the) Convention" (Art. 62 (1)).  States that accept the obligatory jurisdiction of the Court recognize that competence.  The broad terms employed by the Convention show that the Court exercises full jurisdiction over all issues relevant to a case.  The Court, therefore, is competent to determine whether there has been a violation of the rights and freedoms recognized by the Convention and to adopt appropriate measures.  The Court is likewise empowered to interpret the procedural rules that justify its hearing a case and to verify compliance with all procedural norms involved in the "interpretation or application of (the) Convention."  In exercising these powers, the Court is not bound by what the Commission may have previously decided; rather, its authority to render judgment is in no way restricted.  The Court does not act as a court of review, of appeal or other similar court in its dealings with the Commission.  Its power to examine and review all actions and decisions of the Commission derives from its character as sole judicial organ in matters concerning the Convention.  This not only affords greater protection to the human rights guaranteed by the Convention, but it also assures the States Parties that have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court that the provisions of the Convention will be strictly observed.


33.       The interpretation of the Convention regarding the proceedings before the Commission necessary "for the Court to hear a case" (Art. 61(2)) must ensure the international protection of human rights which is the very purpose of the Convention and requires, when necessary, the power to decide questions concerning its own jurisdiction.  Treaties must be interpreted "in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose" (Art. 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).  The object and purpose of the American Convention is the effective protection of human rights.  The Convention must, therefore, be interpreted so as to give it its full meaning and to enable the system for the protection of human rights entrusted to the Commission and the Court to attain its "appropriate effects."  Applicable here is the statement of The Hague Court:


Whereas, in case of doubt, the clauses of a special agreement by which a dispute is referred to the Court must, if it does not involve doing violence to their terms, be construed in a manner enabling the clauses themselves to have appropriate effects (Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, Order of 19 August 1929, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 22, p. 13).







34.       The Court will now examine the preliminary objections.


35.       According to the assertions of the Government, the preliminary objections that the Court must consider are the following:


a)         lack of a formal declaration of admissibility by the Commission;


b)         failure to attempt a friendly settlement;


c)         failure to carry out an on-site investigation;


d)         lack of a prior hearing;


e)         improper application of Articles 50 and 51 of the Convention, and


f)          non-exhaustion of domestic legal remedies.


36.       In order to resolve these issues, the Court must first address various problems concerning the interpretation and application of the procedural norms set forth in the Convention.  In doing so, the Court first points out that failure to observe certain formalities is not necessary relevant when dealing on the international plane.  What is essential is that the conditions necessarily for the preservation of the procedural rights of the parties not be diminished or unbalanced and that the objectives of the different procedures be met.  In this regard, it is worth noting that, in one of its first rulings, The Hague Court stated that:


The Court, whose jurisdiction is international, is not bound to attach to matters of form the same degree of importance which they might possess in municipal law (Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Judgment No. 2, 1924, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 2, p. 34; see also, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1978, para. 42).



37        This Court must then determine whether the essential points implicit in the procedural norms contained in the Convention have been observed.  In order to do so, the Court must examine whether the right of defense of the State objecting to admissibility has been prejudiced during the procedural part of the case, or whether the State has been prevented from exercising any other rights accorded it under the Convention in the proceedings before the Commission.  The Court must, likewise, verify whether the essential procedural guidelines of the protection system set forth in the Convention have been followed.  Within these general criteria, the Court shall examine the procedural issues submitted to it, in order to determine whether the procedures followed in the instant case contain flaws that would demand refusal in limine to examine the merits of the case.







38.       At the hearing, the Government argued that the Commission, by not formally recognizing the admissibility of the case, had failed to comply with a requirement demanded by the Convention as a prerequisite to taking up a case.


39.       At the same hearing, the Commission asserted that once a petition has been accepted in principle and the procedure is underway, a formal declaration of admissibility is no longer necessary.  The Commission also stated that its practice in this area does not violate any provision of the Convention and that no State Party to the Convention has ever objected.


