Fernando H. Giovanelli v. Argentina, Case 12.298, Report No. 30/01, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111 Doc. 20 rev. at 121 (2000).
REPORT
Nº 30/01 I. SUMMARY 1. On
June 5, 2000, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter
the Commission) received from the OAS office in Buenos
Aires a petition submitted by the Commission of Relatives of Defenseless
Victims of Social Violence (COFAVI, hereinafter the petitioner),
describing alleged human rights violations perpetrated by the
Argentine Republic (hereinafter the State) against
Fernando Horacio Giovanelli, now deceased (hereinafter the
alleged victim). 2. The
petitioner maintains that the alleged victim was detained on October
17, 1991, by officers of the Buenos Aires Provincial Police, and
transferred in an unmarked vehicle to the Third Police Station
in Quilmes, where he was brutally beaten; he was then
taken to a public thoroughfare and thrown onto the footpath
and murdered by one of the police officers who discharged a firearm
into his head. The petitioner further states that the police
investigation was deliberately oriented toward covering up the
truth of the killing and that the ensuing criminal trial, which
has been ongoing for nine years, is almost without activity
and is plagued with irregularities and has failed to identify
the perpetrators of the crime. 3. According
to the petitioner, the State has thereby violated, with respect
to the alleged victim, the following rights enshrined in the American
Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter the Convention):
to life (Article 4), to humane treatment (Article 5), to personal
liberty and security (Article 7), and to a fair trial and judicial
protection (Articles 8(1) and 25). 4. The
Commission concludes that the case meets the admissibility requirements
set in Articles 46 and 47 of the Convention. Regarding the prior
exhaustion of domestic remedies, as required by Article 46(1)(a)
of the Convention, the Commission believes that the exception
provided in Article 46(2)(c)unwarranted delay in rendering
a final judgment on those remediesapplies in this case.
Consequently, and without prejudging its merits, the Commission
declares this case to be admissible in all regards. II.
PROCESSING BY THE COMMISSION 5. The
petition was delivered to the OAS office in Buenos Aires on May
18, 2000; it was then forwarded to the Commission, where its arrival
was recorded on June 5. On June 20, the petitioner was told of
its arrival and, on June 28, the case was opened, with notice
served on the State and notification thereof sent to the petitioner. 6. The
States reply was received by the Commission on December
5, 2000; receipt of this was acknowledged and the petitioner notified
thereof on December 13. The State sent additional information
on January 19, 2001, which was forwarded to the petitioner on
February 20. III.
POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES A.
The petitioner 7. The
petitioner claims that at around 9:45 p.m. on October 17, 1991,
the alleged victim left his family residence in the district of
Quilmes, Buenos Aires province, with the intention of paying a
call on a sick uncle. While still only a few yards from his home,
he was confronted by officers of the Buenos Aires Provincial Police
inside a vehicle, who demanded that he show them his identification
documents. Since he had failed to bring his papers with him and
was thus unable to produce them, the alleged victim was arrested
and transferred, in an unmarked vehicle, to the Third Police Station
in Quilmes. 8. At
the police station the alleged victim was brutally beaten
and then: taken
to the August 14 Bridge (Quilmes district), a few meters from
the police station, [where] he was thrown onto the footpath and
murdered by one of the police officers who discharged a firearm
into his head (the bullet entering through the left earlobe).
Later his body was taken to the place known as Villa Los
Eucaliptos [
], which, while quite distant from the
police station in question, still comes under its jurisdiction.
