U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protections of Minorities on its 46th Session, The Administration of Justice and the Human Rights of Detainees, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/24 (1994).


UNITED NATIONS


Distr.
GENERAL

E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/24
3 June 1994

Original: ENGLISH

 

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities
Forty-sixth session
Item 10 (d) of the Provisional Agenda

THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS
OF DETAINEES

The right to a fair trial:
Current recognition and measures necessary for its strengthening

Final report prepared by Mr. Stanislav Chernichenko
and Mr. William Treat


CONTENTS

Paragraphs

Introduction

Chapter

Introduction 1 - 12

Chapter

I. PREPARATORY, PRELIMINARY AND PROGRESS REPORTS - COMMENTS AND REVISIONS 13 - 30

II. FUNDAMENTAL SOURCES OF FAIR TRIAL STANDARDS AND NORMS 31 - 70

A. Treaty provisions on the right to a fair trial 33 - 39

B. Other instruments with provisions on fair trial 40 - 46

C. Other provisions relevant to the right to a fair trial 47 - 57

D. General observations regarding the right to a fair trial 58 - 70

III. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS RELATED TO THE STUDY OF THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL 71 - 84

A. Developments within the United Nations 71 - 79

B. Establishment of the International Tribunal for Violations of Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 80 - 84

IV. INTERPRETATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL 85 - 126

V. THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL AS A NON-DEROGABLE RIGHT 127 - 140

VI. THE RIGHT TO A REMEDY AS A NON-DEROGABLE RIGHT AND AS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL 141 - 159

VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 160 - 184

A. Publication and dissemination of the study 163 - 164

B. Draft third optional protocol 165 - 168

C. Draft body of principles 169 - 171

D. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and other mechanisms for implementation 172 - 173

E. Other recommendations for strengthening the right to a fair trial and a remedy 174 - 183

F. Conclusion 184

Annexes

I. DRAFT THIRD OPTIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, AIMING AT GUARANTEEING UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL AND A REMEDY

II. DRAFT BODY OF PRINCIPLES ON THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL AND A REMEDY

III. BIBLIOGRAPHY ON THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL AND A REMEDY

1. In its resolution 1989/27 of 1 September 1989, the Sub-Commission decided to appoint two of its members as rapporteurs to prepare a report on existing international norms and standards pertaining to the right to a fair trial. The Sub-Commission also requested that the rapporteurs recommend which provisions guaranteeing the right to a fair trial should be made non-derogable.

2. On 7 March 1990, the Commission on Human Rights in its decision 1990/108 welcomed the decision of the Sub-Commission to appoint Mr. Stanislav Chernichenko and Mr. William Treat as rapporteurs to prepare a report on existing international norms and standards pertaining to the right to a fair trial and requested the Sub-Commission to consider the report, at its forty-second session, under agenda item 10(d) entitled "Administration of Justice and the human rights of detainees: the right to a fair trial".

3. The two members of the Sub-Commission submitted a brief preparatory report (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/34) to provide an overview of the subject and to indicate the areas where further study was needed. In their brief preparatory report they also made some general observations and set forth the principal treaties and other international human rights standards which provide the strongest protection for the right to a fair trial. Further, they discussed considerations relevant to making non-derogable the right to a fair trial. In addition, they recommended a more comprehensive study of the right to a fair trial and how that right might be strengthened.

4. In its resolution 1990/18 of 30 August 1990, the Sub-Commission recommended to the Commission on Human Rights and the Economic and Social Council that they endorse the decision to entrust Mr. Stanislav Chernichenko and Mr. William Treat with the preparation of a study entitled "The right to a fair trial: current recognition and measures necessary for its strengthening."

5. The Commission, in resolution 1991/43 of 5 March 1991 and the Economic and Social Council in its resolution 1991/28 endorsed that decision and requested the Special Rapporteurs to draft a questionnaire on the right to a fair trial.

6. The two Special Rapporteurs prepared their preliminary report (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/29) consisting principally of a summary of the interpretations of the right to a fair trial by the Human Rights Committee and also including a revised questionnaire relating to national practices regarding the right to a fair trial.

7. In resolution 1991/14 of the Sub-Commission, resolution 1992/34 of the Commission, and decision 1992/230 of the Economic and Social Council, the two Special Rapporteurs were asked to continue their study of the right to a fair trial.

8. In August 1992 the two Special Rapporteurs submitted to the Sub-Commission a progress report on the right to a fair trial (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/24). That progress report had three addenda. Addendum 1 consisted of a study of the interpretations of international fair trial norms by the European Commission and Court of Human Rights. Addendum 2 evaluated the interpretations of international fair trial norms by the Inter-American Commission on and Court of Human Rights. Addendum 3 consisted of a study of the right to amparo, habeas corpus, and similar procedures.

9. In its resolution 1992/21 of 27 August 1992 the Sub-Commission requested the Special Rapporteurs to continue their study, but also asked Mr. Fisseha Yimer to serve as the principal commentator on the study without prejudice to the right of all Sub-Commission members to make comments and express their opinions. By its decision 1993/106 of 5 March 1993 the Commission endorsed the Sub-Commission's request, which was approved by the Economic and Social Council in its decision 1993/291 of 20 July 1993.

10. In August 1993 the two Special Rapporteurs presented to the Sub-Commission their progress report on the right to a fair trial (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/24 and Add.1-2). That progress report contained a preliminary draft of a third optional protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aimed at guaranteeing under all circumstances the right to a fair trial and a remedy. The progress report had two addenda. Addendum 1 contained a preliminary draft declaration on the right to a fair trial and a remedy. Addendum 2 contained a summary of the information received by the Special Rapporteurs from non-governmental organizations concerning national laws and practices regarding the right to a fair trial and a remedy.

11. In its resolution 1993/26 of 25 August 1993 the Sub-Commission requested the Special Rapporteurs to submit to the Sub-Commission at its forty-sixth session their final report. The Commission, in its decision 1994/107 of 4 March 1994 endorsed the Sub-Commission's request. The Commission's decision specifically mentioned that the final report should include a set of conclusions and recommendations. The Commission also decided "to consider at its fifty-first session the final report of the Special Rapporteurs including, if appropriate, the desirability of a third optional protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aimed at guaranteeing under all circumstances the right to a fair trial and a remedy, ...".

12. Chapter I of the present and final report summarizes the discussion of the preparatory, preliminary and progress reports. Chapter II summarizes fundamental sources of international fair trial norms identified since the inception of this study. Chapter III recognizes other developments related to the study of the right to a fair trial. Chapter IV summarizes interpretations of the right to a fair trial which have been made recently by the Human Rights Committee, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the Inter-American Commission on and Court of Human Rights, and the European
Commission and Court of Human Rights. Chapter V identifies the right to a fair trial as a non-derogable right and Chapter VI discusses the right to a remedy as a non-derogable right. Chapter VII contains conclusions and recommendations on strengthening the right to a fair trial and a remedy. Annex I contains the text of a revised draft third optional protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at guaranteeing under all circumstances the right to a fair trial and a remedy. Annex II contains a draft body of principles on the right to a fair trial and a remedy. Annex III contains a comprehensive bibliography of relevant material identified since the commencement of the study.

I. PREPARATORY, PRELIMINARY AND PROGRESS REPORTS -
COMMENTS AND REVISIONS

13. This chapter summarizes the findings of the study on the right to a fair trial since its inception in 1989. This study provides a unique resource for lawyers, judges and others concerned with the administration of justice throughout the world on the prevailing international norms of the right to a fair trial and a remedy. Through a detailed look at the provisions guaranteeing the right to a fair trial and a remedy in international instruments and national laws, and the interpretations of those provisions by international and regional human rights bodies as well as by individual Governments, the Special Rapporteurs have brought together a comprehensive definition of the meaning of the right to a fair trial and a remedy. By identifying the prevailing meaning of the right to a fair trial, this study will serve as the cornerstone for the next task of providing further guarantees and strengthening the right to a fair trial and a remedy. With the advent of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, the need for an international understanding of the right to a fair trial is more pressing now than when the Sub-Commission first requested this study. Further, the efforts of the Special Rapporteurs will also be relevant to the work of the International Law Commission which appears to be in the process of concluding its draft statute for an International Criminal Tribunal. Indeed, the Special Rapporteurs, as will be discussed in greater detail throughout this report, recommend that the material gathered in this report and their previous reports be made accessible to the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and to the International Law Commission, as well as being distributed more broadly in a definitive United Nations publication on the right to a fair trial and a remedy.

14. The foundation for the study on the right to a fair trial was laid by the brief preparatory report (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/34). The brief preparatory report looked at the treaties and other instruments defining the attributes of the right to a fair trial and a remedy which are the most protective of the right. The principal treaties identified in the brief preparatory report which contain provisions on the right to a fair trial include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights; the American Convention on Human Rights; the [European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the protection of war victims; and the two Additional Protocols of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The brief preparatory report also discussed other instruments with provisions on the right to a fair trial and a remedy including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary; the Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions; the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners; the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials; the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment; the Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice ("The Beijing Rules"); Conclusion No. 44 of the Executive Committee of the Programme of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on the detention of refugees and asylum seekers; and the Concluding Document of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

15. The preliminary report (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/29) and the subsequent progress reports (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/24 and Add.1-3 and E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/24 and Add.1-2) identified additional sources of fair trial norms, bearing in mind the previously established international fair trial norms outlined in the brief preparatory report. As a result, the reports submitted to the Sub-Commission thus far include the most comprehensive compilation of existing international fair trial norms and provide a unique resource for anyone interested in the right to a fair trial and a remedy.

16. Further, the preparatory, preliminary and progress reports contained excerpts from the General Comments of the Human Rights Committee as well as the Committee's interpretations of fair trial standards under articles of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights relevant to the right to a fair trial and a remedy. Moreover, addenda 1 and 2 to the 1992 progress report evaluated the interpretations of relevant international norms by the European Commission and Court of Human Rights as well as the Inter-American Commission on and Court of Human Rights. Interpretations of the recognized fair trial norms are of foremost importance because treaty rights mean little if they are not applied in practice.

17. In addition to the international and regional interpretations of the right to a fair trial, the preparatory and preliminary reports contained a questionnaire on national practices regarding the right to a fair trial. The 1992 progress report contained initial responses to the questionnaire and the 1993 progress report summarized the more detailed government responses to the questionnaire. The 1993 progress report also contained an addendum summarizing the information received by the Special Rapporteurs, principally from non-governmental organizations and bar associations, concerning national laws and practices relating to the right to a fair trial and a remedy (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/24/Add.2). The compilation of governmental interpretations provide an insight into a very extensive body of law and practice. These national interpretations, along with the international interpretations discussed above, form the basis for the draft third optional protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights contained in the 1993 progress report, a revised version of which is contained in Annex I of the present final report. The Special Rapporteurs firmly believe that the third optional protocol, if adopted, would significantly strengthen the right to a fair trial and a remedy by making it a non-derogable right.

