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I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ................................................. 1 - 30
II. LEGISLATIVE, ADMINISTRATIVE AND OTHER
MEASURES IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS
TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF TORTURE AND
OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING
TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT (ARTICLES 1, 2, 4
AND 16 OF THE CONVENTION) ............................................. 31 - 194
A. Measures to combat all armed groups outside
the law .................................................................................... 45 - 65
Measures to prevent kidnapping ............................................... 58 - 61
Strengthening of the commitment of the military
forces to combat armed groups outside the law ........................ 62 - 65
B. Protection of human rights defenders and
threatened persons ................................................................... 66 - 77
C. Promotion of the administration of justice
and measures to combat impunity ............................................. 78 - 95
D. Special measures to promote international
humanitarian law ...................................................................... 96 - 102
E. Care for the population displaced by violence ........................... 103 - 113
F. Legislative measures ................................................................ 114 - 195
disappearance, forced displacement and torture -
Act No. 589 of 2000 ............................................................... 114 - 122
Reforms of the military criminal justice system -
Act No. 522 of 12 August 1999 .............................................. 123 - 128
Military jurisdiction .................................................................. 129 - 136
Functioning of the military criminal justice system ...................... 137 - 165
CONTENTS (continued)
Paragraphs Page
Exclusion of minors from military service -
Act. No. 548 of December 1999 ............................................. 166
Accession to the Convention on the Prohibition
of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer
of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their
Destruction - Act No. 254 of January 2000 ............................. 167 - 168
New Penal Code - Act No. 599 of July 2000
(entered into force on 24 July 2001) ......................................... 169 - 175
New Code of Penal Procedure - Act. No. 600
of July 2000 (entered into force on 24 July 2001) ..................... 176 - 181
Statute of the International Criminal Court ................................ 182 - 184
Bill on the adoption of the Inter-American
Convention on the Forced Disappearance of
Persons ................................................................................... 185 - 187
Draft single disciplinary code .................................................... 188 - 191
G. Other human rights policy mechanisms ...................................... 192 - 194
III. LEGISLATIVE AND OTHER MEASURES TO
PROHIBIT THE EXPULSION, RETURN OR
EXTRADITION OF PERSONS AT RISK OF
BEING SUBJECTED TO TORTURE;
JURISDICTION; INTERNATIONAL TREATIES
AND RECIPROCAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE
(ARTICLES 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 AND 9 OF THE
CONVENTION) .......................................................................... 195 - 247
Extradition ...................................................................................... 195 - 203
Procedural aspects ......................................................................... 204 - 234
Relations with foreign authorities ..................................................... 235 - 241
Requests for judicial assistance
from abroad ....................................
242 - 247
IV. EDUCATION AND INFORMATION CONCERNING THE
PROHIBITION OF TORTURE; TRAINING OF CIVILIAN
AND MILITARY LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL
(ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION) ..................................... 248 - 254
V. INTERROGATION RULES - INSTRUCTIONS,
METHODS AND PRACTICES; ARRANGEMENTS
FOR THE CUSTODY OF PERSONS SUBJECTED
TO ARREST, DETENTION OR IMPRISONMENT;
INADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED
UNDER TORTURE (ARTICLES 11 AND 15 OF
THE CONVENTION) .................................................................. 255 - 261
VI. EXAMINATION AND PROCESSING OF
COMPLAINTS AND REPORTS OF TORTURE,
MATERIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE
(ARTICLES 12, 13 AND 14 OF THE CONVENTION) .............. 262 - 297
A. Authorities competent to examine and process
complaints of torture ................................................................ 262 - 270
B. Material responsibility of the State for human
rights violations ........................................................................ 271 - 273 56
Direct reparation and restitution of rights ................................... 274 - 296
Compensation of victims of human rights
violations .................................................................................