40.       Article 46(1) of the Convention lists the prerequisites for the admission of a petition and Article 48(1)(a) sets out the procedure to be followed if the Commission "considers the petition . . . admissible."


41.       Article 34 (1) (c) of the Commission's Regulations establishes that:


1.         The Commission, acting initially through its Secretariat, shall receive and process petitions lodged with it in accordance with the standards set forth below:


. . .


c.         if it accepts, in principle, the admissibility of the petition, it shall request information from the government of the State in question and include the pertinent parts of the petition.



42.       There is nothing in this procedure that requires an express declaration of admissibility, either at the Secretariat stage or later, when the Commission itself is involved.  In requesting information from a government and processing a petition, the admissibility thereof is accepted in principle, provided that the Commission, upon being apprised of the action taken by the Secretariat and deciding to pursue the case (Arts. 34 (3), 35 and 36 of the Regulations of the Commission), does not expressly declare it to be inadmissible (Art. 48 (1) (c) of the Convention).


43.       Although the admission of a petition does not require an express and formal act, such an act is necessary if it is found to be inadmissible.  The language of both the Convention and the Regulations of the Commission clearly differentiates between these two options (Art. 48 (1) (a) and (c) of the Convention and Arts. 34 (1) (c) and 3, 35 (b) and  41 of its Regulations).  An express declaration by the Commission is required if a petition is to be deemed inadmissible.  No such requirement is demanded for admissibility.  The foregoing holds provided that a State does not raise the issue of admissibility, whereupon the Commission must make a formal statement one way or the other.  That issue did not arise in the instant case.


44.       The Court, therefore, holds that the Commission's failure to make an express declaration on the question of the admissibility of the instant case is not a valid basis for concluding that such failure barred proper consideration by the Commission and, subsequently, by the Court (Arts. 46-51 and 61 (2) of the Convention).







45.       In its submissions and at the hearing, the Government argued that the Commission violated Article 48 (1) (f) of the Convention by not promoting a friendly settlement.  The Government maintains that this procedure is obligatory and that the conditions for friendly settlements established by Article 45 of the Regulations of the Commission are not applicable because they contradict those set out in the Convention, which is of a higher order.  The Government concludes that the failure to attempt a friendly settlement makes the application inadmissible, in accordance with Article 61 (2) of the Convention.


46.       The Commission argued that the friendly settlement procedure is not mandatory and that the special circumstances of this case made it impossible to pursue such a settlement, for the facts have not been clearly established because of the Government's lack of cooperation, and the Government has not accepted any responsibility in the matter.  Moreover, the Commission contends that the rights to life (Art. 4), to humane treatment (Art. 5) and to personal liberty (Art. 7) violated in the instant case cannot be effectively restored by conciliation.


47.       Taken literally, the wording of Article 48 (1) (f) of the Convention stating that "(t)he Commission shall place itself at the disposal of the parties concerned with a view to reaching a friendly settlement" would seem to establish a compulsory procedure.  Nevertheless, the Court believes that, if the phrase is interpreted within the context of the Convention, it is clear that the Commission should attempt such friendly settlement only when the circumstances of the controversy make that option suitable or necessary, at the Commission's sole discretion.


48.       Article 45 (2) of the Regulations of the Commission establishes that:


In order for the Commission to offer itself as an organ of conciliation for a friendly settlement of the matter it shall be necessary for the positions and allegations of the parties to be sufficiently precise; and in the judgment of the Commission, the nature of the matter must be susceptible to the use of the friendly settlement procedure.



The foregoing means that the Commission enjoys discretionary, but by no means arbitrary, powers to decide in each case whether the friendly settlement procedure would be a suitable or appropriate way of resolving the dispute while promoting respect for human rights.


49.       Irrespective of whether the positions and aspirations of the parties and the degree of the Government's cooperation with the Commission have been determined, when the forced disappearance of a person at the hands of a State's authorities is reported and that State denies that such acts have taken place, it is very difficult to reach a friendly settlement that will reflect respect for the rights to life, to humane treatment and to personal liberty.  Considering the circumstances of this case, the Court finds that the Commission's handling of the friendly settlement matter cannot be challenged.