18. The preparatory, preliminary, and progress reports were discussed at the forty-second, forty-third, forty-fourth and forty-fifth sessions of the Sub-Commission and several useful comments were received. Sub-Commission members suggested that certain aspects of the right to a fair trial, for example, the right to petition for habeas corpus or amparo, should be made non-derogable even during periods of emergency. In this regard, the Sub-Commission in its resolution 1991/15 of 28 August 1991 on habeas corpus, recommended to the Commission to call on all States that had not yet done so "to establish a procedure such as habeas corpus by which anyone who is deprived of his or her liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to institute proceedings before a court, in order that the court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his or her detention and order his or her release if the detention is found to be unlawful ... [and] to maintain the right to such a procedure at all times and under all circumstances, including during states of emergency.". In further response to the Sub-Commission members' comments regarding habeas corpus and amparo, addendum 3 to the 1992 progress report studied these and other similar procedures in greater detail, defining these procedures, identifying sources of international habeas corpus/amparo norms, and discussing the derogability of these procedures. The Special Rapporteurs noted that articles 2 (3), 9 (3) and 9 (4) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights embody the essence of habeas corpus and amparo and should be made non-derogable.

19. Comments of the Sub-Commission members also reflected the need for coordination in regard to recommendations arising from the Sub-Commission studies on the right to a fair trial, states of emergency, and the independence of the judiciary and the protection of practising lawyers.

20. The two Special Rapporteurs welcomed the substantive comments and suggestions made by members and alternates of the Sub-Commission as well as by representatives of Governments and non-governmental organizations.

21. Pursuant to Sub-Commission resolution 1992/21 of 27 August 1992, which authorized Mr. Fisseha Yimer (Ethiopia) to serve as principal commentator for the study, Mr. Yimer submitted his comments and observations on the 1993 progress report to the 1993 session of the Sub-Commission. The Special Rapporteurs welcomed and found valuable Mr. Yimer's comments which focused almost entirely on the 1993 progress report.

22. Mr. Yimer began his observations by noting that the actual practice of the right to a fair trial was of paramount importance and that the Special Rapporteurs had paid special attention to the actual practice of States in the implementation of the right to a fair trial. Mr. Yimer focused on chapter I of the 1993 report, observing that the Special Rapporteurs should continue to place special emphasis on the institutions of amparo and habeas corpus and that the issue of the independence of the judiciary and practising lawyers should form an important component of the entire study. Mr. Yimer commented that the Special Rapporteurs' classification of chapter II as "additional sources of fair trial norms" appeared to be misleading because the norms identified were actually restatements of internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms. Mr. Yimer's comments accurately reflect the 1993 report standing alone, yet the previous reports had summarized the principal international fair trial norms and, rather than republish the entire list of fair trial norms, due to space limitations, the 1993 report simply identified those "additional" sources which had recognized and adopted existing international fair trial standards.

23. Mr. Yimer commented that the governmental responses in chapter III were not extensive enough to warrant some of the general conclusions on national practices on the right to a fair trial. He further commented that, in the light of the importance of chapter III of the 1993 progress report, he found it to be more descriptive than analytical. The Special Rapporteurs share Mr. Yimer's concern with the completeness of the national material made available to them for chapter III regarding 65 nations. The Special Rapporteurs believe, however, that the usefulness of chapter III and the overall strength of the study has been to collect the international interpretations on the right to a fair trial. The Special Rapporteurs have collected sufficient international and national materials to serve as the basis for drafting a third optional protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and a draft body of principles on the right to a fair trial and a remedy. The Special Rapporteurs concur with Mr. Yimer that further study of national practices might be undertaken by a later study.

24. Mr. Yimer commented that the proposed third optional protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights would, if adopted, be a significant measure to strengthening the right to a fair trial.

25. Mr. Yimer questioned, however, whether the proposed draft declaration was necessary in light of the fact that the right to a fair trial has been provided for in article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Mr. Yimer believed that the proposed declaration was simply a restatement of the fundamental provisions on the right to fair trial in existing human rights instruments. The Special Rapporteurs accept Mr. Yimer's concerns and, rather than preparing a draft declaration, the present final report contains in Annex II a draft body of principles which is intended to be a restatement of the existing international norms and not a new "declaration".

26. Mr. Yimer concluded his comments by questioning whether the issue of the death penalty came within the purview of the topic of the study of a right to a fair trial. The Special Rapporteurs agree that the death penalty is not an aspect of the right to a fair trial but, as recognized in the safeguards guaranteeing protection of the rights of those facing the death penalty (Economic and Social Council resolution 1984/50), the administration of the death penalty may raise particular fair trial concerns. States employing the death penalty, due to its finality, will want to ensure that those facing the punishment have first received a fair trial.

27. The Special Rapporteurs are grateful for the thoughtful comments of Mr. Yimer and have attempted to address many of his concerns in this final report.

28. The Special Rapporteurs also sought comments from Governments concerning the fourth report. Many Governments responded and the Special Rapporteurs would like to thank the Governments of Bangladesh, Canada, Chad, China, Egypt, Germany, Iraq, Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, the Republic of Korea, Senegal and Turkey for their very thoughtful and helpful comments. The Governments of Canada, China, Egypt, Germany, Nepal, Niger and Senegal provided comments and corrections to the 1993 report, while the Governments of Bangladesh, Chad, Iraq, Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, Myanmar and the Republic of Korea responded to some of the non-governmental reports regarding national practices on the right to a fair trial contained in addendum 2 to the 1993 report. The Special Rapporteurs indicated that they would seek to reflect the comments received from Governments in further addenda to the 1993 progress report. Accordingly, the Special Rapporteurs anticipate the circulation of a future document (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/25) containing the comments received from Governments - particularly in regard to the information contained in addendum 2. The Special Rapporteurs also expect that these comments will be reflected in a publication in the United Nations Study Series which will embody an updated and corrected compilation of the present report and the previous reports of this study on the right to a fair trial and a remedy.

29. One member of the Sub-Commission expressed the view that the draft protocol recommended by the Special Rapporteurs should be preceded by a declaration as had been the usual United Nations practice with regard to United Nations conventions. Indeed, for example, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the Convention on the Rights of the Child were both preceded by declarations. The Special Rapporteurs would like respectfully to point out, however, that while declarations have preceded conventions, they do not typically precede protocols. The two Optional Protocols to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for example, were not preceded by declarations. Moreover, the new optional protocol to the Torture Convention being drafted by the Commission on Human Rights, the draft protocols being drafted by the two open-ended working groups for the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Additional Protocols of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty, and the 10 Protocols to the European Convention were all not preceded by a draft declaration.

30. Instead of the delay which typically accompanies the drafting of a declaration, the Special Rapporteurs recommend that the Commission on Human Rights establish an open-ended working group to complete the drafting of the third optional protocol and to permit Governments to provide their input as to the protocol.

II. FUNDAMENTAL SOURCES OF FAIR TRIAL STANDARDS AND NORMS

31. This chapter identifies and summarizes the fundamental standards of the right to a fair trial and a remedy identified in the first brief report (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/34) and updates those standards. The Special Rapporteurs recommend that a compilation of existing fair trial standards and norms be included in a publication in the United Nations Study Series. The compilation should contain a structural and textual summary of the principal treaties, other instruments, and interpretations of those instruments and treaties by international and regional human rights bodies relating to the right to a fair trial and a remedy, the original full text of those treaties and instruments, and a topical index which would permit the reader to find both the original text of the relevant instruments and the interpretations of those instruments by the various international and regional human rights bodies. The need of lawyers, judges, legislators and lay people worldwide for a more comprehensive review of existing fair trial standards and norms is one of the most compelling reasons to adopt the Special Rapporteurs' recommendation that a United Nations Study Series publication be issued.

32. This chapter begins with treaty provisions on the right to a fair trial and continues by identifying other instruments with provisions on and relevant to the right to a fair trial and a remedy. The chapter concludes with some general observations about these standards.

A. Treaty provisions on the right to a fair trial

33. Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognizes the right to "a fair trial and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law". Every person is "equal before the courts and tribunals" under article 14 (1). Article 14 also distinguishes between the sort of fair hearing required for civil and criminal cases; most of article 14 deals with the "minimum guarantees" required in the determination of any criminal charge. Article 14 embodies the most comprehensive and important provisions protecting the right to a fair trial and thus needs to be made non-derogable even in times of emergency.

34. The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (arts. 7 and 26), the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights (art. 8) and the [European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (art. 6) all contain fair trial provisions. The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights has adopted a Resolution on the Right to Recourse Procedure and Fair Trial which elaborates on article 7 (1) of the African Charter and guarantees several additional rights, including: notification of charges, appearance before a judicial officer, right to release pending trial, presumption of innocence, adequate preparation of the defence, speedy trial, examination of witnesses and the right to an interpreter (Doc. No. ACHPR/COMM/FIN(XI)/Annex VII, 9 March 1992). The African Charter does not contain a provision allowing States to derogate from their obligations under the treaty in times of public emergency.

35. Although article 27 of the Inter-American Convention authorizes the suspension of guarantees in "times of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the independence or security of" the Government, and does not make article 8 (the right to a fair trial) a non-derogable right, article 27 does extend non-derogable status to "judicial guarantees essential for the protection of such rights" as the right to life, humane treatment and the other rights identified in article 27. Hence, a certain aspect of the right to a fair trial and a remedy has been made non-derogable by the Inter-American Convention.

36. Common article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the protection of war victims and article 6 of Additional Protocol II of 1977 contain fair trial guarantees for timeu of non-international armed conflict. Articles 96 and 99-108 of the Third Geneva Convention prescribe the rights of prisoners of war in judicial proceedings, essentially creating a fair trial standard. Articles 54, 64-74 and 117-26 of the Fourth Geneva Convention contain provisions relating to the right to fair trial in occupied territories. Additional Protocol I (art. 75) extends fair trial guarantees in an international armed conflict to all persons, including those arrested for actions relating to the conflict. The Geneva Conventions and the two Additional Protocols assure the right to a fair trial even during periods of armed conflict.

37. The right to an effective remedy either by national tribunals or another national authority for violation of an individual's fundamental rights is an aspect of the right to a fair trial and is guaranteed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (arts. 2 (3), 9 (3), and 9 (4)), the American Convention (arts. 10, 25), and the European Convention (art. 13). For a more detailed discussion of the right to a remedy as a fundamental aspect of the right to a fair trial, see chapter VI, infra.