Approximately two and a half hours after his death, his body was
dumped in front of that shanty town. 9. The
petitioner maintains that the version of events contained in the
police report, which was used as the basis for the criminal proceedings,
is plagued with inconsistencies. According to the police report,
the alleged victim was approached and assaulted by four residents
of the Los Eucaliptos shanty town, one of whom fired on him when
he put up resistance. According to the petitioner, however, it
is impossible that Fernando [the alleged victim] was in that area
at 1:00 a.m. because [
] his plan was to visit his uncle,
who lived far away from there, and under no circumstances could
he have taken that route to reach a destination that was some
40 blocks from his home. 10. The petitioner
states that the autopsy conducted on October 18, 1991, in the
police morgue of the La Plata cemetery describes a series of wounds
and bruises inflicted prior to death, indicating that the alleged
victim was tortured. 11. On December
17, 1993, the petitioner claims, a forensic report on the alleged
victims remains was drawn up by three physicians from the
La Plata Forensic Service; based on this report, it was concluded
that the alleged victims corpse was abandoned in a location
other than the murder scene. This is indicated by the absence
of copious deposits of blood in the samples taken at the place
where the body was found. In other words, claims the petitioner,
the clinical report confirms that Fernando Horacio Giovanelli
did not die in the place where his body was found [as maintained
in the police report]. The blood from his wounds remained in the
place where he was tortured, at the site where he was fired upon,
and in the vehicle in which he was transported. 12. The petitioner
holds that the version set forth in the police report is also
inconsistent regarding the time of day the incident occurred,
in that it does not agree with the times given in either the autopsy
or the subsequent forensic report. According to the police report,
the attack and killing took place at around 1:00 a.m. on October
18, 1991, while the two medical reports agree that death must
have taken place between 9:30 and 10:30 p.m. the night before. 13. The petitioner
criticizes the fact that the police investigation was guided
by an alleged anonymous telephone call [to the Third Police Station
in Quilmes] made by a transvestite, [and] a group of youths from
Villa Los Eucaliptos were presumed to be the perpetrators. 14. The petitioner
refers in detail to the testimony taken by the police from 14-year-old
Angel Leonardo D. Acevedo, an alleged witness: On
31/Oct/91, at Police Station III in Quilmes, before Station Chief
Héctor Omar Amado, a witness statement was rendered by [
]
Angel Leonardo David Acevedo, aged 14, who lives with his grandparents
in Villa Los Eucaliptos, who stated that on the night in question
(17/Oct/91) [
] at ten to one on 18/Oct/91 he
saw that, on the path opposite [across from where he was spending
the night], a young man came running [presumably the alleged victim],
that the transvestite Sandra spoke to the young man for five minutes
and then the young man walked on, and that later, Ramonchi
[José Ramón Prado, under the influence of drugs], who had a Versa
22-caliber firearm, confronted him and said, Be quiet or
Ill shoot, and, although the young man put up no resistance,
Ramonchi fired on him. [
]
On November 8, 1991, the minor Acevedo gave a new witness statement
[
], this time to Criminal Court No. 1 [
] claiming
that the statement taken from him at Police Station III [
]
was obtained through torture inflicted by the interrogating officers
and that he only learned of the incident under investigation on
29/Oct/91 from remarks made by others. He
also claims [in his new statement] that the police directed him
to say certain things and that physical blows were inflicted on
him. They told him that if he did not say he had seen the incident,
they would hold him guilty and send him to prison. On
the same day that Acevedo gave his statement (8/Nov/91), proceedings
No. 2446 were opened before Criminal Court No. 1 in Quilmes to
investigate the possible commission of a publicly prosecutable
crime. [
]
On December 30, 1992, the minor [Acevedo] elaborated on his statement
[
] saying that a few days after Fernando [Giovanelli] was
killed, he was detained by three police officers and taken in
a van to Police Station III in Quilmes, where they began to interrogate
him; the Station Chief asked the questions and they kept him in
detention overnight. To secure his statement they hit him, placed
a bag over his head (in other words, they tortured him), and tied
him to a chair. The
minors grandmother [
] also gave a statement on 8/Nov/91
[
] at the Court, about the actions of the transvestites
[who allegedly witnessed the killing]. She said that the brother
of one of them [
] (Peggy), also a transvestite, was killed
for giving a statement incriminating a police officer. As a result
of that killing, all the homosexuals who frequent that area are
terrified and refuse to give evidence against anyone, and certainly
not against the police. 15. The petitioner
also reports that on October 31, 1991, the police raided the home
of the person they had accused of the murder, José Ramón Prado,
and arrested him; they kept him incommunicado for the maximum
period of 72 hours but did not inform him of the reasons for his
detention; and they arrested Cristian L. Carabajal on charges
of being an accomplice to the murder. Almost a month later,
on 29/Nov/91, the judge was going to release Prado and Carabajal
because of insufficient evidence, but on June 26, 1994,
the presiding magistrate of Criminal and Correctional Court No.
1 in Quilmes ordered that they both be kept in preventive custody
because he had found them prima facie guilty of the
crime of homicide. On December 16, 1996, the presiding magistrate
of that same court reissued the detention order against José Ramón
Prado and ordered the provisional release of Cristian L. Carabajal.