277 - 297
Annexes
I. Act No. 589 of 2000, defining genocide, forced disappearance, forced displacement and
torture
II. Act No. 599 of 2000 - New Penal Code (entered into force on 24 July 2001)
III. Act. No. 600 of July 2000 - New Code of Penal Procedure (entered into force
on 24 July 2001)
IV. Act No. 522 of 12 August 1999 - New Military Penal Code
V. Act No. 548 of December 1999 - Public Order Exclusion of minors from the
armed conflict
VI. Act No. 409 of October 1997 - Adoption of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent
and Punish Torture
VII. Decree No. 1636 of August 2000, establishing, in the Administrative Department of the
Office of the President of the Republic, the Presidential Programme for the Promotion of,
Respect for and Safeguarding of Human Rights and the Application of International
Humanitarian Law
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
1. The problem of torture in Colombia must be considered in the context of the violations of human rights and international humanitarian law that are taking place in the country, particularly as a result of the internal armed conflict. Therefore, with due regard for autonomy and the complementarity between the political will to seek peace and the decision to guarantee and protect fundamental human rights, on 19 August 1999 the Government presented its policy for the promotion of, respect for and safeguarding of human rights and the application of international humanitarian law, 1998-2002, to the national and the international community.
2. The basic guidelines of the policy include the intensification of the fight against impunity by promoting the investigation of the most relevant cases, protection of human rights defenders and union leaders, measures to combat self-defence groups and prevent kidnapping, comprehensive care for the displaced population and strengthening of governmental capacity, particularly the modernization of the police and armed forces.
3. The internal armed conflict, which is becoming more widespread, degraded and dehumanized and increasingly affecting the civilian population, is the principal cause of violations of fundamental rights.
4. Consequently, the Government is promoting, together with its human rights policy, a policy of peace with the armed groups through negotiation and international humanitarian law in the interests of peace, security and justice.
5. Bearing in mind the nature of the armed confrontation in Colombia, the Government has broadened the traditional notion of human rights by incorporating international humanitarian law, which restrains the conflict and holds all armed participants responsible. The Government is also promoting the cultural, ethical and legal understanding of human rights in keeping with the current international approach, according to which individuals, organizations or groups are held responsible when they commit crimes. The aim of this approach is not to relieve the State of its duty to provide protection, or of any of its other obligations, but to punish, with greater rigor and objectivity, those individuals and centres responsible for serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the armed confrontation.
Violations of international humanitarian law
6. In 1999, with the escalation of the internal armed conflict, violations of international humanitarian law increased. The number of recorded violations of international humanitarian law has risen in the past three years. Murder is the most frequent offence, and it is increasing dramatically. Attacks on life and personal integrity, acts of terrorism and hostage-taking are common occurrences. Recruitment of minors by illegal armed groups is also on the rise. In recent times there has been a marked increase in the participation of self-defence groups in the conflict, which has aggravated the humanitarian situation.
7. In accordance with the data collected by the non-governmental organization Research and Popular Education Centre (CINEP), on violations of international humanitarian law in 1999, the self-defence groups commit the overwhelming majority of the murders of protected persons (74 per cent) and acts of torture (85 per cent). Guerrillas are responsible for most of the violations involving hostage-taking (98 per cent), threats (77 per cent) and recruitment (75 per cent) and for the wounded (70 per cent). In the context of the war, the police and armed forces are held accountable for 12 per cent of the wounded, 7 per cent of the incidents involving torture, and 2 per cent of murders of protected persons.
8. Information from the General Command of the Military Forces concerning attacks on life and personal integrity as violations of international humanitarian law over the past three years indicate that there has been an increase in such violations by the self-defence groups, as well as by the guerrillas as a whole. In 1998, guerrillas committed slightly fewer crimes of this nature. The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, FARC) is the group that commits the greatest number of violations of international humanitarian law.
9. In the strict sense of international humanitarian law, the deaths of persons who do not participate directly in the hostilities, or who have stopped participating in them, including members of the armed forces who have laid down their arms or have been taken out of combat for various reasons, are considered to be murders. Such murders have been perpetrated on a large scale by guerrilla and self-defence groups. The army command has registered 20 murders falling within the category of deaths of protected persons. There have also been reports of murders committed by members of the police and armed forces.
10. More broadly, the deaths that occurred hors de combat but which fall within the context of the armed conflict, as well as the 1,561 deaths registered by the army in 1999, which involved summary and extrajudicial executions carried out by participants in the conflict, should be considered as murders from the point of view of international humanitarian law. Subversives murder civilians suspected of having ties with self-defence groups or the military, or for failing to comply with their demands; such murders also include summary executions, which are frequently carried out against persons who supply the military or self-defence groups, landowners who do not pay the vacuna (compulsory levy), and local leaders, owing to their political position. They also murder members of the police and armed forces who have been deprived of liberty. The urban militias of FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN),which operate without uniforms, are also responsible for some of the guerrilla murders.