38. The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment provides in article 15 "that any statement which is established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings ...". Also, article 7 guarantees fair treatment at all stages of the proceedings brought against a person charged with having engaged in or attempted torture. Article 2 (2) makes this convention non-derogable by providing that "[n]o exceptional circumstances whatsoever ... may be invoked as a justification of torture". Under this treaty, therefore, the accused person possesses a non-derogable right to be free from torture at all times during the criminal process, including interrogation, detention, trial, sentencing and punishment.

39. The Convention on the Rights of the Child contains several provisions relevant to the right to a fair trial for children. Article 37 (b) provides, for example, that "[n]o child shall be deprived of his or her liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily". Furthermore, article 37 (d) provides that "[e]very child deprived of his or her liberty shall have the right to prompt access to legal and other appropriate assistance, as well as the right to challenge the legality of the deprivation of his or her liberty before a court or other competent, independent and impartial authority, and to a prompt decision on any such action".

B. Other instruments with provisions on fair trial

40. Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides, "[e]veryone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him". Article 11 (1) protects the "right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence".

41. The Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolutions 40/32 of 29 November and 40/146 of 13 December 1985, help assure the right to a fair trial by preserving the independence and impartiality of the judiciary.

42. The Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, adopted by the Economic and Social Council in its resolution 1989/65 of 24 May 1989, require the "thorough, prompt and impartial investigation of all suspected cases of extra-legal, arbitrary and summary executions (principle 9)". To that end there are several principles relevant to the right to a fair trial, including principle 10 which indicates that the investigative authority shall have the power to oblige witnesses to appear and testify.

43. The Concluding Document of the Vienna Follow-Up Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), issued 17 January 1989, indicates that the participants will "ensure effective remedies" and defines those remedies. The parties to the Vienna Concluding Document have also undertaken to observe the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, to observe the United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, to prohibit torture and other ill-treatment, to protect individuals from psychiatric and other medical practices that violate human rights, and to limit the use of the death penalty. In June 1990 the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE adopted a document containing several provisions relating to the right to a fair trial. The Charter of Paris for a New Europe issued in November 1990 pursuant to a meeting of the CSCE states that everyone has the right "to know and act upon his rights [and] to fair and public trial if charged with an offence ...". The Concluding Document of the Moscow Meeting of the CSCE in 1991 stated that the participating States "will respect the internationally recognized standards that relate to the independence of the judges and legal practitioners ... which, inter alia, provide for (i) prohibiting improper influence on judges ... [and] (v) guaranteeing tenure and appropriate conditions of service ...".

44. Article 19 of the Declaration of Human Rights in Islam, adopted on 5 August 1990 at the Nineteenth Islamic Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Cairo, provides for equality of all individuals before the law, the right to a judicial remedy for each person, individual penal responsibility, no penalties except as prescribed by the Shariah, the presumption of innocence, and an honest trial in which the rights of defence are fully guaranteed. Article 20 forbids arrests, restraints on liberty, exile or punishment without legitimate reasons as well as torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Article 21 forbids the taking of hostages. Article 24 states that all the rights in the declaration are subordinate to principles of the Shariah.

45. Representatives of non-governmental organizations met in Tunis from 29 November to 2 December 1991 for the Arab-African Seminar on Criminal Justice and Penal Reform, held under the auspices of the Centre for Human Rights, the Tunisian League for Human Rights, Penal Reform International and the Arab Institute for Human Rights. The Seminar recommended that no person should be subjected to detention garde à vue for more than 24 hours; that any person placed in detention should immediately be permitted to contact his/her family and doctor; that interrogations should take place in the presence of a lawyer who may consult his/her client in private; that detention garde à vue should be permitted only in locations prescribed by law; that persons under detention garde à vue should not be subjected to pressure to incriminate themselves; that no one should be subject to torture, arbitrary arrest or preventive detention for his/her beliefs or religious convictions; that provisional detention should not be imposed as a sanction; and that public authorities should not make contact with persons in provisional detention prior to their appearance in court. The Seminar made a number of other recommendations in regard to the independence of the judiciary, the rights of the defence, penal reform and other related issues.

46. The attention of the Special Rapporteurs has been drawn to a very useful document entitled "Executive Action and the Rule of Law" prepared by the International Commission of Jurists as a result of a conference in Brazil in 1962. The document sets forth fundamental principles for a fair trial in administrative cases, including the requirement of adequate notice to interested parties; adequate opportunity for them to prepare the case, including access to relevant data; their right to be represented by counsel or other qualified person; adequate notice of the decision and the reasons; and their right to recourse to a higher administrative authority or court. The document indicates that it would be advisable for administrators to promulgate regulations after having secured expert advice, consult organizations or interested groups and give an opportunity to interested individuals to present their views.

C. Other provisions relevant to the right to a fair trial

47. Provisions prohibiting arbitrary arrest and detention may be found in the Universal Declaration (art. 9), the Civil and Political Covenant (art. 9), the African Charter (art. 6), the American Convention (art. 7), and the European Convention (art. 5).

48. Provisions against torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment are contained in article 5 of the Universal Declaration, article 7 of the Civil and Political Covenant, articles 2-4 of the Convention against Torture, articles 2-4 of the Declaration against Torture, article 5 of the African Charter, article 5 of the American Convention and article 3 of the European Convention. During international armed conflicts, torture is forbidden by the First Geneva Convention, article 12; the Second Geneva Convention, article 12; the Third Geneva Convention, articles 17 and 87; the Fourth Geneva Convention, article 32; and article 75 of Additional Protocol I. During non-international armed conflicts, torture is forbidden by common article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions and article 4 of Additional Protocol II.

49. The United Nations Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment (General Assembly resolution 43/173 of 9 December 1988) establishes an obligation to inform detainees of their rights (principle 13), to bring detainees before a judicial or other authority promptly after arrest (principle 11) and to provide access to legal counsel (principle 17).

50. The Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners contain several provisions which are relevant to the right to a fair trial, including the right to receive visits from a legal adviser (art. 93) within sight but not within the hearing of prison officials.

51. The Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (General Assembly resolution 34/169 of 17 December 1979) requires in article 2 that law enforcement officials respect and protect the human rights of all persons, which would apparently include the right to a fair trial.

52. The Safeguards guaranteeing protection of the rights of those facing the death penalty (Economic and Social Council resolution 1984/50 of 25 May 1984) state that "[c]apital punishment may only be carried out pursuant to a final judgement rendered by a competent court after legal process which gives all possible safeguards to ensure a fair trial, at least equal to those contained in article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, including the right ... to adequate legal assistance at all stages of the proceedings". In addition, the Council, in resolution 1989/64 of 24 May 1989, Implementation of the safeguards guaranteeing protection of the rights of those facing the death penalty, recommended that member States afford "special protection to persons facing charges for which the death penalty is provided by allowing time and facilities for the preparation of their defence", and provided "for mandatory appeals or review with provisions for clemency or pardon in all cases of capital offence".

53. Provisions which prohibit use of ex post facto laws and retroactive punishment exist in the Universal Declaration (art. 11), the Civil and Political Covenant (art. 15), the African Charter (art. 7), the American Convention (art. 9) and the European Convention (art. 7).

54. Provisions prohibit imprisonment solely for breach of contract in the Civil and Political Covenant (art. 11), the American Convention (art. 7) and the Fourth Protocol to the European Convention.

55. The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice ("The Beijing Rules") contain provisions (rule 14.1) for a "fair and just trial" relating to juvenile offences.

56. Article 16 of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees provides refugees with free access to courts of law and the same treatment as a national in regards to legal assistance in the refugee's country of habitual
residence. Article 1 (1) of the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees applies article 16 of the Convention, inter alia, without geographical or time limitations.

57. There are numerous other provisions related to the right to a fair trial. Some of those other provisions may be found in the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty; the Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers; the Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors; the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-custodial Measures ("The Tokyo Rules"); the United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency ("The Riyadh Guidelines"); the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power; and the International Labour Organisation's Worker Tribunal Standards.

D. General observations regarding the right to a fair trial

58. The concept of "a fair trial" concerns both criminal and civil proceedings. Each type of proceeding has its own character. None the less, certain principles can be applied in any court - whether it be an emergency court, a military tribunal, a juvenile court, etc. If those principles are not observed in accordance with a modern concept of justice, the trial cannot be fair. Moreover, some of the principles of fairness also apply to cases in international courts and arbitration tribunals.

59. It is evident that general principles of law include principles of a procedural nature. Since the question of the right to a fair trial is examined in the context of human rights, particular attention should be given to procedural principles found in the domestic practices of Governments. Such principles may also be applied by international courts dealing with cases related to human rights, for example, the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991, the International Law Commission's proposed International Criminal Tribunal, the Nürnberg and Tokyo Tribunals, the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The ILC's draft statute for the proposed International Criminal Tribunal contains protection for the accused including the right to remain silent with no adverse consequences being drawn from the exercise of that right before any investigation by the prosecutor (art. 30 (4) (a)) and the right not to have evidence used against the accused which was obtained by illegal means constituting a serious violation of internationally protected human rights (art. 48).

60. Justice principally requires that a trial must be objective. Objectivity may have philosophical, moral and juridical aspects. Objectivity cannot solely be achieved by juridical measures. Certain economic, political and other conditions may be required in order for juridical protection to achieve an objective trial. Particular societies may have different ideas of objectivity and fairness. Differences in economic, social and cultural levels of development together with historical, religious and other factors may influence a society's understanding of objectivity and fairness. None the less, sufficiently clear views of fairness and objectivity have emerged such that juridical criteria for an objective trial can be established. Such juridical criteria cannot provide a complete assurance, but they do contribute to the achievement of fair and objective trials.

61. It is widely believed that an objective trial is the same as a fair trial. There is, of course, a direct link, but there are different shades of meaning within the two concepts. Fairness relates to a sense that justice has been both accomplished and appeared to be accomplished. Objectivity considers whether the facts have been adduced, assessed according to the relevant law and appropriate procedures followed. It is difficult to draw a precise line between objectivity and fairness. In any case, it is necessary to define with precision what juridical measures will help to ensure the objectivity and hence, the fairness of a trial.

62. Possible juridical measures to ensure fairness may be very broadly categorized as (a) those measures relating to the organization of adjudicative bodies and (b) procedural guarantees for the conduct of the trial. Organizational matters are concerned with the procedures for appointing judges and other competent decision makers, etc. Procedural guarantees may also help to ensure the objectivity of court proceedings.

63. Essentially, all aspects of the organization of the judiciary should help create conditions for conducting judicial proceedings that exclude any outside influence on the court's evaluation of the facts and application of the law. Organizational measures for achieving fairness ultimately ensure the independence of judges as individuals and of the judiciary as a whole. Without these organizational measures, procedural guarantees of fairness will not be effective.