50.       In its submissions and at the hearing, the Government noted that the Commission had not carried out an on-site investigation to verify the allegations.  The Government claims that Article 48 (2) of the Convention makes this step compulsory and indispensable.


51.       The Commission objected to this argument in its submissions and at the hearing, contending that on-site investigations are not compulsory and must be ordered only in serious and urgent cases.  The Commission added that the parties had not requested such an investigation and that it would prove impossible to order on-site investigations for each of the many individual petitions filed with the Commission.


52.       The Court holds that the rules governing on-site investigations (Art. 48 (2) of the Convention, Art. 18 (g) of the Statute of the Commission and Arts. 44 and 55 - 59 of its Regulations), read in context, lead to the conclusion that this method of verifying the facts is subject to the discretionary powers of the Commission, whether acting independently or at the request of the parties, within the limits of those provisions, and that, therefore, on-site investigations are not mandatory under the procedure governed by Article 48 of the Convention.


53.       Thus, the failure to conduct an on-site investigation in the instant case does not affect the admissibility of the petition.







54.       In its submissions and at the hearing, the Government pursued a similar line of reasoning, arguing that, pursuant to Article 48 (1) (e) of the Convention and before adopting Resolution 32/83, the Commission was obligated to hold a preliminary hearing to clarify the allegations.  In that Resolution, the Commission accepted the allegations as true, based on the presumption set forth in Article 42 (formerly 39) of the Regulations of the Commission.


55.       The Commission contended that neither Article 48 (1) (e) of the Convention nor Article 43 of its Regulations require a preliminary hearing to obtain additional information before the issuance of the report and that, moreover, the Government did not request such a hearing.


56.       The Court holds that a preliminary hearing is a procedural requirement only when the Commission considers it necessary to complete the information or when the parties expressly request a hearing.  At the hearing, the Commission may ask the representative of the respondent State for any relevant information and, upon request, may also receive oral or written submissions from the interested parties.


57.       Neither the petitioners nor the Government asked for a hearing in the instant case, and the Commission did not consider one necessary.


58.       Consequently, the Court rejects the preliminary objection raised by the Government.







59.       In its motion concerning admissibility, the Government asked the Court to rule that the case should not have been referred to the Court, under Article 61 (2) of the Convention, because the Commission had not exhausted the procedures established in Articles 48 to 50 of the Convention.  The Government also referred to the absence of any attempt to bring about a friendly settlement under the terms of Article 48 (1) (f), an issue which has already been dealt with by the Court (supra 45 - 49), and to other aspects of the handling of this case which, in the Government's opinion, did not meet the requirements of Articles 50 and 51 of the Convention.  The Court will analyze the grounds for the latter contentions after making some general observations on the procedure set forth in Articles 48 to 50 of the Convention and the relationship of these provisions to Article 51.  This analysis is necessary in order to place the Government's objections within the legal context in which they must be decided.


60.       Article 61 (2) of the Convention provides:


In order for the Court to hear a case, it is necessary that the procedures set forth in Articles 48 to 50 shall have been completed.


61.       Notwithstanding the statements made in paragraphs 32 and 33 the procedures set forth in Articles 48 to 50 of the Convention must be exhausted before an application can be filed with the Court.  The purpose is to seek a solution acceptable to all parties before having recourse to a judicial body.  Thus, the parties have an opportunity to resolve the conflict in a manner respecting the human rights recognized by the Convention before an application is filed with the Court and decided in a manner that does not require the consent of the parties.