11. Guerrilla and self-defence groups resort to massacres of civilians as war practices. During such massacres, the victims are often tortured before they are killed. Massacres by the self-defence groups have increased markedly since 1995. The self-defence groups have been involved in the practice of torture. In most cases, the tortured person is later found dead. Many of the acts committed by the self-defence groups, such as torture and selective executions (lists, graffiti, threats), are intended to intimidate and spread terror among the civilian population, and cause displacements. It should be borne in mind that the military strategy of the self-defence groups focuses on attacks on the population.
12. On the other hand, guerrillas contribute to the cruelty of the war by executing their own members. The army estimates that some 300 guerrillas were executed in 1999 following revolutionary trials. Many other guerrillas killed in combat have not been properly identified. According to information from the General Command of the Military Forces, the number of cases of persons “disappeared” by the self-defence groups has increased from year to year; such persons are often discovered in common graves, with visible traces of torture and mutilation.
13. The guerrilla carries out attacks and raids on settlements. In 1998, 58 settlements and, in 1999, 47 settlements were attacked. In 1999, guerrilla and the self-defence groups attacked 106 of the country’s settlements, or 9.7 per cent of Colombian municipalities, according to the General Command of the Military Forces.
14. Subversive groups often attack property that is normally considered to be civilian, such as cars, buses, shops or residences; they set fire to buses, trucks and taxis; and they have attacked electrical towers and oil pipelines. The use of car bombs, grenades and other explosives by guerrilla groups affects civilians and combatants without distinction. The guerrilla has used pipettes filled with dynamite to destroy police stations, causing indiscriminate damage to houses of civilians and to private concerns.
15. Violations of international humanitarian law that take the form of attacks on works and installations containing destructive forces, dams, dikes, energy plants and oil pipelines by the guerrilla have increased from 68 to 77 and 80 cases over the past three years, according to information from the General Command of the Military Forces. Two cases were registered as having been perpetrated by the self-defence groups in 1999.
16. The destruction of energy towers is a common practice of the ELN group, which in 1999 blew up 145 towers and this year, up to 15 February, 76 towers. In 1999, FARC attacked 83 energy towers, and the United Self-Defence Groups of Colombia (AUC) attacked four. Oil pipelines are destroyed by both FARC and ELN; such incidents were particularly frequent in 1998.
17. According to the figures provided by the General Command of the Military Forces, plunder, which includes attacks on government and private entities, theft of and attacks on vehicles, and hijacking, is a frequent practice of subversive groups; it is less common among the self-defence groups.
18. Guerrilla and self-defence groups have attacked medical personnel and medical facilities and vehicles, including those used by the Red Cross. They have also blocked the transport of medicines, food and provisions. It is known that the self-defence groups also control food and medicines and limit or completely block the transport of supplies to certain parts of the country. Moreover, guerrilla groups attack religious personnel (according to data supplied by the army, 36 ministers and one priest were murdered in 1999), and religious headquarters and temples.
19. Guerrilla and self-defence groups continue to involve boys and girls in the conflict. According to the Office of the Ombudsman, approximately 2,000 children between the ages of 13 and 17 are members of self-defence groups and, in particular, guerrilla groups. According to the Children’s Movement for Peace of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 18 per cent of the minors involved in such groups have killed a person. In 1999, the army rescued 13 girls between the ages of 14 and 17 who were members of guerrilla groups.
20. With respect to the use of anti-personnel mines and booby traps in the Colombian conflict, Colombia has ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. According to partial estimates, there are currently at least 70,000 anti-personnel mines situated in approximately 105 municipalities in 23 departments. This means that the inhabitants of 10 per cent of the country’s municipalities are, or can be, exposed to the effects of these devices. Civilians and members of the armed forces become victims of anti-personnel mines that the guerrilla has planted indiscriminately in pastures on village roads and in community facilities. An estimated 50,000 mines have been laid by guerrillas. The military forces have planted 20,000 mines in order to defend installations. To date, 2,205 adults and 5,250 boys and girls have been affected by the detonation of mines. In 1999, 22 members of the army were wounded or killed by quiebrapatas (“leg-breaking”) mines, most of which were constructed by ELN and FARC. Between 1997 and February 2000, 87 members of the military forces (80 per cent of whom were soldiers) were killed by quiebrapatas mines, and 269 were disabled. No data is available on the affected civilian population.