64. Means of guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary are closely linked to means for assuring the independence of lawyers and other representatives. Different approaches to independence may be appropriate for civil and criminal cases; but unless lawyers and other representatives are guaranteed independence, a fair trial cannot be ensured, even if the judges are independent. The independence and impartiality of judges, lawyers, assessors, and other participants in the judicial process have already been studied by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (see E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/25 and Add.1). None the less, it is appropriate to recall the importance of this issue - particularly in the preliminary investigation of criminal cases - as an essential requirement of a fair trial.

65. Procedural guarantees of the objectivity of courts can be characterized as conditions, methods, measures, etc. The commonly used term "guarantee" may give the misleading impression that a particular procedural right will assure objectivity. In fact, however, some procedures can help to ensure fairness while others may be less effective. None the less, each procedural right should not be assessed separately, because all procedural rights must combine to achieve fairness and objectivity. Procedural guarantees may be broadly divided into methods of conducting a trial and approaches to the submission and examination of evidence.

66. The relationship between the objectivity and impartiality of a trial deserves attention. These two concepts are closely related, but they may be distinguished in certain respects. Impartiality relates to the course of the trial and indicates that the judge or trier of fact will not favour one party or other during the trial and the parties will have equal opportunity to present their positions. Impartiality also describes the appropriate attitude of the court to the case being tried and that there will be an unbiased assessment of the evidence. Objectivity relates to the correctness of a trial's procedures, in other words, the way evidence is evaluated so as to select the most effective juridical approach to discover the truth.

67. The concepts of independence, impartiality, objectivity, and fairness of a trial are interrelated: independence is a prerequisite and essential condition for the impartiality of a trial, although it is not a complete guarantee of impartiality. Impartiality is the best, albeit incomplete, guarantee of objectivity. In almost all cases, the objectivity of a trial indicates its fairness. Fairness may not be achieved in certain situations, however, if the court applies outdated or otherwise inappropriate legislation, laws, or precedents.

68. Another important prerequisite of a fair trial is the competence of the judges, who should possess a high level of professional training and experience. Judges should also possess high moral integrity, which, although difficult to measure precisely, is as important as other requirements of a fair trial. In addition, lawyers participating in the trial should be competent and independent.

69. Impartiality and objectivity are two criteria for a fair trial and these criteria must be fulfilled by specific procedural guarantees. Countries have adopted various procedures for assuring a fair trial, including a public hearing, proceedings in which all parties are permitted to participate, the right of the parties and of witnesses to use their own language (including the provision of translation), prohibition of any kind of influence on the court to undermine its independence (for example, attempts to exert pressure, infringement on the secrecy of deliberations, etc.), and the right to counsel or other representative. These procedures provide the minimum guarantees for an objective trial in both civil and criminal proceedings, although the procedures may be applied in different ways as required by the type of proceeding. These procedural guarantees are found in the principal international standards for the administration of justice. None the less, the incorporation of guarantees in international standards cannot assure that the procedures will be implemented successfully at the national level. Therefore, it is desirable to consider means of strengthening implementation.

70. Accordingly, the Special Rapporteurs recommend that the draft third optional protocol contained in annex II to this report be adopted. Adoption of this protocol will certainly strengthen the right to a fair trial and a remedy by making it a non-derogable right during periods of public emergency. Moreover, by compiling the reports of this study and publishing them in the United Nations Study Series, the resources gathered by the Special Rapporteurs can serve as a valuable resource for anyone interested in protecting the right to a fair trial and a remedy.

III. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS RELATED TO THE STUDY OF THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL

A. Developments within the United Nations

71. In January 1993 the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention of the Commission on Human Rights issued its second report (E/CN.4/1993/24) in which it rendered its first decisions in regard to communications which had been submitted. The Working Group considered several communications which stated that a person had been imprisoned without a trial or after a trial failing to comport with international fair trial standards. Accordingly, the Working Group determined whether procedures followed in particular cases violated international fair trial norms and could thus be considered to be "arbitrary" within its mandate.

72. The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention also commented on the practice of several countries in establishing special courts, including emergency courts, revolutionary courts, military courts, people's courts, or courts of State security. The Working Group observed,

"Admittedly, courts of this kind do not seem to be strictly inconsistent with international rules. However, experience unfortunately proves (and the examples of many cases submitted to the Group shows) that in many States they are being used more and more, or even being established for the purpose, to try dissidents and opponents who are then denied any guarantee to the right to be heard by an independent and impartial tribunal. The Working Group therefore shares the Commission's concern, reflected in resolution 1992/31, about respect for the protection of all persons in the administration of justice, and it considers that the human right to be heard by an independent and impartial tribunal is the very essence of the human right to justice (E/CN.4/1993/24, para. 34)."

73. Furthermore, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention recommended "strengthening the institution of habeas corpus". The Commission on Human Rights responded to this recommendation in its resolution 1993/36 of 5 March 1993. In that resolution the Commission encouraged States, in accordance with its resolution 1992/35 of 28 February 1992 "to establish a procedure such as habeas corpus and maintain it in all circumstances, including during states of emergency". In its resolution 1994/32 of 4 March 1994 the Commission reiterated its encouragement of States "to establish a procedure such as habeas corpus or a similar procedure as a personal right not subject to derogation, including during states of emergency".

74. In its 1994 report (E/CN.4/1994/27) the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention continued its practice of deciding cases relevant to the right to a fair trial. The Working Group also reported (para. 36) that, regrettably, in many countries habeas corpus procedures did not exist, had been suspended, were not readily available or had not been used. The Working Group also indicated (para. 75) its support for the efforts of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to elaborate a declaration on habeas corpus with a view to arriving at an additional protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

75. In this regard, the Chilean delegation's comments at the fiftieth session of the Commission on Human Rights are relevant. The Chilean delegate stated that his delegation supported the need for an additional protocol to assure the right to habeas corpus. Although articles 2 (3), 9 (2) and (3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights already contained the substance of the habeas corpus procedure without using the term "habeas corpus", there was still a need for a protocol to the Covenant making articles 2 (3), 9 (3), and 9 (4) non-derogable. The Chilean delegation further expressed its support for the work of the two Sub-Commission experts, Stanislav Chernichenko and William Treat, to draft a third optional protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights making non-derogable the rights to a fair trial under article 14 and habeas corpus under articles 2 (3), 9 (3) and 9 (4). The Chilean delegation stated that it looked forward to considering their draft optional protocol when it was submitted to the Commission at its fifty-first session.

76. In June 1993, Mr. Leandro Despouy (Argentina) presented his sixth annual report on states of emergency to the Sub-Commission (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/23). Mr. Despouy identified 83 countries which had declared states of emergency since 1985. Mr. Despouy also identified those countries in which exceptional measures had been adopted without an official proclamation of a state of emergency, that is de facto states of emergency. Mr. Despouy has received valuable and pertinent observations concerning the draft guidelines for the development of legislation on states of emergency, including the question of non-derogable rights.

77. In July 1993, Mr. Louis Joinet (France) presented his final report on the independence of the judiciary and the protection of practising lawyers to the Sub-Commission (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/25 and Add.1) pursuant to Sub-Commission resolution 1992/38. The report provided detailed information on measures and practices adopted by various countries which had either strengthened or weakened safeguards for judicial independence, and discussed reinforcement of cooperation between United Nations programmes to guarantee the independence and impartiality of the judiciary and the establishment of a monitoring mechanism. Accordingly, in its resolution 1994/41 of 4 March 1994 the Commission established a thematic Special Rapporteur on the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, jurors and assessors and the independence of lawyers.

78. In August 1993, the Sub-Commission's Working Group on Detention convened and reported on developments concerning human rights of persons subjected to detention or imprisonment, habeas corpus, the death penalty, juvenile justice, etc.

79. In July 1993, Special Rapporteur Theo van Boven presented his final report concerning the right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for victims of gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8). Mr. van Boven discussed State responsibility, relevant decisions and views of international human rights organs, national laws and practices, the issue of impunity in relation to the right to reparation for victims of gross violations of human rights, and proposed basic principles and guidelines concerning reparation to victims of gross violations of human rights.

B. Establishment of the International Tribunal for Violations of Humanitarian Law Committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991

80. On 22 February 1993 the Security Council adopted resolution 808 (1993) in which it decided that an international tribunal should be established for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, and requested the Secretary-General to submit a report to the Council on all aspects of the matter including specific proposals for the effective and expeditious implementation of the decision.

81. On 3 May 1993 the Secretary-General issued a report (S/25704 and Add.1) proposing the establishment of an international tribunal as requested by the Security Council in its resolution 808 (1993) and recommending a Statute for the tribunal. On 25 May 1993 the Security Council adopted resolution 827 (1993) in which it approved the Secretary-General's report and established "an international tribunal for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia between 1 January 1991" and a later date to be determined by the Security Council. Article 15 of the Statute of the International Tribunal authorizes the judges of the International Tribunal to "adopt rules of procedure and evidence for the conduct of the pre-trial phase of the proceedings, trials and appeals, the admission of evidence, the protection of victims, and witnesses and other matters". Article 20 of the Statute provides that the Trial Chambers of the International Tribunal "shall ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and that proceedings are conducted in accordance with the rules of procedure and evidence, with full respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the protection of victims and witnesses". Articles 20 through 26 contain more specific provisions relating to the right to a fair trial, judgement and appeal. In particular, most of the fair trial provisions in article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are reproduced in article 21 of the Statute, although the Covenant is not mentioned as such.

82. The International Tribunal adopted rules of procedure and evidence on 11 February 1994. The rules provide many of the same protections which are found in the Body of Principles contained in annex II of this report, although phrased in much more general terms. The rules contain safeguards designed to ensure the impartiality of the tribunal (rules 14-36), ensure the suspect's right to free counsel and the assistance of an interpreter (42), provide for the video- or audio-taping of all suspect questioning (43), contain procedural safeguards for all indictments and arrest warrants (47-61), require that all accused be brought promptly before the tribunal (62), do not allow the suspect to be questioned without counsel present (63), require the prosecution to disclose all exculpatory evidence to the accused (68), allow the judges to close the proceedings to the public in certain circumstances (79), and provide for appeal (107-122) and pardon (123-125) procedures. The rules also provide, however, for the pre-trial release of a suspect only in exceptional circumstances - thus making pre-trial detention the rule rather than the exception.

83. The Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International Tribunal fail to address, however, some important components of the right to a fair trial. There is no mention, for example, of the treatment of pre-trial detainees, such as the right to immediate notice to families of one's detention or prompt access to one's family (rule 92, United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners), the right not to be tortured or subjected to other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (art. 7 of the Civil and Political Covenant). In all fairness to the International Tribunal, however, in his report on the Statute of the Tribunal the Secretary-General made clear that the enumeration of rights in the Statute did not exclude any other internationally recognized right so that the Tribunal could take into account other concepts of fairness. Presumably, then, the International Tribunal will adhere to the well-established international safeguards not specifically enumerated in its Statute or Rules of Procedure and Evidence.