Prado was later released on May 20, 1997, by the decision
of Circuit II [of the] Criminal and Correctional Appeals Chamber
of the Quilmes Judicial Department. 16. Based
on the police investigations, the petitioner reports, on October
18, 1991, criminal proceedings were begun against José Ramón Prado
and Cristian Leonardo Carabajal for the murder of Fernando Horacio
Giovanelli (case No. 2378). 17. The petitioner
maintains that: Almost
nine years after the first steps were taken, little has been done
to cast light on this incident; [the different judges who heard
the case] merely produced unconvincing evidence to clear up Mr.
Giovanellis death. Moreover, because of the scant evidence
that existed, they did not study those elements of the case that
appeared to be confusing, suspicious, or contradictory. After
so many years, it is clear that no attempt was made to carry out
a fair, swift, objective, and transparent judicial process, as
witnessed by the courts lack of eagerness to discover the
truth. At
present, no judicial activity is taking place with respect to
case No. 2378/1991, and it is plagued with irregularities. 18. The petitioner
concludes: [that]
police personnel attached to the Third Police Station in Quilmes,
Buenos Aires province, took part in the illegal arrest, torture,
and murder of Fernando Horacio Giovanelli on 17/Oct/91, and in
the subsequent cover-up, [and that] both the Buenos Aires Police
and the authorities of the Quilmes Judicial Department failed
to perform their duty of conducting an exhaustive investigation
into the victims death [and that] both the police and the
judicial authorities directed the investigation of the case in
such a way as to place the blame for it on individuals whose involvement
was not proven [and that] in spite of having been seen by seven
judges, practically no progress was made with the investigation
of this incident. 19. The petitioner
therefore argues that the State has violated, with respect to
the alleged victim, the following rights protected by the Convention:
to life (Article 4), to humane treatment (Article 5), to personal
liberty and security (Article 7), and to a fair trial and judicial
protection (Articles 8(1) and 25).
B.
The State
20.
The State claims that there are a number of contradictions
between the petition as placed before the Commission and the case
documents used at trial in Argentina, particularly as regards
the victims reasons for venturing out from his home and
the courts treatment of the irregularities committed
in the police investigation. 21.
The State suggests that the procedural delays suffered
by the proceedings in case No. 2378/1991 arose from the complexity
of the crime and from the fact that at first, under Law 3.589,
the investigation was conducted by the Buenos Aires Provincial
Police, some members of which had been named by the petitioner
as the perpetrators of the alleged torture and murder. 22. Under
a recent amendment to the procedural law, the State reports, the
judicial investigation of the case will continue under the terms
of Law 3.589 until January 1, 2002, after which time the provisions
of Laws 11.922 and 12.059 will apply.
23.
The State confirms that proceedings vis-à-vis the death
of the alleged victim continue in accordance with the hypothesis
of police involvement in the incident under investigation, with
related proceedings in which the officers involved in the investigation
are charged with publicly prosecutable crimes. The State
also points out that there is as yet no direct evidence to indicate
criminal liability on the part of the police officers.
24.
Given this lack of evidence, the State argues, there are
no grounds for holding it responsible for the torture and murder
of the alleged victim. Declaring this case admissible would
undermine that standard legal precept under which the individual
making an allegation is required to prove it.
25.
The State claims that: the
petitioners only became involved in the proceedings on page 320,
where they appear as individuals claiming to be injured parties.
This also shows that the petitioners have not made good use of
domestic jurisdiction, since, as is well known, an individual
appearing in criminal proceedings as an injured party does so
in order to provide the evidence necessary to support his claim,
irrespective of the formalities required by the public prosecutor.
26.
The State holds that: the
case at hand is clearly inadmissible [because domestic remedies
have not been exhausted]. Indeed, the investigation is still ongoing,
with three submissions made by the injured party in the entire
proceedings, and in which he asks for a single piece of evidence
[
]. Consequently, the petitioner cannot claim that domestic
jurisdiction is ineffective if he has failed to make proper use
of it.
27.
The State concludes that the Commission must declare this
case inadmissible because it fails to meet the requirement that
domestic remedies be exhausted and because it does not tend to
describe violations of the Convention, pursuant to the terms of
Articles 47(a) and 47(b) thereof. IV.
ANALYSIS A.
Competence Ratione Materiae, Ratione Personae,
Ratione Temporis, and
Ratione
Loci 28. The Commission
is competent to hear this case, in that it describes alleged violations
of rights protected by the Convention (ratione
materiae), attributable to the State in that they took place
within its territorial jurisdiction (ratione
loci), committed
against an individual (ratione
personae), at a time when it had come into force for the State
(ratione temporis).[1] B. Other Requirements for Admissibility
a.
Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies 29.
Article 46(1)(a) of the Convention contains the rule requiring
the prior exhaustion of domestic remedies, a provision that the
State has expressly invoked in requesting that the case be declared
inadmissible. 30.
However, Article 46(2)(c) of the Convention provides that
enforcement of this requirement may be waived when there has been
an unwarranted delay in rendering a final judgment under
the aforementioned remedies. The petitioner has expressly
invoked this exception, maintaining that the criminal trial in
question has made little progress despite having been opened more
than nine years ago. 31.
The prima facie
assessment of an unwarranted delay in judicial proceedings for
determining the admissibility of a case does not demand the level
of analysis required to determine whether that same delay constitutes
a violation of Articles 8(1) and 25(1). Those provisions are independent
of the terms of Article 46 of the Convention and a more exhaustive
analytical standard applies to them.[2] 32.
The Commission has repeatedly stated then when an admissibility
ruling involves one of the exceptions to the prior exhaustion
of domestic remedies rule contained in Article 46(2), that ruling
shall not be taken as implying any judgment on the merits of the
case. The Commission, like other international human rights protection
bodies, holds that the correct moment for ruling on the exceptions
to the prior exhaustion rule is governed by the individual circumstances
of each case. 33.
The Commission notes that more than nine years have passed
since judicial proceedings into the murder of the alleged victim
began, and that the trial has not yet been brought to a conclusion.
Under Argentine law, prosecution of this case must proceed on
an ex officio basis.
In its reply to the Commission, the State provides information
that supports the waiving of the requirement of prior exhaustion
of domestic remedies; in particular, the fact that the police
officers who conducted the murder investigation have been accused
of publicly prosecutable crimes related to their alleged attempt
to pervert the course of that investigation. Consequently, the
Commission believes that the exception set forth in Article 46(2)(c)
of the Convention should apply in this case, in light of the unwarranted
delay in rendering a final judgment under those remedies. b.
Timeliness of the Petition 34.
Since the remedies offered by domestic jurisdiction have
not been exhausted, the six-month period stipulated in Article
46(1)(b) does not apply. c.
Duplication of Proceedings and Litispendence 35.
There is no evidence to indicate that the case is substantially
the same as one previously studied by any another international
body or that it is pending in any other international settlement
proceeding. d.
Characterization of the Alleged Facts 36. The State
maintains that this case does not meet the terms of Article 47(b)
of the Convention, which requires that petitions state facts
that tend to establish a violation of the rights that it
guarantees. In the Commissions opinion, however, the incidents
described, if proven true, could constitute violations of the
following rights protected by the Convention: to life (Article
4), to humane treatment (Article 5), to personal liberty and security
(Article 7), and to a fair trial and judicial protection (Articles
8(1) and 25). Similarly, they could tend to establish a violation
of the obligation to respect the rights enshrined in the Convention
set forth in Article 1(1) thereof.
V.
CONCLUSIONS 37. The Commission
concludes that it is competent to deal with all the allegations
of this petition and that the case is admissible under Articles
46 and 47 of the Convention. Based
on the foregoing considerations of fact and law, and without prejudging
the merits of the case, THE
INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS DECIDES: 1. To
declare this case admissible as regards the alleged violation
of the following rights and obligations enshrined in the Convention:
to life (Article 4), to humane treatment (Article 5), to personal
liberty and security (Article 7), to a fair trial and judicial
protection (Articles 8(1) and 25), and the obligation of respecting
those rights (Article 1(1)). 2. To
give notice of this decision to the parties. 3. To
continue with its analysis of the merits of the complaint. 4. To
publish this decision and to include it in its Annual Report to
the General Assembly of the OAS. Done
and signed by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on the 22nd day of February,
2001. (Signed): Claudio Grossman, Chairman; Marta Altolaguirre,
Second Vice-Chairman; Commissioners Hélio Bicudo, Robert K. Goldman,
Peter Laurie, and Julio Prado Vallejo.
*
The First-Vice Chairman of the Commission, Juan Méndez did
not take part in the discussion and voting on this case, pursuant
to Article 19(2) of the Commission's Regulations. [1]
The Convention came into force for the Argentine Republic
on September 5, 1984, when the State deposited its instrument
of ratification. [2]
See: IACHR (2001), Report No. 02/01, Case 11.280, Juan Carlos
Bayarrí vs. Argentina. Pending
publication. |