21. Guerrilla and self-defence groups, particularly FARC, are using gas cylinders filled with various kinds of explosives in their attacks on civilians and members of the armed forces; such attacks damage installations and cause suffering to the victims. Between 1998 and 1999, 21,725 cylinders were stolen, 69 per cent by FARC.
22. The self-defence groups, together with the guerrilla groups, are the major cause of mass displacements of the rural population. In 1999, 19,194 families - 86,511 persons (4.5 persons per family) - were registered as having been displaced by the violence; according to the Social Solidarity Network’s programme of care for displaced persons, the displaced families requested assistance from government programmes. According to the figures supplied by the Advisory Office for Human Rights and Displacement (CODHES), in 1999, there were 288,127 displaced persons, or 57,627 families. These figures reflect internal population movements and include persons who pass through various municipalities; such figures are not limited to the segment of the population displaced by the violence.
23. The Social Solidarity Network’s system
for estimates of forced displacement by contrasting sources (SEFC) was created
for the purpose of providing information to show the extent of displacement
in the year 2000. SEFC has indicated that, in 2000, there were
1,351 displacement events that forced 128,843 persons, belonging to 26,107
families, to migrate. In the first
half of 2000, 51,515 persons, or 40 per cent, were displaced and,
in the second, 77,328 persons, or 60 per cent; this represents
an increase of 45 per cent.
24. Of the 128,843 displaced persons, the place of expulsion of 96 per cent (124,187 persons, from 25,979 families) is known. Of these displacements, 35 per cent (476) took place in the first half of the year and 65 per cent (884) in the second half, which represents an increase of 89 per cent.
25. In terms of territory, in the year 2000, 322 municipalities expelled people and 322 municipalities received displaced persons. In all, 480 municipalities were affected by displacement; 158 municipalities were only places of expulsion, an additional 158 were only places of refuge, and 164 were places of both refuge and expulsion. In addition, 159 municipalities registered more than one displacement event in the course of one year.
Factual overview of the problem of torture in Colombia
26. In order to demonstrate the trends in practice of torture, which violates fundamental rights and common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, data from various sources is provided below.
27. In its publication Noche y niebla [Night and Fog], the non-governmental organization CINEP reports that, in 2000, there was a total of 420 victims in 100 cases. This figure represents an increase as compared to that of the previous year.
Number of victims by perpetrator, 1997-2000
| Year |
No. of victims |
Self-defence groups |
Unknown |
Convivir |
Police and armed forces |
Public officials |
Social cleansing groups |
ELN |
FARC |
ERPb |
EPLc |
| 1997 |
222 |
177 |
21 |
1 |
22 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
| 1998 |
124 |
76 |
32 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| 1999 |
166 |
57 |
47 |
0 |
14 |
35 |
1 |
0 |
11 |
1 |
0 |
| 2000a |
420 |
274 |
98 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
1 |
| Total |
|
584 |
198 |
1 |
55 |
35 |
15 |
1 |
41 |
1 |
1 |
a Figures up to September 2000.
b People’s Revolutionary Army.
c People’s Liberation Army.
Source: CINEP - Justice and Peace Noche y niebla.
Prepared by the Vice-Presidential Monitoring
Centre for the presidential human rights and international humanitarian law
programme.
28. According to existing data, the self-defence groups are, without a doubt, principally responsible for this violation, since they account for 65.2 per cent, which reflects their increasing nominal and percental participation and provides a gloomy picture of Colombian reality in this regard. In 2000, as compared to 1999, the self-defence groups increased this practice by 231.7 per cent. On the other hand, the associations Convivir and guerrilla groups also engaged in this practice, although to much lesser extent than the self-defence groups and unknown perpetrators.
Participation by perpetrator - 2000
| No. of victims |
Self-defence groups |
Unknown |
Subversion |
“Social cleansing” groups |
Police and armed forces |
| 420 |
65.2% |
23.3% |
6.9% |
2.1% |
1.9% |
Figures up to September 2000.
Source: CINEP - Justice and Peace Noche y niebla.