84. With the advent of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the need for an international understanding of the right to a fair trial is more pressing than ever before. The eyes of the world will be watching and it is vital that the defendants are afforded a fair trial. The International Tribunal will need to assure the observance of at least the procedural safeguards afforded by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the other international instruments discussed in this study, even if they are not specifically enumerated in the Tribunal's rules and governing statute. The International Tribunal will also focus more clearly on the need for adopting a draft third optional protocol on the right to a fair trial and a remedy.

IV. INTERPRETATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL

85. The right to a fair trial has been a norm of international human rights law for over 40 years and a substantial body of interpretation has developed elaborating and construing this right. The three principal sources of interpretation of the right to a fair trial have been the Human Rights Committee, the European Commission and Court of Human Rights, and the Inter-American Commission on and Court of Human Rights. More recently, however, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has also undertaken a role in interpreting the right to a fair trial. Previous reports in this study contained extensive summaries of interpretations of the right to a fair trial by these bodies. This chapter continues that practice by providing a summary of the more recent interpretations of the right to a fair trial. The chapter organizes the summaries based on the outline of the final publication of this study. All subjects do not have a corresponding interpretation since these interpretations reflect only recent cases. The final publication will contain, however, fair trial interpretations for every outline entry, based on the materials collected in the previous reports under this study as updated by the most recent developments. The chapter begins with summaries of recent decisions on standards applicable to all adjudicative proceedings by the European Commission and Court of Human Rights. It then continues with summaries of recent decisions relating to further standards applicable in criminal cases by the Human Rights Committee, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, the Inter-American Commission on and Court of Human Rights, and the European Commission and Court of Human Rights.

I. Standards in All Adjudicative Proceedings

A. Introduction

B. Notice

C. Fair hearing

D. Public hearing

E. Independent and impartial tribunal

86. In Demicoli v. Malta (decision of 27 August 1991), the European Court of Human Rights held unanimously that there had been a breach of article 6 (1) of the European Convention since the applicant had not received a fair and public hearing for the charge of breach of privilege concerning alleged defamation of members of the Maltese House of Representatives. The proceedings against the applicant were conducted by the members of the Maltese House of Representatives, which found the applicant guilty of defamation as editor of a political satirical periodical. The Court took the view that the House of Representatives could not be considered to be a court and did not fulfil the requirements of the Convention as to independence or impartiality.

F. Methods of conducting a trial

G. Approaches to the submission and evaluation of evidence

87. In Kraska v. Switzerland (decision of 19 April 1993), the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the failure of a member of the Federal Court of Switzerland to read thoroughly the whole file concerning a public law appeal did not prejudice that Court's later decision. The applicant possessed a medical diploma and wished to practise medicine in the private sector. Article 6, section 1, of the European Convention on Human Rights places a competent court under the duty to conduct a proper examination of submissions, arguments and evidence adduced by the parties, without prejudice to its assessment of whether they are relevant to its decision. Certain remarks made by a Federal Court judge left the applicant's lawyer with the impression that the judge did not have sufficient knowledge of the file. The importance of appearances in the administration of justice was acknowledged, but the Court stated that misgivings of individuals must be objectively justified. The applicant's complaint was unfounded, on account, inter alia, of the active part played by the judge in question during the deliberations.

H. Interpreter

I. Counsel

88. In Megyeri v. Germany (decision of 12 May 1992), the European Court of Human Rights held unanimously that there had been a violation of article 5 (4) of the European Convention because the applicant had not been assisted by a lawyer in proceedings concerning his possible release from detention in a psychiatric hospital. The Court stated that a person confined in a psychiatric institution for the commission of acts constituting criminal offences as to which he was not responsible on account of mental illness should, unless there are special circumstances, receive legal assistance in subsequent proceedings reviewing his detention.

J. Adequate time and facilities for the defence

K. Witnesses

L. Appeal

M. Remedy



II. Standards in Criminal Cases

A. Introduction

B. Notice

1. Right to be informed promptly of charges

89. Brannigan and McBride v. UK (decision of 26 May 1993) involved the arrest of suspected Irish Republican Army members who were believed to be involved in terrorist activities against the Government of the United Kingdom in Northern Ireland. The European Court of Human Rights grappled with the issue of the detention for over six and four days respectively of the suspected terrorists before being brought before a tribunal. The Court reasoned that derogation from guarantees under article 5 was in conformity with article 15 of the European Convention. Having regarded the nature of the terrorist threat in Northern Ireland, the limited scope of the derogation and the reasons advanced in support of it, as well as the existence of basic safeguards against abuse, the Court took the view that the Government did not exceed its margin of appreciation in considering that the derogation was strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.

90. In decision No. 4/1993 (Philippines) (E/CN.4/1994/27 at 46), the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention held that the practice of arresting persons without a warrant, not informing them of the reasons for their arrest, and not filing charges against them within a reasonable period of time would render their detention arbitrary in contravention of articles 8, 9, 10, and 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and articles 9 and 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In this particular communication, five Philippine nationals were arrested without warrant in 1990 and 1991 and none have had formal charges filed against them nor have they been informed individually of the reasons for their arrest. The Philippine Government failed to provide any information concerning the communication. The Working Group requested that the Government take the necessary steps to remedy the situation, so as to comply with the provisions and principles incorporated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

91. In decision No. 45/1992 (Ethiopia) (E/CN.4/1994/27 at 28), the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention held that the detention of three Ethiopians without charge and without the ability to challenge their detention through any judicial or administrative procedure was arbitrary and deprived them of their right to use judicial procedure for appealing against their detention and of their right to a fair trial, as guaranteed by articles 9 and 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and articles 9 and 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The three detainees are former high government officials reportedly being held for war crimes and human rights violations under the former Government. The Working Group requested that the Government of Ethiopia take the necessary steps to remedy the situation, so as to comply with the provisions and principles incorporated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

92. In Henry Kalenga v. Zambia (comm. No. 326/1988), the author of the communication, a Zambian citizen, was arrested and detained for over nine months for political offences. He was not formally informed about the reasons for his arrest for over a month after his arrest. During detention, he was frequently deprived of food, access to recreation as well as medical assistance, and subjected to various forms of psychological torture. The Human Rights Committee, in its views of 27 July 1993, was of the opinion that the uncontested response of the Zambian authorities to Mr. Kalenga's attempts to express his opinions freely and to disseminate the tenets of the People's Redemption Organisation constituted a violation of his rights under article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Committee was also of the opinion that Mr. Kalenga's right under article 9 (2) to be promptly informed about the reasons for his arrest and of the charges against him had been violated, as it took the authorities almost one month to inform him. Similarly, the Committee found a violation of article 9 (3), as Mr. Kalenga was not brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power. Additionally, the Committee considered that the State party violated Mr. Kalenga's right under article 10 (1) to be treated with humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of his person by its occasional deprivation of food and failure to provide needed medical assistance.

93. In Glenford Campbell v. Jamaica (comm. No. 248/1987), Mr. Campbell was convicted of murder. The Human Rights Committee, in views adopted 30 March 1992, found violations of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights because the author had not been promptly informed of the charges against him upon his arrest, nor was he brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power. In addition, the author's legal aid representative had failed to raise objections to the prosecution's case, despite specific instructions from the author to this effect. Mr. Campbell was also unable to instruct his representative for the appeal. In addition, the Committee found a violation of Mr. Campbell's right to life, since the final sentence of death had been imposed in violation of his right to a fair trial.

1. Rights relating to the bringing of charges

94. L.K. v. the Netherlands (comm. No. 4/1991) involved de facto housing discrimination by members of the neighbourhood where a foreign-born man wished to reside. The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, in its opinion of 16 March 1993, found that the mere existence of a law making discrimination a criminal act was insufficient and thus decided that the State's obligation to treat instances of racial discrimination with particular attention was missing. The police and judicial proceedings in the case did not afford the applicant effective protection and remedies within the meaning of article 6 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. The Committee ordered the Netherlands to compensate the author and report back to the Committee on measures taken to remedy the situation.

C. Presumption of innocence

95. Articles 1, 2, 4 (1), 5 (2), 7 (1), 7 (2), 7 (3), 25 (1), and 25 (2) of the American Convention on Human Rights were cited as being violated in Gangaram-Panday v. Suriname (case No. 10.274), in which the author complained that his brother, Mr. Asok Gangaram-Panday, was detained by the Military Police when he arrived at Zanderij Airport in Paramaribo. The Military Police at Fort Zeeland, where Mr. Gangaram-Panday was later detained, subsequently reported that he hanged himself. The Inter-American Court, in its decision of 4 December 1991, rejected the preliminary objections interposed by the Government of Suriname of: (1) abuse of the rights conferred by the Convention; (2) non-exhaustion of domestic remedies; and (3) non-compliance of the provisions contained in articles 47 to 51 of the Convention. The Court decided to proceed with consideration of the case, postponing its decision on costs until such time as it renders judgement on the merits.

D. Right to humane treatment during detention

96. In the cases of Randolph Barrett v. Jamaica (comm. No. 270/1988) and Clyde Sutcliffe v. Jamaica (comm. No. 271/1988), both of whom were sentenced to death for murder, the Human Rights Committee had to determine whether prolonged judicial proceedings and concomitant prolonged periods of detention on death row may in themselves amount to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Committee held, in views adopted 30 March 1992, that prolonged judicial proceedings did not constitute that kind of treatment per se, even if it might be a source of mental strain and tension for detained persons. This holding also applied to appeal and review proceedings in cases involving capital punishment, although an assessment of the particular circumstances of each case would be necessary.

97. The Committee further found that even prolonged periods of detention on death row under a severe custodial regime could not generally constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment if the convicted person was merely availing himself of appellate remedies. The Committee found, however, that the beatings and injuries Mr. Sutcliffe suffered on death row violated his rights under the Covenant and recommended that he be awarded an appropriate remedy, including adequate compensation. No finding of violations of the Covenant was made in respect of Mr. Barrett.

98. In the murder case of Willard Collins v. Jamaica (comm. No. 240/1987), the author of the communication was a Jamaican citizen under sentence of death who alleged various irregularities in the course of the judicial proceedings against him, such as inadequate legal representation, unavailability of witnesses, and undue prolonging of the judicial procedures - all in violation of the rights found in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Mr. Collins also alleged that the judge presiding over his retrial should have been disqualified, in light of remarks prejudicial to the author's case he was said to have made at an earlier stage in the proceedings. Mr. Collins further alleged that there had been unlawful attempts at influencing the verdict of the jury. The Human Rights Committee, although not entertaining the allegations of judicial bias and attempts at jury tampering, none the less found violations of the author's right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment (arts. 6 and 10 (1)), on account of ill-treatment he had been subjected to on several occasions during his detention on death row. The Committee, in views adopted 1 November 1991, urged the State party to take measures to secure Mr. Collins' physical integrity, and to grant him an appropriate remedy for the violations suffered.