62.       The procedures of Articles 48 to 50 have a broader objective as regards the international protection of human rights:  compliance by the States with their obligations and, more specifically, with their legal obligation to cooperate in the investigation and resolution of the violations of which they may be accused.  Within this general goal, Article 48 (1) (f) provides for the possibility of a friendly settlement through the good offices of the Commission, while Article 50 stipulates that, if the matter has not been resolved, the Commission shall prepare a report which may, if the Commission so elects, include its recommendations and proposals for the satisfactory resolution of the case.  If these procedures do not lead to a satisfactory result, the case is ripe for submission to the Court pursuant to the terms of Article 51 of the Convention, provided that all other requirements for the Court to exercise its contentious jurisdiction have been met.


63.       The procedure just described contains a mechanism designed, in stages of increasing intensity, to encourage the State to fulfill its obligation to cooperate in the resolution of the case.  The State is thus offered the opportunity to settle the matter before it is brought to the Court, and the petitioner has the chance to obtain an appropriate remedy more quickly and simply.  We are dealing with mechanisms whose operation and effectiveness will depend on the circumstances of each case and, most especially, on the nature of the rights affected, the characteristics of the acts denounced, and the willingness of the government to cooperate in the investigation and to take the necessary steps to resolve it.


64.       Article 50 of the Convention provides:


1.         If a settlement is not reached, the Commission shall, within the time limit established by its Statute, draw up a report setting forth the facts and stating its conclusions.  If the report, in whole or in part, does not represent the unanimous agreement of the members of the Commission, any member may attach to it a separate opinion.  The written and oral statements made by the parties in accordance with paragraph 1.e of Article 48 shall also be attached to the report.


2.         The report shall be transmitted to the states concerned, which shall not be at liberty to publish it.


3.         In transmitting the report, the Commission may make such proposals and recommendations as it sees fit.



The above provision describes the last step of the Commission's proceedings before the case under consideration is ready for submission to the Court.  The application of this article presumes that no solution has been reached in the previous stages of the proceedings.


65.       Article 51 of the Convention, in turn, reads:


1.         If, within a period of three months from the date of the transmittal of the report of the Commission to the states concerned, the matter has not either been settled or submitted by the Commission or by the state concerned to the Court and its jurisdiction accepted, the Commission may, by the vote of an absolute majority of its members, set forth its opinion and conclusions concerning the question submitted for its consideration.


2.         Where appropriate, the Commission shall make pertinent recommendations and shall prescribe a period within which the state is to take the measures that are incumbent upon it to remedy the situation examined.


3.         When the prescribed period has expired, the Commission shall decide by the vote of an absolute majority of its members whether the state has taken adequate measures and whether to publish its report.


The Court need not analyze here the nature of the time limit set by Article 51 (1), nor the consequences that would result under different assumptions were such a period to expire without the case being brought before the Court.  The Court will simply emphasize that because this period starts to run on the date of the transmittal to the parties of the report referred to in Article 50, this offers the Government one last opportunity to resolve the case before the Commission and before the matter can be submitted to a judicial decision.


66.       Article 51 (1) also considers the possibility of the Commission preparing a new report containing its opinion, conclusions and recommendations, which may be published as stipulated in Article 51 (3).  This provision poses many problems of interpretation, such as, for example, defining the significance of this report and how it resembles or differs from the Article 50 report.  Nevertheless, these matters are not crucial to the resolution of the procedural issues now before the Court.  In this case, however, it should be borne in mind that the preparation of the Article 51 report is conditional upon the matter not having been submitted to the Court within the three-month period set by Article 51 (1).  Thus, if the application has been filed with the Court, the Commission has no authority to draw up the report referred to in Article 51.


67.       The Government maintains that the above procedures were not fully complied with.  The Court will now examine this objection, keeping in mind the special features of the procedure followed before the Commission, which gave rise to some unique problems due largely to initiatives taken both by the Commission and the Government.


68.       The Commission adopted two Resolutions (32/83 and 24/86) approximately two and a half years apart, neither of which was formally called a "report" for purposes of Article 50.  This raises two problems.  The first concerns the prerequisites for reports prepared pursuant to Article 50 and the question whether the resolutions adopted by the Commission fulfill those requirements.  The other problem concerns the existence of two resolutions, the second of which both confirms the earlier one and contains the decision to submit the case to the Court.