Prepared by the Vice-Presidential Monitoring Centre for the presidential human rights and international humanitarian law programme.
29. The department of Valle, with 18 per cent of the national total, holds first place for the commission of torture, followed by the department of Antioquia with 13 per cent, Bolívar with 8 per cent, Cesar with 7 per cent and Norte de Santander.
30. In the case of the participation of State agents, particularly members of the police and armed forces, the Government acknowledges with concern the information provided by the Office of the Attorney-General, according to which 101 reports of serious human rights violations were received in 2000, a figure similar to the average of 112 cases a year for the years 1997 to 1999, during which a total of 338 cases were reported.
II. LEGISLATIVE, ADMINISTRATIVE AND OTHER MEASURES IN THE FIELD
OF HUMAN RIGHTS TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF TORTURE AND
OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR
PUNISHMENT (ARTICLES 1, 2, 4 AND 16 OF THE CONVENTION)
31. The Government of Colombia is working tirelessly to promote, ensure respect for and guarantee human rights, since it is aware of the serious implications of the internal armed conflict for the exercise of such rights - a degraded armed conflict in which the civilian population is the principal target of the armed outlaws. While important and valuable achievements have been made in the field of human rights, the Government recognizes that it is necessary to improve them and to continue to concentrate its efforts on overcoming the conflict. The Government is committed to finding a negotiated solution to the conflict, while recognizing the undeniable difficulties and crises that a peace process anywhere in the world entails, as well as the specific nature of the Colombian situation and the enormous challenges that it poses.
32. In this context, the actions listed below are the results of the Government’s implementation of its policy for the promotion of, respect for and safeguarding of human rights and the application of international humanitarian law in its search for peace.
33. The process with FARC clearly demonstrates such difficulties but is also an unequivocal sign of progress:
(a) A national and international consensus has been reached with respect to the need to find a political solution to the conflict, which takes precedence over concepts linked exclusively to military solutions;
(b) The international community has gained greater understanding of the complexity of the Colombian situation, with greater insight into and identification of the real interests of the participants in the conflict, which enables it to provide more effective assistance in promoting the process. This is reflected, inter alia, in the support and commitment of friendly countries, as a valuable result of peace diplomacy which, contrary to the view expressed in some quarters, is not a strategy to conceal the actual situation but an effort to “internationalize” the peace process with the aim of ending the war;
(c) Progress has been made in reaching a consensus for supporting the peace process, by inviting the various political forces and social actors to participate in that process by joining the Common Front for Peace and against Violence, as well as through the National Peace Council. The Government will continue to work towards strengthening and broadening the consensus;
(d) There is still a demilitarized zone that makes dialogue possible. In spite of the considerable criticism that the zone has received, the existence of the zone has made it possible to establish minimum conditions of confidence in order to overcome the major reservations in the area of security that more than three decades of armed confrontation have created. On the other hand, the territory in question is receiving considerable investments for social development, which include programmes in the field of agriculture, health, education, recreation and culture, drinking water and basic sanitation, electrification, environment and road infrastructure. Such programmes are being carried out in the five municipalities that form the demilitarized zone. Approximately 87 billion pesos have been invested in these programmes.
34. Even in crisis situations, the process has resulted in the conclusion of four agreements,namely:
(a) The La Machaca Accord, signed on 6 May 2000, established the thematic agenda, which includes: a negotiated political solution; human rights protection; a comprehensive agrarian policy; use and conservation of natural resources; economic and social structure; judicial reform; measures to combat corruption and drug trafficking; political reform; State reforms; agreements on international humanitarian law; military forces; international relations; and conclusion of agreements. This agenda was later divided into three major thematic groups: social and economic structure; human rights, international humanitarian law and international relations; and democracy and State political structure;
(b) The Los Pozos Accord, signed in February 2001, in which the parties pledged to promote discussions on mechanisms to put an end to paramilitary organizations and reduce the intensity of the conflict through the establishment, by the National Dialogue Table, of a commission of national notables to make recommendations in these two areas; speed up the conclusion of a humanitarian agreement that would lead to the release of sick soldiers, policemen and guerrillas; establish, through the National Dialogue Table, a commission to study the factors that hinder the advancement of the process; and create a mechanism for the periodic evaluation of compliance with, and the purpose of, the demilitarized zone;
(c) Humanitarian agreement, signed on 2 June 2001, which made it possible to release more than 100 soldiers and policemen held by FARC, and to hand over sick FARC members, subject to a provision on security measures or punishment;
(d) The San Francisco de la Sombra Accord, signed on 5 May 2001, for the purpose of studying the document containing recommendations submitted by the Commission of Notables, relating to such topics as the truce with ceasefire and cessation of hostilities, kidnapping, measures to end the phenomenon of paramilitary groups, and the possible convening of a constituent assembly, without prejudice to the common agenda, and inviting candidates and movements and political parties, the various social sectors, and the National Peace Council to refer to the aforementioned topics. In addition, FARC has pledged to respect the political and electoral activities that candidates standing for the next elections conduct in the zone, and to instruct members of the insurgent group not to carry out so-called pescas milagrosas (“miraculous fishing”, the kidnapping of civilians at roadblocks) on the country’s roads.