99. Articles 1, 2, 4 (1), 5 (2), 7 (1), 7 (2), 7 (3), 25 (1), and 25 (2) of the American Convention on Human Rights provide the rights of obligation to respect rights, domestic legal effects, life, humane treatment, personal liberty, and judicial protection. The Inter-American Court considered the case of Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname (case No. 10.150), wherein the author complained that more than 20 unarmed males were detained by government soldiers under suspicion that they were members of the Jungle Commando. Some of the detained men were seriously wounded with bayonets and knives and all were forced to lie face-down on the ground while the soldiers stepped on their backs and urinated on them. Seven detainees were blindfolded and dragged to a military vehicle and driven to an area where they were later killed. The Court, in its decision of 4 December 1991, accepted Suriname's acknowledgment of responsibility and postponed judgement on reparations and costs.

E. Right to release pending trial

100. W. v. Switzerland (decision of 26 January 1993) involved the detention of a suspect whom authorities presumed would take flight at the first opportunity, as he had previously fled after an earlier arrest and release. The European Court of Human Rights determined that the dangers of absconding and collusion by the accused justified a period of pre-trial detention of over four years. The period did not exceed the "reasonable time" required under article 5 (3) of the European Convention. The dissent argued that there is a presumption of innocence and that protection of personal liberty is the rule, while detention should be the exception.

101. In Letellier v. France (decision of 26 June 1991), the European Court of Human Rights held that there had been a violation of article 5 (3) of the European Convention due to the excessive length of the applicant's pre-trial detention based on suspicion of her being an accessory to her husband's murder. The Court stressed the necessity of judicial authorities to establish with diligence the grounds for refusal to release a detained suspect. These grounds include the risk of pressure being brought to bear on witnesses, the danger of absconding, the inadequacy of court supervision, and the preservation of public order.

F. Methods of conducting a trial

1. Right to a trial without undue delay

102. Article 9 (3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides, inter alia, that anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release. Article 14 (3) (c), entitles everyone faced with a criminal charge to be tried without delay. In Fillastre v. Bolivia (comm. No. 336/1988), Mr. Andre Fillastre and Mr. Pierre Bizouarn, French citizens, were arrested on 3 September 1987 by the Bolivian police. On 12 September 1987, criminal proceedings were initiated against them on several charges, including the attempted kidnapping of a minor on behalf of the mother. When the Human Rights Committee considered the case, Mr. Fillastre and Mr. Bizouarn were still in detention, four years after their arrest, awaiting the decision of the court at first instance. Bolivia informed the Committee that if found guilty, the two detainees would face a sentence of up to five years' imprisonment. It pointed out that the delays in the judicial proceedings were due to the written procedure commonly followed in Bolivian criminal investigations and to budgetary problems facing the administration of justice. In finding a violation of the Covenant, the Committee, in its decision of 5 November 1991, considered that the information forwarded by Bolivia did not justify the unreasonable delay in arriving at a decision at first instance. The Committee requested Bolivia to release Mr. Fillastre and Mr. Bizouarn immediately.103. In Angelucci v. Italy (decision of 19 February 1991), the European Court of Human Rights decided unanimously that there had been a violation of article 6 (1) of the European Convention because the prosecution of a businessman involved in a police raid of suspected illegal business activities was discharged more than eight years after the raid. The Court stated that the applicant's case had not been examined within a "reasonable time" as required under the Convention. The Court pointed out that under its case law on the subject, the reasonableness of the length of proceedings is to be assessed in the light of the particular circumstances of the case. The case was undoubtedly of some complexity owing to the number of accused. The Court, however, noted that there were very long periods of inactivity in the proceedings - at least as far as the applicant was concerned. Further, the accused did nothing to slow down the progress of the case. It followed that the Court could not regard as "reasonable" in the instant case a lapse of time of at least eight years and two months.

2. Right to be tried by an independent and impartial tribunal

104. In decision No. 40/1993 (Djibuti) (E/CN.4/1994/27 at 125), the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention held that the fact that the majority of judges at the trial consisted of government officials, was contrary to the requirement in article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that the tribunal be independent. The Working Group further found that the Security Tribunal of the Republic of Djibouti's refusal to examine allegations that the confession of 14 individuals had been extracted under torture contravened internationally recognized standards relating to the right to a fair hearing and that non-observance of those provisions is such that it confers on the deprivation of freedom of the accused an arbitrary manner. The Government of the Republic of Djibouti failed to respond to the communication. The Working Group found that the arbitrary detention of the 14 individuals was in contravention of articles 5, 9 and 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and articles 7, 9 and 14, paragraphs 1, 2, 3 (d) and (e), of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Working Group requested that the Government of the Republic of Djibouti take the necessary steps to remedy the situation, so as to comply with the provisions and principles incorporated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

105. In Pfeifer and Plankl v. Austria (decision of 25 February 1992), the correspondence between two detainees awaiting trial was read by the judges involved in their case. The letter was read by the same judges performing judicial and investigative functions. The European Court of Human Rights considered the investigating judge's censorship of a letter containing "jokes of an insulting nature against prison officers" as a violation of the right to an impartial tribunal. The Court decided that the right to have one's case heard by an impartial tribunal is established by law in article 6 (1) of the European Convention, and the right to respect for correspondence is established by article 8 of the Convention.

G. Right to defend himself/herself

106. In F.C.B. v. Italy (decision of 28 August 1991), the European Court held unanimously that the decision to try the applicant in his absence had violated section 1 in conjunction with section 3 (c) of article 6 of the European Convention. The accused was released from custody, then tried in absentia on appeal while subsequently in custody for other reasons in the Netherlands. He did not expressly (or at least in an unequivocal manner) waive his right to appear and defend himself. The Court reasoned that an applicant's indirect knowledge of his trial date does not meet the strict requirements for the State's diligence in following the provisions of article 6, sections 1 and 3, of the Convention.

H. Counsel

1. Right to free, effective legal representation

107. In decision No. 2/1992 (Lao People's Democratic Republic) (E/CN.4/1993/24 at 29), the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention held that detention of two Lao nationals in complete isolation with no charge, trial or access to a lawyer and with no ability to challenge the lawfulness of their detention, and the failure to provide the medical care their state of health required was arbitrary. The official media announced that the two individuals were to be questioned and tried under article 51 of the Criminal Code which prohibits treason, yet the Lao People's Democratic Republic failed to respond to the Working Group's communication. Accordingly, the Working Group found that the individuals' detention was in contravention of articles 9, 10, 11 and 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and articles 9, 14 and 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Working Group requested that the Government of the Lao People's Democratic Republic take the necessary steps to remedy the situation, so as to comply with the provisions and principles incorporated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

108. In Delroy Quelch v. Jamaica (comm. No. 292/1988), the Human Rights Committee noted with concern that the State party in its submission confined itself to issues of admissibility (Committee views adopted on 23 October 1992). Its failure to investigate in good faith all the allegations made against it had rendered the Committee's examination of the communication unduly difficult. With regard to the author's claim that he was not represented by counsel during the appeal proceedings, the written judgement of the Court of Appeal showed that his counsel was present during the hearing. The Committee was therefore of the view that the facts before it did not disclose a violation of article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

2. Right to communicate with counsel and have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defence

109. In decision No. 50/1993 (Peru) (E/CN.4/1994/27 at 144), the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention held that the incommunicado detention, torture, failure to specify reasons for their detention, or the inability to communicate with counsel of 13 Peruvian citizens accused of plotting to assassinate the President of the Republic of Peru constituted violations of the rules of due process of law and that such contraventions made the deprivation of freedom during the first 15 days arbitrary. The Working Group noted, however, that planning armed conspiracy cannot be regarded as legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of association, expression or opinion or participation in political life, and that it constitutes an offence in all legislation and political systems. Accordingly, the detention beyond the 15 day incommunicado period cannot be considered arbitrary. The Working Group therefore transmitted the information on the presumed ill-treatment to the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the question of torture.

110. In Dieter Wolf v. Panama (comm. No. 289/1988), Mr. Wolf, a German citizen who had been detained and convicted on charges of cheque fraud in Panama, claimed that he was not heard personally in any of the judicial proceedings against him; that he was never served a properly motivated indictment and was not brought promptly before a judge; that the proceedings against him were unreasonably prolonged; that he was at all times denied access to legal counsel; and that he was forced to perform hard labour in an island penitentiary. The Human Rights Committee, in views adopted on 26 March 1992, found violations of the articles in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights relating to: the right to be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power; the right to be treated in detention with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person; the right of unconvicted prisoners to be segregated from convicted prisoners; the right to a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal; the right to adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defence; and the right to legal representation. The Committee recommended that Mr. Wolf be provided a remedy.

111. In Campbell v. UK (decision of 25 March 1992), the European Court found that the control of a prisoner's correspondence with his solicitor and with the European Commission of Human Rights was incompatible with article 8 of the European Convention. Letters to and from a lawyer are privileged under article 8. Prison authorities, however, may open a letter from a lawyer to a prisoner where they have reasonable cause to believe that it contains an illicit enclosure, as long as suitable guarantees preventing the reading of a letter are provided, and that the reading of correspondence should only be permitted in exceptional circumstances. The Court stated that there is no pressing social need for the opening and reading of an applicant's correspondence with his solicitor. This kind of interference, the Court continued, is not necessary in a democratic society since the risk of abuse is so negligible that it must be discounted.

112. In S. v. Switzerland (decision of 28 November 1991), the European Court of Human Rights held unanimously that there had been a violation of article 6 (3) (c) of the European Convention because the applicant, while in pre-trial detention, had not been allowed to communicate freely with his lawyer for over seven months. A concurring opinion emphasized that the freedom and inviolability of communications between a person charged with a criminal offence and his counsel are among the fundamental requirements of a fair trial, inherent in the right to legal assistance, essential for effective exercise of that right, and that there can be no exception to this principle. The dissent stressed that while in principle a defendant is allowed to communicate freely with his defence counsel, there are exceptional situations where surveillance of the defendant's communications with his counsel may be necessary and hence compatible with the principle. This exception is evidenced, according to the dissent, by the not so infrequent cases of serious collusion between lawyers and persons in custody which have occurred in several countries in recent years.