69.       In addressing the first issue, it should be noted that the Convention sets out, in very general terms, the requirements that must be met by reports prepared pursuant to Article 50.  Under this article, such reports must set forth the facts and conclusions of the Commission, to which may be added such proposals and recommendations as the Commission sees fit.  In that sense, Resolution 32/83 meets the requirements of Article 50.


70.       The Commission did not call Resolution 32/83 a "report," however, and the terms employed by the Commission do not conform to the wording of the Convention.  That is, nonetheless, irrelevant if the content of the resolution approved by the Commission is substantially in keeping with the terms of Article 50, as in the instant case, and so long as it does not affect the procedural rights of the parties (particularly those of the State) to have one last opportunity to resolve the matter before it can be filed with the Court.  Whether this last condition was complied with in the instant case is related to the other problem:  the Commission's adoption of two Resolutions -- Nos. 32/83 and 24/86.


71.       The Commission adopted Resolution 32/83 at its 61st Session (October 1983) and transmitted it to the Government by note of October 11, 1983.  On December 1 of the same year, that is, fewer than three months after the adoption of Resolution 32/83 and, thus, within the deadline for filing the application with the Court, the Government asked the Commission to reconsider the Resolution on the grounds that various domestic remedies were underway and still pending which could lead to the settlement of the matter in the terms suggested by the Commission.  The Commission approved the request for reconsideration and decided at its 62nd Session (May 1984) "to continue the study of the case."  Pursuant to that Resolution, the Commission asked the Government to provide additional information.  Because the Commission deemed the evidence presented since the adoption of Resolution 32/83 insufficient to warrant a new study of the matter, it adopted Resolution 24/86 on April 18, 1986, which confirmed Resolution 32/83 and contained its decision to submit the case to the Court.


72.       The Convention does not foresee a situation where the State might request the reconsideration of a report approved pursuant to Article 50.  Article 54 of the Commission's Regulations does contemplate the possibility of a request for reconsideration of a resolution.  However, that provision only applies to petitions involving States that are not parties to the Convention, which is not the instant case.  Quite apart from strictly formal considerations, the procedure followed by States Parties to the Convention in requesting reconsideration has repercussions on procedural deadlines and can, as in the instant case, have negative effects on the petitioner's right to obtain the international protection offered by the Convention within the legally established time frames.  Nevertheless, within certain timely and reasonable limits, a request for reconsideration that is based on the will to resolve a case through the domestic channels available to the State may be said to meet the general aim of the procedures followed by the Commission, since it would achieve a satisfactory solution of the alleged violation through the State's cooperation.


73.       The extension of the time limit for submission of an application to the Court does not impair the procedural position of the State when the State itself request an extension.  In the instant case, the Commission's decision to "continue the study of the case" resulted in a substantial (approximately two and a half years) extension of the period available to the Government for a last opportunity to resolve the matter without being brought before the Court.  Thus, neither the State's procedural rights nor its opportunity to provide a remedy were in any way diminished.


74.       The Commission never revoked Resolution 32/83, rather, it suspended the procedural effects in expectation of new evidence that might lead to a different settlement.  By confirming the previous resolution, the Commission reopened the periods for the succeeding procedural stages.


75.       The Government argues that the ratification of Resolution 32/83 should have reinstated the 60-day period granted therein for the Government to adopt the Commission's recommendations.  Given the circumstances of this case, the Court considers that argument to be ill-founded because the Government was afforded a much longer period, to the detriment of the petitioner's interest in obtaining a satisfactory result within the established time limits.


76.       As shown by the text of its submissions of October 31, 1986, the Government's investigation conducted between 1983 and 1986 concluded that it was impossible "to reach an unequivocal determination regarding disappearances resulting from actions attributed to governmental authorities, or to identify those responsible."  Under the circumstances, it made no sense to grant new extensions, which would have resulted in even longer periods than those provided for by the Convention before the matter could be submitted to the Court.