35. The Government, on the other hand, has stated emphatically to FARC that the criticism of the demilitarized zone does not imply the abandonment of the search for a negotiated solution to the conflict. On the contrary, such criticism represents evaluations and opinions that are expressed and respected in the normal development of a democratic system. The Government has vigorously stressed that the main reason for the demilitarized zone’s bad reputation is the inappropriate use that has been made of it, and that what contributes most to discrediting the process is the scant progress that has been achieved with respect to the thematic agenda.
36. The Government regrets the insurgent group’s failure to fulfil some of the commitments that have been signed, since this has caused serious setbacks in the advancement of the process in recent months, with such acts as the kidnapping of three German aid workers, the detaining of Mr. Alan Jara, the former governor of Caquetá, when he was under the protection of an international agency, the assassination of Ms. Consuelo Araújo, the former Minister of Culture, and the recent destruction of an oil pipeline, which resulted in the death of four children. Nevertheless, the President of the Republic has not wavered in his commitment and, under his leadership, efforts are continuing to move the negotiations forward, and all segments of society - civil, political and religious - have been invited to support him through their contributions and opinions.
37. With regard to the rapprochement with the insurgent group ELN, it should be noted that, a few months after the current administration took office, the administration, in recognition of the contacts that the group had been making with civil society, formally began talks and recognized the group’s status as a political organization. Since that time, the Government has been examining the proposals put forward by that group and has considered the possibility of holding the so-called national convention, a mechanism proposed by the parties and society to advance the peace process.
38. Nevertheless, for various reasons, the talks have been suspended from time to time. One cause for the suspension of talks has been acts of terrorism committed by the insurgent organization; these include the Machuca tragedy, the hijacking of an Avianca passenger aircraft, and the kidnapping of a large number of people from the church of La María and the church of La Ciénaga del Torno. The group itself has unilaterally suspended the talks on various occasions. On the other hand, the criminal acts committed by AUC in order to obstruct the creation of the meeting zone, have also hindered progress.
39. Because of the changes made in the original proposals of ELN, which began to demand a demilitarized zone for holding the negotiations, the Government, in its constant desire to promote peace, stated that it was willing to explore possibilities and seek viable formulas in that regard. The Government proposed a large number of options for defining a meeting zone and even reached agreements in that regard, which included regulations governing the operation of the zone and the mechanisms to verify compliance, through a commission with national and international participation.
40. In July of this year, when tangible progress had been made, ELN changed its position, backtracking on what had been discussed and imposing new conditions, which were unacceptable to the Government. In order to overcome the obstacles, the Government proposed formulas that had previously been discussed, such as holding the process abroad, the gradual establishment of the zone, the alteration of its size and the changing of its location, or beginning talks abroad while optimum conditions for the holding of talks in Colombian territory were created, but ELN rejected the proposals outright and left no other alternative than to suspend the talks.
41. Fortunately, in a gesture welcomed by Colombia and the international community, ELN decided to resume talks with the Government. As a result of the talks, the parties signed the Agreement for Colombia. Pursuant to that Agreement, in the Declaration signed in Havana, Cuba, at a meeting held from 12 to 15 December 2001, pursuant to the first round of bilateral working sessions provided for in the Agreement, they expressed their full readiness to continue to seek a political solution to the conflict. In this regard, ELN, as a positive gesture in response to the commitments obtained in the Agreement for Colombia, announced, on 17 December 2001, its decision to declare a “unilateral and unconditional” Christmas truce, from 18 December 2001 to 6 January 2002.