I. Right to free assistance of an interpreter

J. Rights during trial

113. In decision No. 36/1993 (Indonesia) (E/CN.4/1994/27 at 116), the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention held that the Indonesian Government's reliance on tainted testimony vitiates the trial and renders the continued detention of Fernando de Araujo, a member of the National Resistance of East Timorese Students, arbitrary. Mr. de Araujo's conviction, based on the testimony of witnesses who could not be cross-examined on account of their absence and whose statements were relied on, despite the fact that they were made in the presence of police and other investigatory authorities, suggests that the testimony itself is tainted. The Working Group also found that the fact that Mr. de Araujo was subjected to beating and solitary confinement further points to the arbitrary nature of his detention and found that Mr. de Araujo's detention and ultimate conviction is in violation of articles 5, 9, 19, and 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and articles 7, 9, 10, 14, 19, and 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Indonesian Government failed to respond to the communication and the Working Group requested that the Government take the necessary steps to remedy the situation, so as to comply with the provisions and principles incorporated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

114. N.A.J. v. Jamaica (comm. No. 351/1989) concerned a Jamaican citizen under sentence of death for murder. The author claimed that his trial was unfair and that a number of irregularities had occurred in its conduct. The Human Rights Committee, in its decision on admissibility of 6 April 1992, decided that the communication was inadmissible under article 3 of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It found that the allegations did not come within the scope of the Covenant under the right to a fair trial, as they related primarily to the judge's instructions to the jury and the evaluation of evidence, which are beyond the Committee's competence unless there is manifest partiality or arbitrariness on the part of the judge.

115. Article 14 (3) (e) of the Civil and Political Covenant provides that everyone charged with a crime has the right to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him. The Human Rights Committee considered the case of Delroy Prince v. Jamaica (comm. No. 269/1987), wherein the author complained that witnesses on his behalf had been subjected to intimidation and therefore had failed to testify. He had not raised this matter, however, during trial. In the absence of further evidence, the Committee, in views adopted on 30 March 1992, found no violation of this article. The Committee also found that Mr. Prince's claim that he was severely beaten upon his arrest was not substantiated; this allegation had been raised during the trial and rejected by the jury.

116. In Carlton Linton v. Jamaica (comm. No. 255/1987), the author claimed that he did not receive a fair trial because the judge improperly summarized the legal requirements of common design in relation to murder and manslaughter. The Human Rights Committee, in views adopted on 22 October 1992, noted with regret the absence of cooperation from the State party in not making any submissions concerning the substance of the matter under consideration. In respect of the claim of unfair trial, the Committee concluded that there had been no violation of article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as the material before it did not reveal that the jury instructions had been clearly arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice, or that the judge had violated his obligation of independence and impartiality. In the absence of refutation by the State party, however, the physical abuse inflicted on the author while on death row, the mock execution set up by the prison warders, and the denial of adequate medical care after an aborted escape attempt constituted cruel and inhuman treatment under articles 7 and 10 of the Covenant. The Committee urged the State party to take effective steps to investigate the treatment to which Mr. Linton was subjected, to prosecute any persons responsible for his ill-treatment, and to grant him compensation.

117. In Denroy Gordon v. Jamaica (comm. No. 237/1987), the author claimed to be innocent of the verdict of murder and alleged that because the jurors were sympathetic to the deceased and his relatives, they did not base their decision on the facts of the case. The Human Rights Committee, in views adopted on 5 November 1992, could not conclude that the author's lawyers had been unable to prepare properly the case for the defence, found that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not provide an unlimited right to obtain the attendance of any witness requested by the accused or his counsel, and held that it would have been incumbent upon the author's counsel to raise on appeal the question of whether a verdict of manslaughter should have been left open to the jury. The facts before the Committee therefore disclosed no violation of any of the articles of the Covenant.

118. In S. v. UK (application No. 16757/90), the applicant complained that he did not receive a fair trial since he was unable to hear the witnesses giving evidence against him as a result of a glass screen in front of the dock. He invoked article 6 (1) of the European Convention, which entitles all to a "[f]air and public hearing . . .. " The Government submitted that the applicant's legal representatives were able to follow the proceedings and that the inability of the applicant to follow the proceedings was not brought to the attention of the trial court. The Government contended that it cannot be held responsible for the failure of the accused's legal representatives to raise the matter. The European Commission on Human Rights, in its decision of 10 February 1992, considered that the application raised serious issues of law and fact under the Convention, the determination of which should depend on an examination of the merits. The application was therefore declared admissible.

119. In Isgro v. Italy (decision of 19 February 1991), the European Court held unanimously that the applicant's criminal conviction, which had been based in part on the statements made by a witness before an investigating judge and read at the trial, had not infringed paragraph 3 (d) of article 6 of the European Convention, taken in conjunction with paragraph 1 thereof. The applicant's conviction was based essentially on records of statements made by a witness in the absence of the applicant and his lawyer during the investigative stage of the proceedings. Later, during trial, the witness was summoned to appear, but proved to be untraceable. The applicant complained that neither he nor his lawyer was able to examine the witness against him in order to establish a fair hearing by an impartial tribunal. The Court found that the evidence produced did not disclose any negligence on the part of the national authorities in seeking to secure the witness's appearance in court. The witness was not an anonymous witness - he was questioned by the investigating judge, who organized a confrontation between him and the applicant, and with a co-accused. The Court further found that the District Court and Court of Appeal did not base their decisions solely on the witness's statements, but also on other testimony and on the applicant's observations. Additionally, the applicant's lawyer had the possibility to challenge, during trial, the accuracy of the witness's allegations and the latter's credibility.

K. Right not to be held guilty of any criminal offence for an act or omission not constituting a criminal offence

120. In decision No. 18/1993 (Israel) (E/CN.4/1994/27 at 75), the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention held that the detention of Walid Zakut, a member of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), simply on the fact that he is a member of an organization provides no legal basis for the detention of a person. Even though the DFLP advocates violence and carries out acts of violence, the Working Group found that for such detention to be upheld as a preventive measure it must be shown that the person concerned has committed, or is in the process of committing acts in furtherance of the objectives of the organization of which he is a member. The Israeli Government failed to address the communication. Accordingly, the Working Group found that Walid Zakut's detention was in contravention of article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Working Group requested that the Government of Israel take the necessary steps to remedy the situation, so as to comply with the provisions and principles incorporated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

L. Right to an appeal

121. In Leroy Simmonds v. Jamaica (comm. No. 338/1988), a prisoner, who had been sentenced to death, claimed that he was not informed about either the date or outcome of his appeal from a sentence of death until two days after it had been dismissed. The Human Rights Committee, in views adopted on 23 October 1992, found a violation of article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights because the delay in notification of the hearing date jeopardized his opportunities to prepare his appeal and to consult with his court-appointed lawyer. It considered that the imposition of a sentence of death upon the conclusion of a trial in which the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights had not been respected, if no further appeal against the sentence was available, would be a violation of article 6 concerning the right to life. The Committee was of the view that Mr. Simmonds was entitled to a remedy and requested the State party to provide information within 90 days on any relevant measures taken in respect of the Committee's wishes.

122. In G.J. v. Trinidad and Tobago (comm. No. 331/1988), a prisoner, who had been sentenced to death for murder, complained of irregularities during the conduct of his trial in the court of first instance. The Court of Appeal, although acknowledging that there had been irregularities during the trial at first instance, concluded that these defects had not affected the outcome of the trial and dismissed the prisoner's appeal. The Human Rights Committee (decision on admissibility of 5 November 1991), after examining the case, recalled that it is generally for the appellate courts of States parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and not for the Committee, to evaluate the facts and evidence and to review the interpretation of domestic law. Similarly, it is for appellate courts and not for the Committee to review the judge's attitude during the trial, unless it is apparent that the judge manifestly violated his obligations of impartiality.

123. In Alrick Thomas v. Jamaica (comm. No. 272/1988), Mr. Thomas, who had been sentenced to death for murder by the court of first instance, was informed about the date of the appeal hearing only after it had taken place. He was unable, therefore, to communicate with his legal representative, who withdrew the original ground of appeal without consulting his client. The Human Rights Committee, in views adopted on 31 March 1992, taking into account the combined effect of these circumstances, found that the appeal proceedings in this case did not meet the requirements of a fair trial under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and requested Jamaica to offer Mr. Thomas an appropriate remedy.

124. In the murder cases of Raphael Henry v. Jamaica (comm. No. 230/1987), and Aston Little v. Jamaica (comm. No. 283/1988), the authors of the communications were Jamaican citizens under sentence of death who alleged various irregularities in the course of the judicial proceedings against them, such as inadequate legal representation, unavailability of witnesses, and undue prolonging of the judicial procedures - all in violation of the rights found in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In the former case the Human Rights Committee, in views adopted on 1 November 1991, due to the absence of a written judgement from the Court of Appeal of Jamaica, found a violation of the author's right to have his sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal as provided in article 14 (5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It found a similar violation, in views adopted on 1 November 1991, in the case of Mr. Little, who had also been unable to obtain a reasoned judgement from the Court of Appeal for many years. In Mr. Little's case, the Committee further found violations of the author's right to have sufficient time for the preparation of the defence (art. 14 (3) (b)), and because the witnesses on his behalf were not heard under the same conditions as the witnesses against him (art. 14 (3) (e)). In both cases, the Committee also found a violation of the author's right to life (art. 6), since the final sentence of death had been imposed in violation of their right to a fair trial.
M. Right not to be tried again for the same offence

125. In Juan Terán Jijón v. Ecuador (comm. No. 277/1988), Mr. Terán an Ecuadorian citizen who had been arrested in March 1986 in connection with an armed robbery, claimed to have been kept incommunicado after his arrest, to have suffered ill-treatment, and to have been forced to sign blank sheets of paper. He further alleged that he was not promptly brought before a judge and that after his release in March 1987, he was re-arrested and re-indicted for the same offence. The Human Rights Committee, in views adopted on 26 March 1992, considered the evidence sufficiently compelling to find a violation of the articles 7 and 10 (1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Regarding the re-arrest, re-indictment, and incommunicado detention, the Committee found further violations of the Covenant and recommended that the author be given an appropriate remedy, including compensation. It also called upon Ecuador to investigate the use to which papers signed by Mr. Terán under duress had been put, and to see that these documents were either returned to the author or destroyed. A Committee member appended an individual opinion on this point, finding a violation of article 14 (3)(g), which provides that no one may be compelled to testify against himself or confess guilt.

N. Juvenile procedures

O. Concluding remarks

126. The final publication of this study will update this chapter with the latest available interpretations on the right to a fair trial at the time the publication is compiled. Moreover, the final publication will categorize the interpretations by subject matter as indicated in the proposed outline contained in the recommendations section of chapter VII. This ordering will better facilitate the use of the interpretations as a reference tool for those interested in the substantive interpretations of the right to a fair trial and a remedy.

V. THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL AS A NON-DEROGABLE RIGHT

127. Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the right to a fair trial and a remedy may at present be the subject of derogation and therefore the right to a fair trial and a remedy may be suspended in certain circumstances, such as times of public emergency.