77.       Thus, the Commission's decision to submit the case to the Court in the Resolution confirming its previous Resolution is not a procedural flaw that diminished the Government's procedural rights or ability to present its defense.  The objection is, therefore, rejected.


78.       Once an application has been filed with the Court, the provisions of Article 51 regarding the Commission's drafting of a new report containing its opinion and recommendations cease to apply.  Under the Convention, such a report is in order only after three months have elapsed since transmittal of the communication referred to in Article 50.  According to Article 51 of the Convention, it is the drafting of the report that is conditional on the failure to file a case with the Court and not the filing of a case that is conditional on the report not having been prepared or published.  If, therefore, the Commission were to draft or publish the report mentioned in Article 51 after having filed the application with the Court, it could be said that the Commission was misapplying the provisions of the Convention.  Such action could affect the juridical value of the report but would not affect the admissibility of the application because the wording of the Convention in no way conditions such filing on failure to publish the report required under Article 51.


79.       It follows that, although the requirements of Article 50 and 51 have not been fully complied with, this has in no way impaired the rights of the Government and the case should therefore not be ruled inadmissible on those grounds.


80.       Likewise, the reasoning developed from paragraph 34 onwards leads to the conclusion that the case should not be dismissed for failure to comply with the procedures set out in Articles 48 to 50 of the Convention.







81.       Moreover, the Government has challenged the admissibility of the petition before the Commission on the grounds that domestic remedies had not been previously exhausted.


82.       The Government did not expressly raise this issue until its note of December 1, 1983, when it requested reconsideration of Resolution 32/83.  It then asserted that the remedies had been incorrectly pursued by the petitioner.  By note of May 29, 1984, in response to the Government's request for reconsideration, the Commission, in turn, asked whether the domestic legal remedies had been exhausted."  Finally, Resolution 24/86 pointed out that "the evidence presented in this case, both that submitted by the Government and that offered by the petitioner, shows that the alleged victim or those who claim in his name and on his behalf did not have access to the domestic legal remedies of Honduras or where prevented from exhausting them."


83.       In its submissions to the Court, the Government declared that "the petitioner tacitly accepted the non-exhaustion" and that he "had not filed any criminal charges."  It also argued that "a decision on a writ of habeas corpus does not necessarily mean that domestic remedies have been exhausted."  The Government also asserted that Honduran law provides due process of law for the rights involved and that recourse to the courts by the family and friends of Saúl Godínez Cruz proved that they had access to them.  The Government reiterated this position at the hearing.


84.       Both in its submissions of March 20, 1987 and at the hearing, the Commission argued that domestic remedies had been exhausted, because those pursued had been unsuccessful.  It specifically referred to a criminal complaint that was never decided. Even if this argument were not accepted, the Commission asserted that the exhaustion of domestic remedies was not required because there were no effective judicial remedies to forced disappearances in Honduras in the period in which the events occurred.  The Commission believes that the exceptions to the rule of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies contained in Article 46 (2) of the Convention were applicable because during that period there was no due process of law, the petitioner was denied access to such remedies, and there was an unwarranted delay in rendering a judgment.


85.       The Commission maintains that the issue of exhaustion of domestic remedies must be decided jointly with the merits of this case, rather than in the preliminary phase.  Its position is based on two considerations.  First, the Commission alleges that this matter is inseparably tied to the merits, since the lack of due process and of effective domestic remedies in the Honduran judiciary during the period when the events occurred is proof of a government practice supportive of the forced disappearance of persons, the case before the Court being but one concrete example of that practice.  The Commission also argues that the prior exhaustion of domestic remedies is a requirement for the admissibility of petitions presented to the Commission, but not a prerequisite for filing applications with the Court and that, therefore, the Government's objection should not be ruled upon as a preliminary objection.