42. For its part, the Government of Colombia, in its resolution No. 148 of 2001, decided to resume the process of dialogue, negotiation and signing of agreements with ELN. In the same resolution, the Government recognized the political status of the National Liberation Army.
43. On the other hand, in the firm conviction that respect for human rights and international humanitarian law is essential for achieving peace, the Government is promoting the consolidation of the results of the policy for the promotion of respect for and safeguarding of human rights and the application of international humanitarian law, 1998-2002, through decisions carried out under the leadership of the Vice-President of the Republic and the coordination of the Presidential programme on human rights and international humanitarian law. The assignment of Vice-President as Minister of Defence and the appointment of the Director of the programme as a member of the negotiating team in the peace process with FARC confirm the Government’s interest in highlighting the theme of human rights and international humanitarian law in its security and peace agendas.
44. The recognition by national and international opinion of the participation of various illegal armed groups in the deterioration of the situation in Colombia coincides with the Government’s concentration of its human rights policy on finding ways of dealing with the conditions arising from the conflict.
A. Measures to combat all armed groups outside the law
45. Measures to combat, on an equal basis, all armed groups outside the law has been a priority in the implementation of this policy, since the Government recognizes that the deterioration of the situation in Colombia is related to violations of international humanitarian law committed by such groups.
46. The operational results obtained by the police and armed forces reflect a substantial improvement in measures to combat armed groups outside the law. Positive results have been registered in efforts to repress subversive groups, and there have been unprecedented achievements in activities to combat the self-defence groups.
47. As at 30 October 2001, 894 subversives had been killed and 1,524 captured, and 103 members of self-defence groups had been killed and 917 captured. These data, compared with the same period in 2000, yield the following results: arrests of guerrillas increased by 16 per cent while, in the case of the self-defence groups, arrests increased by 241 per cent; at the same time, casualties among subversives registered a 12 per cent increase and casualties among the self-defence groups increased by 30 per cent.
48. The results of the action taken by competent State judicial bodies to punish violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by members of illegal armed groups are also impressive. The prosecution of members of illegal armed groups for violations of human rights and international humanitarian law has become common practice as a result of the continuous assignment of the most important investigations to the Human Rights Unit of the Public Prosecutor’s Office and its intensive activities. Moreover, the satellite units of the Human Rights Unit, situated in Neiva, Cali, Villavicencio and Medellín are currently fully operational. At the end of this year, two additional units will begin operation in the city of Medellín and, in the first half of the coming year, the remaining units will be established in Cúcuta, Bucaramanga and Barranquilla, in that order.
49. By the end of August 2001, the Human Rights Unit of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, had issued 244 warrants for the arrest of, 142 measures for the custody of and 108 decisions to indict members of subversive groups. At the same time, there were 404 valid warrants for the arrest of, 520 measures for the custody of and 372 decisions to indict members of the self-defence groups. Arrest warrants increased by 44 per cent in the case of members of the self-defence groups and by 20 per cent in the case of members of subversive groups, as compared with December 2000.
50. Judicial efficiency has increased, as is evident from the measures that have been taken against members of subversive and self-defence groups since December 1999. Measures for the custody of members of subversive groups have increased by 61 per cent, decisions to indict members of such groups increased by 108 per cent, and warrants for their arrest rose by 152 per cent. Against members of self-defence groups, custody measures rose by 21 per cent, decisions to indict by 49 per cent and arrest warrants by 67 per cent. Nevertheless, it should be noted that illegal armed groups are increasing rapidly, and that this situation continues to exceed the capacity of the apparatus for the administration of justice, in spite of its notable improvements.
51. Measures to combat the self-defence groups have been the central focus of the Government’s implementation of its policy on human rights and international humanitarian law. The Government is fully aware of the seriousness of this phenomenon and of its effects on the fundamental rights of the population and the damage that it causes to the State itself. It is also aware of the obstacles that the existence of such groups poses to the peace process.
52. A technical support structure is currently being created for the National Centre for the Coordination of Measures to Combat the Self-Defence Groups. The purpose of the Centre is to coordinate the activities carried out by the military authorities, the police, members of the judiciary and civil servants against these gr