128. Article 4 of the Civil and Political Covenant provides that in situations threatening the life of the nation, a Government may issue a formal declaration suspending most human rights as long as (1) the exigencies of the situation strictly require such a suspension, (2) the suspension does not conflict with the nation's other international obligations, and (3) the Government informs the United Nations Secretary-General immediately. The only rights that are not subject to suspension in this situation are those specified in article 4 of the Civil and Political Covenant as protected from derogation. These rights include freedom from discrimination based on race, colour, sex, language, religion, or social origin. The Civil and Political Covenant also does not permit any derogation from the rights to be free from arbitrary killing; torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; slavery; imprisonment for debt; retroactive penalties; or failure to recognize a person before the law. It should be noted that the right to a fair trial and a remedy is not included in this provision.

129. Accordingly, in the 128 countries that have ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as of 11 May 1994, some of the most important human rights would be protected as non-derogable rights. Such protection would encompass prohibitions against torture, inhuman treatment, and extrajudicial executions. Other rights, however, including the right to a fair trial and freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, can provide effective safeguards of these non-derogable rights already included in article 4.

130. The Human Rights Committee has observed, "If States parties decide in circumstances of a public emergency as contemplated by article 4 to derogate from normal procedures required under article 14, they should ensure that such derogations do not exceed those strictly required by the exigencies of the actual situation, and respect the other conditions in paragraph 1 of article 14" (A/39/40, p. 144, para. 4).

131. Probably at no other time will the right to a fair trial and a remedy be as important as it is during a time of civil or international conflict. Yet it is precisely at this time that the right to a fair trial becomes vulnerable under article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

132. The Convention against Torture does not permit derogation: "No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture." (art. 2 (2)). Under this treaty the accused person possesses a non-derogable right to be free from torture at all times during the criminal process, including interrogation, detention, trial, sentencing, and punishment. Accordingly, evidence obtained as a result of
torture can never be permitted to be introduced. Also, persons accused of torture are guaranteed fair treatment at all stages of the proceedings under article 7.

133. The African Charter does not contain a provision allowing States to derogate from their obligations under the treaty in times of public emergency. Hence, it appears that derogation would not be permitted under the African Charter. Some commentators have suggested that the African Charter's use of broadly-worded limitation clauses in several provisions made it unnecessary for the African Charter to include the concept of derogation. Article 7 of the African Charter does not, however, contain any limitations:


"1. Every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard. This comprises:

(a) The right to an appeal to competent national organs against acts of violating his fundamental rights as recognized and guaranteed by conventions, laws, regulations and customs in force;

(b) The right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty by a competent court or tribunal;

(c) The right to defence, including the right to be defended by counsel of his choice;

(d) The right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial court or tribunal.

"2. No one may be condemned for an act or omission which did not constitute a legally punishable offence at the time it was committed. No penalty may be inflicted for an offence for which no provision was made at the time it was committed. Punishment is personal and can be imposed only on the offender."

134. Similarly, article 26 of the African Charter, which guarantees the independence of the Courts, does not allow for either derogation or limitation in times of public emergency.

135. Article 27 of the American Convention authorizes the suspension of guarantees in "times of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the independence or security of the State Party ...". Article 27, however, does not authorize the suspension of several significant rights including the "Right to Life" (art. 4), "Right to Humane Treatment" (art. 5), "Freedom from Ex Post Facto Laws" (art. 9), "or of the judicial guarantees essential for the protection of such rights". Although article 27 does not make article 8 (the right to a fair trial) a non-derogable right, article 27 does extend non-derogable status to "judicial guarantees essential for the protection of such rights" as the right to life, humane treatment, and the other rights identified in article 27. Hence, a certain aspect of the right to a fair trial has been made non-derogable by the American Convention.

136. It is unclear what are the required "judicial guarantees" protected by article 27 as non-derogable, but presumably they include fair trial guarantees included in the American Convention (art. 8) - most of which relate to criminal trials:

(a) The right to a hearing "within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal" (art. 8 (1));

(b) The "right to be presumed innocent" (8 (2));

(c) The right to assistance by a translator or interpreter (8 (2) (a));

(d) "Prior notification in detail to the accused of the charges against him" (8 (2) (b));

(e) "Adequate time and means for the preparation of his defence" (8 (2) (c));

(f) The right to defend himself or assistance of "counsel of his own choosing, and to communicate freely and privately with his counsel" (8 (2) (d));

(g) The inalienable right to be assisted by counsel provided by the State" (8(2)(e));

(h) The right to examine and obtain appearance of witnesses in court (8 (2) (f));

(i) The "right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself or to plead guilty" (8 (2) (g));

(j) The "right to appeal the judgment to a higher court" (8 (2) (h));

(k) Confession of guilt by the accused must be "made without coercion of any kind" (8 (3));

(l) The right not to be subjected to double jeopardy (8 (4)); and

(m) A public trial, except to protect the interests of justice 8 (5)).

137. It is also important to note that the Geneva Conventions and the two Additional Protocols assure the right to a fair trial even during periods of armed conflict. For example, article 129 of the (Third) Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of Prisoners of War states, "In all circumstances, the accused persons shall benefit by safeguards of proper trial and defence, which shall not be less favourable than those provided by article 105." Article 105 includes the right to counsel, the calling of witnesses, the services of an interpreter when needed, the advising of these rights in due time before trial, the right to have competent counsel appointed for the accused, necessary time for preparation of the defence, right to consult with counsel, the right to be notified of the particulars of charges, and the right to have observers from the protecting Government present, unless there are exceptional circumstances. Article 130 of the Third Geneva Convention makes "depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial" a "grave breach". Under these provisions the right to a fair trial appears to be non-derogable, at least in times of international armed conflict.

138. As to non-international armed conflicts, common article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions prohibits a party to such a conflict from "the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples." The judicial guarantees are not specified but presumably reflect the safeguards identified by article 105 of the Third Geneva Convention, article 6 of Additional Protocol II, and evolving standards relating to the right to a fair trial and a remedy.

139. Article 6 of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions sets forth a number of fair trial rights applicable to non-international armed conflicts as defined in Protocol II:

(a) The right to be informed without delay of the particulars of the offence alleged and the right to "all necessary rights and means of defence";

(b) Individual penal responsibility;

(c) Punishment only on the basis of existing laws and the right to benefit from later laws which may reduce the penalty;

(d) Presumption of innocence;

(e) The accused's right to be present at trial;

(f) The right not to be compelled to testify or confess guilt;

(g) The right to be advised on conviction of rights and available remedies;

(h) The death penalty may not be imposed on persons who are under the age of 18 at the time of the offence; also pregnant women or mothers of young children may not be executed; and

(i) At the end of hostilities, the authorities shall grant the broadest possible amnesty.

140. Therefore, while the right to a fair trial has not been recognized as a non-derogable right in article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the African Charter, the American Convention, and the Geneva Conventions and Protocols indicate that aspects of the right to a fair trial have been accepted as non-derogable. Moreover, the broad framework of international standards related to fair trial which are not in the form of treaties, such as the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, the Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, and the Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors, are intended to apply at all times. The right to a fair trial, and as the next chapter makes clear, the ability to challenge the legality of one's detention, especially in times of public emergency, are essential to guaranteeing the right to a fair trial. For this very reason, it is essential that the draft third optional protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights be adopted. This optional Protocol, if adopted, would make the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guaranteeing a fair trial and a remedy non-derogable in all situations.

VI. THE RIGHT TO A REMEDY AS A NON-DEROGABLE RIGHT AS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL

141. The right to an effective remedy is a fundamental aspect necessary to ensure the right to a fair trial. If habeas corpus and amparo are going to be effective remedies to protect other non-derogable rights, not only should they be non-derogable under all situations, but they should be in practice an efficacious means at all times, including periods of emergency, to challenge the legality of detention.

142. This view was expressed by members of the Sub-Commission during the discussions of the previous reports. Pursuant to these discussions and the request of the Sub-Commission contained in its resolution 1991/15, the Commission on Human Rights in its resolution 1992/35 called upon all States which had not yet done so to establish a procedure such as habeas corpus by which anyone who is deprived of his or her liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to institute proceedings before a court so that the court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his or her detention and order his or her release if the detention is found to be unlawful. The Commission also called upon all States to maintain the right to such a procedure at all times and under all circumstances, including during states of emergency. The Commission in its resolution 1994/32 reiterated its encouragement of States "to establish a procedure such as habeas corpus or a similar procedure as a personal right not subject to derogation, including during states of emergency".

143. Other human rights bodies have recommended that remedies such as habeas corpus and amparo be made non-derogable. The Sub-Commission Working Group on Detention, for example, in its August 1993 report (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/22) discussed habeas corpus as a non-derogable right and as one of the requirements for the right to a fair trial. The members of the Working Group were of the opinion that the guarantees provided by habeas corpus should be incorporated into every country's national legislation as a non-derogable right. They also shared the view that States should maintain the right to habeas corpus at all times and under all circumstances, even in a state of emergency. The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention made similar observations in its 1994 report (E/CN.4/1994/27). Moreover, various other human rights bodies identified in the 1992 progress report (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/24/Add.3) also recognized the need for the non-derogability of these procedures.

144. When considering the requirements of a fair trial, both in civil and criminal cases, the court should apply those standards which are the most protective of the rights of the individual. Principal among the basic fair trial standards recognizing the right to a remedy are article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, articles 2 (3) (b), 9 (3) and 9 (4) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 5 (4) of the European Convention, articles 7 (5) and 7 (6) of the American Convention on Human Rights, and articles 6 and 7 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.

145. Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states, "[e]veryone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law."

146. Article 2 (3) (b) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that each State party undertakes "[t]o ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy."

147. Article 9 (3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights indicates that anyone "arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release."

148. Article 9 (4) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides:

"Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful."

149. Articles 2 (3), 9 (3), and 9 (4) embody the essential characteristics of amparo and habeas corpus even though the words "in the nature of habeas corpus" from earlier drafts of the Covenant were deleted to allow States the freedom to fashion remedies through their own legal systems.

150. A provision similar to article 9 (4) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights may be found in European Convention article 5 (4):

"Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful."

151. The equivalents of amparo/habeas corpus are also found in the American Convention on Human Rights. Article 7 (5) provides:

"Any person detained shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to be released without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings. His release may be subject to guarantees to assure his appearance for trial."

Article 7 (6):

"Anyone who is deprived of his liberty shall be entitled to recourse to a competent court, in order that the court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his arrest or detention and order his release if the arrest or detention is unlawful. In States parties whose laws provide that anyone who believes himself to be threatened with deprivation of his liberty is entitled to recourse to a competent court in order that it may decide on the lawfulness of such threat, t