86.       The Court must first reiterate that, although the exhaustion of domestic remedies is a requirement for admissibility before the Commission, the determination of whether such remedies have been pursued and exhausted or whether one is dealing with one of the exceptions to such requirement is a matter involving the interpretation or application of the Convention.  As such, it falls within the contentious jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to the provisions of Article 62 (1) of the Convention (supra 32). The proper moment for the Court to rule on an objection concerning the failure to exhaust domestic remedies will depend on the special circumstances of each case.  There is no reason why the Court should not rule upon a preliminary objection regarding exhaustion of domestic remedies, particularly when the Court rejects the objection, or, on the contrary, why it should not join it to the merits.  Thus, in deciding whether to join the Government's objection to the merits in the instant case, the Court must examine the issue in its specific context.


87.       Article 46 (1) (a) of the Convention shows that the admissibility of petitions under Article 44 is subject to the requirement "that the remedies under domestic law have been pursued and exhausted in accordance with generally recognized principles of international law."


88.       Article 46 (2) sets out three specific grounds for the inapplicability of the requirement established in Article 46 (1) (a), as follows:


The provisions of paragraphs 1.a and 1.b of this article shall not be applicable when:


a.         the domestic legislation of the state concerned does not afford due process of law for the protection of the right or rights that have allegedly been violated;


b.         the party alleging violation of his rights has been denied access to the remedies under domestic law or has been prevented from exhausting them; or


c.         there has been unwarranted delay in rendering a final judgment under the aforementioned remedies.


89.       The Court need not decide here whether the grounds listed in Article 46 (2) are exhaustive or merely illustrative.  It is clear, however, that the reference to "generally recognized principles of international law" suggests, among other things, that these principles are relevant not only in determining what grounds justify non-exhaustion but also as guidelines for the Court when it is called upon to interpret and apply the rule of Article 46 (1) (a) in dealing with issues relating to the proof of the exhaustion of domestic remedies, who has the burden of proof, or, even, what is meant by "domestic remedies."  Except for the reference to these principles, the Convention does not establish rules for the resolution of these and analogous questions.


90.       Generally recognized principles of international law indicate, first, that this is a rule that may be waived, either expressly or by implication, by the State having the right to invoke it, as this Court has already recognized (see Viviana Gallardo et al. Judgment  of November 13, 1981, No. G 101/81. Series A, para. 26).  Second, the objection asserting the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, to be timely, must be made at an early stage of the proceedings by the State entitled to make it, lest a waiver of the requirement be presumed.  Third, the State claiming non-exhaustion has an obligation to prove that domestic remedies remain to be exhausted and that they are effective.


91.       The record shows that the Government failed to make a timely objection when the petition was before the Commission and did not object at any time during the proceedings.  There is also considerable evidence that the Government replied to the Commission's requests for information, including that concerning domestic remedies, only after lengthy delays, and that the information was not always responsive.


92.       Under normal circumstances, the conduct of the Government would justify the conclusion that the time had long passed for it to seek the dismissal of this case on the grounds of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.  The Court, however, must not rule without taking into account certain procedural actions by both parties.  For example, the Government did not object to the admissibility of the petition on the grounds of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies when it was formally notified of the petition, nor did it respond to the Commission's request for information.  Instead of accepting the Government's silence as a tacit waiver of the rule, the Commission, by note of May 29, 1984, asked the Government to provide information on whether "the domestic legal remedies have been exhausted."  Under those circumstances and with no more evidence than that contained in the record, the Court deems that it would be improper to reject the Government's objection in limine without giving both parties the opportunity to substantiate their contentions.


93.       The rule of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies under the international law of human rights has certain implications that are present in the Convention.  Under the Convention, States Parties have an obligation to provide effective judicial remedies to victims of human rights violations (Art. 25), remedies that must be substantiated in accordance with the rules of due process of law (Art. 8 (1)), all in keeping with the general obligation of such States to guarantee the free and full exercise of the rights recognized by the Convention to all persons subject to their jurisdiction  (Art. 1).  Thus, when certain exceptions to the rule of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies are invoked, such as the ineffectiveness of such remedies or the lack of due process of law, not only is it contended that the victim is under no obligation to pursue such remedies, but, indirectly, the State in question is also charged with a new violation of the obligations assumed under the Convention.  Thus, the question of domestic remedies is closely tied to the merits of the case.


94.       At the hearing, the Government stressed that the requirement of the prior exhaustion of domestic remedies is justified because the international system for the protection of human rights guaranteed in the Convention is ancillary to its domestic law.


95.       The observation of the Government is correct.  However, it must also be borne in mind that the international protection of human rights is founded on the need to protect the victim from the arbitrary exercise of governmental authority.  The lack of effective domestic remedies renders the victim defenseless and explains the need for international protection.  Thus, whenever a petitioner alleges that such remedies do not exist or are illusory, the granting of such protection may be not only justified, but urgent.  In those cases, not only is Article 37 (3) of the Regulations of the Commission on the burden of proof applicable, but the timing of the decision on domestic remedies must also fit the purposes of the international protection system.  The rule of prior exhaustion must never lead to a halt or delay that would render international action in support of the defenseless victim ineffective.  This is why Article 46 (2) of the Convention sets out exceptions to the requirement of recourse to domestic remedies prior to seeking international protection, precisely in situations in which such remedies are, for a variety of reasons, ineffective.  Of course, when the State interposes this objection in timely fashion it should be heard and resolved; however, the relationship between the decision regarding applicability of the rule and the need for timely international action in the absence of effective domestic remedies may frequently recommend the hearing of questions relating to that rule together with the merits, in order to prevent unnecessary delays due to preliminary objections.


96.       The foregoing considerations are relevant to the analysis of the application now before the Court, which the Commission presented as a case of the forced disappearance of a person on instructions of public authorities.  Wherever this practice has existed, it has been made possible precisely by the lack of domestic remedies or their lack of effectiveness in protecting the essential rights of those persecuted by the authorities.  In such cases, given the interplay between the problem of domestic remedies and the very violation of human rights, the question of their prior exhaustion must be taken up with the merits of the case.


97.       The Commission has asserted, moreover, that the pursuit of domestic remedies was unsuccessful and that, during the period in which the events occurred, the three exceptions to the rule of prior exhaustion set forth in the Convention were applicable.  The Government contends, on the other hand, that the domestic judicial system offers better alternatives.  That difference inevitably leads to the issue of the effectiveness of the domestic remedies and judicial system taken as a whole, as mechanisms to guarantee the respect of human rights.  If the Court, then, were to sustain the Government's objection and declare that effective judicial remedies are available, it would be prejudging the merits without having heard the evidence and arguments of the Commission or those of the Government.  If, on the other hand, the Court were to declare that all effective domestic remedies had been exhausted or did not exist, it would be prejudging the merits in a manner detrimental to the State.


98.       The issues relating to the exhaustion and effectiveness of the domestic remedies applicable to the instant case must, therefore, be resolved together with the merits.


99.       Article 45 (1) (1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court states that "(t)he judgment shall contain: (1) a decision, if any, in regard to costs."  The Court reserves its decision on this matter, in order to take it up together with the merits.












1.         Rejects the preliminary objections interposed by the Government of Honduras, except for the issues relating to the exhaustion of the domestic legal remedies, which are herewith ordered joined to the merits of the case.








2.         Decides to proceed with the consideration of the instant case.






3.         Postpones its decision on the costs until such time as it renders judgment on the merits.






Done in Spanish and English, the Spanish text being authentic, at the seat of the Court in San José, Costa Rica, this 26th day of June, 1987.





Thomas Buergenthal






Rafael Nieto Navia                                                                                                   Rodolfo E. Piza E.





Pedro Nikken                                                                                                      Héctor Fix-Zamudio





Héctor Gros-Espiell                                                                                         Rigoberto Espinal Irías






Charles Moyer






So ordered:

Thomas Buergenthal






Charles Moyer



Home / Treaties / Search / Links